

Travel Motivation: considerations from the theoretical assumptions of Pecheutien discourse analysis

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Abstract

This study offers a contribution for discourse analysis in the field of tourism. Recognizing the diverse and contradictory conditions of the academic production on this field of knowledge, our aim was to question how travel motivation is produced as belonging to the individual. Therefore, affiliated to the theoretical-methodological device of discourse analysis proposed by Michel Pêcheux, we present the individual of the unconscious as the one responsible for dislocating, as it is the order of desire. That said, we place travel motivation in opposition to the displacement of the desiring individual. Travel motivation, which is shown as the theater of consciousness, is an ideological effect produced by the interpellation of the individual as a tourist, whose evidences of itself and meanings are used to control, censor, and curtail the individual's desire. This ideological production is related to the fulfillment of the dominant ideology within tourism, performed as an Ideological State apparatus, responsible for the reproduction of the production relations, which are capitalist exploitation relations, in which the individual's desire has no place.

Keywords: Tourism; Discourse analysis; Travel motivation; Displacement; Ideology.

Resumo

Motivação de Viagem: uma problematização a partir dos pressupostos teóricos da análise do discurso pecheutiana

Este trabalho se propõe a oferecer uma contribuição da análise do discurso para os estudos no campo do turismo. Reconhecendo a condição plural e contraditória da produção do conhecimento neste campo do saber, buscamos problematizar o modo como a motivação de viagem é produzida como própria do sujeito. Dessa forma, filiados ao dispositivo teórico-metodológico da análise do discurso proposta por Michel Pêcheux, apresentamos o sujeito do inconsciente como sendo aquele que se desloca, pois é da ordem do desejo. Com isso, posicionamos a motivação de viagem em oposição ao deslocamento do sujeito desejante. A motivação de viagem, apresentada como o teatro da consciência, é um efeito ideológico produzido pela interpelação do sujeito como turista, cujas evidências de si e dos sentidos servem para controlar, censurar e cercear o próprio desejo do sujeito. Essa produção ideológica está ligada à realização da ideologia dominante no interior do turismo, apresentado como aparelho ideológico de Estado, responsável pela reprodução das relações de produção, que são as relações de exploração capitalistas, nas quais o desejo dos sujeitos não possui lugar.

Palavras-chave: Turismo; Análise do discurso; Motivação de viagem; Deslocamento; Ideologia.

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Resumen

Motivación de viaje: una problematización desde los presupuestos teóricos de la análisis del discurso pecheutiana

Este trabajo se propone a ofertar una contribución del análisis del discurso para los estudios en el campo del turismo. Reconociendo la condición plural y contradictoria de la producción del conocimiento en este campo del saber, buscamos problematizar el modo como la motivación de viaje es producida como propia del sujeto. De esa forma, afiliados al dispositivo teórico-metodológico del análisis del discurso propuesta por Michel Pêcheux, presentamos el sujeto del inconsciente como siendo aquel que se desplaza, pues es de la orden del deseo. Con eso, posicionamos la motivación de viaje en oposición al desplazamiento del sujeto deseante. La motivación de viaje presentada como el teatro de la conciencia, es un efecto ideológico producido por la interpelación del sujeto como turista, cuyas evidencias de sí y de los sentidos, sirven para controlar, censurar y cercar el propio deseo del sujeto. Esa producción ideológica está conectada a la realización de la ideología dominante en el interior del turismo, presentado como aparato ideológico de Estado, responsable por la reproducción de las relaciones de producción, que son las relaciones de explotación capitalistas, en las cuales el deseo de los sujetos no posee lugar.

Palabras clave: Turismo; Análisis del discurso; Motivación de viaje; Desplazamiento; Ideología.

INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS

Tourism, as a result of its multifaceted condition, is a multidisciplinary field of study, which can be looked at from different theoretical lenses. Some researchers even consider the possibility of situating it in a transdisciplinary dimension, though the hegemony of some subjects over others is recognized. This condition, which is not perceived as unfavorable, has imposed some difficulties on tourism scholars in what refers to the conceptual construction of the field, considered necessary for the delineation of an epistemological framework. It is possible that these delineations shall (never) be achieved, but maybe they should not even be desired – or maybe they should. To reflect, however, on and by this *mise-en-scène* is essential to the position we occupy as researchers.

We might think that our richness as a research field is this: a grand patchwork quilt made with treads of different materials, embroideries, textures, and colors. Thus, we would be our duty to carry out the hard work of analyzing, questioning, and transforming the processes by which tourism is developed. We can think of each piece, tread, and embroidery of this fabric from the different theoretical hands that produce it, from different historical periods, and under different paradigms. To deny this condition is to deny knowledge construction, especially in the field of tourism. It is the same as resorting to an impoverished reproduction of the non-thinking or of cynical thinking (Laureano, 2015). It is to assume the possibility of existence of a homogeneous, solid, and transparent reason, capable of giving us the power to answer all riddles.

