

A FAMILY IMBROGLIO: BRAZIL'S INVASION OF THE BANDA ORIENTAL IN 1816 AND REPER- CUSSIONS ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA, 1816-1820.

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In August, 1816, Brazilian troops entered the Banda Oriental for the second time in five years. The new turn of events dashed all prospects for a Spanish-Portuguese effort against the insurgents of Buenos Aires. Furthermore, it dealt a severe blow to the Spanish pacification scheme in America and set in motion a wave of indignation and inflamed passion among the Spanish nation. And for Continental Europe it created the distinct possibility of another general conflagration.

In the eyes of Madrid this unprovoked aggression added to its woes in the colonies. Officials at home and in America admitted a need for maintaining amicable relations with the Portuguese-Brazilian monarchy, with its capital removed to Rio de Janeiro where D. João resided since the Napoleonic thrust into the Peninsula. Strong ties and a proper reading of Brazil's intentions in the Plata region would assure the success of the long projected but often postponed expedition to Buenos Aires and possibly guarantee Spain's continued domination of South America. The need became more acute for an accord with San Martín's crossing of the Andes in 1817. Control of the Banda Oriental by a hostile Rio would jeopardize the Inca empire and imperil Buenos Aires (1).

(1). — Museo Naval, Madrid, "Memorias inéditas de José Vázquez Figueroa" (hereafter cited as Vázquez Papers), MSS, 442, fols. 57-70; Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Guillermo Lohmann Villena (eds.), *Memoria de gobierno del Virrey Pezuela* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1947), p. 233.

Because of the explosive situation in the Plata and the deteriorating relations with Rio, Spanish officials estimated the size of the expedition on a sliding scale, to be determined by the Portuguese position. They realized the need to neutralize Brazil and preclude the risk of Spanish troops fighting the Brazilians too (2).

Spaniards never expected these complications with Portugal. Because of the recently strengthened royal ties they presumed that the Crowns would not only be drawn closer together but also would present a common front against the insurgents. At the time of the invasion Madrid and Rio were in the process of concluding the nuptial contracts of Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos with their nieces, daughters of D. João VI, Maria Isabel de Braganza and Maria Francisca de Assis, marriages preferred by Great Britain to that possibility of Ferdinand taking a Russian princess (3).

The controversy between Madrid and Rio eventually reached the Paris Conference. By bringing the dispute to the attention of the Allied Powers meeting in Paris, Spain seized the initiative. Her official *démarche* proposing mediation caught Rio off guard. She intended to employ divisive tactics to isolate her adversary and compel Portugal to accede to her demands. We are not concerned directly with the complicated diplomatic maneuverings at Paris, the Courts of the contending parties, and those of the mediating powers — England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France (4). The Allied failure to adopt a more pro-Spanish position infuriated Madrid.

We turn instead to our major concern: that during the agitative diplomatic activity Spain considered taking bellicose steps against her recalcitrant neighbor, and Portugal prepared for such a possibility,

(2). — Minutes of the Council of State, 20 November 1816, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Sección Estado (hereafter cited as AHN, Estado), lib. 18d.: 17 September 1817, AHN, Estado, lib. 20d.: 22 May 1818, AHN, Estado, lib. 21d.: Vázquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 87-101, 155-158; Gaspar Vigodet to King, 23 June 1817; Anonymous Memorial to King, 3 July 1817, Archivo General de Palacio, Madrid, "Papeles reservados de Fernando VII", tomo 31, vol. 16, fols. 159-181.

(3). — Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, 11 October 1814; n. d. October 1814, in Charles Wm. Vane (ed.), *Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh* (hereafter cited as *Castlereagh Papers*) (London: John Murray, 1851-1853), X, 164-166, 178-181.

(4). — The diplomatic narrative is best set forth in Esther Suzzi Casal, "Las discusiones en Europa acerca de la invasion lusitana a la Banda Oriental", *Cuarto Congreso Internacional de Historia de America* (Buenos Aires, 1966), VII, 35-63; Alan K. Manchester, *British Preeminence in Brazil* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933), pp. 141-149.

while publicly, at Paris and in the British press (5), defending her actions in the New World.

Madrid should not have been caught unaware by the invasion. Portugal had displayed interest in the territories since the founding of Colonia do Sacramento in 1680 and throughout the eighteenth century. The episode in 1811-1812 was still fresh in the mind. And Ferdinand and Pedro Cevallos, the First Secretary, received disconcerting reports from Rio about Brazil's designs on the territories. Carlota Joaquina, D. João's wife and Ferdinand's sister, kept in touch with her brother since his return from exile in 1814. She warned that Portuguese officials at Rio had stressed to D. João the usefulness of the ports of Maldonado, and Montevideo, which commanded the entrance into the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, and of Colonia do Sacramento, which served as the entrepôt for goods into Santa Fe, Corrientes, and Paraguay (6).

Arguments justifying the attack abounded at Rio de Janeiro. Particulars reached Madrid. Carlota Joaquina apprised her brother and the First Secretary, who also received similar news from his envoy at that Court. D. João's advisers favored a more aggressive foreign policy in light of conditions in that distraught Viceroyalty, which Spain lacked sufficient troops to control. They viewed the Uruguay river as a natural boundary and one which would establish defensible frontiers. Annexation of the territory could not be considered aggression but self protection since José Artigas, the gaucho leader, menaced Brazil and since the insurgents or Buenos Aires rather than the Spaniards controlled the area.

D. João's confidants brushed aside any qualms over family ties by asserting that in spite of these Spain had despoiled Portugal in 1801 and again in 1807. And a successful venture would right these wrongs because Ferdinand would be compelled to settle existing territorial differences between the two countries in Europe and America. Unless he accepted Portugal's stipulations, the Spanish monarch might fear an invasion of Buenos Aires or even a possible intervention in Upper Peru (7).

(5). — "A Brazilian Settled in London", *The Times* (London), 17 January; 7 June; 9 June 1817.

(6). — Carlota Joaquina to Ferdinand VII, 17 May 1816, in Carlos Seco Serrano, "Doña Carlota Joaquina de Borbón y la cuestión uruguaya", *Revista de Indias*, Nos. 28-29 (Madrid, 1947), 449-450.

(7). — Carlota to Ferdinand, 30 June; 16 July 1816, in Seco Serrano, *op. cit.*, pp. 455-457; to Cevallos, 15 June 1816, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Sección Estado (hereafter cited as AGI, Estado), leg. 98; Andrés Villalba to Cevallos, no. 332, Muy reservada, 28 June 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.

The cabals reached such proportions that Carlota expressed a desire to leave the country (8). She became despondent at learning that even groups once opposed to a policy of aggrandizement had switched positions. Now all factions stressed the need for the Paraná and Plate rivers as permanent frontiers. They agreed that the insurgency in Buenos Aires offered a good opportunity to enlarge the boundaries of Brazil. This dream could be achieved amicably by D. João proffering military assistance to his son-in-law in exchange for territorial concessions (9).

At least one of the parties presented the king with a detailed plan. That unsigned memorial provided for the stationing of a secret envoy at Buenos Aires during the period of negotiations with Spain. His instructions would be, in the first instance, to win rebel leaders over to the Spanish cause. If this proved impracticable, he was to persuade them to acknowledge Portuguese sovereignty.

