Infrações ambientais e a reputação do regulador: análise em dados de painel para o Brasil

Autores

  • Júlia Gallego Ziero Uhr Universidade Federal de Pelotas
  • Daniel de Abreu Pereira Uhr Universidade Federal de Pelotas

Palavras-chave:

Ambientais, Multas, Regulação Formal, Efeitos Spillover, Painel.

Resumo

O objetivo deste artigo é testar o papel do regulador no combate a infrações ambientais no Brasil. As principais variáveis explicativas são os valores das multas lavradas no estado (efeito específico) e nos estados vizinhos (efeito spillover), que refletem a reputação do regulador. Este artigo testa ainda o papel complementar dos agentes privados sobre o monitoramento e a aplicação de sanções informais. A fonte de dados compreende, em nível estadual, a quantidade de autos de infração registrados pelo IBAMA e as respectivas multas aplicadas para os anos de 2000 a 2011. Os resultados obtidos pelo método de Efeitos Fixos demonstram que um aumento no valor das multas aplicadas em um estado e em seus vizinhos gera uma redução no número de autos de infração para anos subseqüentes à aplicação da multa.

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Biografia do Autor

Júlia Gallego Ziero Uhr, Universidade Federal de Pelotas

Profa. Adjunta do Departamento de Economia da UFPel e do Programa de Pós Graduação em Organizações e Mercados (PPGOM). Áreas de pesquisa e interesse: economia do meio ambiente e dos recursos naturais, economia das instituições, direito e economia.

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Publicado

2014-03-30

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