We must, however, recognize the efforts made this far with greater or lesser degree of acceptance. No study, no matter how clever, is produced without a theoretical reference to support it. This is exactly the criticism we propose in this introduction. To understand and guide human displacement, we end up being

guided by the economic system to which we are an apparatus. Even though we have, to some extent, awakened to its destructive effects, we are still trying to rationalize it and make it palatable under the utilitarian premise of maximization of positive effects and minimization of the negative effects. We need to think about how and of what we are constituted.

It does not take great effort to understand what is being said here. As an example, we can cite Santos Filho (2005), who already identified in his book *Ontologia do turismo* [Tourism Ontology] that the foundations on which tourism stood were a reproduction of a reality outside of materiality. According to him, the concepts of entrepreneurship and sustainability, for example, mask the conditions under which our economic system exists. There is no capitalism without work precariousness, as there is no capitalism without damage to the environment.

The contradiction of knowledge production in tourism thus repeatedly consisted of ignoring the depth and context of the conceptual contributions brought by references from other fields. At the same time, such concepts were shaped, adapted, and transformed in service of the same system that allowed for them to be ignored. Initially, economic approaches predominated in our field, contextualized to benefit the current economic system. And even though other disciplines have been approximated to tourism in the course of its theoretical development, the economic dimension had – and still has – notorious domain. According to Pêcheux (2014), this is a characteristic of bourgeois ideology theories, which not only cover up “the distinction between science and non-science” (p. 69), but also seeks above all to “forget the existence of historically constituted scientific disciplines” (p. 69), aiming to “conceal the political record” (p. 111).

The bourgeois ideology, in its most completely developed form, instructs us not only about the functioning of the ideological instance in general, but also about the historical forms that preceded it. However, we should not project the bourgeois forms of interpellation over previous forms. It is not evident, for example, that interpellation always consists of applying over the individual his own determination. The individual's autonomy as “representation of the imaginary relationship” is, in fact, strictly linked to the appearance and the extent of the legal-political bourgeois ideology. (Pêcheux & Fuchs, 1975/2014, p. 162)

The contradiction thus does not arise as a place of transformation, dismissing dialectics as an engine of social change (Laureano, 2015), because “while the individual recognizes production as an historical and material foundation of society, he is also able to enjoy the fetish, of the ideological character of the expansion of capital” (Laureano, 2015, p. 475), i.e., its production/reproduction/transformation process. Therefore, recognizing this flawed, equivocal, and contradictory condition as hands weaving tourism, we seek to situate this study from an interface of three theoretical fields: psychoanalysis, historical materialism, and linguistics. These three theoretical fields were used in the late 1960s by French philosopher Michel Pêcheux on the proposition of the theoretical-methodological device of discourse analysis (DA).

Through DA, it has been sought to see tourism in an articulate way. This interface shall enable us to expose some thoughts that have been carried out within the

framework of our studies. More precisely, we want to think about the possibility of rapprochement between displacement (considered in this work as the object of tourism), the individual of the unconscious (object of psychoanalysis), and the concept of ideology (brought from historical materialism). In this study, we will carry out this approach putting in question the reasons why people travel. Our goal with this text is to ask how the reasons of these travels become reasons, how they are produced. Thus, we present displacement not only as related to space and time, but as a historical and ideological act performed by an individual that desires, and therefore exists/resists.

To put it in another way, the purpose of this text is to problematize the production of travel motivation as something inherent to the individual, since to do so, we would need to admit an individual who was centered and who possessed order of reason, an individual capable of fully controlling his own consciousness and the act of displacement. This is a central point and must be taken into consideration when reading this study. Throughout this text, motivation will be presented as an ideological effect of the “theater of consciousness”. Contrary to the motivation individual, the individual with whom we shall deal here is the individual of a desire that revolves around an impossible *jouissance*. Motivation and displacement, here, shall be showed in open opposition.

For that, we need first to present the concept and functioning of the Freudian unconscious, in which the psychic displacement happens. Then, we shall relate it to the forms of interpellation of the individual of the unconscious through ideology. And, finally, we shall expose the methods of production of meanings regarding travel motivation, briefly resuming the constructions made in tourism from cognitive-behavioral psychology and sociology to, subsequently, establish its counterpoint within our analysis.