The project foresaw, moreover, the necessity of averting a confrontation with Great Britain and hence cautioned D. João to keep London abreast of his intentions. Information channeled to British authorities should lay stress upon D. João's previous attempts to reach an amicable accord with Ferdinand regarding the destruction of the revolutionary forces. At the same time hints should be thrown out that Spain's refusal to cooperate might compel unilateral action since Brazil's security was threatened.

During the period of intensive diplomatic activity, the government should divert troops to the borders in the event of a "spontaneous uprising" by the people. If diplomacy failed, the troops would strike. The conquered territories, concluded the memorial to D. João, would remain in Brazil's possession until a final settlement of all territorial differences with Spain in America and Europe (10).

Large scale military operations would assure the success of the venture. To avoid speculation and to keep the English off guard as to the reasons behind the transfer of troops from the Continent, the government asserted a need to defend the captaincy of Rio Grande do

(8). — Carlota to Cevallos, 15 June 1816; Villalba to Cevallos, no. 332, *Muy reservada*, 28 June 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.

(9). — Henry Chamberlain to Lord Castlereagh, Secret, 31 March 1817, Enclosures, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Records (hereafter cited as FO), 63/202.

(10). — "Memo Rio de Janeiro, June 6, 1816", Enclosure, Chamberlain to Castlereagh, Secret, 31 March 1817, FO 63/202.

Sul. The ruse worked on Marshal Lord Beresford, Commander-in-chief of Portugal's army (or so he asserted), but not, apparently, on the inhabitants of Rio (11).

D. João had initiated the process of troop embarkations from Lisbon in early 1815. The termination of the war in Europe freed troops for duty in the New World. But news of Napoleon's escape made the monarch apprehensive about the future of his throne in Portugal, causing a temporary suspension of embarkations (12).

When the threat passed after Waterloo, D. João ordered a resumption of embarkations. Rumors of military preparations abounded at Lisbon and Rio. And at the Brazilian capital soldiers and supplies were being loaded on ships destined for the Río de la Plata via Santa Catarina (13).

Doña Carlota kept abreast of the advanced state of military preparations at Rio, details of which she sent to her brother. General Carlos Frederico Lecór, who had been ordered to Brazil from Portugal with 5,000 crack troops (14), had been appointed governor of Montevideo and Captain-general of the new territories. Military supplies included artillery pieces, 2,000 barrels of gunpowder, 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition, timber for building bridges, 2,000 tents, and other material. Moreover, the governor of Rio Grande pledged to augment the forces by supplying an additional 7,000 men, twenty-four gunboats, and some brigantines (15).

The ramifications of the complot were not lost to the queen. She urged her brother neither to relax his guard nor to be deceived by assertions disclaiming any intention of aggrandizement or invasion. If he were lulled into complacency,

(11). — Marshal Lord Beresford to Duke of Wellington, 7 November 1816, in 2nd Duke of Wellington (ed.), *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington* (hereafter cited as WSD) (London: John Murray, 1858-1872), XIV, 642-644; letters from Luiz Joaquim dos Santos Marrocos in Brazil to his father in Portugal, 23 February; 30 March; 28 May 1816 (copies, Oliveira Lima Library, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.).

(12). — Letters from Luiz Joaquim dos Santos Marrocos in Brazil to his father in Portugal, 23 May; 29 June 1815 (copies, Oliveira Lima Library).

(13). — Manuel de Lardizábal y Montoa to Cevallos, no. 140, 17 April 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 4504; letters from Luiz Joaquim dos Santos Marrocos in Brazil to his father in Portugal, 3 November; 15 November 1815; 23 February; 30 March; 18 April; 28 May; 10 July 1816 (copies, Oliveira Lima Library); Mr. Samuel Bennett to Lord Castlereagh, 29 November 1815, FO 63/188.

(14). — Beresford to Castlereagh, 29 June 1815, FO 63/188.

(15). — Carlota to Ferdinand, 16 July 1816, in Seco Serrano, *op. cit.*, p. 456.

"Spain would lose the trade from this part of America and forfeit the revenue for the Exchequer" (16).

The opportune moment for Rio arrived. Irritated by Spain's hesitancy and failure to pacify the area, D. João heeded the advice of his counsellors and approved the campaign. In August, 1816, Portuguese and Brazilian troops crossed into Spanish territory. Later, it seems, the Prince Regent regretted having given his approval (17). Within five months the combined forces occupied Montevideo. Reaction in Spain to these events centered around three groups (1) government officials; (2) the nation-at-large; and (3) the Court.

The new turn of events impelled Pedro Cevallos to consult with the Council of State, in theory Ferdinand's principal advisory body. Between August and October, 1816, the counsellors thrashed out the problems of deteriorating relations with Portugal and of what counter-measures to adopt.

The First Secretary still had not received official confirmation of an invasion when he consulted the Council but relied on what information he had received from the charge at Rio and probably on reports from his ambassador in London on the flurry of press items mentioning the Portuguese expedition. The counsellors learned that neither D. João nor his ministers had bothered to inform the Spanish legation of details about the expedition and had even refused to reply to direct questions about the venture. The news excited them and they realized that although it was too late to stop the expedition they must protect their colonial possessions and forestall further encroachments. Portugal must be made to realize that Spain would not sit idly by during a foreign invasion of her territories. Because of the manpower shortage at home and in the colonies the counsellors urged the government to provide funds to overhaul the battered Royal Navy (18).

The King did not share his counsellors' concern. In spite of warnings from his sister and consultation with his Secretary of State, Ferdinand showed little sign of apprehension. Throughout the deliberations he refused to attend meetings. Motions to call special sessions of the Council went unheeded. The monarch worried more about preparations for the brides than about Portugal's perfidy.

(16). — Carlota to Ferdinand, 30 June; 16 July 1816, in Seco Serrano, *op. cit.*, pp. 455-457.

(17). — Beresford to Wellington, 7 November 1816, WSD, XIV, 642-644.

(18). — Minutes of the Council of State, 20 August 1816, AHN, Estado, lib. 18d.

By contrast Pedro Cevallos adopted a more aggressive policy. Relations between the two countries were approaching a breaking point. Cevallos showed determination and firmness. (His stand appears to belie the opinions of those who have accused him of pusillanimity and subservience). During the weekly interval and in subsequent sessions he became more vehement and intransigent, as his proposals to the Council show. Brazil's action generated a wave of anti-Portuguese diatribes.

Using as a pretext the need to advise the King post-haste about a reply due to a note from his father-in-law regarding the departure of the princesses, the First Secretary fulminated about Brazilian duplicity. He censured that government for refusing to assist in the struggle against the insurgents, arguing that Brazil had thereby contravened existing treaties as well as obligations imposed by family ties, and that the aloof posture of D. João had blinded the monarch to the very real threat to his country's security and tranquility. To aggravate matters, D. João had now consented to the invasion of Spanish territory.

