Proclus on the Forms as Paradigms in Plato’s *Parmenides*

The Neoplatonic Response to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Criticisms

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This paper sets out to analyze Proclus’ exegesis of Socrates’ suggestion in *Parmenides* 132d1-3 that Forms stand fixed as patterns (παραδείγματα), as it were, in the nature; the other things being images and likenesses of them. Proclus’ analysis of the notion of being pattern reveals the impact of the Aristotelian conception of the form as paradigm on his views, as we can infer from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ and Simplicius’ explanation of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian form. Whereas Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias refute the efficient causality of the Platonic Forms and support that μέθεξις is just a metaphor, Syrianus, Proclus and Asclepius defend the Platonic theory, and specifically Proclus, who brings to the fore the multilateral role of the Forms as patterns with regard to the secondary things of this realm.¹

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the Aristotelian ἐίδος considered as paradigm in his lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, according to the testimony of Simplicius. Thirdly, to examine in general the Neoplatonic response to the attacks by Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Forms considered as patterns, by comparing the way in which Proclus, Syrianus, and Asclepius of Tralles interpreted the Forms as paradigms. Furthermore, since the latter’s commentary is highly dependent on the lectures of Ammonius, we can assume that we can also trace in it Ammonius’ view of the notion of παράδειγμα. Throughout this post-Platonic discussion, we find interesting lines of reasoning which are offered by the Platonists as a solution to the problem of μέθεξις, with which the dialogue is concerned in its first part. Within the frame of the same discussion, this problem is interwoven with the problem of causality and the theory of principles, since it relates to the question of how the principles operate as paradigmatic causes.

1. Preliminaries to Socrates’ new hypothesis on the Forms as patterns

In passage 905. 28-906. 2 and at the end of his comment on Plato’s Parmenides 132b-c, Proclus concludes that the midwifery of Parmenides has led the argument from the lowest entities to the most primal, demonstrating that we must not think of participation in the Forms as a corporeal process, nor yet a physical one, nor even as a psychic one, but one proper to intellectual and intelligible Forms. The first part of this conclusion corresponds to the first ἀπορία, formulated in 131a4-e7; the participation cannot be corporeal because this would imply that the Forms are divisible. Its second part corresponds to the second ἀπορία, formulated in 131e8-132b2; the participation cannot be natural because, in this case, it would be necessary to presuppose something common between the Form and its participants, a third factor, and this would lead to a regressus ad infinitum. The third part of Proclus’ conclusion corresponds to the third ἀπορία,

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2 For the Greek text I follow the edition by Steel, Carlos, Procli in Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria (Tom. II, Oxford 2008). In general outline, I follow the translation by Morrow, Glenn R. and Dillon, John M., Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides (Princeton 1987), but I also deviate from it whenever I believe it is necessary. I am indebted also to the translation by Luna, Concetta and Segonds, Alain-Philippe, Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon (Tome IV, 1re partie: Livre IV/ Tome IV, 2e partie: Notes complémentaires et index du Livre IV, Paris 2013), which, although in French, has helped me on many occasions to render in English that which I understand in the Greek text.
formulated in 132b3-c12; the participation cannot be psychic, because in this case all things would be capable of thinking.\(^3\)

At the beginning of his comment on Plato's *Parmenides* 132d (906. 10ff.), Proclus notes that Socrates, guided by the midwifery of Parmenides, now is of the firm opinion that he has worked out the order (τὴν τάξιν) and the manner of participation (τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθέξεως) in the Forms, saying that the Forms “stand fixed in the nature as paradigms” (“are firmly established in nature as patterns”)\(^4\), while the other things here resemble the Forms and are likenesses of them (ὄμοιόματα). Although these two questions, namely the order of the Forms and the manner of participation in them, are referred to as distinct by Proclus, they are substantially interdependent. From Proclus’ analysis we can infer that the order of the Forms determines the way in which generable and destructible things participate in them. Furthermore, the order of the Forms determines the way in which we must understand one of their most important ontological characteristics, in relation to the inferior ontological level of the sense-perceptible and changeable things, i.e. their quality of being paradigms.

Proclus explains the order of the Forms by focusing on the words ἔστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει (132d2), whereas he analyzes the manner of participation in the Forms, based on the one hand on the technical Platonic term παραδείγματα and on the other hand on the sentence included within passage 132d2-4 («τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὀμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μεθέξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἴδων οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτῶις»). In fact, this sentence constitutes a concise explanation of the manner of participation in the Forms, derived from the standard understanding of this technical term.\(^5\) Proclus sets out

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\(^3\) Cf. Luna and Segonds 2013: Notes complémentaires 397 (p. 107, n.3).

\(^4\) Here I deviate from the translation by Morrow and Dillon. Also, within the parenthesis I propose an alternative translation of my own.

to indicate the order of the Forms by opposing the infinitive ἑστάναι to the infinitive γίγνεσθαι and by adding to the latter the prepositional phrase πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, which denotes either dependence on the Forms and generally the relation of the generable things to them or comparison with their ontological status. He shows the ontological inferiority of the things which depend on the Forms by choosing to place the infinitive γίγνεσθαι in contradistinction to the infinitive ἑστάναι, as well as by repeating the use of the indefinite pronoun ἄλλα, which already exists in the Platonic text. The pronoun ἄλλα denotes an indeterminate subject which is defined only by its difference from the Forms. Proclus emphasizes that through these two infinitives, which are used in contrast, Socrates speaks of two completely different ontological categories, which are already well known by the Platonists. He acknowledges that Socrates is allotting to the Forms motionless and unchangeable essence, and to the things that come to existence in dependence on them an essence which is tossed about in the realm of generation.

According to Proclus, by making the distinction between two infinitives, “standing fixed” (ἑστάναι) and “coming to be” (γίγνεσθαι), Socrates reproduces in this passage of Parmenides the distinction between that which is always identical and in the same state, and that which is never in the same state, but only in process of generation; which is tantamount to a central distinction, the distinction between being and becoming, known not only from the Timaeus and the Sophist, as mentioned by Proclus, but also from the Phaedo, the Republic and other dialogues. Through the distinction between these two infinitives Socrates made his quest for the order of Forms. At the same time, according to Proclus, he introduced the question of the manner of participation (τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθέξεως), offering in this way a solution to the difficulties previously discussed, i.e. the first and second ἀπορία. As Proclus remarks (906. 22-27), by declaring that the manner of participation is assimilation (ὁμοίωσις), Socrates introduces two serious ontological implications. In the first place, the pattern (παράδειγμα) is not present to the image (εἰκών), so no one is forced to say that the things of this realm share in the Forms either as wholes or as parts; in this way he inactivates the first ἀπορία. In the second place, the

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6 See Phaedo 78c6-8; 78d1-e4; 79d1-6; Respublica 479a2-3; 484b3-5; Philebus 61e1-3; Timaeus 35a1-4; Sophista 252a5-10; 255e 11-14.

7 See again Prm. 131a4-e7 and 131e8-132b2.
pattern is not coordinate with the image; correspondingly, the Forms are not coordinate with the things of this realm (τὰ τῇδε). So, no one is forced to assume a third common factor between the Forms and the generable things; in this way he inactivates the second ἀπορία. From the use of the words παραδείγματα and ὁμοιώματα in 132c-d, Proclus infers that Socrates has introduced the idea that participation takes place by assimilation (ὅμοιωσις). It is reasonable to assume that by calling the Forms παραδείγματα and the things that participate in them ὁμοιώματα (likenesses), Socrates not only denotes the order of the Forms but on the grounds of this order he is led to discover the manner of participation in them.

From 907. 20 henceforth, Proclus proceeds to examine and explain in what way Socrates’ present hypothesis, i.e. that the Platonic Forms are patterns and the things participating in them are likenesses, constitutes an advance, yet without constituting a complete solution. So, his comment regarding this hypothesis is split into three parts. The first part (907. 21-908. 18) includes the arguments which justify the judgment that Socrates’ hypothesis is correct. The second part (908. 19-910. 2) analyzes the reasons and the corresponding arguments which justify why Socrates’ hypothesis is deficient and incomplete. Within the third part (910. 2-911. 17), Proclus focuses on the interpretation of the term μέθεξις and puts forward some arguments complementary to those of the second part. Furthermore, from the language he uses, especially in 910. 12-13, we can

8 These implications correspond to Proclus’ remark (905. 28-906. 2) that Parmenides’ midwifery has led to the conclusion that the participation must not be considered as a corporeal nor as a natural process. In 132c12-d4 it seems that, in following Parmenides’ route of Dialectic, Socrates is inspired so as to produce new ideas which shed more light on this conclusion.

9 The term ὁμοίωσις (homoiōsis) does not occur in the text. Luna and Segonds (2013: Notes complémentaires 398 [p. 108, n. 11]) suggest that Proclus infers this word from the words ὁμοιώματα (homoiōmata 132d3) and ἀφωμοιώθη (aphōmoiōthē 132d6) that are used in this context. Although Proclus’ reasoning (906. 27-30) is quite plausible, it is worth considering whether this inference is the only one possible or whether it really answers the question regarding the manner in which the Forms are participated. Μέθεξις (methexis) perhaps needs or presupposes more than what assimilation means. Furthermore, to say that the things participating the Forms are likenesses or that μέθεξις is realized by assimilation does not shed light on the question how assimilation occurs or, in other words, what is the appropriate meaning of assimilation in the present case. Broadie, S. (2011, “The metaphysics of the paradigm”, in Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, Cambridge University Press, 70) notes that thinking about a Form as an eternal and intelligible paradigm, rather than perishable and sensible, easily leads to the fixed mind-set of assuming “that the way to make something in accordance with an eternal paradigm is to copy or reproduce it. For this is how we operate when making something in accordance with an empirical paradigm”. So, ὁμοίωσις is probably a term borrowed from the realm of the sensible paradigms and applied by way of analogy to the realm of the eternal paradigms.