THE INDIVIDUAL OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IS THE ONE WHO DISPLACES HIMSELF

To present the unconscious, in his first work, Sigmund Freud attempts to identify the ways with which this unconscious happens and manifests itself in the individual. For this, he uses the analysis of his patients, of art, and of himself, as a way of understanding its manifestations. For this reason, we used the studies on *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, and *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious*, in which Freud (1900/1996, 1901/1996, 1905/1996) identifies in dreams, slips, forgetfulness, misconceptions in action, mistakes, jokes etc., the manifestations by which the unconscious appears. From them, Freud starts to establish some ground rules for the operation of the unconscious.

Accompanying the Freudian incursion to the unconscious and its operation, we assume that the unconscious is not a ready or given concept, but which shows itself from the individual and, therefore, exists when the individual fails, stumbles, and/or when all that the individual does not control appears, emerges, rebounds in the surface. As the psychoanalytic theory proposes, the individual fails because he consists of a primary lack that makes him desire, and the moment when the lack install itself is the moment when the unconscious is structured.

This lack means that, to place himself within the field of language, the individual had to forgo his primordial completeness condition regarding his mother, in which nothing lacked to him. This lack is, consequently, what causes the desire, but differs from a need. This desire is the desire for completeness, i.e., of the (re)encounter with the idealized mother. Therefore, the object of desire, while it is elusive and remains hidden, as it cannot be (re)encountered, refers to the cause of desire itself (Lacan, 1960-1961/1992).

With this impossibility of (re)encountering, the individual will guide his impulses for objects that demand low investment of energy, i.e., to other objects that allow partial satisfaction of the desire, to the detriment of those objects of high investment, which cause greater suffering for the primordial desire that cannot be satisfied (Freud, 1901/1996). This process, in psychoanalysis, is called displacement (Freud, 1905/1996), which here we call psychic displacement. This in no way means that the psychic displacement experiences cannot generate suffering, but only that they present themselves as a possibility of partial gratification of an unconscious desire.

Psychic displacement is, thus, the process in which unconscious contents can be gratified, expressed, appeared, and enjoyed, even if partially. This shall be understood by Lacan (1998, p. 515) as “the transportation of meaning that metonymy demonstrates and that, since its appearance in Freud, is presented as the most appropriate means of the unconscious to outwit censorship”. This means that psychic displacement is the transportation of meaning from the primordial desire to an object of metonymic desire (Lacan, 1957-1958/1999), by which the individual may achieve some pulsional gratification, beyond that which regulates/censures his desire. Here, the power relationship among censorship, ideology, and desire stands out. That is, psychic displacement is a form of resistance to the interpellation of the individual of the unconscious, by means of which desire is controlled.

In this sense, the unconscious desire for encountering with the lost object has a direct relationship with ideology and language, since ideology is responsible for regulating/censoring the possibilities for us to symbolize our desire with language and, with that, for us to take possession of the partial gratification objects of desire to say where we can achieve our *jouissance*. This *jouissance*, in the context of psychoanalytic interpretation, can mean many possibilities of gratification of the desire of this interpellated individual, such as travelling, consuming goods and services, breaking everyday life, freeing himself, restoring the energies etc.

Desire, therefore, is interpreted here as that which moves the individual towards something, an object that marks this desire, but that differs from a need. The latter belongs to the order of satisfaction generated by corresponding objects such as, for example, food meets the nutritional needs of the body. Desire is the desire of fulfillment, of the order of the repressed, therefore, of what is not known, and can only be partly gratified through the hallucinatory fulfillment of this desire, as in dreams, or by its unfolding through fantasy (Freud, 1900/1996).

In this eternal cutting and moving, the individual does not displace only physically in time and space, but he displaces himself physically through time and space as a result of a process of psychic displacement, an unconscious process that makes the individual move toward something, even without knowing what.

As Lacan puts it (1960-1961/1992, p. 126), “loving is giving what you do not possess”, possibly to someone who does not want it.

It is, therefore, in the discursive field regulated by ideological formations that the battles of interpellation of individuals are fought, the play of forces between censorship and desire in which some objects of desire are allowed at the expense of others. Here, some meanings are allowed concerning the satisfaction of desire that allow individuals to experience moments of *jouissance*, at the same time enabling the reproduction of the capitalist production conditions.

IDEOLOGY AND THE PRODUCTION CONDITIONS OF DISPLACEMENT

In this reflective sequencing, it is indispensable to expose the way we treat the concept of reproduction of production conditions, i.e., of what reproduction and which production conditions we speak of. Louis Althusser (2003), in his study entitled *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, carries out a (re)reading of part of the Marxist work and also makes his considerations and propositions regarding a theory of ideologies in general. The author starts with two premises: no production exists without the reproduction of production conditions; and “every social formation is the result of a dominant mode of production” (Althusser, 2003, p. 54). Therefore, to produce, every social formation must reproduce the productive forces (labor force and means of production) and the existing production relations that, in class society, are the relations between the labor force and the owners of the means of production (Althusser, 2003).