Ferdinand's response should be of such a nature as to protect national honor, maintain the dignity of the Crown, and compel D. João to return the conquered areas. It should warn him of Spain's intent to avenge the insult but at the same time of her willingness to settle differences amicably. It should furthermore assuage the fears of Spaniards, who would be incensed to learn that in lieu of cooperating Brazil had invaded their cherished possessions. Only if D. João would hand over the occupied territory to the Viceroy of Peru, General Joaquín de la Pezuela, would the princesses be most welcome in Spain (19).

Cevallos delayed too long but worse, had miscalculated. The question of the princesses' departure had already been settled. D. João decided not to wait for a response. His daughters departed in July, 1816, and reached Cadiz in September, at which time heated debates were taking place in the Council of State. As if to add insult to injury, they arrived without a proper dowry and furnishings but with a large entourage (20).

Upon learning of their arrival the startled counsellors became more indignant. They could not hide their pique and proposed adopting Draconian measures to counteract D. João's impudence as well as

(19). — Minutes of the Council of State, 27 August 1816, *ibid*.

(20). — W. Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, "España en el Congreso de Viena", *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos*, XVI (Madrid, 1907), 166.

the insult. Measures suggested included confining the princesses to a convent; sending them on to Lisbon; ordering their return to Rio; refusing to sign the marriage contracts; or ordering a national mobilization for an attack on Portugal (21). Few of these steps, as will be seen, were adopted.

The matter did not rest, however. The United States ambassador captured the mood of the government when he wrote that

“the late marriage has not assuaged in the least degree, the indignant feelings which the attempts of Brazil have excited in this government” (22).

Cevallos used every opportunity to incite the counsellors against Brazil. He scoffed at Portuguese attempts to equate their occupation with Spain's control over Olivenza. To the First Secretary any thought of a territorial *quid pro quo* smacked of sanctioning aggression legally since the incorporation of those territories on the Peninsula had been sanctioned by the Treaties of Badajoz and Amiens.

While the rationale satisfied most of the counsellors, the Minister of Marine dissented. José Vázquez Figueroa contended that the precarious state of the colonies and the need to quicken their pacification necessitated swallowing national pride. Spain needed to maintain good relations with Portugal, thereby obviating any further impediment to the projected expedition to the Plata. To Vázquez the Banda Oriental was far more important strategically since it would serve as a landing place for the expedition whereas its loss would hamper naval operations in southern South America.

Vázquez was a minority of one. These cogent arguments failed to sway either the First Secretary or the counsellors and the government would continue to base its claim primarily on international law as well as on its obligations to avoid what might be construed as an insult to the prestige of the nation (23).

(21). — Minutes of the Council of State, 27 August; 3, 10, 17 September 1817, AHN, Estado, lib. 18d.; Alvaro Alonso-Castrillo (ed.), *Memorias de José García de León y Pizarro, 1770-1835* (hereafter cited as *Memorias de Pizarro*) (2 vols.; Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1953), I, 219; Seco Serrano, *op. cit.*, pp. 450-451; Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 85, 5 September; no. 97, 14 September 1816, FO 72/187; Wellington to Beresford, 15 October 1816, WSD, XI, 511-514.

(22). — George Erving to James Monroe, no. 21, 8 October 1816, National Archives, Washington, D. C., “Despatches from United States Ministers to Spain, 1792-1906”, Microcopy 31/Roll 15 (hereafter cited as DSS 31/-).

(23). — Minutes of the Council of State, 10, 17 September 1816, AHN, Estado, lib. 18d.; Secretaría de Estado y de Gobierno del Consejo de Estado to Ministro de Estado, 13 September 1816, AHN, Estado, leg. 181.

Throughout the next month the issue lay dormant in the Council. Perhaps Cevallos had been too bellicose. Diplomacy required time. The on-going bilateral negotiations might bear fruit, thereby obviating the need for military operations or outside mediation.

Other factors guided the Secretary's decision. By stalling for time he might disarm his enemies at Court. He was indignant and piqued at not having been consulted about the marriages, which had been arranged by Miguel de Lardizábal y Uribe, Minister of the Indies, Gaspar Vigodet, ex-governor of Montevideo, and Father Cirilo Alameda y Brea, Ferdinand's private chaplain. Furthermore, his diatribes in the Council had not endeared him to the King or the new Queen. Intrigues were continually afoot to depose Ministers. The King did little to dispel the fears of his appointees. By not consulting them on important matters of state he fostered tension at Court as well as timidity and irresolution among those holding office.

By October, 1816, official confirmation of the invasion had been received. The First Secretary conferred again with the Council. In the interval little progress had been made. The bilateral conferences produced nothing. Brazil refused to budge and hedged her replies to Spain as well as to Great Britain.

Cevallos decided to weigh the possibility of foreign mediation by an impartial party or parties. He considered Great Britain the most influential and pivotal power but the least impartial, arguing that Portugal feared any rebuff from Britain and probably would not have acted unless she had received the green light from London, a conviction shared by at least one diplomat at Madrid and by a member of the opposition in Parliament (24).

This bias led Cevallos to recommend bringing the controversy before the Quadruple Alliance. By acting in concert these nations might compel even England to adopt a more neutral position. Nevertheless, Spain never tired of trying to induce England to undertake unilateral action, even while the matter was before the Paris Conference (25).

Despite any recourse to pacific measures, the First Secretary decided to chart his own course. He had no aversion to the use of force. To achieve peace, he realized, one often must prepare for war. Im-

(24). — Erving to Monroe, no. 16, 29 August 1816, DSS 31/15; *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* (1st series), 19 March 1817, XXXV, 1194-1201.

(25). — General Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, 8/20 January 1818, *Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva* (hereafter cited as *Sbornik*), CXIX (1904), 557-562.

plementing his program would necessitate a monumental effort to put the finances in order (26).

Pedro Cevallos never had an opportunity to act. His enemies at Court persuaded Ferdinand to replace him with José García de León y Pizarro. This turned out to be, as will be seen, merely a change of personnel but not of policy.

The government's attempt to ring Spain with a *cordon sanitaire* proved only partially successful. Some papers of port cities carried news of Brazil's invasion as early as December, 1816, and January, 1817 (or so claimed the British press). Inhabitants of Madrid had to wait until 13 May to read of the attack in the *Gaceta* (27). With or without the press the people learned of the invasion and the country seethed with an undercurrent of revenge. The allurements of conquest and the possibility of reunifying the Peninsula whetted the public appetite.

Foreign diplomats and the English press captured the mood. Allowances for the reliability of the sources and the accuracy of the accounts considered, news items paralleled dispatches to London from the British Minister at Madrid, Henry Wellesley, and from the Commander-in-chief of Portugal's army, Marshal Lord Beresford, to the Duke of Wellington at Paris.

That Englishmen should be better informed of events in Spain and America than most Spaniards — whether of Cabinet meetings, secret sessions of committees, or the like — was no surprise. The United States ambassador wrote in August, 1816, that with the

“command of \$100,00” he “would get all the secrets of their Cabinet for the same reason the englishmen (*sic*) or anyone else who can pay may know our affairs with it” (28).

And later one delegate to the Spanish Cortes in 1821 remarked that

(26). — Minutes of the Council of State, 16 October 1816, AHN, Estado, lib. 18d.

