Cultural Citizenship

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Abstract: Cultural citizenship is a concept whose time has come. Following on from political citizenship—the right to reside and to vote—and economic citizenship—the right to thrive and prosper—it insists on a right to communication and to the representation of cultural difference.

Keywords: Culture, citizenship, political theory

The European liberal constitutions of the nineteenth century were political constitutions. … The constitutions of the first third of the twentieth century … were devoted to economic and social issues. … another stage is evidenced in the decade of the 1970s in the eruption of cultural concerns: this generates lexical forms and doctrinal categories such as “cultural rights” … the free existence of culture, cultural pluralism, and the access of citizens to culture are guaranteed in intensified forms — Jesús Prieto de Pedro (1999: 63)

The last two hundred years of modernity have produced three zones of citizenship, with partially overlapping but also distinct historicities. These zones of citizenship are:

- the political (conferring the right to reside and vote)
- the economic (the right to work and prosper); and
- the cultural (the right to know and speak)

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They correspond to the French Revolutionary cry ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ [liberty, equality, solidarity] and the Argentine left’s contemporary version ‘ser ciudadano, tener trabajo, y ser alfabetizado’ [citizenship, employment, and literacy] (Martín-Barbero 2001: 9). The first category concerns political rights; the second, material interests; and the third, cultural representation (Rawls 1971: 61).

Of course, citizenship has always been cultural. For instance, the Ottoman Empire offered non-Muslims ‘extensive cultural but few political rights’ (Parekh 2000: 7). The first constitutional guarantees of culture appear in Switzerland in 1874. Today, cultural provisions are standard in post-dictatorship charters, for example those of Mexico, South Africa, Brazil, Portugal, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Perú, and Spain. The meaning is generally a double one, blending artistry and ethnicity. Concerns with language, heritage, religion, and identity are responses to histories structured in dominance through cultural power and the postcolonial incorporation of the periphery into an international system of “free” labor, Malaysia, for instance, has been a predominantly Islamic area for centuries. Colonialism brought large numbers of South Asian and Chinese settlers, along with their religions. The postcolonial Constitution asserts a special status for ethnic Malays and Islam, while protecting the cultural rights of others. Muslims are the only people who can evangelize, and they have religious courts. Other varieties of superstition are tolerated, but may not proselytize, and are governed by secular rule (Miller, 2007a).

In the Netherlands, Sudan, Yemen, Slovenia, Bahrain, and Portugal, citizenship rests on language skills. In Sweden and Sudan, it depends on leading ‘a respectable life’ and having ‘good moral character’ respectively. ‘Attachment’ to local culture is a criterion in Croatia, and knowledge of culture and history in Romania. Liberia requires that citizens ‘preserve, foster, and maintain the positive Liberian culture,’ something it avows can only be done by ‘persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent.’ This racialization also applies in Sierra Leone, and Israel restricts citizenship to Jews plus Arabs who lived there prior to 1948 and their descendants. Partial racial and religious preferences also rule in Bahrain and Yemen. No wonder the British Government’s desire to impose an English-,
Welsh-, or Scottish Gaelic-speaking requirement on those seeking citizenship, announced in 2002, quickly drew fire from the people of color it was clearly designed to exclude, even as its defenders regarded it as a test of fitness for everyday life. Or that the Argentine state’s attempt to suppress non-Euro cultural formations by a variety of bizarre cultural technologies, from requiring all school pupils to cover their clothes with white dustcoats to prohibiting indigenous languages, has failed (Miller, 2007b).