The reproduction of the workforce occurs, partly, in the manner of its material way of reproduction: the salary. In addition, the workforce should make its use feasible in the production process through the reproduction of its qualification. Unlike the production systems prior to capitalism, the qualification of this production force no longer occurs on production itself, but outside it.

The reproduction of the work force does not require only a reproduction of its qualification, but at the same time a reproduction of its submission to the standards of the established order, i.e., a reproduction of the submission of workers to the dominant ideology on the part of the workers and an ability of perfectly dominating the dominant ideology on the part of the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they also ensure “by the word” the dominance of the ruling class. (Althusser, 2003, p. 58)

The reproduction of the productive forces is, therefore, the restoration of those forces to enable its use. In this scene, the concept of ideology is also presented. According to the same author, “ideology is a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 2003, p. 85). It is worth mentioning that ideology is not the real representation of the system that operates on people’s lives, but the imaginary relationship of those people with the real relations under which they exist.

In this sense, due to the material existence of ideology, Althusser (2003, p. 93) understands that “practice only exists of and under an ideology”, as well

as “ideology only exists by and for the individual”, because individuals are always subjects, since they are already always interpellated by an ideology, even before birth. “Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects” (Althusser, 2003, p. 93).

It must be so, for things to be what they should . . . ; so that the reproduction of production relations is, in the processes of production and circulation, ensured daily, within “awareness”, i.e., within the behavior of individuals-subjects, occupants of places that the social-technical division of work gives them in production, exploitation, repression, ideologization, scientific practice, etc. (Althusser, 2003, p. 104)

There is, therefore, on the part of ideology, a need to hide and camouflage all this interpellation process of the individual as a subject submissive to a double speculation structure, “subdued, subjected to a higher authority, devoid of freedom, except to freely accept submission” (Althusser, 2003, p. 104). Also, on the part of Pecheutien DA, there is a need to question how this process occurs through which the speech individual is originated, which is the individual of the unconscious interpellated by ideology, so that he can say and be said. According to Pêcheux:

If it is true that ideology “recruits” subjects among individuals. . . and that it recruits them all, it is thus necessary to understand . . . that all individuals receive as evident the meaning of what they hear and say, read or write (of what they want and what is wanted to tell them), as “speaker-individuals”: to truly understand that is the only way to avoid repeating, in the form of a theoretical analysis, “the Münchhausen effect”, placing the individual as a source of the individual, i.e., in this case we are dealing with, placing the individual of the speech as the source of the individual of the speech. (Pêcheux, 2014, p. 144, emphasis added by the author)

The processes described so far are made possible because the individual with whom we are dealing is the individual of the unconscious interpellated by ideology. We have yet to understand how ideology operates on the unconscious so that the individual is interpellated when physically displacing himself. To establish this link, between ideology and unconscious, Pêcheux (2014, p. 139, emphasis added by the author) notes that both structures dissimulate “their very existence within their own operation, producing a fabric of ‘subjective’ evidences, with the latter adjective being understood not as ‘that affect the individual’, but ‘through which the individual is constituted’”. For him, it is at this point of evidence that the delineation of a materialist theory of speech is initiated, comparing the evidence of the existence of the individual as the source or cause of himself with the evidence of the transparency of language, which dictates that what is said could only be said and meant in one way. This game of evidences is called ideological effect (Pêcheux, 2014), in reference to the concept proposed by Althusser (2003), but expanded by Pêcheux (2014).

In this relationship between evidences – the evidence of the individual and the evidence of meaning – or, as says Pêcheux (2014, p. 140, emphasis added by the author), in the “determination by which the question of the constitution of meaning joins the the constitution of the individual”, is where the interpellation

is. Through interpellation, understood as an illustration of the “theater of consciousness” (Pêcheux, 2014, p. 140), we can resume the notion of motivation and present it as an ideological effect of the individual’s interpellation. When saying this, we are localizing the motivation production outside of the individual, i.e., on ideology. To comprehend this statement, we need to resume two considerations already mentioned: ideology constitutes the individual and the individual constitutes ideology; and the ideology and the unconscious function by hiding their existence. Thus, “what happens within ideology seems to occur outside it” (Althusser, 2003, p. 97).