10 This is what Proclus implies in 907. 2-3.
infer that he aims to answer Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms considered as παραδείγματα, as set out in the first book of his *Metaphysics*.

### 2. Proclus on Socrates’ notion of intellectual and real patterns

In the first part of his comment on Socrates’ new hypothesis (907. 21-908. 18), Proclus states that Socrates is correct in so far as he has grasped the notion of intellectual (νοερά) and real patterns (ὀντως παραδείγματα) and in that he has defined their characteristic, declaring that they “stand fixed” and, further, that the other things are assimilated to them. There are two issues that emerge from Proclus’ remark here. The first is whether being a pattern, being a paradigm, is essential to an intelligible Form and is somehow differentiated from ἑστάναι since Proclus, when referring to ἑστάναι and to the assumption that the other things are assimilated to the Forms, speaks of a characteristic, of a quality, by using the word ἰδιότητα (907.23). The second question is whether the reference to intellectual and real patterns implies that there are also other kinds of patterns. Regarding the first question, Proclus in his second argument in *De Aeternitate Mundi*, assumed that “if the pattern of the cosmos is eternal and this is its essence (the paradigm’s being), and if, further, it has this power of being a pattern not accidentally but in virtue of itself, by its very being (for it is eternal by its being), then it is surely a pattern always”. It is obvious that Proclus’ argument is based on that presented in 28a6-29b1 of Plato’s *Timaeus*; if the world is beautiful, then its creator must have looked to an eternal pattern; the world is the most beautiful of generated things and its creator the best of causes; therefore, the creator looked to the eternal pattern.

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11 From Proclus’ language in 907. 21-24, and especially his use of the word ἰδιότητα with reference to ἑστάναι, we can infer that νοερά (intellectual) and ὄντως παραδείγματα (real patterns) are terms interwoven with the essence of the Forms and not just characteristics (ἰδιότητες), whereas even ἑστάναι and all the attributes of the Forms which will be mentioned later are οὐσιώδεις ἰδιότητες, i.e. characteristics that belong to their essence in an un-detachable manner.


13 In his Commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*, Proclus examines the views of some of his predecessors concerning the nature of the paradigm; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria* I, 321. 24-325. 11 (Diehl 1903).

14 Cf. Lang and Macro 2001: 41, n. 1. Proclus’ argument proceeds by stating that “if the pattern’s being is present eternally, then a copy too is necessarily eternal; for the pattern is a pattern in relation to a copy. But if there is no copy when there is no pattern, then there will be no pattern, when there will be no copy; so, the pattern too either is not a pattern when there is no copy, or is not a pattern of a copy. Given the relation of the one to the other, the one is not, if the other is not.
Philoponus, on the other hand, in his *De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum*, disputes Proclus’ thesis that Forms have their essence in being patterns, by stressing that this is something which Plato clearly nowhere states. Philoponus notes that the second proof of Proclus in his aforementioned work “is constructed from two hypotheses, the one, which states that the world has come to be in relation to an eternal pattern, being Platonic, the other, which Proclus puts forward as Platonic although it is not Plato’s, [stating] that the pattern of the world has its being in being a pattern”. He then maintains that, “even if one concedes that Plato’s hypothesis of Forms is true, it is not also true, as Proclus thinks, that they have their being in being patterns, since Plato refers to them as οὐσίαι (substances)”. Regarding Philoponus’ criticism of Proclus with reference to the second hypothesis of his second proof, it is worth considering that Proclus, in the construction of this reasoning, uses several important Aristotelian technical terms, which proves that he chooses to elaborate on this hypothesis without strict adherence to Platonic views.

The second question raised in the first part of Proclus’ evaluation of Socrates’ new hypothesis in *Parmenidem* (907. 21-908. 18), is whether apart from the intellectual and real patterns which are referred to here, there are also other kinds of patterns. The notion of an eternal paradigm in contradistinction to the generated paradigm is introduced in *Timaeus* 28a6-b2. “Whenever the artificer of any object looks to that...” See also, Lang and Macro 2001: 42, n. 6.


16 Philoponus, *De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum*, 24. 18-24; 25. 3-7(Rabe 1899).

17 Share (2004: 97, n. 87) notes that Proclus does not explicitly claim that either hypothesis is Platonic or to be found in Plato. He adds that Proclus would doubtless have held, as Philoponus himself does, that the first is, citing the *Timaeus*, but might not have claimed Platonic warrant for the second, which is expressed in Aristotelian language. I agree with Share that in his claim that the pattern of the world has its being in being a pattern, Proclus uses immediately recognizable Aristotelian language. This can be easily inferred from the use of the Aristotelian terms, italicised by me, in the relevant sentence, as one reads in H. Rabe’s edition of the Greek text of Proclus within Rabe’s Teubner edition of Philoponus’ *De Aeternitate Mundi*: “τοῦτο ἐστιν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι αὐτῷ τὸ παραδείγματι εἶναι καὶ οὕτως κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὐτὸ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι παράδειγμα δὴν...” (24. 3-6). Cf. Lang and Macro 2001: 41, n.2.

18 Broadie (2011: 66-68) suggests that the two kinds of paradigms are presented in a symmetrical way; that they are logically and rhetorically symmetrical, so to speak, since each paradigm functions as a method for producing the same result. She believes that simply as methods they are on a par even if one is superior; this can only be judged by putting them logically side by side. She notes that the reader apprehends them both in the same way and simply thinks of each. He is not in the position of the world maker who actually has to choose between perceptible and
which remains in the same state always and, using a paradigm of some such kind, produces its form and its power, everything completed in this way will necessarily be beautiful. But whenever he looks to that which has come into existence, using a generated paradigm, the object thus produced will not be beautiful”.¹⁹ So, we already have two kinds of paradigms acknowledged by the Platonists. Xenocrates in his definition of the Platonic Form states that it is “the paradigmatic cause of whatever is at any time composed according to nature (αἰτία παραδειγματικὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνεστῶτων)” (Fr. 30 Heinze).²⁰ According to a certain line of interpretation, this definition implies that there are other paradigmatic causes besides these.²¹ Alcinous, in chapter IX of the Handbook of Platonism or Didaskalikos, presents a definition of the Form which is very similar to that of Xenocrates, so he seems to adopt the definition which, on the evidence of Proclus, goes back to the latter: “Form is defined as an eternal model of things that are in

intelligible cosmic paradigms. Broadie claims that Plato’s language encourages the reader to imagine that the paradigms involved in the methods are a matching pair of objects: alternative versions, eternal and generated, of what is essentially the same type of thing. But she notes an important asymmetry between the paradigm that has come to be and the eternal paradigm: the latter is an answer to a “What is …?” question; it is a quiddity. This means, according to Broadie’s explanation, that it is eternal because the right answer is necessarily always the same, or so the Platonist assumes. I believe that Broadie’s explanation, which interprets the difference between the eternal and the generated paradigm only in terms of temporality, contributes to a better understanding of Proclus’ aim when he attempts to expand and deepen this difference between the two kinds of paradigm beyond the temporal parameter, by endowing the eternal paradigms with a range of activities which make them agents.


²¹ Steckerl (1942: 293) claims that Xenocrates’ definition is expressed in such carefully considered words that we are led to think he would have said, “ideas are παραδείγματα, but only things of nature have παραδείγματα”, if he had not thought of the other kind of παραδείγματα. Cherniss, H. (1944, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy, New York: Russell & Russell, Vol. I, 256-257, and notes 166 and 167) notes that although the definition was later used as supporting evidence by those who wished to reject ideas of artefacts, there is no certain indication of what Xenocrates meant by it. He suggests that the phrase “τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνεστῶτων”, which without further context is ambiguous, could equally well mean either “whatever things have a real, objective existence (as opposed to such combinations as ‘chimaeras’)”, or “whatever things are in their normal states (as opposed to deviations such as malformations whether natural or artificial)”. Dillon (1993: 96) notes that by applying this interpretation, Xenocrates’ definition would not necessarily be rejecting Plato’s broad definition of Form in Republic 596a and his entertaining of the possibility of an Ideal Bed or Shuttle. Proclus, who testifies about Xenocrates’ definition, supports that the phrase “τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνεστῶτων”, was meant to exclude ideas both of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν and of τὰ κατὰ τέχνην; In Parm. 888. 31-33.
accordance with nature”\textsuperscript{22}; Dillon notes that Alcinous merely adds the word “eternal” (αἰώνιον), which is certainly implied in the Xenocratean definition.\textsuperscript{23} Shortly after this, Alcinous justifies the definition which limits the doctrine of eternal models in the realm of things that are in accordance with nature, by saying: “For most Platonists do not accept that there are Forms of artificial objects, such as a shield or a lyre, nor of things that are contrary to nature, like fever or cholera” (\textit{Did.} 9. 2. 2-4). However, shortly before the definition of the Form, not only does Alcinous assert that Form is considered in relation to the sensible world as its paradigm, but he also expounds some ideas which prove that he believes that there are also παραδείγματα (patterns or models) of artefacts: “For in general everything that we can conceptualize must come to be in reference to something, of which the paradigm must pre-exist, just as if one thing were to be derived from another, in the way that my image derives from me; and even if the paradigm does not always subsist externally, in any event every artist, having the paradigm in himself, applies the structure of it to matter” (\textit{Did.} 9. 1. 7-12). According to Steckerl\textsuperscript{24}, upon close examination we can notice that Alcinous said even more, namely that the images (εἰκόνες) or the products of mimetic art have their παραδείγματα too, which are the sense-perceptible objects whose images (εἰκόνες) they are. So, Alcinous explicitly states that there are two kinds of παράδειγμα and makes a clear distinction between them: 1) the Forms are the eternal παραδείγματα of all products of nature; 2) but there are also παραδείγματα of artefacts which are the pure concepts that exist only in the souls of the artists. However, we can also recognize that, implicitly and in a wider sense, Alcinous also accepts the existence of a third kind of παράδειγμα, i.e. the sense-perceptible objects as παραδείγματα of the products of mimetic art, the latter being images (εἰκόνες) of the former.\textsuperscript{25} This third kind of παράδειγμα can be perfectly inferred from what is said in the

\textsuperscript{22} Alcinous \textit{Did.} 9. 2. 1-2; I follow the translation by Dillon (1993).