The model liberal citizen is a clear-headed, cool subject who knows when to set aside individual and sectarian preferences in search of the greater good. This sounds acultural and neutral; perhaps neutered. But historically, it has frequently corresponded, in both rhetorical and legal terms, to male, property-owning subjects protecting their interests from the population in general by requiring the public renunciation of other loyalties, an unquestioning embrace of national ideologies, and an apparent self-control over personal desire. This has led to profoundly cultural qualifications for a putatively culture-free zone—the United States government. Many philosophical liberals insist on a common language and nation as prerequisites for effective citizenship. But cultural differences bring into doubt what a ‘properly ordered life’ might mean in nations split by a migrant population’s languages, religions, and senses of self. As the political theorist Will Kymlicka says, it ‘is not that traditional human rights doctrines give us the wrong answer to these questions. It is rather that they often give no answer at all. The right to free speech does not tell us what an appropriate language policy is’ (1995: 5). Theodore Roosevelt’s insistence on a ‘swift assimilation of aliens’ via the ‘language and culture that has come down to us from the builders of the republic’ (quoted in Parekh 2000: 5) looks impractical, an ill-advised ideological furphy. These issues cannot be decided by force or fiat any more. The US is unable to sustain the cultural nationalism of a ‘Monolingual Eden’ (Fuentes 2004: 79).

When the US sought to prevent Chinese-Americans from obtaining passports a century ago, applicants were required to speak English, follow ‘American customs and dress,’ and demonstrate a knowledge of national geography and history. Today, to become a
citizen of the US other than by birth or blood, in addition to never having murdered anyone or had more pot than for immediate personal use, one must meet certain cultural requirements:

- reside there
- renounce allegiance to other states
- ‘support the Constitution’
- know the country’s basic political history
- ‘read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language’
- eschew polygamy
- only gamble legally; and
- neither consort with sex workers nor be repeatedly drunk in public

To join the US military it is not necessary to be a citizen—obtaining citizenship is a potential benefit that attracts recruits—but there are several cultural requirements, such as no tattoos on the hand or face, no children out of wedlock, and no more than two within it (only recently did no convictions for domestic violence join the list). The Citizenship and Immigration Service utilizes these tests to determine ‘whether an applicant has established good moral character.’ Just as well I’m content with my Green Card.

It is clear that just as globalization imposes and invites mobility, so cultural practices proliferate, split, and cross-pollinate. With little time for ‘processes of acculturation and assimilation’ (Castles and Davidson 2000: vii), a volatile mix of hybridity and primordiality emerges. It would be excessive to claim this as entirely new—the rebel pragmatist philosopher Randolph Bourne coined the phrase ‘Transnational America’ in 1916 (Portes 2001: 182-83, 185), and blends of the modern and the traditional are constitutive of Latin America—but it does appear as though more and more transnational people and organizations now exist, weaving a blend of political, economic, and cultural links between places of origin and domicile. There is a crucial difference between the early-modern period in which contemporary citizenship was forged, when the West provided unwelcome, warlike migrants to the Third World, and the post-1950s period,
when the process went into reverse (largely minus belligerent intentions). Traditional views of naturalized citizenship have been thrown into confusion by late 20\textsuperscript{th}-century immigration and multiculturalism. This is a matter of cultural belonging and material inequality.

The ‘history of individual peoples, and indeed of whole continents such as ‘Europe’, is now being written in terms of a cultural formation defined by something outside, ‘the other’ (Halliday 2001: 113). A global, postnational, or transnational citizenship emerges. Unlike the longstanding utopias of world citizenship, these terms are heuristic devices to describe actually-existing formations, beyond mere signs to fulfill wishes. And transnational cultural rights have emerged as a terrain of struggle. The framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were riven over the topic, with the US and Canada virulently opposed to enshrining minority rights. Now a developing discourse of national and international human rights transcends borders, with the Commission on Human Rights recognizing the cultural in 2002.