This implies that the individual shall find himself outside ideology, even if he is within it, being led to believe on motivation as an act of his own volition, but which in reality is a form of external control of his desire. Motivation is presented by Dejours (2012) as this attempt to control the individual, in order to direct his behavior to perform certain tasks. Motivation is, therefore, an imaginary record that dissimulates the impossibility of fulfillment of the desire, an illustration of the theater of consciousness, an illusion. It is a meaning produced around an object of desire – the travel – as a possibility of satisfaction of the unconscious desire that shall never be fulfilled. This is precisely the dialectic of the functioning of the ideological interpellation of individuals in subjects, as it presents itself as a structure that is “‘concrete’ enough to be recognized and abstract enough that it is thinkable and thought of” (Althusser, 2003, p. 96).

As a result, interpellation assumes an important role in the context of reproduction of the production relations. It shall make feasible the relationship between the State apparatus (repressive) and the State ideological apparatus (SIA), or also, the “bond between the ‘right-holder’ (the one that is in a contractual relationship with other right-holders; his peers) and the ideological individual (the one that says when talking about himself: ‘It’s me!’)” (Pêcheux, 2014, p. 140, emphasis added by the author). Thus, the evidence of existence of the individual, of the existence of his identity, becomes the result of this identification/interpellation. In this sense, the theater of consciousness operates, according to Pêcheux (2014, p. 140, emphasis added by the author), as the place where “we talk about the individual, to the individual, and before the individual can say: ‘I speak’”.

It is in this place that we seek to apprehend the individual to which we are talking about, the place where he thinks when being thought of, where he talks when being talked to, where he signifies when being signified. The theater of consciousness is where, spectacularly, the unconscious of the individual structured as language is shown (Lacan, 1964/1996), a language that pre-exists the individual (Lacan, 1998), such as ideology (Althusser, 2003).

Returning to the beginning, we showed that, to produce, in addition to the reproduction of the productive forces, all social formation shall reproduce the production relations. Althusser (2003) proposes that this reproduction of production relations is guaranteed by one of the parts that make up the society model proposed by the Marxist theory: superstructure (juridical-, political, and ideological). In other words, the reproduction of the production relations is guaranteed by the exercise of State power, either through repression, or by ideology, in different levels, but never separated from each other (Althusser, 2003, p. 73).

The State apparatuses (repressive) are institutions, generally public, constituted by the political representatives of the ruling classes, holders of power, such as the government, administration, army, police, courts, prisons etc. They seek to ensure, through physical force (or not), the political conditions of reproduction of the exploitation relations (Althusser, 2003). As for the SIA, they are institutions, public and/or private, whose operation happens mainly to and through the dominant ideology, aiming to ensure the reproduction of production relations, ensured by the repressive power of the State (Althusser, 2003).

In the context of what we demonstrated until here, it seems plausible to suggest that tourism acts as a SIA, even if we do not have conditions yet to locate it in the typology of the SIA proposed by Althusser (2003). We thus understand it because tourism acts as the reproducer of the capitalist production relations, paradoxically, by the ideological interpellation of the individual as a tourist, through the existing game of forces of the relationship between ideology and the unconscious of the desiring individual.

We believe that we have achieved, therefore, to present travel motivation as an ideological production, or, as already said, as an ideological effect of interpellation of the individual as a tourist, by the reproduction of productive forces and, above all, by the reproduction of capitalist production relations by tourism, seen as an ideological State apparatus. The meaning of displacement is already given before the individual displaces himself. This marks the impossibility of filling of the void of the desiring individual, and that, at the same time, makes him desire or, in this case, displace. We abide to the Other's desire, which summons us to experience a *jouissance* that shall never be full, and we displace, psychically and physically.

(IN)FLECTIONS OF/IN TOURISM

When reflecting on contradictions in the field of social sciences, Michel Pêcheux, under the pseudonym of Thomas Herbert (1995), says that the object of a particular scientific field must, at first, be built theoretically and conceptually, and after reproduced. Thus, this reproduction "cannot be exercised otherwise in so far as the producer transformation of the object has already occurred" (Henry, 1969/2014, p. 15), i.e., the first phase should be designed to "subvert the 'given' natural ideological discourse" (Herbert, 1995, p. 64). Thus, Herbert (1995) warns that, when the first step is taken by the conceptual-experimental practice – which usually occurs in social sciences –, it is because "the breaking effect regarding the ideology had not been produced, and because, consequently, the experimentation reproduced it, stating its illusory reality (effect of achievement of the real)" (Herbert, 1995, p. 65). Thus, the scientific practice is transformed into a consequence of technical practice, as is the case of what happened in tourism.