(27). — *The Times* (London), 17 January 1817, citing *Correo Mercantil de Cadiz* (24 December 1816); *Morning Chronicle*, 23 January 1817, citing *Cadiz Diario Mercantil* (*sic*) (14 December 1816); 21 January 1817, citing *Barcelona Journal* (*sic*) (4 January 1817); *Gaceta de Madrid*, 13 May 1817.

(28). — Erving to Monroe, Private and Confidential, 31 August 1816, DSS 31/15.

"more was known (about America) in the taverns of London than in the Cortes" (29).

Furthermore, British papers began to speak of an imminent invasion of the Banda Oriental as early as July, 1816, and details about the preparations under way paralleled, remarkably, correspondence of Doña Carlota with her brother (30).

People in Spain looked upon the invasion as a national disgrace and demanded satisfaction for the insult. Their latent desire to reunite the Peninsula surfaced. Even before the present crisis Wellington and the British chargé at Madrid, Henry Vaughn, worried about such a possibility. The former had cautioned Lord Castlereagh against committing too many Portuguese troops in the fight against Napoleon in March, 1815, because

"modern Spaniards [did not] have more principle than those who went before them; and they could not withstand the temptation of the offer of the conquest and possession of Portugal..." (31).

Toward the end of that year the chargé discussed with Cevallos his fears of an attack because of the strengthening of the Army of the Reserve and of the points where the troops were to be formed (32). Now, that craving for annexation would override protests about Spain's unpreparedness for launching the attack (33). And most Spaniards, whom Wellington on more than one occasion accused of "thirst(ing) for military reputation" (34), might be willing to "relinquish the whole Continent of America" for the unification of the Peninsula (35).

Londoners read dramatic accounts of the feeling and expectations of Spaniards. The *Courier* concluded that

(29). — *Diario de las sesiones de cortes* (Madrid: J. A. Garcia, 1871), 2 April 1821, II, 849.

(30). — *Courier* (London), 29 July; 19 August; 3 September 1816; *The Times*, *Liverpool Mercury*, VI, 6 September 1816; the Spanish ambassador reported these notices to his government, Count Fernán Núñez to Cevallos, no. 1030, 10 September 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.

(31). — Wellington to Castlereagh, 24 March 1815, Extract, *Castlereagh Papers*, X, 322-323.

(32). — Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 22, 8 October 1815, FO 72/177.

(33). — Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 85, 5 September 1816, FO 72/187; Wellington to Beresford, 15 October 1816, WSD, XI, 511-514.

(34). — Wellington to Castlereagh, Extract, 24 March 1815, *Castlereagh Papers*, X, 322-323; to Beresford, 11 February 1817, WSD, XI, 627-629.

(35). — Wellesley to Castlereagh, Private, 15 June 1817, FO 72/198.

"there [was] only one voice in Spain.... *The Portuguese troops have entered the territory of Monte-Video, let us enter Portugal, we shall withdraw when they evacuate ours*". (Italics in original).

Others informed readers that the war would be most popular because the country was demoralized and might gain compensation for the lost American territories. It seemed, moreover, that Count Abisbal's forces stationed in Andalusia in preparation for embarking for the Plata were more disposed to fight in Portugal rather than America (36).

The Duke of Wellington, too, expected Spain to retaliate. As Commander-in-chief of the Allied Army of Occupation, he kept abreast of affairs in Europe and America. Being stationed at Paris enabled him to maintain a wide circle of European acquaintances and be intimate with representatives of the Allied Powers. Because of his prestige, Spanish and Portuguese diplomats as well as their home governments endeavored to sway him. He argued that even the recent marriages could not dampen the yearning to reunite the Peninsula. And in the light of the aggression in America, the delaying tactics of Portugal at Paris, and D. João's refusal to supply satisfactory explanations a Spanish invasion would be only a matter of time, in spite of the Allies (37).

Spaniards, themselves, demanded a more aggressive stand by their government. If the remarks of Álvaro Flórez Estrada, at the time in exile in London, are any indication, then the émigrés, too, felt that only an attack would protect national honor (38). At least two diplomats concurred. Pedro Gómez Labrador wrote from Paris that Spain should exact satisfaction for Portugal's perfidy and discount any opposition from Great Britain. He considered the Tagus and Duero rivers natural boundaries, just as Brazil insisted on the Río de la Plata.

(36). — *Courier*; *The Times*, 8 May 1817; *Morning Chronicle*, 9, 12 May 1817.

(37). — Wellington to Castlereagh, 27 September 1816; to Beresford, 15 October 1816; 11 February 1817, WSD, XI, 497-498, 511-514, 627-629; to Beresford, 28 February 1818; to Castlereagh, 22 March 1818, WSD, XII, 351-352, 430-432.

(38). — "Representacion hecha a S. M. C. El Senor Don Fernando VII en defensa de las Cortes", 8 October 1818, in *Obras de Alvaro Florez Estrada* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 1958), II, 194-195.

From Brussels came Miguel de Alava's support for an immediate attack (39).

Meanwhile at Madrid the circle at Court pushed for military action. At first glance the royal family appeared to be divided. The King favored a call for national mobilization (40). His consort, however, opposed such a rash step. Erving reported that she had

"succeeded at times (underlined in original) in assuaging the King's resentment" (41).

But she soon became of his mind. Henry Wellesley reported to London that he had heard from Pizarro, who reiterated the same in his mémoires (42), that the Queen

"espoused the interest of . . . the Spanish nation, in preference to every other tie" and supported all measures "felt to be necessary upon this aggression of Portugal" (43).

The overwhelming support for military action quickly dispelled any of the new First Secretary's reservations. Pizarro's remarks to the British ambassador heightened prospects for an imminent invasion, one which might produce an easy victory and enhance his standing at Court, although Wellington had cautioned him that

"the little glory resulting from it will belong to the General who conducts it" (44).

If the conquered territories were not restored he gave notice to Wellesley that the King should not be expected

"to continue in the system of forbearance to which had been compelled by his recent alliance with the Court of Brazil".

(39). — Labrador to Pizarro, 24 January 1817, in Jerónimo Bécker, *Historia de las relaciones exteriores de España durante el siglo xix* (Madrid: Jaime Ratés, 1924), I, 413; Francisco Pagés y Belloc, *Algunas noticias de las ultimas negociaciones acerca de la independencia de la America Española continental* (Sevilla: Eulogio de las Heras, 1917), p. 10n.

(40). — *Memorias de Pizarro*, I, 221-222.

(41). — Erving to Monroe, no. 21, 8 October; no. 26, 15 December 1816, DSS 31/15.

(42). — *Memorias de Pizarro*, I, 220.

(43). — Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 4, Most Secret and Confidential, 20 December 1816, FO 72/188; Private, 18 March 1817, FO 72/198.

(44). — Wellington to Beresford, 11 February 1817, WSD, XI, 627-629.

The Secretary was adamant, even minimizing Britain's avowed intention to honor her guaranty of Portugal's European dominions. He stated that

"none of the ... ministers could, consistently with their duty, recommend a line of conduct which would hold him [the King] up to Europe in a dishonorable light" and that England's pledge would not prevent Ferdinand from "taking reprisals when his territories were invaded without any kind of explanation ... and at a moment when a double marriage had been concluded" (45).

