Phantasia/imagination (φαντασία) in Aristotle is one of the parts (µόρια) or faculties/powers (δύναµεις) of the soul that cannot exist apart from sensation (α/σθησις) and thought (διάνοια). The function of phantasia and its connection with phantasmata (φαντάσµατα), the products of this faculty, plays a significant role in the psychological treatises of the Aristotelian Corpus. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of phantasia in Book III, Chapter 3 of De Anima, and to show that the Stageirite philosopher distinguishes three and not two kinds of phantasia, starting from the lowest, which is found in imperfect creatures, to the highest, which appears only in the human beings.

Introduction

Aristotle’s De Anima (Περὶ Ψυχῆς) is one of the major treatises. In this treatise the nature and the role of the soul (ψυχῆς) are analyzed and for this reason it is often characterized as Aristotle’s psychology. Most of the discussion is concerned with ‘mental’ functions, however there is also a certain amount of physiology and biology. As Michael Durrant stresses «the De Anima presents the first systematic attempt to deal with a whole range of topics and problems falling under the general heading of ‘Philosophical Psychology’»¹.

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¹ A previous draft of the present paper was presented at the Workshop in Philosophy entitled «What it is to be Alive: Vital and Cognitive Functions in Aristotle’s De Anima» (February 6-7, 2010), University of Kassel, Institute of Philosophy, Germany. I am very grateful to Professor Gottfried Heinemann and Dr Rainer Timme for inviting me to participate in this Workshop. I would also like to sincerely thank all the participants for their valuable and insightful comments. I really enjoyed the conversation with them. In addition, I would like to express my special thanks to Professor Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou for her critical suggestions to improve the content of my paper. Finally, this paper is based on a research that has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and Greek national funds through the Operational Program “Education and Lifelong Learning” of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) - Research Funding Program: THALIS –UOA (2007-2013).
In this paper I shall try to elaborate systematically the role of *phantasia* /imagination (φαντασία) and its relation to *phantasmata* (φαντάσματα), namely the products of the faculty/power of *phantasia*, in Aristotle’s *De Anima*. To be more precise, I shall examine the unified concept of *phantasia* in *De Anima* as follows:

I. I shall present briefly Aristotle’s concepts of the various parts (μόρια) or faculties/powers (δύναμεις) of the soul. Namely, I shall focus my attention on the Aristotelian psychic faculties/powers and the way they correlate with the living beings.

II. I shall outline and explore the notion of *phantasia*, which is described by the Stageirite philosopher as: (a) the faculty/power (δύναμις) by which a *phantasma* is presented to us («εἰ δὴ ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι ήμιν γίγνεσθαι»)², (b) the faculty/power which is not sensation (αἴσθησις), or opinion (δόξα), or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), or intellect (νοῦς), and (c) the type of motion (κίνησις), which is generated by actual perception («ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη»)³. Furthermore, I shall argue that we need to be very careful about how we interpret the word «φάντασμα» in the Aristotelian texts.

III. Finally, I shall try to demonstrate that when we study in depth the notion of *phantasia* (φαντασία), as it is described in Book III of *De Anima*, we can realize that Aristotle speaks about three and not two kinds or grades of *phantasia*.

I. Parts (Μόρια) or Faculties/Powers (Δυνάμεις) of the Soul

In Book II, Chapter 1 of *De Anima* Aristotle describes the soul as «ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ» («the first actuality of a natural organic

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³ Ibid., III, 3, 429 a 1-2.
The soul is organically connected with the body. The soul is the form (μορφή or εἶδος) of the body, while the body is the matter (όλη) of the soul (hylomorphism). According to Aristotle, the soul is inseparable from the body. The soul and body are not two separate entities but one composite substance.

In addition, the philosopher distinguishes different parts (μόρια) or faculties/powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul corresponding to different kinds of living beings. These parts perform, as we shall see later in the present paper, specific functions; however they form a unified whole.

Aristotle in Book III of De Anima refers to an infinite number of parts of the soul:

«ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεί μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. τρόπον γάρ τινα ἀπειρα φαίνεται».

But which are the parts (μόρια) or faculties/powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul according to Aristotle? The Stageirite philosopher defines the soul as «τοῦτο ῥ ἐστὶν τὸν καὶ αἰσθάνομεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως·» («that with which we primarily live, perceive and think») and as that which is associated with the following faculties/powers (δυνάμεις). In the next passages Aristotle distinguishes three faculties of the soul:

(a) De Generatione Animalium, Book II, Chapter 3, 736 b 8-14:

«Τὴν μὲν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰ κυήματα τὰ <ἀ>χώριστα δῆλον ὅτι δυνάμει μὲν ἔχοντα θετέον, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχοντα, πρὶν ἢ καθάπερ τὰ χωριζόμενα τῶν κυημάτων ἐλκεῖ τὴν τροφήν καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς ζωήν».

4 Ibid., II, 1, 412 b 5-6. This is the last of the three general definitions of the soul outlined by Aristotle in Book II, Chapter 1 of the treatise De Anima. The other two are the following: (i) Ibid., II, 1, 412 a 19-21: «τὴν ψυχὴν οὕσιαν εἶναι ὡς εἴδος σώματος φυσικῶς δυνάμει ἐξοντὸς», «the soul is substance in the sense of a natural body having life in potentiality» and (ii) Ibid., II, 1, 412 a 21-22: «ἡ δὲ οὕσια ἐντελέχεια τοιουτου ἀρχα σώματος ἐντελέχεια», «And substance is actuality. Therefore it is actuality of such as this body».

5 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 432 a 22-24: «in what sense we are to speak of parts of the soul and how many they are. For in a sense their number is innumerable».

6 Ibid., II, 2, 414 a 12-13.

7 The emphasis in the present paper is added.
ἔργον· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντ᾽ ἅπας ἄπαντα ζῆν τὰ τοιαῦτα φυτοῦ βίον. ἑπομένως δὲ
dήλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς λεκτέον ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ τῆς νοητικῆς»

(b) *De Anima*, Book II, Chapter 4, 415 a 14-18 and Book III, Chapter 9, 432 b 6-7:

«Αναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον
αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ
dὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ
θρεπτικὸν, πρότερον ἐτί λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι»

«εἰ δὲ τριὰ ἡ ψυχῆ».

(c) *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book I, Chapter 7, 1098 a 1-5:

«ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ
tις ἂν εἴη· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοϊ καὶ παντὶ ζωίῳ. λείπεται
dὴ πρακτικὴ τῆς τῶν λόγων ἑχοντως τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιτειθέος λόγῳ, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς
ἔχον καὶ διανουούμενον»

As it has been shown these faculties are: (a) the nutritive (θρεπτική), (b) the
sensitive (αἰσθητική), and (c) the rational (νοητική) faculty/power of the soul.