According to Moesch (2000), a large part of the production carried out in the field of tourism sees it as a product, assuming that tourism is able to satisfy human needs. This conception, understood by both Moesch and us as misguided, opens loopholes so that consumer goods and individuals are interpreted in the same way (Moesch, 2000). It is not about ignoring such aspects, but, on the contrary, showing other existing relationships, even the ones permeated by the field of economy, without objectifying the human aspect. As Santos Filho (2005, p. 16)

argues about the study of tourism, it “will only be possible if we understand the global, historical, and dialectical dimensions”.

In his study, Moesch (2000) highlights that the most common concepts were concerned about making a relationship of tourism with its economic effects, leaving aside the importance of theory and/or methodological concern of the knowledge of the phenomenon. This was due to the fact that tourism has been first studied by economists, whose studies were based on statistical data, supply and demand, projects etc. This epistemological empiricist conception was gradually challenged, but theoretical reproduction had already started before its production. We must not forget that tourism is born, first, as an economic activity and only after became an object of study.

Thus, when we talk about travel motivation, some mottos come to mind immediately. We use an examples, to expose what we want here, two approaches of motivation in tourism widely known and used. The first, one of the pioneers, is that of the Scottish sociologist Graham M. S. Dann (1977, 1981). The second, the theses on motivation developed by the Swiss economist Jost Krippendorf (2009).

Seeking to answer the question “what makes tourists travel?”, Dann (1977) found that the distinction between *push* factors (internal factors that predispose the tourist to travel) and *pull* factors (external factors that attract tourists to travel) was accepted among scholars, and that, among them, there was a preference for the use of pull factors to explain why tourists travelled. He decided, then, to work around the push factors, assuming they were earlier concerning time, because, even if tourists are still attracted to a certain location, their actual decision would be made from their needs prior to the travel.

With this, he proposed going beyond the description of external factors and towards the understanding of the physiological and psychological levels involved in the push factors, from the Durkheimian concept of anomie and the concept of “ego-enhancement” (Ludberg, 1971, cited by Dann, 1977, p. 186). Therefore, for Dann (1977), the social anomie would be responsible for the need of the individual to get away from his life context, and the ego-enhancement factor would be responsible for the need of the individual to be recognized, to seek a differentiation in terms of status through his travels. Dann (1981) was so convinced of his theory that he also considered that the push factors were not only prior to pull factors, but that without push factors tourist displacement would not occur at all.

With the approach of cognitive-behavioral psychology and sociology, Dann inaugurates in tourism a series of approaches produced over the decades by different authors (Crompton, 1979; Gnoth, 1997). They will develop travel motivation regarding the push and pull factors, changing their understanding to a greater or lesser extent, but never moving away from its basic premises: there is something prior that imposes to the individual the need to travel, and there is something external to the individual that attracts him to travel according to his need.

Our counterpoint against these approaches lies in the fact that, unlike the individual of the Pecheutien DA presented here, to Dann (1977) and his followers, the process of travel motivation, whether internal or external to the subject, is fully conscious, i.e., the individual they deal with is of the order of reason, the one who knows what he wants, is self-aware and aware of the world in which he lives. Well, if nothing were opaque to this individual, everything would be transparent,

and nothing would hamper his desire. Dialectically, we could even assume that this individual would not even desire, because everything would be within his reach. The individual of consciousness and external factors of motivation are dialectically antagonists. The individual of consciousness is not the individual who displaces himself in tourism.

In this regard, it is interesting to see how the work of Krippendorf (2009) carries traces of the cognitive-behavioral theory and of the sociological theory of Dann (1977) concerning travel motivations, even if a direct influence cannot be proved. He presents theses on travel motivation that can clarify our argument. In short, Krippendorf (2009, p. 34) proposes that “everyday life will only be bearable if we can escape it”, the anomie push factor mentioned by Dann (1977). Traveling, to him, has the ability of “reconstituting, recreating the man, healing and sustaining body and soul, providing a source of vital forces and bringing meaning to life” (Krippendorf, 2009, p. 34), a push factor of ego-enhancement also referenced by Dann (1977). At the same time, the author acknowledges that travelling “is not so much the result of a personal impulse but the influence of the social environment, which provides to each person their existential standards” (Krippendorf, 2009, p. 36) and also that the travel market is a business market, for which the “reason for traveling is of no importance. What is important is that the travel is undertaken” (Krippendorf, 2009, p. 39).

In this exposed contradiction, Krippendorf says much more than he writes. Everyday life and work have reached levels of exploitation of the human being characterized by the author as unbearable and degrading, due to an economic system that requires the reproduction of its production conditions, which are conditions of exploitation, by means of social control. To be able to (re)produce, no matter the real yearnings of those who travel. There is no concern to deepen the discussion about human subjectivity, because, seen from the backstage of the “theater of consciousness” (Pêcheux, 2014, p. 140), it does not matter. On the stage of this theater, we are free to travel and we travel to be free, a paradox that exposes the contradiction referred to by Althusser (2003): we should be free only to accept our submission, i.e., travel.