Most migrant workers around the world are not in the capitalist class or the salariat. They are “temporary” or “undocumented” employees, neither citizens nor immigrants. Again, culture is critical. These workers’ identities are quite separate from both their domicile and their source of sustenance, and they are frequently guaranteed equitable treatment not by sovereign-states, but through the supranational discourse of human rights and everyday customs and beliefs that supplement the legal obligations of conventional citizenship. The new conditions of citizenship do not necessarily articulate with democracy, because subjects of the international trade in labor frequently lack access to the power bases of native-born sons and daughters. In Argentina, for example, which has a migrant workforce from Bolivia and Peru to do menial jobs, leftists seek protection for “guest workers” by arguing that rights achieved in the aftermath of dictatorship should be extended to all residents, even as the state blames these guest workers for the recrudescence of embarrassing “premodern” diseases such as tuberculosis and measles. In the EU, the creation of “supranational citizenship” in 1992 problematized coupling
citizenship to national culture. But at the same time that this recognized a new international division of labor, equivalent moves limited the rights of guest workers from non-EU nations, who have long represented the vast majority of international labor within the Union.

While both conservative critics and culturalist celebrants explain cultural citizenship as the outcome of social movements, it must also be understood as an adjustment to economic transformation; the right’s project of deregulation has played a role in creating and sustaining cultural citizenship. It is no surprise that the push for the Third World to constitute itself as a diverting heritage site and decadent playground for the West has seen the emergence of sex tourism and terrorism (Downey and Murdock 2003: 84). Globally, cultural citizenship is a response to an increasingly mobile middle-class culture-industry workforce. Domestically, cultural citizenship and media deregulation are coefficients of globalization, offering both raw material for foreign sales, and a means of local control.

SEVEN FORMATIONS

These complex politics form the backdrop to cultural citizenship. Seven key formations have theorized the phenomenon, each with strong links to the public sphere.

First, cultural-studies sociologist Tony Bennett and colleagues in the Anglo-Australian cultural-policy studies movement focus on a guaranteed set of competences that governments should give citizens via artistic capital. Bennett favors uplift and dissemination that respect popular knowledges, borrowing from the liberal donnée that the most effective form of government rules via free individuals, who must be given the skills to live both autonomously and socially. His primary interlocutors are the cultural bureaucracies of Australia and the Council of Europe, and his admirers include progressives in search of influence beyond affective protest and critique (“Citizenship,” 2000; Bennett, 1998 and 2001). Skeptical of ludic protest against the state and capital, Bennett nevertheless recognizes that social-movement identities must be acknowledged
by the modern liberal state. This line buys into the economic opportunities delivered by globalization and the need for local heritage to both counter and participate in it.

Second, Chicano anthropologist Renato Rosaldo and colleagues in Californian, Texan, and New York Chican@, Tejan@, ethnic, and Latino@ studies seek rights for US minorities, claimed at the level of the vernacular or the everyday, in order to ‘establish a distinct social space’ through a combination of self-incorporation into the US, and the maintenance and development of a separate heritage and identity (Flores and Benmayor 1997b: 1-2). Their primary interlocutors are Chican@ and Latin@ social movements, and their admirers include the Fresno Bee, while many of the ideas were promoted in the New York Times as part of debates about multiculturalism in universities (Rosaldo, 1997; Flores and Benmayor, 1997a; Rodriguez and Gonzales, 1995; “A Campus Forum,” 1990). Rosaldo sees cultural citizenship as a ‘deliberate oxymoron’ that bridges difference and sameness in calling for economic and political equality, on the joint grounds of maintaining identity and exercising ‘full membership’ in the wider community (1994: 402). He claims that the difficulty with encouraging minority groups in the US to vote, and the low levels of naturalization for non-Asian minority immigrants (in the 1990s, 57.6% of Asian immigrants became US citizens, versus 32.2% of Latino/as [Aleinikoff 2000: 130]) can be addressed by promoting multiple affinities, to “former” languages, places, or norms, and to adopted countries. This kind of thinking is enshrined in the Indian Constitution, which enforces a common criminal code, but civil law acknowledges minority cultures, a legacy from thousands of years during which the Dharmashastra governed via collective identities rather than individual entitlements. It also informs UNESCO’s Institute for Education, which emphasizes collective as much as individual human rights, and regards cultural citizenship as a development from, and antidote to, assimilationist ideals (1999).

