The genetic structure of community entifications

A estrutura genética das entificações comunitárias

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ABSTRACT
Thinkers of Heideggerian tradition such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito, through concepts such as being-in-common and communitas, suggest a fundamental ontology of community (Mitsein). This ontology, however, has generated a difficulty of interpretation and operation due to the hegemonic subjectivist paradigm that anticipates the reading of these concepts. This article aims to redescribe this ontology from a referential shift: from the Heideggerian metaphysical universe to the field of “absolute immanence” (Deleuze). This shift allows structuralizing and conferring operational communication to that ontology, as well as observing new political phenomena, such as those made possible by today’s technical communication devices.

Keywords: Mitsein, desubstancialization, 2013 demonstrations

RESUMO
Pensadores de tradição heideggeriana como Jean-Luc Nancy e Roberto Esposito, através de conceitos como ser-em-comum e communitas, sugerem uma ontologia fundamental da comunidade (Mitsein). Essa ontologia, entretanto, tem gerado dificuldade interpretativa e operacional em virtude do paradigma subjetivista que se antepõe à sua leitura. O objetivo deste texto é redescrever tal ontologia a partir de um deslocamento: da metafisica heideggeriana ao campo da “imanência absoluta” (Deleuze). Esse deslocamento, além de permitir estruturalizar e conferir operacionalidade comunicacional à referida ontologia, possibilita a observação de novos fenômenos políticos, a exemplo daqueles viabilizados pelos atuais dispositivos técnicos de comunicação.

Palavras-chave: Mitsein, dessubstancialização, protestos 2013

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What was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May was the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands (democracy, freedom are notions too generic and broadly defined to constitute the real object of a conflict, and the only concrete demand, the rehabilitation of Hu Yao-Bang, was immediately granted). This makes the violence of the State's reaction seem even more inexplicable. It is likely, however, that the disproportion is only apparent and that the Chinese leaders acted, from their point of view, with greater lucidity than the Western observers who were exclusively concerned with advancing increasingly less plausible arguments about the opposition between democracy and communism.

Agamben (1993: 66)

The Brazilian June 2013 demonstrations exposed a sample of the current conceptual apparatus insufficiency to analyze the new political phenomena. Made from a dogmatic and moral principle, such concepts have shown not only comprehensive difficulty, but the demonstrations meaning misuse (marked by ephemerality and differentiation), converting its potentiality into conservatism.

This misrepresentation basis and analytical poverty can be assigned to its own ontological constitution: Since these concepts are turned to fixate an identification representations, they tend towards reducing the new phenomena to a substance or to a previously set essence; they serve on verifying contents even so when its degradation is needed for its purpose (adjustment or suppression of its singular character, not subjective); however, they criminalize the exceeding phenomena or attempt against the institutionalized domains of representation, such as the concepts of non-partisanship, anti-partisanship or anonymity in some demonstrations.

In the following text, we intend to give another meaning to these demonstrations by a cognitive enhancing in the community ontological structure.

The community notion highlighting is due to the two human association types presupposed in it (a bond with the same and with the different), whose practice points to two corresponding political modalities: perishing (closure around a substance; ritualization and monitoring of identity borders) and the care of the self (releasement of the substantial forms of representation; opening to the indeterminate, to desubstantialization). This second modality, in which difference, multiplicity or heterogeneity present themselves, is where critics (therefore, the effective politics\textsuperscript{1}) appear completely.

The desire to eliminate this fulfilment constitutes the parish formations, broadly, totalitarian.

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1. This distinction is due to Jacques Rancière, who separates the “political community” from the “political”. Against the “political community which tends to overdrive the bodies and meanings relations, of the parts of the places and the destinations” (In Dias; Neves, 2010: 428), the author claims a “political community that reopens the gaps separating the names of the subjects and their manifestation modes from the social bodies and their properties” (Idem.)
UNCONCEALMENT OF THE COMMUNITY FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

In order to make possible the political reading of these demonstrations, it is necessary to return to the fundamental point, i.e., to the community un-concealment original ontology. An important step, in this direction, was taken by Jean-Luc Nancy and Roberto Esposito on their interpretations of the community notion in Heidegger\(^2\), referred, respectively, as being-in-common and communitas.