The nutritive faculty/power (θρεπτική δύναμη) of the soul, being the same as
the reproductive (γεννητική) («ἐπεί δ᾽ ἡ αὐτή δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτική καὶ

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8 Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, II, 3, 736 b 8-14: «As regards nutritive Soul, then, it is clear
that we must posit that semens and fetations which are not separated <from the parent> possess it
potentially, though not in actuality—i.e., not until they begin to draw the nourishment to themselves
and perform the function of nutritive Soul, as fetations which get separated <from the parent> do; for
to begin with it seems that all things of this sort live the life of a plant. And it is clear we should follow
a similar line also in our statements about sentient [or sensitive] Soul and rational Soul» trans. by A.
Peck.

9 Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, 4, 415 a 14-18: «The enquirer who approaches this subject must ascertain
what each of these faculties is before he proceeds to investigate the questions next in order and so
forth. But if we are asked to state what each of these is; that is to say, what the rational, sensitive and
nutritive faculties/powers respectively are, we must begin by stating what thinking is and what sense
perception is» see R. D. Hicks.

10 *Ibid.*, III, 9, 432 b 6-7: «and if the soul is tripartite».

11 Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, I, 7, 1098 a 1-5: «Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and
growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the
ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of
this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of
possessing one and exercising thought» trans. by W. D. Ross.
γεννητική»)\(^{12}\), exists in all living beings, including plants and animals. It is the first and most common faculty of the soul and is essential to all livings beings. Its works are reproduction and nutrition («ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἢς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χορήσαν»)\(^{13}\). It does it’s own work better when the animal is asleep than when it is awake\(^{14}\).

Next comes the sensitive faculty/power (αἰσθητική) of the soul, which exists in all animals. In plants there is no sensitive faculty/power apart from the nutritive. The sensitive part of the soul cannot exist without the nutritive, and it exists not in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), but only in potentiality (δυνάμει)\(^{15}\).

Finally, species like man have in addition the rational (νοητικὸν) or discursive (διανοητικὸν) faculty/power of the soul and the mind/intellect (νοῦς):

«ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτερόν ἢστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον»\(^{16}\).


\(^{13}\) Ibid., II, 4, 415 a 23-26.

\(^{14}\) See also Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, II, 2, 413 b 7-8: «θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει, «by the nutritive part we mean that part of the soul which is common even to plants». Ibid., II, 3, 414 a 32-33: «ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον», «plants have only the nutritive part». Ibid., III, 9, 432 a 28-29: «τὸ τε θρεπτικὸν, ὅ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πάσι τοῖς ζώοις», «the nutritive part, which belongs to plants and to all animals». Idem., \textit{Ethica Eudemia}, II, 1, 1219 b 22-23: «ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ θρεπτικὸν», «for the nutritive part functions more in sleep» etc.

\(^{15}\) See Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, II, 3, 414 a 32-414 b 1: «ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τούτῳ τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν», «plants have only the nutritive part, while other [living beings] have this and in addition the sensitive part». Ibid., II, 3, 415 a 1-3: «ἀνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἐστιν τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικὸν χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν εν τοῖς φυτοῖς», «the sensitive part does not exist without the nutritive; but in plants the nutritive part exists without the sensitive». Ibid., II, 5, 417 a 6-7: «δὴλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον», «it is clear that the sensitive part is in actuality not in potentiality». Idem., \textit{Ethica Eudemia}, II, 1, 1219 b 23-24: «τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελῆ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ», «the sensitive and appetitive parts are ineffective/incomplete in sleep» etc.

The ancient Aristotelian commentator, Philoponus, explains «διανοητικόν», namely the discursive faculty/power of the soul, as «δυνάμει νοῦς», namely as the «potential mind»:

«ἑτέροις καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ δυνάμει νοῦς, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώποις».

The «potential mind» is analogous to the «passive mind», «which becomes all things» («τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι»). Apart from the «potential mind» there is also the «ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐντελεχείᾳ νοῦς» (actuality mind), which is analogous to the «ποιητικός νοῦς» (active mind). So, according to the previous remarks we could say that in line 414 b 18 of De Anima the term «νοῦς» («mind») probably refers to the «active mind», which is the superior part of the soul. This part of the soul is strongly related to the discursive (διανοητικόν) part of the soul, and their difference is indiscernible (indistinguishable). Consequently, when Aristotle says that «others have also the discursive faculty/power and mind» («ἐτέροισι δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς») he probably means that: (a) the discursive faculty/power is this part of the soul where the passive mind acts, and (b) the mind is the active mind, which is the superior part of the soul.

17 Ibid., II, 3, 414 b 18.
18 Ioannes Philoponus, Aristotelis de Anima, 15, 255, 4-5.
19 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 5, 430 a 14-15. The «passive mind», which is called by Simplicius (Idem., Aristotelis De Anima, 11, 242, 17-18: «Ὁ τοιούτος ὁ ὡς ὄλη πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἐσχῆτο τὸ ἐσχῆτον ἀποδίδοται καὶ ὅπως ός ὄλη, ἔδηλωσεν, ὅτι τῷ πάντα γίγνεσθαι») and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Idem., Aristotelis De Anima, 81, 24-25: «ὑλικὸς νοῦς καλεῖται τε καὶ ἔστι (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δεκτικόν τινος ὄλη ἕκείνου)») as «ὑλικὸς νοῦς» («mind which is like matter»), is a mind which becomes all the intelligible objects («τὰ νοητά»). And since this mind is like matter, and matter as Aristotle says is identical to potentiality (Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 412 a 9: «ἐστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ὄλη δύναμις»), then this mind is a «potential mind» («δυνάμει νοῦς»). This mind is receptive of the forms of the objects. It is a kind of substratum that receives the forms («εἴδη») of the intelligible objects.
20 In a certain chapter of my dissertation [see Christina S. Papachristou, The Cognitive Process in the Aristotelian Philosophy: Αἴσθησις (Sense), Αἴσθημα (Sensation), Φαντασία (Phantasia), Φάντασμα (Phantasma), Μνήμη (Memory), Μνημόνευμα (Mnemonic Image), Νοῦς (Mind), Νόημα (Noêma), Ph.D. Thesis (in Greek) (Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2008), Part 4, Ch. 3, pp. 273-300] I consider and I try to rebut several arguments that commentators have advanced in favor of the thesis that in De Anima, III, 5 Aristotle is referring to two distinct minds, which correspond to the human (παθητικός νοῦς) and the active mind (ποιητικός νοῦς), which is analogous, as certain Aristotelian scholars believe, to the divine mind. Besides that, I argue that this
Aristotle in lines 413 b 11-13 determines the soul according to the following faculties/powers, the nutritive, sensitive, discursive and locomotive:

«νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχή καὶ τούτως ἔφυσα, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει» 21. As we can see in this passage, the philosopher adds another part or faculty of the soul, the locomotive (κίνησις ⇒ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον). This faculty is related to the local movement of animals and is also described as the «progressive motion» («πορευτικὴ κίνησις»):

«τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζώον ἐστιν;...ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζώον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον» 22.