\textsuperscript{23} Dillon 1993: 96. Witt, R.E. (1971, \textit{Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism}, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 16) notes that although the philosopher does not mention his authority for this statement, there can be no doubt that it is ultimately inspired by Xenocrates. He adds that the Platonic passage which most nearly approaches the definition which we have by Xenocrates, is \textit{Timaeus} 28a, and that Xenocrates, relying on this, propounded the formula reproduced in the \textit{Didaskalikos}.

\textsuperscript{24} Steckerl (1942): 290-291.

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Steckerl (1942): 291-293. Steckerl stresses that the question where to look for the immediate sources of Alcinous’ theses is disputed. He maintains that it seems irrefutable that Alcinous substantially follows Xenocrates, though there may be some other intermediary links between these two. For the possible sources of Alcinous see also Witt (1971: 8ff). Steckerl points out that Xenocrates would not have added κατὰ φύσιν in his definition if there had not been a contrast in
X Book of the *Republic* (595c- 598a), where one can read that the Form of the bed is the real bed, whereas the material or sense-perceptible bed is not perfectly real but “a shadowy sort of thing by comparison with reality”\(^{26}\) and the fictitious or imaginary bed, which is the product of the mimetic art of the painter, is even less real than the previous bed. So, this kind of παράδειγμα can be grounded on this aspect of the Platonic theory which introduces or at least justifies what has come to be called by modern scholars, the notion of “grades or degrees of reality”.\(^ {27}\) Mohr\(^ {28}\) refers to the distinction between transcendent and immanent standards, which is drawn in the very opening section of Timaeus’ discourse in the *Timaeus* (28c6-29a2); where it is claimed that there are two kinds of models, standards or paradigms, the one being eternal and the other generated. He further states that immanent demiurgically generated standards or paradigms are to be found also in the *Republic*, while the distinction between transcendental measures and measures immanent in the world also occurs in the *Philebus*.\(^ {29}\)

It is worth examining more closely the reception by the different representatives of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, of the specific relationship between the conception that the artist has in mind and the notion of παράδειγμα, through some indicative examples. Simplicius, in his Commentary in Aristotle’s *Physics*, testifies about Alexander of Aphrodisias that the latter interprets the conception that the artist has in mind generally as παράδειγμα (model) of what is produced in the case of arts. Taking into consideration Simplicius’ testimony about what is said by Alexander, the latter believes that “things that are productive in nature do not first of all have a conception of what they are producing, and then produce it in such a way that one could say that according to Aristotle

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\(^{29}\) Plato, *Respublica* 529d7-e3; 530a6-8; 530b3; *Philebus*; for transcendental measures see 25d3; 26d9; 57d2; 66a6-7; for measures immanent in the world see 26a3; 26d9; 66b1-2. Cf. Mohr (1985): 19-20.
the conception is a model of what is produced, as is the case with the arts”. Alexander states that in the latter case, and generally in the case of things that produce according to choice, art and reason, the end for the sake of which everything else comes-to-be must first be conceived in the mind of the producer and be set up as a target and model (παράδειγμα) for what is to be. Syrianus the Neoplatonist, although asserts that every art that imitates nature and provides some contribution exclusively to mortal life falls short of the causal efficacy of Forms, he accepts that in the soul of the artist there are eternal concepts or eternal λόγοι (καθόλου λόγοι) according to which he creates his works. Syrianus also stresses that we must suppose (ὑποτίθεσθαι) paradigmatic causes for all products of art and he even uses the term παραδειγματικοί τεχνικοί λόγοι. He shows, as Steckerl notes, that the relationship between the artefact and the concept which exists only in the artist’s soul is to be considered as paradeigmatic. In my opinion this thesis becomes obvious with the clear-cut statement, in which Syrianus emphasizes that there reside in the souls of artists/craftsmen artistic reason-principles (τεχνικοὶ λόγοι) which are more of the nature of models than their products (παραδειγματικωτέρους τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων). It is striking that Syrianus here uses the comparative degree with regard to the term παράδειγμα and the derivative adjective παραδειγματικός. So, we can assume that besides the eternal Forms, other kinds of παράδειγμα (τα) are also posited both in the Platonic (Middle-Platonic and Neoplatonic) and Aristotelian tradition. Let us now examine which are the specific characteristics by which the eternal paradigms are bestowed and differentiated from others according to Proclus’ exegesis of the notion of παράδειγμα.

31 Alexander apud Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum A-Δ, CAG IX, 310. 33-35.
33 Syrianus, In Metaphysica, 26. 34-37. Syrianus (ibid. 8. 25-30; 120. 14-17; 149. 6-8) states that even Aristotle himself admits that the manufactured objects (τεχνητά) are created in accordance with the technical forms (ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ εἶδος) inherent in the soul. Cf. Steckerl 1942: 289.
35 Syrianus, In Metaphysica 120.14-16; see also Steckerl (1942): 289.
In the first part of his comment on Socrates’ new hypothesis (907. 21-908. 18), we can recognize that Proclus not only repeats (907. 24-908. 4) to a certain extent what he said in 906. 15-22 about the central ontological features of the Forms derived from the infinitive ἑστάναι, which is “being stable” (μόνιμον) and “being always the same and in the same state” (ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον; κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἀεί), but he also adds for the first time within this comment some characteristics which are reasonably inferred from those referred to previously, because the latter constitute ontological implications of the former: (i) The Forms are not only eternally existent but also eternally active. (ii) The Forms are the most divine of all things, and no longer thoughts of soul, but transcendent over all such things. (iii) The transcendent status of the intelligible Forms is associated with the unity which is prior to the multiplicity in them due to the single henad of all of them. These additional characteristics exposed by Proclus here seem to foreshadow the arguments by which he will justify his criticism of Socrates’ new hypothesis in the second part of his comment. So, we need to examine how he explains these characteristics when he argues for the necessity of their existence.

Proclus states that Forms are eternally both existent and active (αἰωνίως καὶ ὀντων καὶ ἐνεργούντων). We also see that he adds to the already mentioned ontological characteristics of the Forms the quality of “being eternally active”. The assertion that Forms are eternally active may also be construed as an answer to Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms, considered as causes of motion, generation and destruction, as formulated in the *Metaphysics* and *De Generatione et Corruptione*.\(^\text{36}\) The point of Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes in the *Metaphysics* (A9 and Λ6) is that Forms are not at all acting, so they cannot contribute to the explanation neither of motion nor of change of the natural things generally, either of those that are divine or of those which are subjected to generation and corruption. According to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ exegesis of Aristotle’s criticism in *Metaphysics* A9, the Ideas would be causes of stationariness rather than of motion because for the Platonists are motionless.\(^\text{37}\) Especially in *Met.* Λ6, Aristotle focuses his criticism on the fact that the

\(^{36}\) See Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 991a 8-11; 991b 3-5; 1071b 12-22; *De Generatione et Corruptione* 335b 18-20.

\(^{37}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias, commenting on *Met.* 991a 8, states the following regarding the meaning of Aristotle’s criticism here: “He is puzzled, then, about what the Ideas contribute to the things that exist by nature, either to those that are divine or to those in generation and destruction. And first [with reference to] movement, which is the thing most characteristic of natural bodies;…He shows that in this respect the Ideas certainly contribute nothing to bodies, neither to generation nor to any sort of movement whatever, for the Ideas would be causes of stationariness
Platonic οὐσίαι, i.e. the Forms, are incapable of moving things or acting on them, precisely because they lack actuality (ἐνέργεια); consequently, Forms cannot explain why eternal movement of the heaven exists and why sublunary bodies are subjected to motion, generation and corruption. His claim is that in order for the motion and change of natural beings to be implemented there must be such a principle whose very essence is actuality; rather this οὐσία, this first principle, must be only actuality.38 Both in Metaphysics (991b 3-5) and in De Generatione et Corruptione (335b 10-16), Aristotle claims that Plato considered the Forms as efficient causes but he denies this character to them because from the Aristotelian perspective this kind of cause must not only be actually existing, but also actually operating or acting. However, for him the Platonic Forms are not at all active, i.e. in Aristotelian terms, they are not acting and they have no actuality (ἐνέργεια).39

38 “Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the Forms enough; for if it is not to act, there will be no movement. Further even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality” (Metaphysica 1071b 14-20; transl. W.D. Ross 1908, Aristotle, Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press). Pseudo-Alexander, in his comment on this passage, testifies to a peculiar view regarding the way in which the Forms contribute to the generation of enmattered things. He states that those who posited the Forms, also asserted that the Ideas are both unmoving and not at all acting, and that all the atoms come to existence because some emanations emerge from the Ideas and concur with the matter of this realm; see Ps.-Alex. In Aristotelis Metaphysica 688. 34-40 (the translation is my own). So, the standard view was that the Forms were not endedow with actuality by the Platonists.