Being-in-common is, for Nancy, the term that presents the urgency of the opening to the other in the Heideggerian existential analytics – this other assumption in charge (cum or mit) concealed in Dasein. In the limit, the expression would point out to the priority of ethics over ontology as a first philosophy.

The being-in-common is defined and formed for a charge and, ultimately, is not in charge of anything other than the same cum. We are in charge of our cum, that is, us [...] Cum is something that exposes us, puts us facing each other, delivers us to each other, risks us against each other, and, together, leaves us to the experience that is nothing else but to be with [...] (Nancy in Esposito, 2007: 16).

Communitas, on its turn, is the Latin correspondent for community. Its deconstruction in two important radicals (cum = the unavoidable presence of the other; and munus – duty, debt, and obligation) shows, according to Esposito, its archaic meaning: sharing a debt, unconditional opening to the other (whoever), desubjectification.

[...] the munus that the communitas shares is not a property or a possession. It is not having, but on the contrary, it is a debt, a pledge, a gift that is to be given. An ‘obligation’ unites the subjects of the community – in the sense that ‘I owe you something’, but not ‘you owe me something’ – that makes them not entirely owner of themselves. More precisely, expropriates them partly or entirely, their initial authenticity, their most own property, this is, their subjectivities (Esposito, 2007: 30-31).

As we can see, the formulations on community by Nancy and Esposito not only enhance its conventional meaning, but develop an important topic of the Heideggerian thought as well. However, such development occurs in this philosophy boundaries: in both texts, by Nancy and by Esposito, the remarkable presence of the German philosopher can be verified in concepts such as ontological difference, the factual world determinations (the conforming...
function of the meanings, of the structural mobilizers, of the in-virtue-of), as well as its releasement by the original call.

In reference to the distinction between being and entities, especially in Esposito, the fundamental separation between the community being (Mitsein) and its modes of being appears, in other words, its substancialist entifications (or essencialists), as a Gemeinschaft, the new communityism and the communication ethics, in addition to the desubstancialist way of the being-in-common and the communitas.

Differently from Esposito – who reaches the ontological community by the distinction above –, Nancy will access it by claiming that original common trace of the being (mit or cum) which is abandoned for its lonely emergency avail.

Community is not a being or existence predicate. Nothing of the concept of existence is changed by adding or extracting the community perspective. But the community is simply the real position of existence […] It must imply that the being-in-common, or the coexisting, does not add on a secondary extrinsic way to the being-one-self, and to the be-alone. It must be comprehended as what Heidegger named Mitsein, and even Mitdasein, although without the due radicalism. Actually, one has to comprehend that the “mit” does not qualify the “sein” (as if the being would subsist already for itself in any way, as if the being was it-self, which means, as if the being was or absolutely existed), and that the “mit” does not even qualify the “Dasein”, but it constitutes it essentially. In baroque German, it would be said that it is dealt of the “sein-damit” or of the “with” as an authentic modality, exclusive and original of the being-there or Dasein (Nancy, 2000: 97-98).

Walking very similar paths, Nancy and Esposito find themselves in the same intonation point: both call into question the hegemonic ontological assumption of western philosophy which considers primal (and autonomous) the highest being, eliminating the bond with its provenience ground. By its suddenly emerging, absolving it from that original debt (munus), substracts it from its constitutional dimension.

What dimension is that? Mitsein. Or, for us, Community.

The word adopted here, Community, retakes its very first meaning: external and always present authority (virtual), which from the entities demands the recognition of its original obligation (munus); duty, openness, or deliverezance to those requests from this common ground.

In fact, since the most immemorial times, community has always set the instance that introduces the entities in the world enabling their existence through integrated social life, defining their existential situation on the rec-
iprocity chain and in the munus circulation. Hence its lender, expropriating traits that open and dissolve the entities in the collective integration (multiplicity, heterogeneity). It is this meaning which was intended to give to Mitein with the community qualifying: provenience ground of every entity, whether it is the Platonic-Aristotelic being, the Cartesian subject, transcendental or Heideggerian; absolute exteriority, potentiality-for-being which precedes each individuation and ground source of every ontology.