In lines 414 a 31-32 Aristotle adds another faculty of the soul, the appetitive (ὀρεκτικόν):

«δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν 23, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν» 24.

And in lines 414 b 1-2 he says that:

division is related to the duality of a single mind, and I put forward the view that this distinction could find its parallel in the distinction between the physical brain (the physical and biological matter contained within the skull) and the energetic function of thought [Charalampos S. Ierodiakonou, Psychological Issues in the Writings of Aristotle (in Greek) (Thessaloniki: Mastorides, 2004), p. 243]. Cf. also Christina S. Papachristou, «The Puzzling Role of the Brain in Aristotle’s Theory of Sense Perception», herausgeber von Jochen Althoff, Sabine Föllinger, Georg Wöhre, Antike Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption, Band XVIII (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2008), pp. 18-19.

22 Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 8-14.
23 See Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 3-4, «πρὸς δὲ τούτως τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν, ὁ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἔτερον ἄν δόξειν εἶναι πάντων», «In addition to these there is the appetitive faculty, which would seem to be different from all both in concept and in potentiality». Ibid., III, 10, 433 a 21: «ἐν δὴ τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν», «Thus that which produces movement is one in kind, the appetitive faculty». Ibid., III, 10, 433 b 27-29: «ἄλως μὲν ὦν, ὡστερ εἰρηκώ, ἢ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζωὸν, ταύτῃ ἐκείνῳ κινητικὸν ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ ὄντει ἄνευ φαντασίας», «thus, in general, as we have already said, the animal is capable of movement itself so far as it is appetitive and it cannot be appetitive without imagination». Idem., Ethica Eudemia, II, 1, 1219 b 23-24: «τὸ δ’ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελὴ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ», «the sensitive and appetitive parts are ineffective/ incomplete in sleep» etc.
εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις."

The previous remark allows us to assert that the appetitive power (ὀρεκτικόν) is part of the sensitive power (αἰσθητικόν) or that the possession of the sensitive faculty involves the possession of the appetitive faculty. In other words, ὀρεκτικόν belongs to everything that has sensation.

Elsewhere, specifically in lines 432 b 3-6, Aristotle says:

«πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἑτέρον ἂν δόξειν εἶναι πάντων. καὶ ἀτοποὶ δὴ τὸ τούτο διασπᾶν ἐν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός.»

Therefore, the philosopher remarks here that the appetitive faculty is both rational (ἡ βούλησις, namely wish) and irrational (ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός, namely desire and spiritedness).

Aristotle in lines 432 a 28- 432 b 4 adds another part of the soul, the imaginative (φανταστικόν), which is distinct from the other parts (μόρια) or faculties (δυνάμεις), and it is difficult to say with which of the parts it is identical or not:

25 Ibid., II, 3, 414 b 1-2: «and if any class of living things has the sensitive [faculty/power] it must also have the appetitive; where under appetite we include desire, spiritedness and wish».

26 Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 3-6: «In addition to these there is the appetitive faculty, which would seem to be different from all both in concept and in potentiality. And it is absurd to separate this; For in the rational part of the soul corresponds wish and in the irrational part of the soul desire and spiritedness».

27 See Aristotle, De Insomniis et De Divinatione per Somnum, I, 458 b 29-31: «ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε δὴ ταύτων εἴθ᾽ ἑτέρον τὸ φανταστικόν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδὲν ἢτον οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ τοῦ ὀρῶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε». «But whether the imaginative faculty of the soul and the sensitive are the same or different, nevertheless the affection does not occur without our seeing or perceiving something», Ibid., I, 459 a 14-22: «εἴπει δὲ περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήται, καὶ ἑστὶ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τό δ᾽ εἶναι φανταστικός καὶ αἰσθητικός ἑτέρον, ἑστὶ δὲ φαντασμά ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ᾽ ἐνυπνίου φαντασμά οὐ φαίνεται εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὑπνῶν φαντασμά εὐνυπνίου λέγομεν, εἰδὸς ἀπλῶς εἰτε ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου δ᾽ ἢ φανταστικόν). «And since phantasia has been discussed in [the treatise] on the soul, and the imaginative faculty is the same as the sensitive, though their function is different for the imaginative and the sensitive; and phantasia is the movement produced by the active sense, and the dream appears to be a kind of phantasma (for a phantasma which appears in sleep, is what we call a dream, whether it occurs simply or in a particular way), it is obvious that dreaming is the work of the sensitive faculty, but belongs to this faculty qua imaginative» see D. Gallop.
«περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴρηται, τὸ τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πάσι τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἑτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων ταύτων ἢ ἑτερον, ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἰ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς. πρὸς δὲ τούτων τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἑτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων» 28.

Consequently, according to the previous analysis, the parts (μόρια) or faculties (δυνάμεις) of the soul—«with an order of succession within…living beings…going from the most widely shared to the less widely shared capacities» 29—can be summed up in the following table:

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<td><strong>2.</strong> Appetitive (desire, spiritedness, wish) [Ορεκτικόν (ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις)]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. (a)</strong> Rational (Νοητικόν) or Discursive (Διανοητικόν) 30 ⇒ Passive Mind (Παθητικὸς Νοῦς)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 9, 432 a 28-432 b 4: «those [parts] which we have just discussed, the nutritive, which belongs both to plants and to all animals, and the sensitive, which could not easily be classed either as irrational or rational. There is also the imaginative, which is different from all of them, while it is very difficult to say with which of them it is identical or not identical, if someone will set up separate parts of the soul. In addition to these there is the appetitive, which would seem to be different from all both in concept and in potentiality».


30 For a useful analysis of the meanings νοητικόν and διανοητικόν cf. Klaus Oehler, *Die Lehre vom Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der*
(b) Mind (Νοῦς) ⇒ the Active Mind (Ποιητικὸς Νοῦς) acts on the Passive Mind

Table 1

II. Phantasia (Φαντασία) and Phantasma (Φάντασμα) in De Anima III, 331

It is generally agreed that Aristotle analyses the function of phantasia (φαντασία)32 and its relation to phantasmata (φαντάσματα) in his psychological treatises.33 Phantasia (φαντασία)34 is the main subject of discussion in De Anima III, 335.


32 Even though the Greek word 'phantasia' is usually translated as 'imagination', I prefer to leave the word untranslated. I believe that the word 'imagination' does not convey Aristotle’s notion of 'phantasia' as honestly and as understandably as possible.