Wellesley found the attitude and language of the government hostile and irrational throughout, with

"the only hope ... of an amicable settlement through the interference of the mediating Powers" (46).

Even the Russian minister at Madrid seemed unable to persuade officials to adopt a more conciliatory stand (47).

Spain chose a propitious time to plan an attack. No prize was more alluring than her unprotected and distraught neighbor. After eight years of war Portugal was in a state of disorganization from which only years of peace and ordered government could rescue her.

But relations between the Court at Rio and the Regency in Lisbon were strained. All signs indicated that D. João contrived to get rid of his European yoke in order to take up the cudgels in America. The plight of Portugal did not concern the monarch or his ministers, and its defenses concerned them less. Wellington wrote that while agreeing with D. João's intention to remain in Brazil until things in Spanish America quieted down, he believed the monarch preferred to lose Portugal rather than his American possessions (48). The quick conquest of Montevideo but the defenselessness and abandonment of the ancestral home further indicated that the ruler had

"no feeling for any risk or injury to the latter [Portugal] resulting from his measures of aggrandisement (*sic*) of the former

(45). — Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 2, 16 December 1816, FO 72/188; no. 8, 8 January 1817, FO 72/197.

(46). — Wellesley to Castlereagh, 23 January 1818, *Castlereagh Papers*, XI, 398-399.

(47). — Wellesley to Castlereagh, 21 June; 25 June, 1818, *ibid.*, 453-455, 457-458.

(48). — Wellington to Castlereagh, 19 December 1817, WSD, XII, 197.

(Brazil); nay that its total loss [was] contemplated as possible and even probable, and not regretted" (49).

D. João openly affronted his subjects across the Atlantic. He invited the chief noblemen to fix their residence in America; encouraged wealthy merchants with temptations to emigrate with their capital and skill; and bribed artisans with promises of full employment and liberal wages (50). At least one of D. João's principal advisers, Conde da Barca, and a leader of one of the factions initially opposed to a policy of aggrandizement averred that a Spanish invasion of Portugal and its possible repercussions in Europe were of no concern to Rio (51). They carried out their schemes in America by making incessant demands for funds and troops at a time when the Regency could scarcely find money to pay civilian and military personnel or to refund the war debt (52).

The feeling of contempt for the ancient kingdom irritated people in Portugal. Lisbon seethed with resentment toward the transplanted Court. Many were still fuming over D. João's decision to elevate the colony to the status of Kingdom equal to Portugal in rank. These ominous signs indicated to them that the former colony had outstripped the Metropolis and that the latter would be left to the mercy of its ambitious neighbor. They gave credence to reports of

"a sale having taken place, in which the Portuguese, like bullocks [had] been transferred from their old master to FERDINAND (capitals original) in return for the acquisitions the former [D. João] has already made, and may in the future make" (53).

The Regents feuded with Rio, moreover, about the powers delegated to Beresford, the Commander-in-chief of Portugal's army, who refused to take orders from them and frequently acted without consulting the Regency.

(49). — Wellington to Beresford, 28 February 1818, *ibid.*, 351-352.

(50). — *The Times*, 2 May 1817.

(51). — Chamberlain to Castlereagh, Secret, 31 March 1817, FO 63/202; Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 5 April 1817, in Charles K. Webster (ed.) *Britain and the Independence of Latin America: 1810-1830* (2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1939), I, 180-183.

(52). — Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, no. 463, 2/14 June 1817, *Sbornik*, CXIX, 228-232; *The Times*, 6 May 1817; *The News*, 17 August 1817; Beresford to Wellington, 23 November; 9 December 1817, WSD, XII, 135-137, 185.

(53). — *The News*, 26 October 1817.

On one occasion at least one English newspaper captured the people's utter exasperation. *The Times* of 6 May 1817 reported that when the King was proclaimed at Lisbon,

"the populace and the army were unmoved" and only the Staff Officers shouted "Long live the King".

That enmity pervaded the upper classes too. They took umbrage at the monarch's utter disregard for the ancient kingdom and at remarks attributed to his counsellors. The snubs heightened their rage. Some principal families and high officials attempted to counter this gravitation toward America by giving serious thought to and working actively toward a union with Spain (54).

Between March and May, 1817, two revolutionary rumblings rocked D. João's outwardly tranquil empire and enhanced the chances of Spain's prospects for an easy victory. The first at Pernambuco, Brazil, achieved more notoriety because it was bloodier; troops had to be sent to quell the disturbances. The conspiracy at Lisbon, which was nipped in the bud and seemed directed not only against Beresford and the predominant English influence there but also against Rio, included some of the principal families of the kingdom and had repercussions in other parts of the country (55). Following as it did on the heels of the one in Brazil, it gave rise to speculation that rebel leaders had maintained contact. For after hearing news of the disorders across the Atlantic Portuguese merchants at Lisbon immediately became apprehensive about political turmoil at home which might damage the country's commercial relations and hints were thrown out to British merchants to

"be cautious as to the magnitude of their shipments for Lisbon" (56).

The successive events alarmed Portugal's ally, Great Britain, who feared that the chaos of the Spanish empire might spill over into D.

(54). — Beresford to Wellington, 7 November 1816, WSD, XIV, 642-644; 23 November 1817, WSD, XII, 135-137; Wellington to Beresford, 15 May 1817, WSD, XI, 680-681; 28 October 1817, WSD, XII, 116-117; to Castlereagh, 19 December 1817, WSD, XII, 197; Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 40, Secret and Confidential, 17 March 1817, FO 72/198; *Morning Chronicle*, 9 July 1817; Pozzo di Borgo to Count Capodistrias, Private, 8/20 January 1818, *Sbornik*, CXIX, 568-571.

(55). — Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, no. 463, 2/14 June 1817, *Sbornik*, CXIX, 228-232; Private, 2/14 June 1817, *ibid.*, 235-237; to Capodistrias, Private, 2/14 June 1817, *ibid.*, 237-239; *Courier*, 28 June 1817.

(56). — *The Times*, 2 May 1817; *The News*, 4 May 1817.

João's. To prevent the possibility of that happening, Lord Castlereagh even suggested steps which D. João should take

“under the present critical state of his dominions”,

one apparently being his return to Europe (57).

José Pizarro gloated over the state of neglect into which Portugal had fallen and the internal strife. The dream of reuniting the Peninsula was within grasp. Even Allied opposition could be brushed aside by asserting that the invasion was intended to defend national honor, which even one London paper found justifiable if Ferdinand had not any forewarning of the American incursion (58).

To insure the success of the venture, the Secretary dispatched General Javier Cabanes to reconnoiter. His orders were to assess the climate of opinion regarding the attack, estimate the nation's military capability, and contact the “Spanish party”. The general's report intensified the mushrooming martial sentiment (59).

After studying the intelligence, Pizarro decided to put his plan into execution. He consulted the Ministers of War and Finance. The latter promised to allocate funds despite the bankrupt treasury. The Minister of War, on the other hand, opposed the scheme, criticizing the plans of operation and protesting the unpreparedness of the armed forces (60).