Thus, to think the community in its fundamental ontology, more than characterizing it as consummate entities – be it related to themselves, be collective – implies upholding it in its original debtor or inauthentic (Mitdasein), which, in this case, does not mean alienate, surrender to the cares of the world, but be openness (be open) to the Community silent calls, recognizing itself always as indetermination, incompleteness, absence, closeness impossibility, or self-sufficiency. This is what is revealed not only by the semantic structure of Mitdasein (where mit points out the secret bond with its own indeterminate), but also its correspondents communitas and being-in-common, whose bond with the constituent impropriety (Community) appears through the particles cum and common.

The decision between accepting these calls or promoting a new abandonment (which would not solve the question of debt which is permanent and virtual) involves the possibility of life expansion (existence) beyond the limits of ontology. This decision appears every day in the most various community experiences, in the way intra-world entities deal with the significance and the impersonality of a sense field which comes to its encounter with meanings previously made and operational. For instance, conforming fields of Gemeinschaft, of the new communityism and communication ethics, where the entities find themselves from the beginning and most of the times. Importantly, these fields – as pacifying, defensive (in-munizing), turned to the establishment of the “ontological security” (Giddens, 1991) – place the entities in a way that absolves them of the responsibility of the care of the self, making impossible the experimentation of the self (enlargement of life) beyond the common substance.

On the other hand, one can also be choose the desubstantializing (being-in-common and communitas), a community mode of being that conducts the entities to the original indetermination, in which the subject emptying puts the subject in contact with its authentic (potentiality-for-being), opening the crisis that puts it to test, demanding its own reinvention (care of the self)³. Being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode), as implied on the desubstantializing, produces the openness of the entities (un-in-munization) and the disengage-

³. The Heideggerian notion of care (Sorge) is here understood as mode of maintenance of the entities openness to the ontological difference, which would avoid a substantial totalization. This feature resembles the Foucauldian care of the self (epiméleia heautoû), in the sense of a fight against the subjectivity identity absolutism, as well as in the production of the self as a work of art (aesthetic of existence) – constant identity re-elaboration as a way of resisting the biopolitical apparatus of sedentarization.
The genetic structure of community entifications

ment with the conforming structures in the sense of the factual world. Then, the entities, are suspended, obliged to project an existenciary field where it will be indefinitely thrown.

The disengagement with the tutoring and subjectifying community facticity modes stops the social automatisms and gives way to the possibility of several forms of existence, offering itself as a way out of the community essentialism which includes singularities resulted from the most various human encounters. Desubstancialization, although assuming as a task the care of the entities, as well as the Heideggerian worldhood, does not confound with that, once it leads it to the absent or debtor condition (repealing its security, fullness and absolutism), reminding the entities to its bound (cum) with the provenience ground and, by that, to its destiny uncertainty. The guardianship that the being-in-common and the communitas suggest is, therefore, the care of the self – and also of the other (aiming at its releasement) – while responsibility towards the expansion of life; commitment of the entities with the Community (virtual and sovereign) by the awareness of its original debt and inauthenticity.

The care determines the community as much as this to that. You cannot have one without the other: “caring-in-common”. The “task” of the community is not that of freeing us from care but of looking after care as that alone makes community possible. This placement explains Heidegger’s distinction between two different modes – and opposite – of “taking care” of the other with whom we share existence: on the one hand, supplant him, take his place, absolving him of care; on the other hand, that of soliciting the care of the other, of freeing him not from but for care: “This concern which essentially pertains to authentic care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it takes care of, helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it”. But how is this possible? What does it mean to “help” others? According to Heidegger, the only noninvasive or substitute mode of helping others is to decide to “let the other be” in its alterity from itself, i.e., in its authentic inauthenticity or most proper impropriety (Esposito, 2007: 162-163).