A second ontological characteristic of the Platonic Forms added here by Proclus (907. 26-908. 4) is derived from their “being always the same and in the same state”. The infinitive ἑστάναι (standing fixed) used by Socrates in 132d2 is acknowledged as meaning nothing other than “being always the same and in the same state”, as the Eleatic Stranger lays down in the Sophist (249b 12-c2). Furthermore, “being always the same and in the same state” is proper only for the most divine of things as the Eleatic Stranger declares in the Statesman (269d5-6). On the grounds of the previous premises, Proclus constructs a reasoning of which the conclusion is as follows: “it is plain that the Forms would then be the most divine of all things, and no longer thoughts of souls, but transcendent over all such things”.40 Proclus states that Socrates is correct in these assertions and he adds a third ontological characteristic of the Forms, related to their unity, which in his opinion Socrates has aptly indicated (908. 4-18). Most striking is that Proclus traces this characteristic within the prepositional phrase “in the nature” (ἐν τῇ φύσει [132d]), which in his interpretation reveals the unity of the Forms. According to him, in this way Socrates postulated as prior to the multiplicity a unity in the Forms, because by this prepositional phrase he indicates the single henad of all of them. He justifies this interpretation by making reference to both the Philebus41 and Timaeus42, which according to him confirm that Plato, after all, was accustomed to apply this term, i.e. φύσις (nature), also to the intelligible realm. Proclus maintains that the term φύσις (nature) within Timaeus’ phrase “ὁμοίως τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος” (“it happened that the nature of the living being was eternal” [37d]) denotes the monad of the intelligible Ideas and that by using the word αἰώνιος (eternal), he asserts that this nature “stands fixed” (ἑστάναι). Furthermore, according to Proclus, Timaeus declares the “standing fixed” (ἑστώς) of nature (or of the monad of the intelligible ideas) when he says that Eternity (αἰών) remains


40 His reasoning in its full account is: “If, then, Socrates says that the Forms stand fixed and what stand fixed are stated to be always the same and in the same state in the Sophist, and what are always the same and in the same state are defined in the Statesman as the most divine of all things, it is plain that the Forms would then be the most divine of all things, and no longer thoughts of souls, but transcendent over all such things” (907. 30-908. 4).

41 Proclus’ reference is to Philebus 30d, where Socrates talks of a royal mind and a royal soul existing in the nature of Zeus. We must assume that Zeus’ nature illustrates the unity of the first principle which is associated with the true or divine mind; cf. Philebus 22c; Phaedrus 246e-247a.

42 Proclus’ reference is to Timaeus 37d.
in one\textsuperscript{43}, whereas Time is in motion and has its existence involved with generation.\textsuperscript{44} We can assume that the link between the “standing fixed” (ἐστῶς) of the nature of the living being and Eternity (αἰών) is the fact that Eternity remains in one. Since Eternity remains in one it stands fixed. Consequently, since the nature of the living being is αἰώνιος, it also remains in one, so it stands fixed. From these remarks, we can also assume that the monad of the intelligible Ideas (or the nature of the living being) is eternal, which means that it remains in one, and due to its remaining in one, it also stands fixed. Moreover, according to Proclus, through the contradistinction between Eternity and Time, given that the latter is in motion and has its existence involved with generation, is illustrated the ontological

\textsuperscript{43} Timaeus 37d 6. Αἰών, the eternal duration to the nature of which change is alien, is proper only to the model; Timaeus 38c1-3. Cornford, F.M. (1997[1935], Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 102) notes that the concept of duration without change, as the attribute of real being, was first formulated by Parmenides (fr. 8, 5), whose words Plato echoes in 37e5-38a2. Cornford justifies the introduction of the notion of αἰών by Plato in the Timaeus by stressing that “the ’indivisible’ being of Plato’s intelligible world demands a duration that ’abides (rests) in unity’”. Luna and Segonds (2013: Notes complémentaires 400 [p. 111, n. 4]) note that Proclus cites Tim. 37d3 (908. 10-13) in order to explain three words; on the one hand, the word φύσει in Prm. 132d2, since the nature of the living being in the Timaeus is nothing else than the monad of the intelligible Ideas, and on the other, the use of the infinitives ἑστάναι (Prm.132d2) and γίγνεσθαι (Prm.132d4). They also believe that in the Timaeus, Plato explains the adjective αἰώνιος, through which he determines the nature of the living being, by the phrase “μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνί» (37d6). This phrase signifies that Eternity is completely stable and justifies the use of the infinitive ἑστάναι with regard to the Forms in Prm. 132d2; furthermore, if Eternity is stable then Time is associated with movement and generation, so the same context justifies the use of γίγνεσθαι with regard to the things that participate in the Forms, in Prm.132d4.

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Timaeus 38b 6-7.
difference between this “standing fixed” which is ascribed to the realm of the intelligible Ideas, and the quality of generation, ascribed by Socrates to those things that participate in the Ideas. Proclus, by comparing what is said in the *Timaeus* with what is said by Socrates in *Parmenides* 132d, concludes that such is the *nature* (*φύσις*) mentioned here, and generally such is the realm, i.e. the transcendent status, of the intelligible Forms, namely the single henad.45

Regarding Proclus’ remark that Plato was accustomed to apply this term, i.e. nature (*φύσις*), also to the intelligible realm, it is worth considering whether this interpretation can be compared with readings of Plato by contemporary scholars. Mannsperger46 points out that *φύσις* for Plato is the mediating element within the continuous gradation of reality which one discerns in the *Republic*. He suggests that the Ideas stand as normative region within *φύσις*, and that they can be recognized since they are characterized by perfection and uniqueness. According to his analysis, the Ideas’ normative region within nature coincides with the region where the creation of God takes place, as we can understand from the *Republic* 597b5ff. Mannsperger, by referring to the phrase “τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὡσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει” (*Parmenides* 132d1), notes that this normative region is also the place where the unique παραδείγματα for the human arts (τέχναι) stand; but that the very same place must be also understood generally as the ontological sphere of Being, as the *Theaetetus* 176e3 shows. This interweaving of the normative region of Ideas with *nature*, when considered as the nature of each individual thing, is evident in the passage referred to by Mannsperger, i.e. the *Republic* 597b-e, where the Idea of the bed is presented as the bed’s true nature and God is called φυτουργός (nature-maker) because he created only one bed, the real Bed, in its essential nature.47

45 Cf. Proclus, *In Parmenidem*, 887. 17-26; see also Proclus, *In Timaeum*, 457. 22-25, where Proclus explains that the one in all things comes from the single Henad of henads: “[Being] one comes to the universe from the one Henad of henads; just as the being [that is dispersed] everywhere [issues] from Being, so does the one that is in all things [issue] from the One”; I follow the translation by Runia and Share (2008).


47 *Respublica* 597b 5-7; c1-5; d1-8. Cf. Cratylus 387d2, 389b1ff., where the normative status of the Ideas is interwoven with the individual φύσις of each thing, as determined by its own material and the special goal towards which its creation or construction aims. Steckerl (1942: 296) notes that if the Idea of the bed expressly has a φύσις of its own and is part of φύσις, the bed cannot be completely exempt from all φύσις. So, he assumes that the artefacts for Plato are not forms imposed upon nature by man but belong to φύσις, since they partake of the true φύσις of the Ideas. Cf. also *Sophista* 265c, where the Visitor begs the question whether natural things are all made by the God with reason (λόγος) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Notomi, N. (1999, *The Unity of
Brisson and Pradeau focus on the Platonic nature interpreted through the activity of the soul, both in the *Timaeus* (34cff.) and the *Laws* (X Book, 896a-899d). Nature, when considered either as the Soul of Cosmos or as individual soul, represents a medium between the sensible and the intelligible. In the *Timaeus*, the Soul of Cosmos at the first stage operates within this intermediate level, but when the Demiurge withdraws it takes his position and since it is endowed with a mathematical structure it governs in such a way that a good part of motions present permanence and regularity and facilitate the manifestation of a cosmic order. Furthermore, they trace in the *Laws* an effort of rationalization within which Plato rediscovers the signification of nature as a process and insists on the primordial and original character of it, both as process and as source of all movements. In a further step of the same philosophical reasoning, we can recognize the conception of nature as principle (ἀρχή) or the identification of nature with what is considered as principle, since the self-moved soul is the principle and source of all movements and all things moved. A. Macé stresses that the X Book of the *Laws* is one of the first Greek texts where nature appears explicitly as a collective name, and not just as a principle, a source, or a mode of causality. Consequently, according to my reading, we can trace again here the affinity of nature with the sphere of the intelligible, because the principle (ἀρχή) itself as philosophical notion is something which belongs to the realm of the intelligibles, since it is eternal and not subjected to generation and corruption, although it also has an intra-natural hypostasis and meaning, attached with movement, when we realize that this principle is the self-moving soul.

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*Plato’s Sophist, Between the Sophist and the Philosopher*, Cambridge University Press: 272, and n. 3) notes that this passage invites us into the theo-cosmology common in Plato’s later dialogues as the *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Laws*, and above all *Timaeus*.