The list composed by theses of travel motivations presented by Krippendorf (2009), from the meaning of travelling to tourists, is basically common sense. According to him, traveling is resting and remaking oneself, compensating and socially integrating, escaping, communicating, expanding one’s horizon, being free and independent, from the discovery of oneself, being happy (Krippendorf, 2009). These theses just confirm how much the conditions of the capitalist production happen through the exploitation of the workforce, as well as the disintegration of any possibility of understanding the human aspect.

Finally, he finds that travelling happens more for “the desire to leave something than to go towards something” (Krippendorf, 2009, p. 50). Thus, motivation emerges as the possibility to control the individual, who unconsciously moves away from the impossibility of inscription of his desire. As we have already said, the meaning of the displacement is already given before the individual displaces himself, because it is the conditions of displacement, and not the displacement itself, that ensures the meaning of the travel.

To achieve an approximation to the context in which tourism is inserted in the reproduction of production relations, we bring as guiding text the contributions

by Santos Filho (2005), in his book *Ontologia do turismo: estudos de suas causas primeiras* [Tourism Ontology: studies of its first causes]. In summary, the author suggests in his study to think tourism regarding its historical design, since the appearance of goods, when the capital emerges, and according to the development of modes of production, as opposed to thinking it from the emergence of capitalism.

Understanding that tourism activities occur during non-work times, Santos Filho (2005) develops his thought gradually showing that work moves away from non-work as it becomes an individual need, and no longer a collective need. Thus, he shows this progressive distancing through the evolution of the modes of production. The culmination of this process occurs in the last mode of production shown by the author: capitalism, indicating the radical separation between work and non-work and the differentiation of “leisure from professional obligations” (Santos Filho, 2005, p. 37).

And since nothing can obstruct the production and accumulation of capital, the non-working time also needs to reproduce the dominant mode of production. Thus, in this mode of production “the merchandise takes on the conduction of life and objectifies the human relationship to the fullest of its exploration, commodifying and determining the time of men” (Santos Filho, 2005, p. 37). Not only the working time would be treated as a merchandise, but also the non-working time. Tourism possesses, as well, in its historical materiality, the embryo of its operation overlapped in the game of forces between the resistance of the individual of the unconscious and the regulation of the dominant ideology over the time of non-work.

This is the movement on tourism that our reflection tries to achieve. Capitalism “produces the fetishism and/or falsification of reality” from the “retraction between materiality and ideological” (Santos Filho, 2005, p. 37), giving space for this form of reproduction, as well as organizing and determining the time of non-working, sale of leisure, and producing forms of leisure that are “idiotic, unpolitical, and appealing for a total disengagement regarding everyday life, since they deal with a reality outside of materiality, uncompromising the being from his historical existence” (Santos Filho, 2005, p. 37). This occurs because fantasy is responsible for buffering the impossibility of fulfillment of the primordial desire, in which we can only desire the Other’s desire. Fantasy hides “the fact that the Other, the symbolic order, is structured around something that cannot be symbolized, i.e., the real of *jouissance*: through fantasy, the *jouissance* is domesticated” (Žižek, 1992, p. 121)

In the curtain rod that reveals the stage of the show presented by Debord, tourism is embroidered in all its complexity. It is the “result and project of the existing mode of production” (Debord, 1997, pp. 14-15), because it is born with the capital and the commodification of free time, and is (re)organized, to hide the implementation of the State ideology, which is the ideology of the dominant class in the context of the capitalist production relations, relations of exploitation. Tourism “is the ubiquitous statement of choice already made in production, and the consumption that arises from this choice” (Debord, 1997, pp. 14-15), since its offer, as we have already said, anticipates the meaning of the travel to the individual, not allowing him to be defined as a desiring individual, and being interested only in the undertaking of the travel.

Through the established relations, we can perceive tourism as an ideological State apparatus, responsible for ensuring the reproduction of production relations. Tourism is structured, as told by Santos Filho (2005), before the advent of the capitalist economic system, but has been (re)organized since then. Despite our proposition, this occurs with greater intensity today, since, according to Ferrari (2011), one of the psychic consequences of the passage from production society to consumer society is that the individuals identify with ideal types, such as the tourist, by means of an imperative superego for *jouissance*, and no longer by repression.