This fundamental community ontology, accessed through the communitas and the being-in-common, more than enhancing a meaning to the conventional notion, effectively allows a properly community ontology for the community. An ontology that starts no more from the individual, the subject or any other subjectivist image (cogito, conscience, ego, etc.) but dawns by the cost of the Mitsein elimination. However, on the contrary, that makes it present on its ontical reality (virtual), as much as in its absolute origin: Community as measure of itself and for itself.

4. Esposito (2007: 161-162) says about a “purpose of community” as “taking the ‘conscience of our ‘inauthenticity’”, in other words, “the ‘authentic’ stance doesn’t reside in the impossible unmaking of the ‘inauthentic’, but in assuming it as such. And, therefore, in taking care of it” (Id.).
What does succeed from this paradigmatic change? What does it mean to think community according to a community ontology (and no more subjectivist, personalist or immune one)?

THE STRUCTURE OF COMMUNITY ENTIFICATIONS

Well, the difficulty of comprehending the community conception of Nancy and Esposito comes precisely from this subjectivist paradigm that is put in front and interprets community always from the subject or the individual: community as a collective will, a set of equal individuals or a great (unified) subjectivity. For this paradigm, expressions such as being-with, being-together, being-with-one-another, nothing-in-common, reiterated by Nancy and Esposito, when are not objectified into a unity or representation (a territory, an ideology or culture), fall into the bottomless dimension of emptiness, of the undifferentiated abyss, arousing, frequently, ambiguity and application ineffectiveness. This confusion may be related to its own inscription of Mitsein in the hermeneutic projects (of facticity) and existential-analytic of Being and Time, which reiterate the hegemony of the referred paradigm, once performed by the synthetic figure of Dasein.

To escape from this situation, we consider a shift to the transcendental question as it is proposed by Gilles Deleuze. Transcendental, according to him, refers to the determinations instances that rest upon the entities, standing out by its impersonal, neutral, and pre-individual character, but, fundamentally, by the lines of force that constitute it, precluding the permanency of any self-determining substantial unity.

The transcendental refinement Deleuze does, excluding every form of immediate consciousness (intentionalities or pure retentions), ends up leading it to a ground strange to phenomenology, because it is before both the subject and the very phenomenological transcendental as well. From this ground – also known as absolute immanence, pure plane of immanence or, simply, a life... –, Deleuze not only extracts his composition (multiplicity) as suggested in his study or experiment (superior empiricism).

But what can this ground reveal to us so we can think community according to a community paradigm? Or yet: why do resort Deleuze so we can elucidate Community, since he did not even consider it as particular object of thought?

At first, it suits to make explicit what means to think community from a community paradigm. We have seen it: it means to restitute our original debt (munus) with the pre-ontological (Mitsein), considering the general
entities – be individuals or collective (for instance, a community) –, as presentation or derivation from this domain. So we do not return to the ontological unique figure, nor fall in the abyss which supposedly surrounds it (subjectivist paradigm assumptions), that is why we resort to the Deleuzian transcendental. This would function as a subjectless model field or a constituting consciousness – otherwise, a desubjectification instance –, where the referred subjectivist images are substituted by the singularities and original multiplicities dynamics, resonating the genetic potentiality of transcendental (which, maybe, Kant did not realize), its creative intensity.

Multiplicities are the reality itself, and they do not assume any kind of unity, do not join any kind of totality neither address to a subject. Subjectifications, totalizations, unifications are, on the contrary, processes that produce themselves and emerge on the multiplicities. The characteristic principles of multiplicities concern to their elements, which are singularities; to their relations, which are becomings; to their happenings which are haecceities (that is, individuations without subject); to their space-times, which are free spaces and times; to their fulfillment models, which are the rhizome (from a tree model opposition); to their composition level, which constitutes plateaus (continuous intensity zones); to the arrays that cross them, and that constitute territories and degrees of deterritorialization (Deleuze; Guattari, 2009a: 8).

