Duas versões do argumento evolucionário da moralidade e seus desafios ao realismo moral

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.2178-6224v16i1p87-112

Palavras-chave:

Evolução da moral, Realismo moral, Progresso moral, Richard Joyce, Sharon Street

Resumo

Este artigo avalia alguns desafios colocados pelos argumentos evolutivos da moralidade na versão de Joyce e Street ao realismo moral, entendido como a teoria metaética segundo a qual existem fatos morais que são absolutos, universais e independentes de contexto. Argumenta-se que o realismo centrado na sociedade de Copp é insustentável, pois não pode sustentar contrafactuais. Os argumentos de Shafer-Landau e Huemer também estão desacreditados, porque eles não podem mostrar de forma convincente que a moralidade humana não é afetada pelas forças evolutivas. No caso do argumento de Huemer, mostra-se que a existência de progresso moral não pode ser considerada como prova da existência de fatos morais, como exige o realismo moral, porque o progresso depende do contexto e também porque, do ponto de vista evolutivo, não há padrões e ideais anteriores para os quais o progresso é direcionado. Finalmente, uma possível resposta aos argumentos evolutivos da moralidade é a possibilidade de que a natureza da linguagem humana (incluindo a linguagem moral) seja tal que, em essência, ela não possa ser convincentemente dividida em linguagem sobre fatos e linguagem sobre valores.

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Publicado

2021-07-23

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PARRA LEAL, V. E. Duas versões do argumento evolucionário da moralidade e seus desafios ao realismo moral. Filosofia e História da Biologia , [S. l.], v. 16, n. 1, p. 87-112, 2021. DOI: 10.11606/issn.2178-6224v16i1p87-112. Disponível em: https://www.revistas.usp.br/fhb/article/view/fhb-v16-n1-04. Acesso em: 18 out. 2021.

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