49 *Leges* 899b-d; cf. *Phaedrus* 245e2-246a2. Brisson and Pradeau (1998: 39) point out in their analysis of the Platonic nature that, within this philosophical context, soul is proved to be the source both of φύσις and νόμος; the ultimate principle, the real nature and the primordial reality which explains the origin, the development and the present state of the universe, the man and the society.


3. Proclus on the multilateral role of the Platonic Forms as patterns. The impact of the Aristotelian εἶδος as παράδειγμα

While until 908. 18 there was an analysis of the reasons why Socrates’ statement in Prm.132c12-d4 is correct, in 908. 19-910. 2, Proclus undertakes an explanation of the reasons why Socrates’ new hypothesis does not constitute a complete solution to the problems previously discussed. He states that in so far as Socrates allots only the quality of being a pattern (παραδειγματικὸν ἰδίωμα) to the Forms and not also the qualities of bringing to fruition and perfection and preserving and unifying things, in this he would seem still to have an incomplete grasp of the correct doctrine about them. Henceforth (908. 19ff.), Proclus sets out to explain in detail one by one these qualities which Socrates did not allot to the Forms; these include γεννητικὸν (bringing to fruition)52, τελεσιουργὸν (bringing to perfection), φρουρητικὸν (preserving), ἑνωτικὸν (unifying). He places the emphasis on the significance of these qualities for the wide-ranging role he assigns to the Forms. While the opponents of Platonism dispute the causal role and value of the Platonic Forms, he not only accepts them but also argues that they are endowed with a cluster of qualities, beyond the quality of being a pattern, which prove that they are causal agents with varied activity.

Proclus justifies his criticism regarding the omission of γεννητικὸν (bringing to fruition), by clarifying that each Form is not only a pattern (παράδειγμα) to sensible things, but is also the cause of their being (ὑποστατικὸν). For the Forms do not require any other force to produce things in their own image and to assimilate to themselves the things of this realm, while remaining themselves inactive (ἄργα) and motionless (ἀκίνητα) and without any active capacity (δραστήριον οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα δύναμιν), like the waxen types in this realm which serve as models for making small figures53, but rather they themselves produce and generate their own images. Proclus reinforces this thesis by

52 I follow the emendatio by Luna and Segonds (2013: 400, n. 6), who add γεννητικὸν καὶ τὸ in 908. 20, because I agree with them that the quality γεννητικὸν is something which Proclus mostly emphasizes among those that are referred to as missing from Socrates’ description of the character of Forms. So, it is reasonable to be added in this sentence.

53 I do not find necessary the elimination of ἀλλ’ proposed by Luna and Segonds (2013: 111, n. 7) in 908. 27, because this ἀλλ’ can be interpreted as an opposition only to the immediately preceding phrase “καὶ δραστήριον οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντα δύναμιν” (908. 26-27); still, I adopt their translation.
comparing the reason-principles in Nature (οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγοι) with the intelligible Forms; it would be absurd, after all, if the reason-principles in Nature were to possess a certain creative power, while the intelligible Forms should be devoid of any causal role in creation. So then, he emphasizes that every divine Form has not only a paradigmatic aspect, but a paternal (πατρικόν) one as well, and by virtue of its very being is a generative cause of the many particulars. To summarize, until now we have seen Proclus asserting that every divine Form is by virtue of its very being, both a paradigm (since being a paradigm is essential to an intelligible Form) and a generative cause.

It is worth mentioning that when Proclus comments on Xenocrates’ definition of the Platonic Idea as paradigmatic cause in a previous passage (888. 15-31) of his Commentary on Parmenides, he prima facie formulates a thesis which is different to the aforementioned, regarding the generative role of the Forms, assuming that the Ideas are not creative or generative causes in the strict sense. After referring to Xenocrates’ definition of the Idea (“the paradigmatic cause of whatever is composed continually in accordance with nature” [Fr. 30 Heinze]), Proclus stresses that one should not situate the Idea among the contributory causes (συναίτια) and clarifies that by “contributory” he means the instrumental, material or specifying causes (εἰδικὰ αἴτια); he assumes that therefore it is definitely a cause in the fullest sense. Furthermore, nor should one situate the Platonic Idea among types of cause proper (κυρίως αἴτια), namely among the final or the creative causes, for even if we say that it creates by reason of its very essence, and that becoming like to it is an end for all generated things, nevertheless the final cause of all things in the strict sense and that for the sake of which all things are, is prior, i.e. superior, to the Ideas, and the creative cause in the strict sense is posterior, i.e. inferior,

54 For the reasons-principles in Nature, see Proclus In Prm. 879. 10-880. 3. Proclus affirms that the reason-principles in Nature (φυσικοὶ λόγοι) and the natures are in a rank above bodies and the visible order of the species. They descend into bodies and hold them together, acting immanently, not transcendentally. Hence the reason-principles in Nature are ranged in the same rank with the sensible species (αἰσθητὰ εἴδη); 879. 10-15. He firstly explains how we come to conceive of the natural species; we proceed upwards from the common elements in particulars to their immediate cause, which is the natural species (φυσικὸν εἶδος). For instance, when we see a multiplicity of large things and perceive a single character pervading them all, we hold that there is one Largeness common to all the instances of largeness in the individual things; 879. 17-22. Then he explains how we come to conceive of the reason-principles in Nature: “Similarly we should say that we see many men and a single character extending to every man exhibited in the particular cases; and from this we consider that a single man, generative of the visible man, exists previously in the reason-principles of nature, and that in this way the many men participate in the one man, as a natural reason-principle proceeding into matter, the reason-principles not being separate from matter, but resembling the seal which descends into the wax, impressing its form upon it and harmonizing this with the whole Form which is impressed upon it”; 879. 28-39.
to them, looking (βλέπων) to the Paradigm as a criterion (κριτήριον) and rule (κανόνα) of procedure. Proclus asserts that the Platonic Idea, then, is median (μέση) between the final and the creative cause, both taken in the strict sense, striving towards the final cause, and being striven towards by the creative cause.\(^{55}\) However, when one carefully reads the Proclean text, one can assume that there is not an inconsistency between this text and what Proclus states in his comment on \textit{Prm.} 132c12-d4, because in 888. 23-24 he says about the Idea as paradigmatic cause: “for even if we say that it creates by reason of its very essence...”. It is evident that Proclus refers here not just to the Idea but to the Idea considered as paradigmatic cause, for two reasons. Firstly, because he offers his explanation of the Xenocratean definition, which \textit{expressis verbis} defines the Idea as paradigmatic cause. Secondly, because the phrase “for even if we say that it creates by reason of its very essence...” is followed by the phrase “and that becoming like to it is an end for all generated things\(^{56}\)”. I maintain that the latter phrase indicates that the subject of the former phrase, i.e. that which creates by reason of its very essence, is the Idea considered as paradigmatic cause, for two reasons. Firstly, because it includes the expression τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν ὁμοίωσιν and secondly, because this ὁμοίωσις is determined as τέλος (end) for all generated things. My inference from the common terminology which Proclus uses in the two passages\(^{57}\) is that he consistently proposes in both of them that the Idea as paradigmatic cause or the Ideas as παραδείγματα present a mode of creative activity which is appropriate to their quality of being paradigms. This mode of creative activity must not be confused with the activity of a creative cause considered in the strict sense. Since according to Proclus, being a paradigm is essential to the Idea, when the Idea creates as paradigmatic cause, it creates by reason of its very essence.

\(^{55}\) Witt (1971: 16) is wrong when he asserts that “Heinze rightly accepts Proclus’s interpretation of the Xenocratean definition, according to which παράδειγμα signifies not the efficient cause but the formal...”, because Proclus in his interpretation of the Xenocratean definition does not identify the paradigmatic cause with the formal; it is clear from the text that he situates the formal among the contributory causes, whereas he definitely considers the Idea as a cause in the fullest sense. But it is true that Heinze, R. (1892, \textit{Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente}, Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 50-51) identifies the kind of causality that Xenocrates means by his definition of the Platonic Idea with the second Aristotelian cause among those referred to in the Metaphysics 1013a 24-b4, i.e. with the Aristotelian εἶδος and παράδειγμα. Heinze assumes that Xenocrates follows Aristotle in recognizing different types of causality and as Witt correctly states, he acknowledges that “the Ideas fulfil exactly the same role which Plato assigns to them in the \textit{Timaeus}, where the creation of sensible things by God is the result of His looking towards the Eternal Archetypes”.


\(^{57}\) Proclus, \textit{In Prm.} 888. 15-31 and 908. 23-909. 2.
Furthermore, it is essential to the paradigmatic cause to create in a manner which is appropriate to its specific causal nature or causal identity. So, even if we say that the Platonic Idea is not a creative cause in the strict sense, still the Idea as paradigmatic cause creates by reason of its very essence, i.e. by reason of being a paradigm. Proclus offers a full and detailed explanation of his thesis regarding the amalgamation of the paradigmatic with the efficient causality of the Forms in his comments in 910. 12-911.11, to which we will refer later.