Third, Canadian-based political theorist Kymlicka and a number of slightly heterodox Anglo-American liberal and communitarian colleagues seek a rapprochement between majority white settlement, ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ (newer voluntary migrants, who
deserve few cultural rights) and ‘minority nationalism’ (First Peoples, the dispossessed, and the enslaved, who deserve many) via the notion of culture as an aid to individual autonomy through engagement with collective as well as individual histories. The position is in keeping with Canada’s backdrop as the first commonwealth country to establish its own citizenship system, and an official practitioner of multiculturalism since 1971. Kymlicka’s admirers include the Wall Street Journal, the UN Development Programme, where he served as principal consultant for its 2004 venture into culture, and the UN’s chief expert on indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who indexed this impact in his keynote address at the 2003 Congreso Internacional de Americanistas on moving from the status of indigeneity to cultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995 and 2000; Jenson and Papillon, 2001; Zachary, 2000; United Nations Development Programme, 2004; “Chile-Indigenas,” 2003).

Other interlocutors include states dealing with ethnic minorities. When the Soviet Union broke up into close to twenty countries, Moscow was content to see 25 million ethnic Russians remain in what it refers to as ‘the near abroad’ (Rich, 2003). Its former republics had two choices in dealing with these sizeable and often wealthy minorities: propound a retributive cultural nationalism that marginalized the Russian language and set religious, racial, and linguistic criteria for citizenship (which Estonia and Latvia did, relegating Russians from ‘setting the cultural agenda of the public sphere’ to ‘the private/communal’ one); or adopt a pragmatic civic policy that offered entitlements based on territory, fealty, and labor (as was done in Ukraine and Kazakhstan). The former then had to defuse the resultant conflicts via Russian-language schools and cultural groups—courtesy of a Kymlicka consultancy. At the same time, they changed their cultural image, abjuring the nomenclature ‘Baltic’ and ‘post-Soviet’ in favor of ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘pre-European Union.’ Needless to say, they are “encouraged” to incorporate Russian minorities by the prospect of EU membership and money via adherence to the European Convention on Nationality.
Where Rosaldo *et al.* seek to transform citizenship in the interests of those marginalized by the majority, Bennett *et al.* and Kymlicka *et al.* utilize it for a general purpose that takes account of minorities. For Rosaldo, US culture is distinguished by Latin@ disenfranchisement. Cultural difference substantively trumps formal universalism, and it is not good enough to follow the standard arms-length approach of liberal philosophy, whereby state institutions adopt a neutral stance on cultural maintenance. Rosaldo is critical of neoliberalism and liberal philosophy for their myths of the acultural sovereign individual, which in fact assume a shared language and culture as the basis of government. For liberal philosophy’s brand of ‘civic nationalism’ involves an allegiance not merely to the state, but to images of nationhood that stretch across public and private realms (Runnymede Commission 2000: 19, 36). Kymlicka thinks along similar lines, but endorses liberalism, provided that states protect minorities—as a matter of justice and self-interest. For Bennett, culture is a set of tools for living that derive their value from the achievement of specific purposes, rather than being expressive ends in themselves. He sees government as a project of constituting, not drawing upon, the liberal individual, and is agnostic about its sovereign-individual claims. Bennett and Kymlicka’s cosmopolitan approaches remain rooted, for pragmatic reasons, in the nation, because it is assumed to provide a boundary of fealty that can appeal to the better sentiments of its inhabitants.

The fourth theoretical formation, vocalized by the philosopher Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, is a neoliberal capture of the first three positions. On this view, cultural maintenance and development should be by-products of universal access to education, a ‘primary condition of free and equal citizen participation in public life.’ Rorty opposes public funding to sustain familial or religious cultural norms, calling instead for a curriculum that will generate flexible cosmopolitans who learn about their country and its “global neighbors” (1995: 162, 164). Rorty’s argument is a culturalist restatement of human-capital *nostra* about individuals maximizing their utility through investment in skills, with links to Bennett’s call for citizens to learn a set of cultural competences. She rejects cross-cultural awareness as a necessary component of good citizenship and justice, but endorses it as
good business sense. This is in line with the UN Development Programme, which argues that ‘culturally diverse societies’ are necessary preliminaries to the eradication of poverty, rather than a nice afterglow (2004: v). Clearly, Rorty’s instrumental approach may lead to cultural erasure, for all its cosmopolitanism.