33 Aristotle’s psychological treatises are De Anima (Περὶ Ψυχῆς) and Parva Naturalia (Μικρὰ Φυσικά). The Parva Naturalia is a collection of short treatises: (1) De Sensu et Sensibilibus (Περὶ Αἰσθήσεως καὶ Αἰσθητῶν). (2) De Memoria et Reminiscentia (Περὶ Μνήμης καὶ Ἀναμνήσεως). (3) De Somno et Vigilia (Περὶ Ὕπνου καὶ Ἐγρηγόρσεως). (4) De Insomniis (Περὶ Ἐνυπνίων). (5) De Divinatione per Somnum (Περὶ τῆς Καθ᾽ Ύπνου Μαντικῆς). (6) De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae (Περὶ Μακροβιότητος καὶ Βραχυβιότητος). (7) De Juvventute et Senectute (Περὶ Νεότητος καὶ Γήρως). (8) De Vita et Morte (Περὶ Ζωῆς καὶ Θανάτου). (9) De Respiratione (Περὶ Ἀναπνοῆς). In addition the Stageirite philosopher investigates briefly several psychological phenomena in his political [e.g. Politica (Πολιτικά)], metaphysical [e.g. Metaphysica (Μετα φυσικά)], ethical [e.g. Ethica Nicomachea (Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια)], and biological [e.g. De Motu Animalium (Περὶ Ζῴων Κινήσεως)] treatises.

According to the contemporary view of ‘imagination’ – *phantasia* – we define ‘imagination’ as the capacity or power of the mind to create, to recombine or reproduce and to call up mental images of objects, events, faces or scenes, which are not present to the senses.

Aristotle’s concept of *phantasia* in comparison to the contemporary concept of ‘imagination’ has a wider meaning. David Ross, in his book entitled *Aristotle*, lists the main functions of *phantasia* as: (a) the formation of after-images; (b) memory (μνήμη); (c) recollection (ἀνάμνησις); (d) dreams (ἐνύπνια); (e) in relation to desire (ἐπιθυμία); (f) in relation to thought (τὸ νοητικόν).

According to Malcolm Schofield «it was Aristotle who gave the first extended analytical description of imagining as a distinct faculty of the soul» [imaginative part (τὸ φανταστικὸν μόριον)], which cannot be independent of the body:


35 Castoriadis argues that «Aristotle discovers the imagination philosophically – *phantasia* – but what he says about it thematically, when he treats it *ex professo* (fixing the imagination in its alleged place, between sensation, of which it would be a reproduction, and intellection, thereby governing for 25 centuries what everybody thinks about it) is of little consequence next to what he has truly to say about it, which he says elsewhere, and which he has no way of reconciling with what he thinks about *phusis*, the soul, thinking and being». See Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, translated by Kathleen Blarney [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998 (1975)], pp. 174-175.

36 Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 3, 428 a 1-2: «*phantasia* is the faculty/power by which a *phantasma* [mental representation] is presented to us».


Aristotle remarks that *phantasia* (φαντασία) is different from sensation (αἴσθησις), and thought (διάνοια)\(^{41}\). And that means that Aristotle’s conception of *phantasia* differs from that of Plato’s *Sophist*. In other words, *phantasia* for Aristotle is not «a mixture of sensation and judgement» («σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης»), as Plato believed\(^ {42}\). Also the Stageirite philosopher asserts that *phantasia* (φαντασία) is a kind of motion (κίνησις) in the soul that cannot exist apart from sensation (αἴσθησις) —it is caused by the activity of sensation\(^ {43}\) —and supposition (ὑπόληψις), and the term ‘ὑπόληψις’, as Philoponus notes, includes «knowledge, right thinking/practical wisdom and opinion» («ὑπόληψις κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ δόξης λέγεται»)\(^ {44}\). *Phantasia*, according to Aristotle, is an affection (πάθος) and «this affection is in our own power whenever we wish». So, it is up to us to imagine, but it is not up to us to believe, «for the belief that we hold must be either false or true»:

«μάλιστα δ᾽ έοικεν ἰδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τούτ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι»\(^ {40}\).

\(^{40}\) Aristotle, *De Anima*, I, 1, 403 a 8-10: «Thinking seems to be peculiar to the soul; But if thinking is a kind of phantasia, then it would not be possible even for thinking to be independent of the body».

\(^{41}\) Ibid., III, 3, 427 b 14-15.

\(^{42}\) See Plato, *Sophist*, 264 a 4-264 b 3: ‹[ΣΕ.] Τι δ᾽ ὅταν μὴ καθ᾽ αὐτό ἄλλα δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸς ὄροις ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρθῶν εἰπεῖν ἐτερὸν τι πληθρὸν φαντασίαν; [ΘΕΑΙ.] Οὐδὲν. [ΣΕ.] Οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπων, τούτων δ᾽ ἐφανεν διάνοια μὲν αὐτὴς πρὸς ἐαυτὴν ψυχής διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοούσῃ ἀποτελεύσιμης, «φαίνεται» δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὡς σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ὀρθῆς [τε] αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι».

\(^{43}\) Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 3, 428 b 11-13: «ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἄλλα ἀισθανομένως καὶ όν αἰσθήσεις ἔστιν». Ibid., III, 3, 429 a 1-2. *Phantasia* is a type of motion that arises by actual sensation. Sensation is activated by the presence of the external object.

\(^{44}\) Ioannes Philoponus, *Aristotelis de Anima*, 15, 492, 12.

\(^{45}\) The term «ὑπόληψις» has puzzled many Aristotelian scholars. For example Philoponus, as we have already noticed, says that «ὑπόληψις κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ δόξης λέγεται». Robert D. Hicks notices that «ὑπόληψις» and «διάνοια» are closely related, «for in 429 a 23
καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα ἐφ᾽ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες, δοξάζειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν.

In this passage it is important the phrase «πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι», which means our ability to voluntarily («ὅταν βουλώμεθα») set before our eyes mental images, as do those who use memorization techniques, which are based on sight and the powers of visualization. Therefore, phantasia in the above passage seems to be associated or even identified with visual imagery, that is, the ὑπολαμβάνει is obviously added to explain διανοεῖται [«(Λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή)»…The term ὑπολήψις is not a technical term, and is chosen here because it will include ἔποςτήμα, δόξα, and φρόνησις] [see Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes by Robert D. Hicks [New York: Arno Press, 1976 (1907?)], p. 457]. David W. Hamlyn asserts that the word ὑπολήψις is a difficult word to translate since it appears to express a very general notion which functions somewhat as the notion of judgement did in the writings of the Absolute Idealists…» [see Aristotle, De Anima, Books II and III (with certain passages from Book I), translated with introduction and notes by D. W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 130]. David W. Hamlyn and Ronald Polansky [see Ronald Polansky, op. cit., 2007], p. 411] translate the word ὑπολήψις as «supposition». For further discussion and definition of the term «ὑπολήψις» see Françoise Caupolle-Zaslawska, «L’ Emploi d’ Hupolèpsis dans le De Anima, III, 3», sous la direction de Gilbert Romeyer-Dherbey, etudes réunies par Cristina Viano, Corps et Âme: Sur le De Anima d’ Aristote (Paris: J. Vrin, 1996), pp. 349-365.