At first the arguments of the Minister of War fell on deaf ears. Spanish statecraft deemed it expedient to achieve peace by preparing for war. The government prepared the foreign psychological climate for an impending invasion. Madrid considered this a principal objective, at least with regard to official and public opinion in Great Britain, reckoned by her to be the pivotal power of the European alliance. For the moment London worried about a conflict and the movement of troops along the Spanish-Portuguese borders. The threat prompted Castlereagh and Wellington to keep Beresford in Portugal until the crisis passed (61).

(57). — Castlereagh to Chamberlain, 9 June 1817, FO 63/201; Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, no. 463, 2/14 June 1817, *Sbornik*, CXIX, 228-232.

(58). — *Memorias de Pizarro*, I, 221; *The Times*, 14 January 1817.

(59). — *Memorias de Pizarro*, I, 222; Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 40, Secret and Confidential, 17 March 1817, FO 72/198.

(60). — *Memorias de Pizarro*, I, 221-222.

(61). — Count Fernán Núñez to Cevallos, no. 1054, 27 September 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98; Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, no. 554, 19/31 October 1817, *Sbornik*, CXIX, 421-425; Wellington to Beresford, 28 February; 27 April 1818, WSD, XII, 351-352, 502-503.

By exciting fears of another general conflagration, Madrid expected to goad the Allies into accepting its position and forcing Portugal to relinquish the conquered territory. Furthermore, a climate fraught with anxiety might produce an atmosphere of resignation to an attack on the part of the public in many countries and preclude the possibility of a popular outcry if and when hostilities broke out.

For Spain itself, the domestic implications of the policy were also significant, perhaps as significant as the international ramifications. By arousing latent jingoism the Fernandine government would divert attention from internal problems.

Disquieting rumors of a national mobilization and of actual troop maneuvers began to circulate in European capitals as early as Fall, 1816. These would continue unabated for at least another fifteen months, despite the fact that the Paris Conference had agreed to mediate the dispute. Official sources and British newspapers, more often than not asserting their source to be Paris papers, consciously or unconsciously abetted Spain's cause. The weeklies and dailies bombarded readers with news of an impending attack and of soldiers parading up and down the Spanish countryside. The news sources in particular questioned one another's military expertise but on the whole their accounts differed little from official correspondence. All presented inflated estimates of Spanish troops actually involved in military maneuvers. To these correspondents Spain planned a pincer attack—one army entering from Ciudad Rodrigo or Zamora in Leon and the other crossing from Badajoz or Olivenza in Estremadura.

Little doubt existed of troop movements and provisions being readied for an attack, but at the same time a crisscross of contradictory orders were being issued. At least during those fifteen months the main areas of conflict among the writers centered on the number of troops actually so engaged, the points of assemblage, and the motives behind Spain's actions. For example, apparently the government planned to conscript between 40,000 and 60,000 men (62). Thereafter estimates varied — from 54,000 to 8,000 — of those actually engaged in maneuvers and headed toward the frontiers. The latter reduced number included Count Abisbal's expeditionary force in Andalusia which originally had been destined for South America but would be held back until existing differences with Portugal were settled (63).

(62). — Erving to Monroe, no. 16, 29 August 1816, DSS 31/15.

(63). — Wellington to Castlereagh, 27 September 1816, WSD, XI, 497-498; Beresford to Wellington, 26 September; 11 October; 23 November 1817, WSD, XII, 81-82, 90-91, 135-137; to Colonel D'Urban, 17 September; 2 October 1817, WSD, XII, 101, 103-104; Colonel Mozinho (at Elvas) to Beresford

A reason given for the movement of troops from Andalusia to Estremadura, which the British press reported too, was the poor harvest. Beresford dismissed these Spanish claims by asserting that the harvest was worse in Estremadura (64). Reports circulated in Great Britain, moreover, of Spain starting hostilities (65).

Spanish troop maneuvers alarmed the Commander-in-chief of Portugal's army. Members of the Regency did not share Beresford's concern and discounted any menace from their neighbor. The conflict over recruitment and providing for the defenses of the kingdom further served to underscore the Regency's resentment of Beresford in particular and of British meddling in general.

The British were still smarting from the Regents' earlier refusal to commit the army, largely British financed, in the renewed war against Napoleon in 1815 (66). Their recalcitrance in wartime prompted Lord Liverpool to consider seriously cutting off any subsidy to the Portuguese army in peacetime (67).

Marshal Lord Beresford's feelings differed little from his government's. Contrasting the preparations going on in Spain with those in Portugal, he wrote

"With such miserable creatures as we have now for Governors, the Lord preserve us from getting into a war" (68).

He had been particularly irritated by the fact that any one dared question his military acumen. D. João's remarks had given him cause to believe that in such matters he had a free hand and the army of the line would be increased to 56,000 men (69). That plans were afoot

(at Lisbon), 13 September; to Dom. M. P. Forjaz (at Lisbon), 15 September 1817, WSD, XII, 100-102; Erving to John Quincy Adams, no. 45, 1 October 1817, DSS 31/16; *The Times*, 26 March; 19 May; 31 October 1817; *Morning Chronicle*, 9 May; 18 October; 23 October 1817; *Courier*, 17 May; 23 June; 21 October; 23 October; 3 November; 11 November 1817; *The Scotsman*, 25 October 1817.

(64). — Beresford to D'Urban, 2 October 1817, WSD, XII, 103-104; *Morning Chronicle*, 13 October; 20 October 1817.

(65). — *Morning Chronicle*, 10 May; 12 May; 20 October 1817; *The News*, 11 May 1817; *Courier*, 10 May 1817; *Liverpool Mercury*, VI, 16 May 1817.

(66). — Castlereagh to George Canning, Draft, 22 June 1815, *Castlereagh Papers*, X, 383-384.

(67). — Lord Liverpool to Castlereagh, 31 July 1815, *ibid.*, p. 448.

(68). — Beresford to Wellington, 9 December 1817, WSD, XII, 184-185.

(69). — Beresford to Castlereagh, 24 November 1815, FO 63/188.

to increase the regular army to 57.000 without counting the militia was reported by the Spanish minister at Lisbon (70).

The Regents demurred and showed little inclination to improve the country's preparedness. Even the threat from across the border did not provoke a reversal of policy; only token increases in mobilization were undertaken. Both Wellington and Beresford objected to the Regents' shortsightedness. The Duke had recommended getting the army on a solid footing and taking all precautions against the unpredictable Spaniards. That might deter an invasion, at only a slight expense to Portugal

"and the Portuguese well deserve to be burthened (*sic*) with it, for their folly and their insolent ingratitude to Great Britain, and unattention to the advice of us all" (71).

The Marshal protested, in addition, that twenty-four squadrons of indifferent cavalry and approximately 10.000 infantry could not defend the territory from Lagos to Braganza (72).

The government did take some steps. It increased the garrison at Elvas and ordered several regiments to form a line of cantonments on the other side of the Guadiana and along the frontiers of the kingdom of Leon (73).