All these logics are engaged by the fifth key formation of cultural citizenship, the UK Runnymede Trust Commission’s Report on The Future of a Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000). Its Chair was the political theorist and future member of the House of Lords Bhikhu Parekh, and its secondary public face in the UK media came from his fellow Commissioner, Stuart Hall. The Commission examined racism within national institutions of culture, education, policing, and welfare. Populist reactions to their work give us a sense of how deep cultural conflicts run within citizenship: “Sub-Marxist gibberish”; “out-of-touch nonsense”; “an insult to our history and intelligence” (“British’ is Already,” 2000). The authors were accused of ‘a lack of loyalty and affection for Britain’ (Parekh, 2001). The Daily Mail reacted by producing a ‘list of ten dead white heroes of the last millennium’ (Seaford 2001: 108). William Hague, then the leader of the Conservative Party, derided the Report as an index of the left’s ‘tyranny of political correctness and … assault on British culture and history’ (2000: 28), while The Scotsman referred to it as ‘a grotesque libel against the people of this land and a venomous blueprint for the destruction of our country’ (Warner, 2000). Jack Straw, then the Home Secretary and later a notorious warmonger in Afghanistan and Iraq, rejected the linkage of Britishness to white racism. This indicates how much can be at stake in these debates, beyond Bennett’s technical specifications of cultural-policy interventions, Rosaldo’s feel-good vernacular multiculturalism, Kymlicka’s attempt to “get along” in newly free, newly chauvinistic post-socialist environments, or Rorty’s faith in an inclusive curriculum animated by enlightened self-interest.

That becomes clearer still in the sixth formation, which addresses the limits of neoliberalism. Amy Chua, a lawyer operating from a comparative ethnic-studies perspective—and publishing with a US trade house, rather than an academic press—
investigates in a global frame the intersection of neoliberalism, ethnic-minority economic oligarchies, and democracy: what happens when wealthy minorities confront popular backlashes against their economic power via majoritarian rejection of cultural difference. While the economy enriches ‘the market-dominant minority, democratization increases the political voice and power of the frustrated majority’ (2003: 124). As Chua puts it, provocatively and with the clear regret of a fan of both capitalism and democracy, this is about the conundrum ‘that turns free market democracy into an engine of ethnic conflagration’ (2003: 6). Her work details the way that indigenous majorities protest their weakness. Class, corruption, and race jumble together, as ‘market-dominant minorities, along with their foreign-investor partners, invariably come to control the crown jewels of the economy … oil in Russia and Venezuela, diamonds in South Africa, silver and tin in Bolivia, jade, teak, and rubies in Burma’ (2003: 10). Free markets concentrate wealth disproportionately, while democracies concentrate politics proportionately. Political enfranchisement and its economic opposite are mediated through cultural difference, with the outcome revolutionary. The horrors of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s illustrate what happens when ethnonationalist populism draws on majority resentment to quash minority economic power, based on cultural difference (2003: 11-13, 16-17).

The seventh, and most powerful, formation derives from the work of Middle Eastern historian and professional anti-Palestinian Bernard Lewis and Cold-War political scientist, Vietnam-War architect, and English-only advocate Samuel Huntington. In the post-Soviet 1990s, these two men turned to culture for geopolitical explanations. Lewis (1990) coined the expression ‘clash of civilizations’ to capture the difference, as he saw it, between the separation of church and state that had generated the successes of the US, versus their intercalculation in Islamic nations, which had produced those countries’ subordinate status. Forget Yanqui support of authoritarian anti-democrats and coups that furthered oil exploitation—Islamic resentment is all about the US insisting that Caesar get his due, and god his. Huntington (1993) appropriated the ‘clash of civilizations’ to argue that future world-historical conflicts would not be ‘primarily ideological or
primarily economic’ but ‘cultural’ (22). This dematerializes politics—and most specifically, excuses the policies and programs of the United States government and corporations as only broadly relevant to the loathing of that nation elsewhere.

