Qualidade institucional, desigualdade de renda e desenvolvimento econômico
Resumo
Investigar os efeitos sobre o crescimento economico, a partir da heranga do processo da
formagao de quaiidade politico-institucional, constitui o objetivo central deste artigo.
Dentro de uma abordagem teorica de crescimento endogeno, foram incorporados modelos
com agentes homogeneos e heterogeneos, culminando com o modelo de distribuigao de
renda e crescimento. Dados de painel para 7 / paises em uma serie de quatro decadas
(1960, 1970, 1980, 1990) permitiram estimar simultaneamente varidveis de quaiidade
institucional - corrupgao, democracia, taxa de mortalidade no periodo colonial, distribuigao
de renda - e varidveis economicas - capital humano, capital fisico, tecnologia, crescimento
economico. Das estimagoes e simulagdes pode-se inferir que as varidveis institucionais
afetam sobremaneira o nivel de crescimento de longo prazo, sendo este relacionado simultaneamente
com o grau de distribuigao de renda. A hipdtese de que a heranga institucional
influencia na determlnagdo da quaiidade institucional atual, que por sua vez dita o crescimento
dos paises. nao pode ser refutada.
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Copyright (c) 2003 Ronaldo A. Arraes, Vladimir Kühl Teles
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