46 Aristotle in lines 427 b 17-18 of the treatise De Anima says that «this affection [namely phantasia] is in our power, whenever we wish». But Aristotle’s concept of phantasia is connected not only with mental images formed in the course of waking thought, but also with dream images (ἐνύπνια) formed while we are asleep. And while we are asleep, as Aristotle remarks, perception and judgement do not occur. Therefore, dream images, which are one of the works of phantasia, do not occur whenever we wish (see De Insomniis, I, 459 a 15-23 and III, 462 a 27-31).

47 Aristotle by the phrase «those who set things out in mnemonic systems» («οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι») he probably means those who used Mnemonics, the mnemonic art, which was invented by a Greek lyric poet, Simonides of Ceos (556-469 B.C.).

48 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 3 427 b 14-21: «Because phantasia is different from sensation and thought; this [namely phantasia] cannot exist apart from sensation and supposition. It is manifest that [phantasia] is not the same kind of thinking as supposal. For this affect is in our own power whenever we wish (for it is possible to represent an object before our eyes, as do those who set things out in mnemonic systems and form [mental] images of them), but believing/forming opinions is not in our own power; For it is necessary to be either false or true».

49 Vasileios Tatakis translates the passage «πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι» as «for it is possible to represent an object before the soul’s eye». He justifies the translation of «πρὸ ὀμμάτων» as «before the soul’s eye» by citing the passage «ὢ δ’ ἔξις τῷ ὀμματι τοῦτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς», namely, «and this eye of the soul acquires its formed state» (Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 13, 1144 a 29-30).
ability to form mental images, or to ‘see with the mind’s eye’. For example, if someone asks us to describe in detail a lion that is not physically present, we will probably find ourselves ‘looking at’ or ‘visualizing’ lions with ‘our mind’s eye’.

Moreover, I would like to note that we should be very careful about how we interpret the product of the faculty of phantasia, φάντασμα, in the Aristotelian texts. My suggestion is that the word «φάντασμα», which is mentioned twelve times in De Anima, may conveniently and aptly be translated as: (a) «representation» or «image» in contexts where «φάντασμα» is related only with the faculty of phantasia (e.g. «εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν φαντάσμα τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι») and (b) as «mental representation» or «mental image», when «φάντασμα» is described by the philosopher as the substratum upon which the mind works (e.g. «(διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἀνευ φαντάσματος ἢ ψυχή)»).

III. Indefinite/Indeterminate (Άδριστος), Sensitive (Αἰσθητική) and Calculative or Deliberative (Λογιστική or Βουλευτική) Phantasia (Φαντασία)

On the basis of Aristotle’s discussion concerning the role and function of phantasia in certain chapters and passages of the treatise De Anima, we could say that

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52 Ibid., III, 7, 431 a 16-17.
the philosopher distinguishes three kinds or grades of *phantasia* (φαντασία): (a) indefinite/indeterminate (ἀόριστος), (b) sensitive (αἰσθητική) and (c) calculative (λογιστική) or deliberative (βουλευτική) *phantasia*. Let us now examine each one of these kinds or grades of *phantasia* in more detail.

(a) Indefinite/Indeterminate *Phantasia* (Αόριστος Φαντασία)

«Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν, τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστίν, οἷς ἁφὴ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἰσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὔ,...φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὡσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔνεστι μὲν, ἀορίστως δ᾽ ἔνεστιν»

Certain Aristotelian commentators have interpreted the passage cited above as follows: Themistius explains that imperfect animals (τὰ ἀτελέστερα ζῶα), which are the lowest forms of animals, have *phantasia*, but in an inarticulate (ἀδιάρθωτον) and confused (συγκεχυμένην) way:

«φαντάζεται ἀορίστως, ὡστε ἐχει μὲν φαντασίαν, ἀδιάρθωτον δὲ καὶ συγκεχυμένην»

Philoponus says that zoophytes (animals that resemble plants) have an indefinite kind of *phantasia*, because the movements of these creatures are indeterminate:

«ἐν τοῖς ζωοφύτοις, φησίν, ἀορίστως ἐστίν ἡ φαντασία, ὡς δηλοί τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν. ἀορίστον δὲ καλεῖ τῶν ζωοφύτων τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως συστέλλεσθαι τε καὶ διαστέλλεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν μάλλον, ποτὲ δὲ ἦττον ἢ ἀορίστως λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμυδρῶς καὶ πεπλανημένως»

53 *Ibid.*, III, 11, 433 b 31-434 a 5: «We must also consider what it is that produces movement in the imperfect animals, which have no sense but touch, whether they have *phantasia* or not,… But how could they have *phantasia*? Or is it that as their movements are indefinite/indeterminate, they have *phantasia*…but indefinitely?» based on D. W. Hamlyn’s translation, but with some alterations.

54 Themistius, *Libros Aristotelis de Anima Paraphrasis*, 5, 3, 122, 11-12: «they imagine indeterminately, and so they have *phantasia*, but in an inarticulate and confused form».

55 Zoophytes or animal plants, such as corals, sea anemones and sponges, molluscs etc. are the lowest forms of animals.

Thomas Aquinas explains that imperfect animals (animalia imperfecta) possess an indeterminate *phantasia* (*phantasia indeterminata*). This *phantasia* is indeterminate because the motion of *phantasia* (motus *phantasiae*) does not remain in this kind of creatures after the sense object is gone:

«Videtur tamen hoc esse contrarium ei quod supra dixerat: quia si pars decisa habet sensum et appetitum, habet etiam phantasiam; si tamen phantasia est idem cum imaginatione, ut videtur. Dicendum est igitur, quod animalia imperfecta, ut in tertio dicitur, habent quidem phantasiam, sed indeterminatam, quia scilicet motus phantasiae non remanet in eis post apprehensionem sensus: in animalibus autem perfectis remanet motus phantasiae, etiam abeuntibus sensibilibus. Et secundum hoc, dicitur hic quod imaginatio non est eadem omnibus animalibus. Sed quaedam animalia sunt, quae hac sola vivunt, carentia scilicet intellectu, et directa in suis operationibus per imaginacionem, sicut nos dirigimur per intellectum»

From the above analysis we conclude that imperfect or indefinite creatures, which have no sense except that of touch, possess an indefinite/indeterminate kind of *phantasia*. Representations of touch (*phantasmata*) or tactile representations are the products of this kind of *phantasia*. In imperfect animals tactile representations are usually diffuse and indefinite, and do not remain in them, after the sense object is gone (see table 2).