The “clash twins” grotesque generalizations have gained immense attention over the past decade, notably since September 11 2001. In the United States, Huntington’s Olympian grandiosity was lapped up by the bourgeois media, ever-ready to embrace ‘a cartoon-like world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other’ (Said, 2001). Journalists promote the notion of an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil as the bifurcation of the US and Islam, plundering Lewis and Huntington on the differences between Western and Islamic culture. Across the daily press and weekly and monthly magazines of ruling opinion, extra-state violence is attributed to Islam in opposition to freedom and technology, never as the act of subordinated groups against dominant ones. The New York Times and Newsweek gave Huntington room to account for what had happened in terms of his “thesis,” while others took up the logic as a call for empire, from the supposed New Left (Dissent magazine and other progressives who share this common Yanqui blind spot on the region) through to leading communitarians and the neoliberal Economist. After the attacks, Arab leaders met to discuss the impact of the Lewis-Huntington conceit, and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invoked it. As the US occupation of Iraq entered its third year, military commanders and senior non-commissioned officers were required to read the book (along with VS Naipaul and Islam for Dummies) (Rusciano, 2003; Said, 2001; Schmitt, 2005).

Not everyone was so taken with these ideas. UNESCO’s Director General prefaced the Organization’s worthy Declaration on Cultural Diversity with a specific rebuttal (Matsuura, 2001) and El País’ cartoonist Máximo traumatically constructed a dialog alongside the tumbling Towers: ‘Choque de ideas, de culturas, de civilizaciones’ [Clash of ideas, of cultures, of civilizations] drew the reply ‘choques de desesperados contra instalados’ [the clash of the desperate against the establishment] (quoted in García Canclini 2002: 16]. Israel’s Ha-aretz regarded the Lewis-Huntington thesis’ ‘hegemonic
hold’ as ‘a major triumph’ for Al Qaeda, and the Arab News aptly typified it as ‘Armageddon dressed up as social science’ (quoted in Rusciano 2003: 175). Study after study has disproven Lewis and Huntington’s wild assertions about growing ethnic struggle since the Cold War, and a unitary Islamic culture opposed to a unitary “West.” Such claims fatally neglect conflicts over money, property, water, and politics (Fox, 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2003: 203; United Nations Development Programme, 2004). The clash-of-civilizations thesis does not work if you apply it to Iran supporting Russia against Chechen rebels and India against Pakistan, or the US attitude to the Iran-Iraq War. But why bother with world-historical details when you are offered ‘international relations with politics taken out’ (Abrahamian 2003: 535).