The idea of multiplicity, in this case, retakes important ontology questions, such as the untimely, the pre-individual and the difference (took in itself), presented in authors such as Nietzsche (“will to power ↔ eternal recurrence” apparatus), Gilbert Simondon (individuation phase-shift) and Henri Bergson (duration and differentiation).

As for the second question, although the community topic is not in Deleuze’s interests, his critical and descriptive analysis of the transcendental field serves as a bridge to the compositional behavior of Mitsein, based on which a similar behavior can be claimed. This will be fundamental for the structuration of this common original ground and, therefore, an operationally community paradigm.

The Deleuzian expression “double structure of happening” is now extremely important, since it gives the elementary components of this field (singularity, series, becoming, haecceity), as well as the way they place themselves. It is necessary, however, to define well those concepts, starting with the word structure.

In Deleuze, it assumes a very particular meaning. It is a serialized distribution of “singularities”8, where subjectifications, totalizations and unifications

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8. Singularity is “the starting point of a series which is enlarged through every ordinary points of the system until the neighborhood of another singularity”, it can start another series, which time to time converge and diverge from the first (Deleuze, 1988: 438). The singularities relation happens in every field assuring a meta-stable balance, and, therefore, a pure difference field.
coexist with haecceities, becoming blocks, plateaus, and escape lines. In the language record, such structure appears as reunion of singularity points forming a serial duality (signifier/signified) traveled and given dynamism by the meaning (paradoxal element); already in the ontological dominion, as multiplicity in constant movement (metrical matter, inextensive, molarity and molecularity, being and becoming). 9.

In this structural conception, as we can see, the subjectivist determinations give place to the differential relation principle as fundament of an ontological genesis. These relations allow the individuation of an individual or collective entities (identities and subjectivities), the common substance emerge (an ideology or moral), as well as the bond itself of these entities to significational field. It is said, in this case, of a haecceity, individuation resulting from a relation between singularities.

The fact that being individuated is taken as original structure – ignoring the “teeming world of anonymous and nomads, impersonals, pre-individuals” (Deleuze, 2007: 106) – has legitimated the constant epistemological surveillances and the practices of exclusion of differences, such as certain totalitarian politics that try to silent the critics and smother the natural processes of internal differentiation, the identity splits.

The idea of a double happening on the structure, brought by Deleuze, repairs the origins not of the individuated being (totalitarism germ), but of the transcendental field singularities. It is the Mitsein voice resurging to the individuated entities as a reminder of our potentiality-for-being. Indeed, while entities conformed to an individuation (to only one mode of being) we exclude this double of the happening (the ideal, pure, ineffective) that indeterminate us.

In every happening there is really the present moment of the effectuation, that one in which the happening embodies in state of things, an individual, a person, that which we assign by saying: there it is, the moment has arrived; and the future and the past of the happening cannot be judged except by this definitive present, from the point of view of whom embodies it. But there is, on the other side, the future and the past of the happening taken in itself, that dodges every present, because it is free from the boundaries of a state of things, being impersonal and pre-individual neutral nor general nor particular, eventum tantum...; even better, that there is no other present besides that one of the mobile instant which represents it, always unfolding into past-future, forming what it is needed to be called to the counter-effectuation (Deleuze, 2007: 154).
Since the structure is noticed in its double form (not only *Sein*, but *Mit-sein*), it obliges every substantiation, every effectuation of an individuated substance in an individuated body, be it as well another (whoever) to be counter-effectuated, i.e., taken beyond the embodied limits. To counter-effectuate, according to Deleuze, is to not to be limited to the happening; it is to create escaping lines (*cum* or *mit*), to discover a new surface. Attitudes such as interpreting, re-presenting and feeling again the happening suppress the counter-effectuation, once they make us return to the same or to deepen in the occurred.