Proclus’ thesis about the creative and generative role of Forms in 908. 23ff. is grounded on his thesis, as previously discussed in this paper, that the Platonic Forms are eternally both existent and active. By endowing the Forms with a paternal quality and a creative or generative power, he refutes a major part of Aristotle’s objection to the Platonic theory of Forms, namely his criticism of the Forms as efficient or generative causes, as developed in his Metaphysics and De Generatione et Corruptione. We have seen that in the Metaphysics, Aristotle criticizes the Platonic Forms as insufficient to be efficient causes because they are completely inactive, namely they do not have actuality (ἐνέργεια) and do not act at all. Furthermore, and according to my reading, in De Generatione et Corruptione (335b 18-24) Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes consists of two arguments. The first argument poses the question why γένεσις is intermittent, while the Forms and the participants in them always are. The second argument draws an analogy between the products of art and the products of nature and notes that in the case of products of art, besides Forms and the things that partake in them, there is always the need for a third cause. Aristotle claims that similarly in the case of products of nature there is always the need for a sort of cause other than the Forms, which can act as a real, i.e. as a proximate, efficient cause. Vlastos points out that in the Platonic theory of Forms, causation seems to be connected with participation or

59 See again the Aristotelian passages referred to in note 36.
60 Cf. Mouzala (2016): 133. The two arguments in GC 335b 18-24 are formulated as follows: a) For if the Forms are causes, why they do not always generate things continuously rather than sometimes doing so and sometimes not, since both the Forms and the things which partake in them are always there? b) Furthermore, in some cases we observe something else being the cause: it is the doctor who induces health and the knowledgeable man knowledge, despite the existence of both health itself and knowledge and those who partake in it; and it is the same in all the other cases where something is performed in virtue of a capacity (transl. Williams, C.J.F., 1982, Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione, Oxford: Clarendon Press).
commination in Forms rather than with Forms themselves. From this point of view, the real cause of coming to be and perishing is participation and loss of participation in the Form, and not the Form itself. Fine also remarks that since coming and ceasing to participate in a Form involves more than the Form itself, the conclusion that Forms are the sole αἰτίαι of coming and ceasing to be does not follow. Proclus’ thesis about the creative and generative role of the Forms and their power to bring things into being or existence (ὑποστατικόν [908. 24]), answers Aristotle’s criticism of their causal role with regard to the following three significant points: 1) He sets out to show that the real and sole causes of coming to be and perishing are the Platonic Forms themselves and not participation or loss of participation of the sensible things in them, considered independently of the Forms. Forms are sufficient to act as generative or creative causes and do not require any other force in order to produce things. 2) Proclus’ thesis constitutes a solution to the problem of μέθεξις, when construed as assimilation, because according to him, they are the Forms themselves which determine and control the participation of things in them. Since the Forms do not remain inactive, but rather they themselves produce the things of this realm in their own image and assimilate them to themselves, they themselves produce and generate their own images. 3) The fact that the Forms themselves produce and generate their own images and that they determine μέθεξις considered as assimilation, has ontological implications for these images.

61 Vlastos (1973): 88-89, n. 39. Vlastos notes that the only passage in the Phaedo that could have suggested to Aristotle that the Forms are αἰτίαι of generation is 101c 2-7. However, Aristotle in his Metaphysics (991b3-4) takes it for granted that in the Phaedo it is stated that the Forms are αἰτίαι both of being and of becoming. This is the most plausible inference from 95e9-10, 97b5-6, 97c6-7 and 101c 2-7.


63 This means that through knowledge about the ontological status of the paradigm, which in this case is identified with the maker or the producer, we gain knowledge about its image. Broadie (2011: 65) discusses a dilemma regarding the operation of the notion of the paradigm in the Timaeus. Is the eternal paradigm being used so as to offer us knowledge of the physical or the physical to offer us knowledge of the eternal paradigm? She notes that “the Platonic cosmologist conjectures the contents of the good world maker’s eternal paradigm in order to achieve a reasonable account of major features of the physical world. The cosmologist as such is not primarily trying to find out about the paradigm, but about the cosmos. He or she does not ‘use’ the cosmos as a medium by which to penetrate to truths about the paradigm, but refers to the paradigm as an aid for research about the cosmos”. The question that emerges from the Timaeus is whether the notion of the paradigm offers “a cosmological gateway to trans-natural metaphysics” or “a metaphysical gateway to cosmology” (cf. Broadie 2011: 67). I believe that Proclus’ primordial concern is with the Metaphysics which transuses its properties to cosmology; so, the aim is to understand the character and role of the paradigm and further to use our knowledge of it so as to recognize the privileged and endowed with perfection status of the image.
are generated by their own patterns and their assimilation to the patterns is governed by the patterns themselves, then this assimilation is endowed with perfection. The perfection of this assimilation in its turn ensures and guarantees its preservation. Finally, the preservation of the perfect assimilation of their images, i.e. of the things of this realm, to the Forms leads to the reasonable inference that these images are eternal images of the divine intelligible Forms.\footnote{See again note 14; Macro and Lang (2001: 42, n.8) note that the relation of the copy to the pattern \textit{“ἐξ ἀνάγκης”}, as referred to in \textit{Timaeus} 28a4-b1, implies that since the cause is always producing, the effect must always be produced.}

In my view, Proclus’ thesis that the divine intelligible Forms generate the things of this realm, which being images of them will resemble them, can also be interpreted as an attempt or a tendency on the part of Proclus to Aristotelianize the Platonic Forms, given that the Aristotelian forms are typically construed as enmattered forms which generate things that bear a likeness to them. We can easily acknowledge this tendency if we examine the way in which both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius explain the Aristotelian εἶδος considered as παράδειγμα. Simplicius in his Commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} states that when Aristotle calls the form παράδειγμα \footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Physica} 194b 26; cf. \textit{Metaphysica} 1013a 26-27.} he is not suggesting that it is some self-subsisting eidetic substance (εἰδικὴ οὐσία) to which the things in this world bear a likeness, as do those who posit the Forms.\footnote{Simplicius, \textit{In Phys.} 310. 23-24. I follow the translation by B. Fleet (1997).} Simplicius quotes an extended passage from the lost Commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s \textit{Physics}, in which Alexander explains how we must conceive of the term παράδειγμα when this is attributed to the Aristotelian εἶδος.

Based on what we read in Simplicius’ quotation of Alexander’s passage, we can assume that there are two main criteria in order for something to be called παράδειγμα, which are both fulfilled by the Aristotelian εἶδος: 1) The first of these criteria is of teleological value. Alexander\footnote{Alexander apud Simplicius, \textit{In Phys.} 310. 27-31.} stresses that Aristotle calls παράδειγμα the form which is instantiated in matter because nature produces whatever it produces by aiming at this. According to Alexander’s explanation this is clear from the fact that when the form has been produced, nature ceases the process of production, since the form is something defined and, as it were, a target set up at which nature aims, which is the reason why it is called παράδειγμα by Aristotle. Alexander brings to the fore the teleological dimension...
of the Aristotelian term παράδειγμα by making clear the strong connection between ἕνεκά του (for the sake of something), τέλος (end) and παράδειγμα. He also stresses that nature does not work as those things that produce according to choice, art and reason, because it is an irrational power, but this does not mean that one should conceive of it as not acting for the sake of something. The form is considered as παράδειγμα because it is the model according to which nature produces everything, nodding in its direction not through choice, but more like a marionette. 68 2) The second criterion for calling something παράδειγμα is the production of the like form. This criterion is primordially satisfied by the form of the efficient cause. Alexander 69 states that in the case of natural things the form of the producer is the same as the form or the genus of the thing produced and it too would be a παράδειγμα. From what Alexander notes about the production of natural things 70, we can infer that the products of nature are considered to be produced according to παραδείγματα for two reasons: a) In general those who produce something according to a model produce it according to something determined (ὡρισμένον). b) That which is produced according to a model is like it (ὅμοιον). Since it is special to that which is produced according to a model to be produced according to something that is both determined and like it and since this is how the products of nature come to be, then the products of nature are produced according to παραδείγματα.

Simplicius 71 believes that two meanings of the term παράδειγμα when attributed to the form by Aristotle are equally probable. He notes that perhaps Aristotle calls the enmattered form παράδειγμα as a target for nature, at which it aims not by way of knowledge (γνωστικῶς) but by way of substance (οὐσιωδῶς), so producing everything. But it is equally probable that Aristotle calls the enmattered form παράδειγμα as something which becomes a model for art, since he does not want natural things to be produced according to some model, while he says that artefacts do need some model. The assumption that artefacts necessarily need some model, whereas natural things do not, leads Simplicius to the thesis that since intellect is in the proper sense (κυρίως) the cause

68 Alexander apud Simplicius, In Phys. 310. 31-311. 1; 311. 20-25; 311. 28-30.
69 Alexander apud Simplicius, In Phys. 311. 30-32.
70 Alexander apud Simplicius, In Phys. 311. 32-37.
which produces in accordance with the forms within itself, making its products like them, the forms in mind (τὰ ἐν νῷ εἴδη) would properly be called παραδείγματα.\footnote{Simplicius, In Phys. 314. 21-23.}

In my view, when Proclus emphasizes the paternal aspect (πατρικὸν) of the divine intelligible Forms and asserts that they themselves produce the like of them, i.e. their images, he intends to harmonize his explanation with the second of the two criteria for the quality of being παράδειγμα that we recognized in Alexander’s analysis. However, in this way Proclus converts the Platonic Forms into Aristotelian proximate efficient causes. In terms of the first of these two criteria for the quality of being παράδειγμα, i.e. being a target or being a τέλος, I believe that the idea that παράδειγμα is a target aimed at, is a common characteristic shared by the Platonic and the Aristotelian εἶδος. Furthermore, both the Platonic and the Aristotelian εἶδος derive this common characteristic from the realm of art, where εἶδος must first be conceived in the mind of the artisan who produces artistically and must be the end for the sake of which everything else comes-to-be.\footnote{See again Alexander apud Simplicius, In Phys. 310. 33-35. See also Plato, Cratylus 389a-b; Aristotle, Metaphysica 1032a32-b1; 1032b21-23.} This is probably the reason why Simplicius acknowledges that the priority amongst all kinds of forms regarding the paradigmatic quality belongs to the forms in mind (τὰ ἐν νῷ εἴδη). But whereas Simplicius notes that the cause in the proper sense (τὸ κυρίως ποιητικὸν αἴτιον) is the intellect which produces in accordance with the forms contained within itself, making its products like them, Proclus transposes this kind of causality to the Forms themselves, which apart from being παραδείγματα, they also undertake the causal task and role of the mind itself. In this way, not only does Proclus aristotelianize the Platonic Forms by making them proximate efficient causes, but he also modifies the Platonic conception of Forms from two perspectives: a) He puts aside the heterogeneity between intellect and Forms by identifying their role. b) He invalidates the difference between the divine Maker or the Creator (Δημιουργός) and the Forms as illustrated in the Timaeus, where it is notoriously said that the former creates by contemplating the latter\footnote{Plato, Timaeus 28a ff.}, by assigning the role of creator to the Forms themselves.