These minimum reinforcements necessitated a herculean effort. The Regency's financial straits and the troops requisitioned by Rio created serious problems. The military were not paid their arrears and because of a poor harvest received barely enough food. Soldiers displayed an unwillingness to embark for America and desertions were rife. They were aware of and discouraged and disillusioned by the hardships and privations suffered by their comrades in the Banda Oriental. On at least one occasion Beresford intervened to quell mutmurings among the troops, who agreed to ship off only after being promised it would be a three year stint (74). Once on the other side

(70). — Manuel de Lardizábal y Montoya to Cevallos, 5 October 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98.

(71). — Wellington to Beresford, 11 February 1817, WSD, XI, 627-629; 28 October 1817, WSD, XII, 116-117.

(72). — Beresford to Wellington, 11 October 1817, WSD, XII, 90-91.

(73). — *The Times*, 26 March 1817; *Courier*, 24 May; 27 October 1817; *Morning Chronicle*, 20 October; 27 October 1817; *The News*, 26 October 1817.

(74). — Beresford to D'Urban, 18 September 1817, WSD, XII, 101; *Gaceta de Madrid*, 22 October 1816; *Courier*, 13 August; 16 August 1817; *The News*, 17 August; 21 September 1817. Commodore Sir William Bowles to John W. Croker, 24 May; 22 June 1817; 14 July 1818, in Gerald S. Graham and R. A. Humphreys (eds.); *The Navy and South America, 1807-1823* (London: Navy Records Society, 1962), pp. 194-196, 201-204, 240-241.

of the Atlantic some sullen troops refused to mingle with native forces, considering them cowardly and mediocre (75).

The course of events on the Peninsula saved the Regents from embarrassment and bore out their contention that a minimum of preparedness sufficed. Despite provocative military maneuvers and menacing threats, Spain did not invade.

Foreign and domestic complications forced Madrid to reconsider. Most important among the former was the influence of Great Britain. For example, Madrid received the "unswerving" support of Russia for any course of action and welcomed that country's efforts on its behalf. And for a time, other members of the Alliance appeared disposed to follow the Czar's lead (76). But it was a sterile victory. Russia was a paper tiger and not to be trusted as an ally. She deserted Spain on most issues which would have provoked a confrontation with Great Britain. Now that the pivotal power of Europe opposed Madrid's bellicose moves the other countries quickly fell into line. British policy set the pattern for the rest. And Lord Castlereagh had established guidelines soon after hostilities broke-out in America. To dampen Spain's expansionist dreams London let it be known that its guaranty of D. João's European possessions would be honored, at least until the monarch had a chance to explain. The Prince Regent refused, moreover, any proposal for unilateral intervention but preferred to make this a violation of the Treaty of Vienna and on this ground invited the other powers to concur in offering mediation to settle all difficulties between the two. By charting this course, the Foreign Minister hoped to exert pressure on Spain to adopt a more liberal system of government in the rebellious colonies (77).

Unquestionably England's official posture acted as a deterrent on Spain. Domestic considerations, however, proved of more consequence.

(75). — Luiz Joaquim dos Santos Marrocos in Brazil to his father in Portugal, 3 November; 15 November 1815; 23 February 1816 (copies, Oliveira Lima Library).

(76). — Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, 18/30 December 1816, *Sbornik*, CXII (1901), 730-732; Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, 2/14 February 1817, *ibid.*, CXIX, 61-63; Lord Stewart to Sir Charles Stuart, copy, 6 February 1817, FO 7/134; to Castlereagh, no. 22, enclosure, 14 February 1817, FO 7/135.

(77). — Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst, 26 October 1816, *Castlereagh Papers*, XI, 307-309; to Fernán Núñez, n. d. December 1816, *ibid.*, 332-335; same to same, 17 December 1816, FO 72/191; Fernán Núñez, to Cevallos, no. 1043, 17 September; no. 1047, 24 September 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98; to Pizarro, 18 December 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98; Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, 3/15 March 1817, *Sbornik*, CXIX, 83-85; "Memoire en reponse aux communications de la Cour d'Autriche", St. Petersburg, 3/15 April 1817, *ibid.*, 129-133; Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, 5/17 April 1817, *ibid.*, 134-136.

The King had returned from exile in 1814 to find the nation prostrate and weary. The six year struggle against the French had left its scars. The country had been decimated by war and debilitated by the flight of thousands for political reasons. Furthermore, the treasury was empty. The government faced problems of economic and military recovery and of flagging national morale. To exacerbate the situation internal dissention and political animosities heightened divisions within the nation.

Ferdinand could not cope with the situation. His fiscal and political policies aggravated rather than ameliorated things. The consequences of these policies were catastrophic for the nation but for the military in particular. Military forces were neither prepared nor dependable, as the Minister of War had argued cogently in opposition to the invasion. Officers were discontented, military rolls inflated, troops poorly paid, and morale was low.

An undercurrent of discontent gripped some segments of society. Real and imaginary schemes to topple the government, assassinate the King or high officials, or proclaim the Constitution of 1812 increased tension. Military personnel led some of the revolts, one of which resulted in the ouster of the Minister of War. Many of the leaders had gained prominence in the War of Independence. Prominent civilians were also implicated. The poorer classes, in general, refrained from active participation. Even though the government quickly suppressed them, the uprisings disrupted national political life (78).

Notwithstanding the state of the military, troops continued to engage in maneuvers along the borders. Count Abisbal's corps, however, had been delayed in reaching Estremadura, one reason, which Beresford tended to discount, being their

“unwillingness to march without being paid their arrears”
(79).

(78). — Erving to Monroe, Private and Confidential, 31 August 1816, DSS 31/15; Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 20, 24 September 1815, FO 72/177; Wellesley to Castlereagh, Private and Confidential, 9 May 1817; no. 82, 26 June 1817, FO 72/198; Private and Confidential, 10 September 1818, FO 72/212; Vázquez Papers, MSS, 432, fols. 56-62; José Luis Comellas, *Los primeros pronunciamientos en España, 1814-1820* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1958); *Memorias de Pizarro*, I, 217; *Courier*, 2 May; 8 May; 20 May 1817; *The Times*, 8 May 1817; *Morning Chronicle*, 25 April 1817.

(79). — Beresford to D'Urban, 2 October 1817, WSD, XII, 103-104.

Eventually only 4.000 arrived, well below the exaggerated original estimates. And Count Abisbal remained in Andalusia (80).

The tactic of parading soldiers up and down the countryside might, indeed, have been mere show, in keeping with the government's attempt to achieve peace by preparing for war. Even if the military were not in a deplorable state, Madrid could not divert troops at the moment for a European venture. The conflagration across the Atlantic and the expansionist aims of the United States concerned officials and the King. As early as November, 1816, Ferdinand received a report on the state of the empire and a list of priorities to tackle. One urgent problem was the sending of troops to America. The government needed to make a concerted effort to send 4.000 troops to protect Chile from the insurgents of Buenos Aires and another 12.000 to fortify New Spain against a possible invasion from the United States. To permit these vast undertakings, it was recommended that Ferdinand reach an accord with his father-in-law but

"on no account to have recourse to hostilities" (81).

Military considerations aside, the Spanish monarch had other reasons for adopting a moderate course. Some evidence exists that Ferdinand and D. João reached a tacit agreement about their respective possessions. Such an understanding would have proven beneficial to both and have allowed them, for the moment, to concentrate on more pressing matters. Ferdinand found a convenient escape for his frustration with the turn of events in America and his unsuccessful attempts to squash the rebellions. After setting his house in order on the Peninsula he could more readily turn his attention to the distraught colonies, losing nothing in the interim.