If we are used to considering only one part of the happening (the effectuated) and, most of the times, to resign it, condemning it as misfortune, Deleuze reminds us that one which precedes and exceed us, and to which we always shall greet when it befalls, be worthy of its presence, be wanting to die for it as well: *Mitsein* (Community)

There is no ontological issue here: this is not about an anachronist call to war, or abidance to a supreme entity, but of an ethical figuration, in which *to die* means to desubjectify, to enhance life. Open up to the other (whoever) aiming not to reaffirm my position or to lift ourselves, through negative synthesis, to a higher ground, but to overcome ourselves, along with the subjectivity limiting disposition united and the common substance. Therefore, it is a political figuration as well, and maybe a more radical one, as implies that every effectuation (which are ceaseless and unavoidable) be circumstance for a critic, as well as to a care of the self and of the other (*Sorge*).

It is curious to notice that this ethics or politics has been intensified in the last years, especially in the media that echoes the voice of the *Mitsein*. As observed by Antonio Lafuentes and Alberto Cursin Jimenez, by giving visibility to social demands, these media amplify the common substance disputes, cracking the unitary hard structure, “forming what is needed to call to the counter-effectuation”:

The common good is an abstract construction, charitable and teledriven, except when we can discuss it or, more precisely, when it is meaningful to me, when my behavior gives it meaning, when I can react to its proclamation, advent or concession. Counter-effectuate the AIDS was drawing an strategy to face the initial determinisms which followed, because it is true that in the beginning AIDS made itself effective as death penalty against *gays*, which fortunately caused a rebellion, a counter-effectuation, that turned the infected into protagonists of its cure. The attained communities got visibility by counter-effectuation process precept, the proclaimed, the compromise and, at last, what is enforced. Counter-effectuation is, thus, a compassionate gesture with actions such as calling into question, stan-
ding out, stepping forward or changing the focus. Experience which takes part in the key-idea of what we are trying to say: make something visible, by showing its context (Lafuentes; Corsín Jiménez, 2011:20).

It is undeniable that media, by turning the focus to the dissent tissue of a community, intensifies what Deleuze and Guattari (2009b) named a “relative deterritorialization of the capital”, the opening to an infinite beam of relations.

The question, however, is to watch inside our communicational spectrum, how the counter-effectuation does work in this context: to follow the force lines that lead us to a new ethical-political experience or to fall into a new totalitarianism?

TO READ THE NEW PHENOMENA

The demonstration wave that took the country over 2013 brought this double perspective: to follow a becoming or a community transcendence?

Marked by multiple claims and by the ephemerid of is apparitions (recorded and broadcasted on the Internet), these demonstrations have been shortly comprehended by analysts who insist to frame it in theoretical parameters of traditional politics (worth to say, substantialist). By proceeding this way, they ignore what escapes their framing or threatens the representation register, such as desubstantialization and the community counter-effectuation.

Although the beginning of these demonstrations has been connected to the public transport fare raise, approved in several Brazilian capitals, it does not suit to consider them accurate substantializations (fare cuts, politic reforms)\textsuperscript{10}, but to follow their crossing lines without being limited to their effects. That is because the fixation over them, or the search for subjectivist figures (the political party, the leader of the movement, etc.) let escape what we admit fundamental in this event: the so-called Mitsein.

Through platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, this call was intensified in those apparatus languages (#VemPraRua, #OccupySP, #PrimaveraBrasileira, #PasseLivre, etc.). Thereby, we can use our community entification structure and describe duality series – singularities on the community entities ground (individual or collective), and others in cyberspace (viralized through pictures, videos and hashtags), or on the streets (through posters, graffiti and watchwords) –, whose fusion point between grounds compose communities (haecceities).

In these invitations, by communizing the calls of Mitsein to body exposing to clash and multitude affections which produce organic detachment li-
erating them to care of the self. Remember: Mitsein calls, but does not decide for bodies, because it is impersonal, neutral and unmoved; at the edge it points them the community modes of being, whether it is a substantialist posture (The giant has awoken; We are the net; Jesus is 10, education and health care is zero) or desubstantialist (Don't run from a fight, but I'm not your daughter; It's not only 20 cents; No moralism).

It is important to notice in these two community modes of being, two different types of care: while the second one claims a not wanting to be cared anymore, the first one suggests submission to traditional representative systems (State, Church, political parties and labor unions), which become its genuine solicitors on what matters to the ontological security and the institutional deliberations.