And as already warned by Krippendorf (2009, p. 25), in the 1980s, all spheres of the current existence are subject to an “economization”, because the economy reigns in our society. Or yet, as Debord argues (1997, p. 30), “economy transforms the world, but transforms it only in a world of economy”. Thus, “the time that is based on the production of goods is itself a consumable commodity” (Debord, 1997, p. 104). The consumable time shall be used, in this sense, as raw material for new products, especially those that will configure the services economy. These forms of spectacular goods “can only exist due to the shortages of corresponding realities” (Debord, 1997, p. 105).

Tourism, human circulation considered as consumption, can be fundamentally summarized as the leisure to go see what has become banal. The economic planning of the frequency of different places is already, in itself, a guarantee of equivalence. The same modernization that removed time from the travel, also removed from it the reality of space. (Debord, 1997, p. 112, emphasis added by the author)

In short, due to the production conditions of the capitalist system, which are conditions of exploitation, the individual is interpellated to remake himself, compensate, run, be free, independent, and happy. Thus, the interest in measuring and monitoring travel motivation presents itself as a means of controlling the *jouissance* of the individual, from queries/inquiries about their fantasies. The guarantee of submissiveness of the individual and domestication of his *jouissance* are necessary to reproduce not only the productive forces, but mainly the production relations. Tourism, as an ideological State apparatus, is responsible for carrying out the dominant ideology, which is the ideology of the dominant class. For this, it is structured as a spectacle in which the theater of consciousness presents itself, and the objectification of the individual receives a standing ovation (Marx, 2017). The individual who displaces is not the one who knows, but rather the one who does not know what he wants.

GERMINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Tourism, as presented throughout this text, is more the act of withdrawing than the act of searching. The individual displaces himself psychically and physically in an attempt to reshape, reintroduce, and gratify, even if partially, the censored desire. The displacement, in its broad sense, is above all a political and ideological act of resistance of the individual and of insistence of desire. When questioning travel motivation, asking how it becomes a motivation, we are faced with the impossibility of the individual to desire. Thus, displacement,

before occurring in time and space, occurs in the individual's unconscious, which desires. Tourism is thus perceived as a factor of separation, making evident the contradictory character through which it is constituted.

Therefore, we propose thinking tourism from the disciplines that weave it. Only after this resumption there may be conditions develop, or not, concepts that account for the phenomena observed by these theoretical lenses. A necessary dialectical movement, against the positivist paradigm that conceives a rational science, whose homogeneous, solid, and transparent consciousness proves and affirms all the answers. That sees everything. If that was true, nothing would be left for us to know, everything would be given, at our disposal. We find ourselves bored and without any function as researchers.

Thus, we invite not only to the recognition of our failed and contradictory condition in the production of knowledge in the field of tourism, but also to undertake a return to the ideological operation that supported the structuring of this knowledge. With this goal, we challenge ourselves through the question: how do travel motivations become travel motivations? When asking such a question, we ended up being confronted by several other, such as, for example, "is travel motivation a concept?" We chose not to fill that question with answers, only confirming that motivation is of the order of consciousness, i.e., of full, homogeneous, and transparent reason. It assumes a traveler who knows what he wants, where he is going and who know what he will find at the destination.

From our affiliation to the theoretical field of discourse analysis proposed by Michel Pêcheux, we assume that the individual of the unconscious is one that displaces and does it facing a primordial desire, whose fantasy of a full *jouissance* buffers the inability of its fulfillment. With this understanding, we positioned displacement as opposed to motivation. The individual who displaces is the individual of desire. Travel motivation is the theater of consciousness, is an ideological effect produced by the interpellation of the individual as a tourist, whose evidences of itself and meanings are used to control, censor, and curtail the individual's desire, with the market aiming to offer to the traveler everything it wants the traveler to want. In this perspective, the notion of travel motivation makes the individual occupy a place, in an attempt to fill it while an external ideological ideal, which is then internalized by the individual after interpellated as a tourist.

This ideological production is linked to the performance of the dominant ideology within tourism, which we present as an ideological State apparatus. It is, therefore, part of the complex set of State apparatuses, being responsible for the reproduction of the production relations, which are the capitalist exploitation relations, in which the desire has no place, only an itinerary. To problematize is, therefore, to ask questions, and not answer them. It is to disturb, instigate the production of new questions. And, with that, we aimed to subsidize and broaden the discussion regarding the place of the individual in tourism.

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CONTRIBUTIONS

Maicon Gularte Moreira: defined the research problem and objectives; developed the theoretical proposition; performed the literature review and theoretical framework; chose the methodological procedures; performed the critical revision of the manuscript; wrote the manuscript; and adapted the manuscript to the RTA norms.

Luciene Jung de Campos: defined the research problem and objectives; developed the theoretical proposition; chose the methodological procedures; and performed the critical review of the manuscript.