Just as D. João would have helped him out of a predicament so Ferdinand would repay his father-in-law in kind. The Court at Rio seemed little affected by events on the Peninsula. If they could forfeit the ancient kingdom to their neighbor by an act that appeared to be beyond the Regent's control all the better. D. João could justify residing in Brazil without being accused of shirking his responsibilities in Portugal. Consequently, he had delayed responding to demands made on him to explain the attack. The monarch wanted to see Great Britain's reaction to events in America as well as her attitude toward a possible counterattack by Spain. When London voiced its opposition, D. João decided to keep his newly acquired territories and justify his

(80). — Beresford to Wellington, 9 December 1817, *ibid.*, 184-185.

(81). — Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 117, 12 November 1816, FO 72/188.

actions accordingly — the easier done, since he could make a convincing case.

That Ferdinand tacitly consented to the arrangement would not be out of character. He often acted on important matters of state without consulting the Minister concerned, who sometime found himself faced with a *fait accompli*. As early as September, 1815, rumors of secret accords between the two monarchs began to circulate at Rio. One report inferred that Ferdinand and Don Carlos had agreed to dispense with the promised dowry owing to D. João's financial straits (82). Another, the following month, accused the Spanish monarch of promising as part of the marriage contracts to cede

"the fine country lying between Rio Grande and the plate (sic) river, ... [provided] they could conquer it" (83).

Even the King's sister reported to her brother and Pedro Cevallos in June, 1816, that she had heard that Ferdinand had acquiesced to the expedition (84).

General Lecór's second proclamation to the inhabitants of the invaded territory referred to the existence of such an accord. This averred that Spain and Portugal were acting in concert, with Madrid making a complete transfer of the region to the King of Portugal. If not true, at least the assertion represented keen political acumen on part of the invading army (85).

British newspapers printed contradictory reports about a secret pact. These started as early as September, 1816, with the assertion by *The Times* that Spain had agreed to cede the Banda Oriental on condition that Ferdinand receive

"by way of dowry ... confirmed possession of the province of Olivenza, ..." (86).

The same paper concluded the following month that D. João's indifference to Spanish troop movements strengthened

(82). — Luiz Joaquim dos Santos Marrocos in Brazil to his father in Portugal, 18 September 1815 (copies, Oliveira Lima Library).

(83). — Mr. Samuel Bennett to Castlereagh, 29 November 1815, FO 63/188.

(84). — Carlota to Cevallos, 15 June 1816, AGI, Estado, leg. 98; to Ferdinand, n. d. June 1816, in Seco Serrano, *op. cit.*, pp. 454-455.

(85). — *The Times*, 17 January 1817; *Courier*, 17 January 1817.

(86). — *The Times*, 6 September 1816.

"the suspicion . . . of a pending negotiation between the two Crowns for exchanging the European possessions of the House of Braganza against more extensive territories in South America" (87).

Shortly thereafter came the denials. Three papers refuted the contention that Spain had consented to the Brazilian occupation or made any secret agreement about a barter (88).

At Madrid the same type of contradictory rumors gripped government officials and foreign diplomats. The Council of State learned of a possible accord from their chargé at Rio. Andrés Villalba wrote, according to Cevallos, that D. João had attempted to defend the invasion on grounds that his interests "were closely bound" to Spain's and that he merely intended to keep his pledge to his son-in-law (89).

More conclusive evidence, or so they thought, was forthcoming. Ferdinand did not demonstrate the stamina and decisiveness demanded by the counsellors and the nation-at-large. Special sessions of the Council were not called, at least more than once. And after October, 1816, the King removed the controversy from the jurisdiction of the Council. As if to underscore his nonchalance, Ferdinand's letter to D. João did not take the form of an ultimatum but rather of a

"most temperate remonstrance against any premeditated attack upon his territories in South America" (90).

In foreign circles the question seemed equally confusing. George Erving appeared more baffled than his British counterpart, Henry Wellesley. At first the United States envoy reported that Luis de Onís, Spain's minister at Washington, confided and "equally good authority here (Madrid)" had later confirmed that by the "marriage treaty Portugal was ceded to Spain". Within five weeks, Erving denied the existence of an accord (91).

Wellesley turned out to be more consistent and eventually Erving came around to his way of thinking and to that of some Spaniards

(87). — 3 October 1816.

(88). — *The Times*, 24 May; 29 May 1817; *Courier*, 14 January; 23 May; 29 May 1817; *Liverpool Mercury*, VI, 30 May 1817.

(89). — Minutes of the Council of State, 20 August 1816, AHN, Estado, lib. 18d.

(90). — Vaughn to Castlereagh, no. 111, 4 November 1816, FO 72/188.

(91). — Erving to Monroe, no. 16, 29 August; no. 21, 8 October 1816, DSS 31/15.

who tended to accept the "collusion theory" rather than Pizarro's categorical denial of any connivance. They found common ground in Ferdinand's treatment of his staunch supporter and former Minister of the Indies, Miguel de Lardizábal y Uribe. Even after the King abolished his post the prime mover in the marriage negotiations continued to be a confidant and to attend meetings of the Council of State. He was banished later when a letter he had written about intrigues at Court and Ferdinand's penchant for accepting advice from mediocre and malicious persons appeared in a gazette in the colonies.

His continued confinement after the arrival of the princesses increased speculation inside and outside of Spain that Lardizábal had private knowledge of some accord between Ferdinand and D. João. The *Morning Chronicle* claimed that troops had entered Spanish territory

"under an express treaty made with the late Minister Lardizabal, by which the King of Spain cedes to them the whole Eastern Bank of the river Plate, on condition that they shall cooperate with the Lima army, in order to pacify the Western Bank, and restore it to its former allegiance" (92).

In a similar vein although not with such finality Wellesley concluded that Lardizábal possessed

"secrets, the disclosure of which would be embarrassing to the King" and "might afford a pretext for the conduct of the government of Brazil" (93).

His United States counterpart now concluded that with "Lardizábal banished the head of the ostrich was hidden". For when the Council of State confronted Ferdinand with details concerning

"the authority on which Mr. Lardizabal had acted", he "did not deny his signature, but ... had forgotten the whole affair" (94).

Whatever the cause, whether of a military or non-military character, the fact remains — Spain did not retaliate in Portugal. Further-

(92). — 15 January 1817.

(93). — Wellesley to Castlereagh, no. 8, 30 December 1816, FO 72/188.

(94). — Erving to the Secretary of State, no. 30, Private and Confidential, 6 April 1817, DSS 31/16.

more, Ferdinand lost the Banda Oriental and never pacified the Plata region, not to mention the whole empire. The United States minister had clearly discerned one of the government's major handicaps — inability to adopt resolute measures. Early in December, 1816, he wrote,

“While Brazil on one side, and the independents on all sides, are acting; (*sic*) here [Madrid] they are deliberating and re-considering” (95).

(95). — Erving to Monroe, no. 26, 15 December 1816, DSS 31/15.