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57 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Corpus Thomisticum. Sentencia Libri De Anima, Liber II*, textum Taurini 1959 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit <http://www.corpushomisticum.org/can2.html>: «Nevertheless, this seems to be contrary to what he said above; because if a part cut off has sense and appetite, it also has phantasy; provided that phantasy is the same as imagination, as it seems. It must be said, therefore, that imperfect animals, as is said in the third book, do really have phantasy, but it is one which is indeterminate because the motion of phantasy does not remain in them after the apprehension of the sense; however in perfect animals the motion of phantasy remains even after the sensible thing is gone. And according to this it is said here that imagination is not the same for all animals. But there are certain animals which live by this alone, lacking the intellect and being directed in their operations by imagination, just as we are directed by the intellect» trans. by R. A Kocourek.

58 Imperfect creatures cannot sense objects at a distance, but only the perceptions of touch. Polansky asserts that the word «ἀφή» in 434 a 1 may apply to both [touch and taste]» [see Ronald Polansky, *op. cit.*, p. 527].

59 I translate *phantasmata* that are generated by the sense of touch, as representations of touch or tactile representations. The same applies to the rest of the senses, e.g. representations of taste, sight, smell and hearing.

60 They lack the capacity for retaining sensory impressions (*phantasmata*).
Imperfect Animals
(zoophytes, molluscs etc.)

Only the Contact Sense = they can sense only objects in contact with them and in this way they can discriminate which objects are pleasant or unpleasant to them

Indefinite/Indeterminate Phantasia

Phantasmata (Representations of Touch or Tactile Representations) = diffuse and indefinite and do not remain in imperfect animals after the sense object is gone

Table 2

(b) Sensitive Phantasia (Αἰσθητικὴ Φαντασία)

Regarding the next kind or grade of phantasia, we should remark the following: Aristotle says that sensitive phantasia is generated by sense perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι). It does not occur without sense perception. Such kind of phantasia is found in all animals other than man (see Aristotle’s classification of animals, table 4), namely the irrational animals:

«ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζώα μετέχει»\(^{61}\).

«ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὡσπερ είσχημα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ύπάρχει»\(^{62}\).

At this point we can pose the question: If such kind of phantasia is shared by all animals, even the ‘imperfect’ ones, then, what will be the difference between the indefinite (ἄφοροςτος) and sensitive (αἰσθητικὴ) kind of phantasia? We shall return to this question later.

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\(^{61}\) Aristotle, *op. cit.*, III, 10, 433 b 29-30: «So in the later [sensitive phantasia] and other animals partake».

\(^{62}\) *Ibid.*, III, 11, 434 a 5-7: «Sensitive phantasia, then, as it has been said, exists also in the other animals». 
In order to fully understand what the Stageirite philosopher is saying about sensitive phantasia (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία)—and as we shall examine later about calculative or deliberative phantasia (λογιστικὴ ἢ βουλευτικὴ φαντασία)—, it is necessary first to explain some of his views related to desire (ἐπιθυμία) and animal movement (κίνησις). Aristotle identifies two kinds of desire (ἐπιθυμία). David Ross says that «desire, however, is of two kinds, wish [βούλησις] or rational desire, which desires the good, and appetite [ὄρεξις] or irrational desire, which desires the apparent good. Or, to put the antithesis otherwise, wish is for future good, appetite for present pleasure mistaken for absolute pleasure and absolute good»63:

«ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις...ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις τίς ἔστιν»64.

The Stageirite philosopher stresses that appetite is the cause of movement or the moving power in animals:

«(κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἢ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησις τίς ἔστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ᾗ ὀρέγεται ἢ δὲ κινεῖ ὄργανῳ ἢ ὄρεξις, ἣδη τοῦτο σωματικὸν ἔστιν»65.

Also, in another perhaps important remark Aristotle specifically notes that animals cannot be appetitive without phantasia («ὅρεκτικών δὲ οὐκ ἂνευ φαντασίας»)66. Appetite moves the animal but not without the mediation of phantasia. And this kind of phantasia is what the philosopher calls sensitive phantasia.

Very slight traces of sensitive phantasia are found in indefinite animals, since these creatures have the capacity to perceive objects that are in contact with them and in this way they can discriminate which objects are pleasant or unpleasant to them. But they cannot sense objects at a distance, and as Aquinas says «the motion of

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63 Sir David Ross, op. cit., p. 91.
64 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 10, 433 a 23-26: «For wish is appetite;...for desire is a form of appetite».
65 Ibid., III, 10, 433 b 17-19: «(for the animal which is set in motion is set in motion in so far as it desires, and desire is a kind of motion or actuality), and that which is set in motion is the animal; and the instrument by which desire moves it is something bodily».
66 Ibid., III, 10, 433 b 28-29.
phantasy does not remain in them after the apprehension of the sense»\textsuperscript{67}. However in animals other than indefinite creatures, in other words in animals that possess more than one sense (normal animals), and for this reason they can discriminate even the objects at a distance, the product of \textit{phantasia} or \textit{phantasma} remains in them even after the sense object is gone. Therefore, the difference between the indefinite and sensitive kind or grade of \textit{phantasia} is based on their capacity to perceive and retain a sense object (see table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Irrational Animals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[\Downarrow]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senses of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing = they can sense: (a) objects in contact with them, and (b) objects at a non contact-distance with them</td>
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<tr>
<td>[\Downarrow]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sensitive Phantasia</td>
</tr>
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<td>[\Downarrow]</td>
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<tr>
<td>\textit{Phantasmata} (Images/Representations of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing) = these animals have the ability to retain \textit{phantasmata} after the sense object is gone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 3}

Finally there is a passage in \textit{De Anima} that has puzzled many ancient commentators and contemporary scholars. Aristotle in Book III, Chapter 3, says that the ant, the bee and the scolex do not have \textit{phantasia}:

«ἐίτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἄει πάρεστι, φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πάσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ δ᾽ οὐ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι»\textsuperscript{68}.

David W. Hamlyn says that this passage «is puzzling since it is doubtful whether Aristotle would have denied imagination to ants and bees»\textsuperscript{69}. I agree with Hamlyn’s


\textsuperscript{68} Aristotle, \textit{op. cit.}, III, 3, 428 a 8-11: «And then sense is always present, but not \textit{phantasia}. But if [\textit{phantasia}] was the same in actuality [with sense], it would be possible for all beasts to have \textit{phantasia}; but it seems not to be the case; as the ant, the bee and the scolex».
remark and I argue that it is not possible for Aristotle to deny some kind of phantasia to the ants and the bees, since:70

(a) in Historia Animalium I, 1 488 a 7-10 he includes ants and bees among the political animals:

«Πολιτικὰ δ᾽ ἐστίν ἃν ἐν τί καὶ κοινόν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον· ὅπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ τὰ ἀγελαία. Ἐστι δὲ τοιούτων ἀνθρώπος, μέλιττα, σφῆξ, μύρμηξ, γεφανός»71.