Huntington’s later critiques of hispano hablantes in the US (2004) led to support from the Center for Immigration Studies and a battery of influential pop-policy intellectuals whose scholarship lay long behind them, if it ever amounted to much. The chorines include Cold Warrior Zbigniew Brzezinski, old-school area-studies founder Lucian Pye, Nixon and Reagan servant and advocate of the ‘broken-windows’ theory in support of severe punishments for minor wrongdoings James Q Wilson, reactionary Newsweek journalist Fareed Zakaria, and the agile cultural citizens of <vdare.com>, self-appointed keepers of the flame of a lost tribe of Yanqui whiteness. The awkward fact that just 21% of third-generation Latin@s identify with their countries of origin, that most US-born Latin@s have much more conservative views on immigration than recent arrivals, and that third-generation Latin@s are predominantly monolingual English-speakers must be left out for this nonsense to flourish—not to mention the fact that Huntington’s beloved early settlers, whose ethos is supposedly central to the US, were as wrapped up in burning witches, haranguing adulteresses, and wearing foppish clothing and wigs as anything else (Alba, 2004; Lomnitz, 2005). The argument is wrong morally, pragmatically, and empirically. But it is cultural.
The matrix above summarizes these positions. Both the arid lands of Bennett and the humidispheres of Rosaldo, Kymlicka, Parekh, and Chua illustrate the improbability of wiping from history the differences between indigenes, dominant settlers, and minority migrants—yet Rorty contrives a human-capital merger of all the above, and Lewis and Huntington offer an ideological justification for hollowing out material history and accounting for Western hegemony in cultural terms. It seems that Bennett’s competences, Rosaldo’s resistances, and Kymlicka, Parekh, and Chua’s relativisms can be accommodated (albeit with their rhetorics softened at some points and hardened at others) in a neoliberal worldview whose limits are set via the hyper-culturalism and closet nationalism of the ‘clash’ theorists. All for the cultural in the most cultural of all possible
worlds, with the capstone being an efficient and effective workforce, whose
cosmopolitanism is brokered on a respect for difference that goes guarantor of individual
advantage in a globally competitive labor market.

Each of these approaches is dealing with heavily practical yet highly emotional,
profoundly populist yet avowedly technical forms of thought. As such, they inevitably
rub up against contradictions. Bennett must deal with the incommensurability of
neoliberal and statist prescriptions. Rosaldo must make peace with the fact that
government is frequently the court of appeal for vernacular protest. Kymlicka and Parekh
must come to terms with the economic limits to liberal philosophy. Rorty must engage
the obstinate collectivism and hybridity of culture, and the fact that neoliberalism is no
more metacultural than any other form of thought. Chua must acknowledge the
constitutive inequality and brutality of capitalism. Lewis and Huntington must explain the
reality of US Middle Eastern policy, and more precise histories than their grandiosities
will allow.

For reactionaries, cultural citizenship signifies a loss of national and spiritual unity, as
sectarianism and secularism overwhelm patriotism and superstition. For the left, for
cultural studies, cultural citizenship concerns the maintenance, development, and
exchange of cultural lineage—a celebration of difference that is also a critique of the
status quo. For the neoliberal right, it offers a new set of market and ecclesiastical niches
and sites of self-governance. My concern is that the cultural left got what we wanted—
culture at the center of politics and socio-political analysis. But it wasn’t Queer Nation
and Stuart Hall. It was consumerism and Samuel Huntington. We need to rearticulate
culture to the economy and capital ‘p’ politics, not a misleading, anti-materialist sphere
of ideation.

Doctrines of cultural citizenship can work towards a more equitable world if they reject
the technicism, utopianism, liberalism, nationalism, and neoliberalism of business-as-
usual cultural citizenship, and recognize their reliance on deregulatory projects as much
as leftist social movements. In answer to the theoreticism and technocracy of neoliberalism, we can point to participatory/popular budgeting systems undertaken by leftist regional and urban governments in Kerala, Mexico City, and Porto Alegre over the past fifteen years, and Brazil’s *sindicato cidadão* [citizens’ trade union]. We can form strategic alliances with opponents of neoliberalism from within, such as George Soros, who made his fortune on the financial markets, but now sees that ‘the untrammeled intensification of *laissez-faire* capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of life is endangering our open and democratic society’ (1997).

In his “Ten Dispatches About Place” from 2005, the noted cultural critic John Berger responds to the query ‘Are you still a Marxist?’ After tracking through the unparalleled ‘devastation caused by the pursuit of profit,’ he concludes that ‘Yes, I’m still among other things a Marxist.’ Those ‘other things’ are terribly important, registering crucial forms of life that operate with varying degrees of autonomy from the economy. But they can only be engaged alongside the equally crucial aspects addresseped here. So a quick question: are you still a culturalist?

**WORKS CITED**