A source for Proclus’ view of the relationship between the divine Maker or the Creator (Δημιουργός), and the Forms or the Paradigm, is his Commentary on the Timaeus. In his comments on the Timaeus 28c5-29a2, Proclus also examines the views of his
predecessors concerning the nature of the paradigm as well as the relation between the paradigm and the Demiurge, as they are depicted in the *Timaeus*. Proclus’ exposition of the different approaches to this issue adopted by his predecessors proves that a thorough understanding of the relationship which Plato acknowledges between the demiurge and the paradigm was not an easy matter, which is why there have been numerous debates regarding it, since the Platonic text itself allows for different interpretations. According to Proclus, in fact it seems that Plato’s own words sometimes make the Paradigm

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75 See Proclus, *In Timaeum* 321.24-325.11. Cf. Lang and Macro (2001): 41, n.3; D’Hoine, P. (2017), “Platonic Forms and the Triad of Being, Life, and Intellect”, in D’Hoine, P. and Martijn, M. (edd.), *All from One. A Guide to Proclus*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 101ff. Runia (Runia and Share 2008: 176, n. 713), in his translation of Proclus, notes that the doxography of Platonist views on the nature of the Paradigm is in its method similar to that on the Demiurge (Proclus, *In Timaeum* 299-319), but it is much briefer and does not dwell on Middle Platonist views. Proclus (*In Timaeum* 322, 18-19; 322. 24- 323.2) refers to the questions raised by his master Syrianus, who asked whether the Demiurge comes immediately after the One, or whether there are other intelligible ranks [of gods] between the Demiurge and the One. If indeed the Demiurge comes [immediately] after the One, there is the absurdity that the complete multiplicity of the Intelligible gods comes [immediately] after the Non-multiple. But if there are other ranks between the One and the Demiurge, we need to ask whether the Paradigm of the universe is principally in him, or whether it is posterior to him or prior to him. Proclus (*In Timaeum* 322. 20-24) states that some of his and his master’s predecessors had determined that the Demiurge himself was in possession of the paradigms for the universe, as in the case of Plotinus (see *Enn.* 3.9.1), while others placed the Paradigm either anterior to him, as in the case of Porphyry (Fr. 43), or posterior to him as in the case of Longinus (Fr. 19 Patillon-Brisson). Confessed to be based on material derived from his teacher Syrianus, Proclus (*In Timaeum* 324.14ff.) also connects the Platonic theory about the relation of the Demiurge to the Paradigm, with the theological matters revealed by Orpheus, especially when the latter said that the intelligible god was swallowed up by the Demiurge of the universe. According to Proclus (*In Timaeum* 324. 14-22), Plato supposed that the Demiurge looked towards the Paradigm, indicating the act of intuitive thinking (νόησις) through the metaphor of sight, but the Theologian supposed that he leaped as it were on the Intelligible and swallowed it, as the myth stated. Proclus states that the god called Πρωτόγονος in Orpheus, who is established at the limit of the Intelligibles, is the Living-Thing-itself (αὐτοζῷον) in Plato.


77 See Proclus, *In Timaeum* 323. 22- 324.10; I follow the translation by Runia (2008). According to Proclus, Plato shows that the Demiurge is different from the Paradigm in two cases: a) In *Timaeus* 30c3-6, when he reaches out to the Living-Thing-itself, saying that “in the likeness of which of the living things did the constructor construct it [the universe]? we should insist that it was none of the living things that have a partial soul, but should lay down that it resembles most of all the living thing of which all the other living things, both singly and according to kind, are parts”. b) Again, in *Timaeus* 39e7-9, when he says that “to the extent, then, that Intellect contemplates the ideas that are present in that which is the Living Thing, both in terms of quantity and quality, this many he determined this universe to have as well”. But he appears to disclose the sameness of the Demiurge in relation to the Paradigm, when he explicitly states in *Timaeus* 29e 1-3: “he was good, and for someone who is good there was never present any jealousy concerning any matter; since this [sentiment] was foreign to him, he willed that all things would become as much like himself as possible”.

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140
different from the Demiurge and sometime the same as he is; the result is that for Plato sometimes they are the same and sometimes they are different, and each of these two positions is put forward quite suitably. A crucial question for Proclus is the following: “if the Demiurge sees the Intelligible, does he do so with his gaze turned towards himself or outside himself only?”

Through the answer to this question, he clarifies the relation between the Demiurge and the Paradigm. If the Demiurge looks outside himself only, he sees images of Being and he will have perception rather than intuitive knowledge. If, however, he looks towards himself, the object of intellection will be in him as well. The conclusion of this reasoning is that the Paradigm is both prior to the Demiurge and in him, prior to him in the intelligible mode (νοητῶς), in him in the intellective mode (νοερῶς).

We return now to the analysis of Proclus’ comments on Parmenides. We have noted that in 908. 19-910. 2, Proclus is trying to correct and complete Socrates’ grasp of the doctrine about the Platonic Forms, as the latter presented it in Prm. 132c12-d5. The second quality which Socrates omitted and Proclus sets out to add and clarify in 909. 3-9, is that every divine Form is also a cause of completion (τελεσιουργόν) to the many particulars. The justification of this thesis is multifaceted; every divine Form possesses the faculty of leading the things of this realm from an incomplete state to completion and of conferring goodness upon them, and of filling out their lack, and leading matter (ὕλη), which is in all things potentially, to being actually all that it was potentially before the creative onset of the Forms (εἰδοποιΐα). At the end of this description, Proclus reaffirms that the Forms have also this perfective faculty (τελεσιουργὸς δύναμις) within them.

Proclus, *In Timaeum* 323. 16-17.

Van den Berg, R. M. (2000, “Towards the Paternal Harbour. Proclean Theurgy and the Contemplation of the Forms”, in Segonds, A. Ph., Steel. C. [eds.], *Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain*, Leuven-Paris, 427-429) quotes *In Timaeum* 302. 17-25 and notes that it is important to understand that Proclus equates the Demiurge to the divine Nous. He states that it is reasonable to suppose that the contemplator *par excellence* of the Forms is the divine Nous, since the appropriate mental faculty for the contemplation of the Forms is νοῦς. In his commentary on *Parmenides*, Proclus (949. 14ff.) has explained that the transcendent Forms may be contemplated only by the divine Nous. However, Nous in us (ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς) has another important role, since it “moors” our soul to the Demiurge. The discovery of the Father and the immaculate unification with him is what Proclus calls “the Paternal harbor” (πατρικὸς ὅρμος); *In Timaeum* 302. 23-25.

Proclus, *In Timaeum* 323. 18-22. For an analysis of Proclus’ solution to the problem of the relation between the Demiurge and the Paradigm, see D’Hoine (2017): 102-104. D’Hoine interprets Proclus’ approach as the attempt of a subtle philosopher to find a way to tighten the bonds between the two main causes of Plato’s cosmology by rescuing in parallel the Plotinian identity between Intellect and its intelligible objects at the lower levels of the intelligible realm.
Proclus analyzes the task of completion which is implemented by the perfective faculty of the Forms considered as παραδείγματα in four activities: 1) Leading the things of this realm from an incomplete state to completion. This view is clearly and purely Platonic and we can assume that it has its origin both in the Phaedo (97c-98b) and the Timaeus (28a-29b). In the former dialogue it is said that if we wish to discover the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a thing, we must discover how it is best for that thing to exist or to act or to be acted on. The terms τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον predominate in this discussion of aetiology (αἰτιο-λογία) and specifically in the section of criticism of Anaxagoras’ theory of Νοῦς, where Socrates is considered to posit the necessary conditions for recognizing something as a real cause of things, since immediately after it he exposes a theory of causality directly connected with the Forms. Moreover, in the Timaeus, according to an important line of interpretation, when Plato speaks of the Forms as paradigms (παραδείγματα) he means for them to be viewed as standards or measures. This means that the Forms as standards or measures lead the things of which they are measures to their completion because, as is clarified by Socrates in the Republic 504b8-c3, a measure which in any way falls short of that which is, is no measure at all, for nothing incomplete is the measure of anything. However, the Aristotelian εἶδος is also connected with the idea of the completion since it constitutes the τέλος or the end of any natural procedure at which nature aims. According to the third Aristotelian argument in support of the thesis that nature is form, formulated in the second book of his Physics (193b12-18), nature in the sense of growth or coming to be (γένεσις) is a process towards nature, starting from the thing that is coming to be, and finding completion in its nature, which is its εἶδος. Within this line of reasoning, εἶδος is identified with τέλος. 2) Conferring goodness upon the things of this realm. This view is also of Platonic origin since, in the Phaedo (99c), Socrates criticizes those who put forward


82 See Mohr (1985): 12-13. Mohr (ibid.: 13, n. 5) notes that “in the late dialogues ‘measure’ (μέτρον) and its Platonic equivalent ‘limit’ (πέρας) tend to replace ‘paradigm’ (παράδειγμα) as the primary designation for the aspect of Forms as exemplars. Plato, in technical passages in the late group, begins to use the term ‘paradigm’ to mean ‘parallel case’ rather than ‘exemplar’”.