(b) in De Partibus Animalium II, 2, 648 a 6-7 he says that bees are more intelligent than many other animals:

«διό καὶ μέλιτται καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα ζώα φρονιμώτερα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν ἐναίμων πολλῶν»72.

(c) in Metaphysica I, 1, 980 b 22-25 he notices that bees are prudent/intelligent and have memory:

«φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζώα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δὲ ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τούτο ταύτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστὶ, φρόνιμα μὲν ἀνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἂν εἴ τι τοιούτων ἀλλο γένος ἔστιν ἐστὶ), μανθάνει δὲ ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἐχει τὴν αἴσθησιν»73.


71 Aristotle, Historia Animalium I, 1, 488 a 7-10: «Political animals are those that have one and common activity for all; and that thing is not in effect for all the gregarious animals. Such political animals are the human being, the bee, the wax, the ant and the crane».

72 Idem., De Partibus Animalium, II, 2, 648 a 6-7: «wherefore bees and other such as these animals are of a more prudent/intelligent nature than many blooded animals».

73 Idem., Metaphysica I, 1, 980 a 27-980 b 25: «Now animals are by nature born with the power of sensation and from this some acquire the faculty of memory, whereas others do not. Accordingly the former are more intelligent and capable of learning than those, which cannot remember. Such as cannot hear sounds (as the bee, and any other similar type of creature) are intelligent, but cannot learn; those only are capable of learning which possess this sense in addition to the faculty of memory» trans. by H. Tredennick.
and (d) in De Memoria et Reminiscentia I, 450 a 12-17 Aristotle notes that memory involves phantasia:

«ἡ δὲ μνήμη, καὶ η τῶν νοητῶν, οὐκ ἁνεὶς φαντάσματος ἐστιν ὡστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρωτοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, διό και ἓτεροι τοιν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπως καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν δόξαν ή φρόνησιν»74.

Furthermore, as David Ross points out, Aristotle «says none of these things about grubs [scolexes]»75, except that: (a) «a scolex is that out of which in its entirety an animal is produce whole, by differentiation and growth of the foetus» («σκώληξ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐξ οὗ ὅλου ὅλον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, διαρθρουμένου καὶ αὐξανομένου τοῦ κυήματος»)76, (b) «just as the animal is perfect but the scolex and the egg are imperfect» («واجب ὀδ τὸ μὲν ζῷον τέλειον, ὁ σκώληξ καὶ τὸ δ᾽ ὄφον ἀτελές»)77 etc. So, according to the American entomologist William Forbes, the σκώληξ has to be «the first stage of the life-history of an insect or other creature which he [Aristotle] did not recognize as produced by birth or hatching from a real egg. Sometimes he actually had an egg in mind (when he refers to it as hard shelled but soft inside), while in other cases it is obviously the first-stage larva»78.

Accordingly, in view of all of these facts, I accept Torstrik’s emendation of the text «δοκεῖ δ᾽ οὐ, οἶνον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττη ἢ σκώληκι»79, as «δοκεῖ, οἶον μύρμηκι μὲν ἢ μελίττη ἢ σκώληκι δ᾽ οὐ» («it seems that it [phantasia] is found in the ant and

74 Idem., De Memoria et Reminiscentia I, 450 a 12-17: «and memory even of noëmata is not without a phantasma; therefore memory belongs to the rational part only per accidens, while per se to the primary part of the sensitive part. Therefore some other animals have memory, and not only human beings and those beings that have opinion or judgment».


76 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, I, 5, 489 b 9-11.

77 Idem., De Generatione Animalium, II, 1, 733 a 1-2.

78 See William T. M. Forbes, op. cit. p. 23.

the bee, but not in the scolex»). And, as Robert Hicks\textsuperscript{80}, Edwin Wallace\textsuperscript{81}, and David Ross\textsuperscript{82} point out, Torstrik’s emendation of the text is based on the reading of Themistius\textsuperscript{83} and Sophonias\textsuperscript{84}.

Therefore, from the previous analysis, we may conclude that the ants and the bees, which are intelligent creatures and have memory, should be included to the animals that possess the sensitive kind of \textit{phantasia} (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία). Whereas the scolex, which has to be «the first stage of the life-history of an insect or other creature», does not have \textit{phantasia}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Aristotle’s Classification of Animals} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Blooded Animals}\textsuperscript{85} & \textbf{Bloodless Animals}\textsuperscript{86} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{80} Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, with translation, introduction and notes by Robert D. Hicks [New York: Arno Press, 1976 (1907\textsuperscript{1})], p. 462.


\textsuperscript{83} Themistius, \textit{op. cit.}, 5, 3, 90, 5-8: «ἔπειτα αἴσθησις μὲν πάσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις, φαντασία δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δὲ οὔ, μύρμηκι μὲν ἴσως καὶ μελίττῃ καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον κυνὶ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ ὅσα μετέχει αἴσθησις, σκώληκα δὲ οὔ».

\textsuperscript{84} Sophonias, \textit{Aristotelis Libros De Anima Paraphrasis}, 55, 27-32: «μύρμηξι μὲν καὶ μελίτται καὶ τοῖς ὦμοιοι, ἑτε δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ταῦτα, καὶ ἀπλῶς οίς τισιν οὐκ ἀόριστος οὐδ’ ἀνεπίστροφος κίνησις, ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι φαντασίαν, πρὸς ἣν ποιεῖται τεταγμένη τὴν κίνησιν σκωλυκες δὲ καὶ μυῖαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀτάκτως καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁρῶν κινούμενα καὶ καὶ πλάσμα μὲν ἂν διεστὶς εἰς ἔκτης ἔτη καὶ κραώνεις ὁρῶν καὶ ἀμφόδιαν τίνα».  

\textsuperscript{85} Aristotle, \textit{Historia Animalium}, II, 15, 505 b 28-32: «Ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα (namely ἔναμα) ἀνθρώπος τε καὶ τὰ ἄνθρωποι τῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνθρωποστοί ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν τετραπόδων, ἐτε δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄνθρωποι τῶν τετραπόδων καὶ ὄρις καὶ ἐκτός καὶ κόμης, καὶ ἑπι οὐκ ἀναμνησμένοι ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι γένος ἀλλ’ ἄπλως τὸ εἰδος ἐτε τῶν καθ’ ἐκασται».