Many readings of these demonstrations, while interpreting it (only) with representative politics tools, stated that the totalization refuse (be it partisan, nationalist, or moralist) was conservative – hereby example the statement of the minister of the Secretariat-General of the Presidency of the Republic, Gilberto Carvalho, who framed non-partisanship and anti-partisanship of protestors as a desire to return to “dictatorship”¹¹. However, what such demonstrations bring us is the refusing of the government guardianship.

Indeed, the way totalitarian representative systems operate, while interpreting phenomena that are out of their scope, or which threatens them, inverts the idea of politics itself, transforming the releasement of facticity structures into a salvation potentiality which paralyses life and the ungovernable vitalism.

There is not a lack of those that, in any way, tried to take care of us: big media columnists, broadcasting presenters of “police tv” shows, internet genius, political and military leaders, in addition, of course, to intellectuals themselves. In this last class, we highlight Marilena Chauí and her reading on these new political phenomena, as a sample of groups adept to the black bloc strategy, whose radical acts were classified as “fascism” by her. According to Chauí, this “group” is not anarchist, as some name themselves, neither do make use of “revolutionary violence”, which, according to the philosopher, “is only accomplished if there is a vision of what is unacceptable in the present and which is the future institution intended to be constructed” (Black…, 2013).

The “inopportune language” of such movement, according to her, should be replaced by the creation of other flags and for the “political and tributary reform”.

This legitimates the concern about the political interpositions; however, it leaves aside the fact that this new phenomena are already a flag, although they are very different from those from the political parties whose acknowledgement develops inside institutional borders. A flag seeking its affirmation not as a political party, fascist group or as extreme left, but as a singularity.

¹¹. “When 'no party' is screamed we see there a great claim. And there is no democracy without parties. There is no democracy without a minimum institutions form. No party is, essentially, dictatorship” (Carvalho, apud Mendes, 2013).
They do not fit the fascism category, firstly, because (as observed by the author herself) it lacks “future institution”; secondly, because its attacks do not violate life, but attempt against objects that belittle it (luxury cars, fast foods, banks, precarious public services). Diversely, life, as a human realization potentiality, should be protected, ensured or released from the governmentalized apparatus (military police, public administration). In this sense, and beyond reformisms, what they seem to aim, as political communities, are becomings. And this is the topic deserved to be emphasized: such phenomena are becoming blocks, they were born from a schism (perhaps from the anarchism) and aim at the community desubstantialization – they were emblematic on their last appearances on 2013 during the Confederation Cup and the parades on September 7th, totalization celebrating events.

This refers us to another important topic that made them distinctive in relation to the numerous demonstrations: the masks. We highlight there, as observed by Richard Sennet, the personalist finitude on politics and on socialization; an auto-detachment of the self-gesture indispensable to the counter-effectuation. Not for nothing the sedentarization agents are among its harshest critics, beckoning to the psychological return, to family-focused politics alliances and to the guardianship government.

To recover that obsolete meaning of civility and relate it to the frame of public life, I would define civility as follows: it is the activity which protects people from each other and yet allows them to enjoy each other’s company. Wearing a mask is the essence of civility. Masks permit pure sociability, detached from the circumstances of power, malaise, and private feelings of those who wear them. Civility has as its aim the shielding of others from being burdened with oneself (Sennett, 1995:323).

Behind those masks, therefore, there are great questionings about our moral (culture) that cannot be judged in a simplistic way as media currently does. Why is it so hard to give up our ontological security? Why do we resent (other than counter-effectuate) the events that move us away from ourselves? And why do we convict the anti-subjectivist figures?

So far, what seems clear about these new political phenomena is that their actions are not against life or capitalism itself (as it may recall the self-nominated anarchist black blocs), but against its sedentary forms: the representative democracy, the traditional reformist politics. Considering future studies, it would be interesting to determine social oscillations arising from these demonstrations – for instance, a Sorge awakening. Obviously, not surrounding an individual or community, but despite them. M
The genetic structure of community entifications

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