Incentivos de mercado e comportamento criminoso: uma análise econômica dinâmica

Autores

  • Liliana E. Pezzin Autor

Palavras-chave:

modelos dinâmicos, comportamento criminoso, escolha racional

Resumo

Este artigo formaliza e estima um modelo econômico de otimização dinâmica aplicado ao comportamento criminoso. 0 objetivo principal do artigo é determinar a extensão pela qual incentivos de mercado, em contraste com fatores relacionados a família e outras formas de controle social, influenciam a dinâmica das carreiras criminais. 0 argumento chave do estudo enfatiza que o processo decisório relativo a escolha tanto do padrão da carreira criminal quanto do
momento de seu término depende criticamente de fatores gerais e específicos que afetam o ciclo-vital do
retorno líquido associado com as duas opções de atividade: a legal constituida e a delinquencial. A análise dos dados coletados ao nível individual pelo "National Longitudinal Survey of Youth" confirma a hipótese central resultante do modelo teórico.

Downloads

Os dados de download ainda não estão disponíveis.

Referências

AVI-ITZHAK, B. & SHINNAR, R. Quantitative models in crime control. Journal of Crininological Justice, v. 1, p. 113-127, 1973.

BARNETT, A., BLUMSTEIN, A. & FARRINGTON, D. Probabilistic models of youthful criminal careers. Criminology, v. 25, p. 83-107, 1987.

BECKER, Gary. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of PoliticalEconomy, v. 76, p. 169-217, 1968.

BLOCK, Michael & HEINEKE, J. A labor theoretic analysis of the criminal choice. American Economic Review, v. 65, p. 314-325, 1975.

BLUMSTEIN, Alfred & COHEN, J. The duration of adult criminal careers. Einal Reportto the NationalInstitute ofJustice. Pittsburgh, PA, 1982

BLUMSTEIN, Alfred, FARRINGTON, D. & MOITRA, S. Delinquency careers. ln TOURY, M. & MORRIS, N. (eds.), Crime andjustice: an annual review ofresearch. University of Chicago Press, 1985, V 6.

BLUMSTEIN, Alfred & MOITRA, S. The identification of career criminals from chronic offenders in a cohort. Law Policy Quarterly, v. 2, p. 321-334, 1980.

COOK, Phillip. Punishment and crime. Law and Contemporary Problems v 40 d 164-204, 1977.

COOK, Phillip & ZARKIN, G. Crime and the business cycle. The Journal of Legal Studies,v. 13, p. 115-128, 1985.

CUSSON, Maurice & PINSONNEAULT, P. VAbandon de la carnere cnmmtnale. Universidade de Montreal, Centre Internationale de la Criminologie Comparee, 1986.

DUBIN Jeffrrey & McFADDEN, D. An econometric analysis of residential 1984 apP Ce holdlngs and consumption. Econometrica, v. 52, p. 345-62,

ECKENSTEIN Zvi & WOLPIN, K. The specification and estimation of dynamic stochastic discrete choice models, journaj of Human Resources, v.24, p. 562-598, 1989.

EHRLICH, Isaac. Participation in illegitimate activities: a theoretical and empirical investigation. v. 81, p. 521-567. 1973.

FARRINGTON, D. P. Age and crime. In: TONRY, M., MORRIS, N. (eds). Crime and Justice. V. 7, p. 189-250, 1986.

GOOD, David H., GOOD, M. P & SICKLES, R.C. An analysis of youth crime and employment patterns. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, v. 2, n. 3, p.219-236, 1986.

GORDON, Roger & BLINDER, A. Market wages, reservation wages, and retirement decisions.ofPublic Economics, v. 14, p. 277-308, 1980.

GREENBERG, David & LARKIN, N. Age-cohort analysis of arrest rates. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, v. 1, p. 227-240, 1985.

GROGGER, Jeffrey. Arrests, persistent youth joblessness, and black/white employment differentials. Review ofEconomic andStatistic, 1992, p. 100-106.

HECKMAN, James. Sample selection as a specification error. Econometrica, v. 47, p. 153-62, 1979.

HECKMAN, James. & McCURDY, T Labor econometrics. In: GRILICHES, Z. & INTRILIGATOR, M. (eds.), Handbook of econometrics, Elsevier Science Pyblishers, 1986, V 3.

HINDELANG, Michael, HIRSCHI, T. & WEIS, J. Measuring delinquency. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981.

HIRSCHI, Travis & GOTTEREDSON, M. Age and the explanation of crime. American Joumal ofSociology, v. 89, p. 552-584, 1983.

KOHN, Meir & SHAVELL, S. The theory of search. Journal ofEconomic Theory, v. 9, p. 93-123, 1974.

LEE, Lung Eei. Generalized econometric models with selectivity. Econometrica, v. 51, p. 507-512, 1983.

MANSKI, Charles & McEADDEN, D. Structural analysis of discrete data with econometric applications. Cambridge Press, 1981.

NERLOVE, Michael & MONTMARQUETTE, C. Deterrence and delinquency: an analysis of individual data. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, v. 1, p. 37-57, 1985.

PAKES, Ariel. Patents as options: some estimates of the value of holding european patents. Econometrica, v. 54, p. 755-784, 1987.

PEZZIN, Liliana E. When crime no longer pays: a dynamic economic analysis of crime retirement decisions. Dissertate de PhD., University of Washington, 1992.

PHILLIPS Llad & VOTEY, H. The influence of police interventions and alternative income sources on the dynamic process of choosing crime as a czizet. Journal ofQuantitative Criminolos/, v. 3, p. 251-273, 1987.

SAH, Raaj. Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Journal ofPolitical Economy, v. 99, p. 1272-1295, 1990.

SALANT, Stephen. Search theory and duratin data: a theory of sorts. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, p. 39-56, 1977.

SCHMIDT, Peter & WITTE, A. D. Predicting criminal recidivism using split population models. Journal ofEconometrics, v. 40, p. 141-159, 1989.

SHAVELL, Steven. A model of optimal incapacitation. American Economic Association: Papers andProceedings, 1987, p. 107-110.

SICKLES, Robin, PIROG, D. & PIROG, M. An analysis of youth crime and employment patterns. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, v 2, p. 219-236, 1986.

SJOQUIST, David. Property crime and economic behavior: some empirical evidence. American Economic Review, v. 63, p. 439-446, 1973.

STIGLER, George. The optimum enforcement of laws. Journal of Political Economy, v. 78, p. 526-536, 1970.

VISCUSI, W. Kip. Market incentives for criminal behavior. In: Inner City Black Youth Etnploy?nent. University of Chicago Press, 1986.

WEIS, Joseph. Issues in the measurement of criminal careers. In BLUMSTEIN, A. et alii (eds.), Criminal careers and "career criminals". National Academy Press, 1986.

WEST, W G. The short term careers of serious thieves. Canadian Journal of Criminology, v. 20, p. 169-190, 1978.

WHITTLE, Peter. Optimization* over time: dynamic programming and stochastic control. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982.

WILDE, Louis. An information-theoretic approach to job quits. In LIPPMAN, S. & McCALL, J. (eds.), Studies in the economics ofsearch. North Holland, 1979.

WITTE, Ann. Estimating the economic model of crime with individual data. The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, v. 94, p. 57-84, 1980.

WOLFGANG, Marvin, FIGLIO, R. & SELLIN, T. Delinquency in a birth cohort. University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Downloads

Publicado

01-09-1994

Edição

Seção

Não definida