\textsuperscript{86} Idem., \textit{De Partibus Animalium}, IV, 5, 678 a 27-31: «Τὰ δὲ καλομένα μαλάκα καὶ μαλακοσκότακα πολλὴν ἔχει πρὸς ταύτα διαφοράν εὐθὺς γὰρ τὴν τῶν σπλάγχνων ἀπαθίαν οὐκ ἔχει φύσιν. ὁμοιοὶ δ’ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναίμων οὐδέν. ἐστι δὲ δύο γένη λοιπὰ τῶν ἀναίμων, τα το ὀστρακόδεμα καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος».
### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Vertebrates)</th>
<th>(Invertebrates)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Man</td>
<td>1. Hard-Shelled Animals (Clams, Oysters, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Viviparous Quadrupeds</td>
<td>2. Weak-Shelled Animals (Crabs etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cetacea (Wales, Dolphins, Seals)</td>
<td>3. Cephalopoda (Squids, Cuttle-Fishes etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Birds</td>
<td>4. Insects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Oviparous Quadrupeds and Footless Animals (Reptiles and Amphibians)</td>
<td>5. Zoophytes (Anemones, Holothuria, Sponges etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fishes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Calculative or Deliberative Phantasia (Λογιστικὴ or Βουλευτικὴ Φαντασία)

The third kind or grade of phantasia is that which is calculative (λογιστική) or deliberative (βουλευτική):

«φαντασία δὲ πάσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητικὴ».

«ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ [φαντασία] ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς».

It should be underlined here that the epithets/adjectives «λογιστική» (calculative) and «βουλευτική» (deliberative) are equivalent. The verbs «λογίζομαι» and «βουλεύομαι» are synonymous, since they both mean, «to determine, to consider».

But what kind of phantasia is that which is calculative or deliberative? Is there a phantasma involved? The Stageirite philosopher notices that:

«ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ἧστεροι εἴσηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἣδη ἔστιν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὡστε

87 Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 10, 433 b 29.

88 Ibid., III, 11, 434 a 7.

89 The Greek translator and commentator of the treatise *De Anima*, Andreas Papatheodorou, notices that pleasure, interest and duty are some of the standards or criteria of measurement that intelligent
The third kind or grade of phantasia is found in those animals, which possess reason, or, as Sir David Ross asserts, «the deliberative imagination, the rational imagination…is monopoly of reasoning beings, i.e. of men» 91. For whether a person will do this or that is the work of calculation, of reasoning. Of course, rational beings do not always act according to a plan (use of calculative or deliberative phantasia), but they can also act according to the awareness of the moment (use of sensitive phantasia).

What the philosopher meant by saying «καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην», was that other animals than man are thought not to have opinion (δόξα), because their desires have no deliberation. Only animals with intellect—and therefore language— have the phantasia that comes from inference. This kind of phantasia appears as an intermediate between sense perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι) and nous or mind (νοῦς). It involves having and combining several mental images (phantasmata) into one. This is the difference between human beings and animals. The elaboration, organization and unification of images (phantasmata) are typical characteristics of human beings (see table 5).

It should be noticed that the activity of calculative or deliberative phantasia involves the use of phantasmata with (a) propositional and (b) pictorial or quasi-pictorial content:

(a) propositional content

90 Ibid., III, 11, 434 a 5-12: «Sensitive phantasia, then, as it has been said, exists also in the other animals, but deliberative phantasia in those that are calculative; for the decision whether it will do this or that, is already a work of calculation; and there must be a single standard to measure by; for one pursues what is superior. Hence one has the ability to make one phantasma out of many phantasmata. And the reason why [these animals] are thought not to have opinion is that they do not have opinion which comes from inference, though this [opinion] involves that [phantasia]».

“ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἢδη ἔστιν ἔργον·”

(b) pictorial or quasi-pictorial content

«ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα»

The above examples (a) and (b) are excellent Aristotelian remarks with respect to contemporary ideas about mental images.

Rational Animals
↓
Senses of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing = they can sense: (a) in contact with them, and (b) objects at a non contact-distance with them
↓
Sensitive Phantasia
↓
Phantasmata (Images/Representations of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing) = these animals have the ability to retain and to combine phantasmata after the sense object is gone
↓

93 *Ibid.*, III, 7, 431 b 6-8: “and when by the phantasmata or the noemata in the soul it calculates, as if seeing them, and deliberates what is going to happen in the future in relation to the present”.
IV. Conclusion

On the basis of the analysis undertaken above it appears that Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia/imagination is a complicated subject. Phantasia is a faculty of the soul, the imaginative (φανταστικόν), that is placed between sensation (αἴσθησις) and thought (διάνοια). On the one hand it depends on sensation, is a kind of affection (πάθος), and on the other is a necessary condition for memory, motion, desire, dreaming, thinking etc. In other words it is connected with a wide variety of psychological phenomena.

Furthermore, it has been noted that phantasmata, are the products of the function of phantasia, resulting from sense perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι). Phantasmata are (mental) representations or (mental) images of sense objects. They have several functions, as for example remembering and thinking process.

Thereafter, I have tried to show that a detailed study of the notion of phantasia in De Anima, Book III, leads us to the conclusion that the Stageirite philosopher discriminates not two —as it is commonly argued— but three kinds or grades of phantasia: (a) Indefinite/indeterminate phantasia (ἀόριστος φαντασία) which is to be found in the imperfectly developed creatures — they have no sense except that of touch—, as for example zoophytes and molluscs, which have the power of formatting diffuse and indefinite phantasmata. (b) Sensitive phantasia (αἰσθητική φαντασία)
which is to be found in animals that possess more than one sense (normal animals) and have the power of forming more vivid *phantasmata*. (c) Calculative, or deliberative, *phantasia* (λογιστικὴ or βουλευτικὴ φαντασία) which is the highest development of the faculty of *phantasia*. It appears only in human beings, because they have the power of thinking and the ability to combine several mental images (*phantasmata*) into one.

Thomas J. T. Nigel notes that «the impact on latter thinkers of Aristotle’s account of cognition in general, and of imagery and imagination in particular, was enormous, and extended far beyond those who were avowed Aristotelians»\(^{95}\). Indeed, Aristotle’s treatment of *phantasia* in *De Anima* exerted an important influence on Hellenistic philosophy\(^{96}\) and Western thought (Medieval and Modern)\(^{97}\).

Beyond this, if we shed further light on Aristotle’s theory of *phantasia* and *phantasmata*, we shall find deep conceptual relationship with the current debate over the issue of mental images or mental imagery. But this is another issue that needs further investigation\(^{98}\).

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\(^{96}\) Cf. the Stoics’ theory of *phantasia*.

\(^{97}\) E.g. St. Thomas Aquinas’s account on imagination (imaginatio), Rene Descartes’ views on the function of the faculty of imagination etc.

\(^{98}\) Cf. Christina S. Papachristou, «The Mental Images (*Phantasmata*) in Aristotle’s *De Anima* and in S. Kosslyn’s Contemporary Work» (in Greek), in Demetra Sfendon-Mentzou (ed.), *The Aristotelian Philosophy and the Contemporary Scientific Thought* (Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2006), pp.112-134.
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