83 I follow the translation by Bloom, A. (1968), The Republic of Plato, Translated with notes and an interpretive essay, Basic Books.

material causes for never being capable to imagine even for a moment that it is the binding force of good which really binds and holds things together. In the Republic (509b6-10), this force becomes for Plato the unhypothetical principle of everything, i.e. the Idea of the Good; the other Forms owe to it both their being and essence (εἶναι τὲ καὶ οὐσίαν), and the Good itself is not being but is still further beyond, surpassing being in dignity and power. In his Commentary on the Republic, Proclus makes the distinction between οὐσία and ἄγαθόν and shows that the latter is subordinate to the former. He further distinguishes between being (εἶναι) and being good (εὖ εἶναι), because a thing can be without being good. He also makes a distinction between two kinds of Forms. The first kind includes Forms which are existence-endowing (ὑπαρκτικά), while the second comprises Forms that are perfection-endowing (τελειωτικά). Whereas at the head of the first group stands οὐσία, at the head of the second group stands ἄγαθόν, which participates in οὐσία because it is a being (δόν, δόν τι). Everything which offers to the things salvation (σωστικόν) and brings them to perfection (τέλειον ποιοῦν) and is preservative of them (φυλάσσον), exists as good (ἀγαθὸν υπάρχει). So, we can note that here, in his Commentary on Parmenides, Proclus recognizes the perfection-conferring character of all the Forms when considered as παραδείγματα. 3) Filling out the lack of the things of this realm. This view, in my opinion, is both of Platonic and Aristotelian origin. In Plato’s Phaedo (74d-e) we see that equal things of this realm do not seem to us to be equal in the way that Equality itself is equal; they do come very short of being like Equality itself, but they resemble Equality to which they are inferior. On the other hand, the Aristotelian εἶδος is what replaces privation (στέρησις), since privation withdraws when matter receives the form. So, the Aristotelian εἶδος also fills the lack of the previously indeterminate matter, which is only potentially (δονύμει) what it is to be. 4) Leading matter (ὕλη), which is in all things potentially, to being actually all that it was potentially before the creative onset of the Forms (εἰδοποιώ). I believe this is clearly a view of purely Aristotelian origin, as the terminology proves. We can realize that through this view, it is again confirmed that Proclus identifies the task of the divine intelligible Forms with that of the Aristotelian forms, and further of the Aristotelian efficient causes which act upon matter and convey their form to it.

The third quality that Proclus adds to the paradigmatic character of the Forms, in 909. 9-18, is the faculty of preservation (φρουρητικὴ δύναμις). This is interwoven with the faculties of cohesion and unification which are inherent in the Forms. If we agree that the universe has an indissoluble orderly arrangement (ἀδιάλυτος διακόσμησις), Proclus raises the question, where would this come from if not from the Forms? He further asks: “And whence arise the reason-principles that stand fixed and preserve unbroken (ἄρρηκτον διασῴζοντες) the single sympathy of all things (τὴν μίαν συμπάθειαν τῶν ὀλῶν), those reason-principles because of which the cosmos remains eternally complete.

86 Luna and Segonds (2013: Notes complémentaires 401 [p. 112, n. 2]) note that the issue of the preservative power of the Forms is already present in the *Chaldaean Oracles* (fr. 82.1). Lewy, H. (1956, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy: Mysticism, Magic and Platonism in the Later Roman Empire*, Le Caire: Institut Français d’archéologie orientale, 349) stresses that “In the *Chaldaean Oracles* the Ideas are found not only as ‘connectives’ but also as powers which give form to matter (ἀρχαί) and as guardians (φρουροί”). He also remarks that, likewise, Iamblichus distinguishes four activities of the intramundane gods: the demiurgic, the vivifying, the connecting and the guarding; see Lewy (*ibid*: 349, n. 141). Lewy (*ibid*: 131) asserts that “we have reason to think that when it was complete the collection of the *Chaldaean Oracles* contained a systematical account of the action exercised by the Ideas upon all the regions of the universe, as well as a description of the continuous process by which they issue forth”. He points out that “the task of ‘connecting’, incumbent upon the Ideas, is practically identical with that of watching over the permanence of the intramundane order”; see also Lewy (*ibid*: 112, n. 247).

No Form being absent from it, other than from the steadfast causes, just as change arises from moving causes?” So, the reason-principles that stand fixed (ἕστωτες λόγοι) arise from the steadfast causes (ἕστωτα αἴτια), i.e. the Forms. Proclus shows in his reasoning that the ontological status of each sensible body requires a power which will hold it together. In and of itself, body is prone to division (διαιρετόν) and it requires the cohesive force of the reason-principles. The divisible (μεριστόν) and dispersible (σκεδαστόν) quality of bodies, after all, is compressed and held together by no other agency than the indivisible power of the Forms from which the reason-principles that stand fixed arise.

But the prior condition of any cohesion is unity, which is the fourth and last quality which Proclus claims that Socrates omitted, and which he sets out to analyze and justify in 909. 18-910. 2. Everything that causes cohesion in others should itself first be one and indivisible. So, if the divisible and dispersible body is held together by the cohesive and indivisible power of the Forms, then the Form would be not only generative (γεννητικόν) and preservative (φρουρητικόν) and perfective (τελεσιουργόν), but also cohesive (συνεκτικόν) and unificatory (ἑνωτικόν) of all secondary entities (τῶν δευτέρων ἁπάντων). We can assume that since cohesion presupposes unification, the former characteristic (cohesive) is reduced to the latter (unificatory). So, Proclus integrates the analysis of the specific qualities by which the divine Forms are endowed in his interpretation, by emphasizing the cohesive and unificatory character of them. His criticism of Socrates’ new hypothesis is concentrated in the concluding statement: “he should then, one might say, not have only focused on the assimilative power of the Forms, but should also have examined their other powers, and on that basis have defined the mode of participation in them” (909. 22-26). According to his own conception of μέθεξις, Socrates should have called this participation assimilation, certainly, but also declaring it to be cohesive and preservative and perfective of what is assimilated. Proclus suggests that all these qualities are indeed confirmed by what Timaeus is teaching us when he declares that the cosmos is generated to be perfect and indissoluble by reason of its assimilation (ἐξομοίωσιν) to the perfect Living Being.88 My interpretation will pay

88 Timaeus 30d1-31a1; 31b1-3; 32b8-c4; 32d1. Gerson, L.P. (2011, “Proclus and the Third Man”, Études platoniciennes, 8, Dossier: Les Formes platoniciennes dans l’ Antiquité tardive, 114-115) believes that when Proclus is claiming here that the Form is not only generative and perfective but also preservative, cohesive, and unitative he is taking into consideration the standard Platonic understanding of the identity of Intellect and intelligible, that is, of the Demiurge and the Forms or, as Proclus puts it, the creative and the paradigmatic causes. According to Gerson, Proclus
attention to two issues from Proclus’ analysis. Firstly, it is evident that for Proclus, those qualities attributed to the Forms characterize not only the Forms themselves but also the participation in them, which is called assimilation. It is not sufficient to say that the things of this realm resemble the Forms and become images of them by assimilation. Proclus believes that in order to completely explain the mode of participation in the Forms, when one speaks of this assimilation, one needs to be accurate about its character, since it has certain qualifications which are indicative of its outcomes; e.g., it is cohesive, preservative, and perfective of what is assimilated. Secondly, in 911. 35-912. 5, Proclus shows that all of these qualities of the Forms, when considered as paradigms, determine a range of correspondent qualities which are bestowed to their likenesses. The Forms are not only patterns, but also productive (γεννητικά) and perfective (τελεσιουργά) and preservative (φρουρητικά) of sensible things, as we have said. Correspondingly, the things of this realm are not simply likenesses, but also products of the former (γεννήματα ἐκείνων), protected by them (φρουρούμενα ὑπ’ ἐκείνων) and gaining all their completeness and coherence from that source (καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τελειότητα καί τὴν συνοχὴν ἐκεῖθεν κομιζόμενα). We can infer that the superior qualities of the Forms determine both the mode of participation in them, i.e. assimilation, and the qualities of the participants considered as images or likenesses. The charismatic qualities of those images or

refuses to see the Demiurge as active and the Forms as static patterns observed by the Demiurge prior to his imposition of intelligibility on the sensible world. He rather seems to be thinking of the passages in *Timaeus* (29d, 30e) where the Demiurge is said to want the cosmos to resemble both the Forms and himself, which makes sense only if there is an extensional equivalence between the Demiurge and the Living Animal to which he looks. Gerson, L.P. (2019, “Why the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”, in Finamore, J.F., and Nejeschleba, T., *Platonism and its Legacy. Selected Papers from the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies*, Lydney: The Prometheus Trust, 1, n. 1) stresses that although in *Timaeus* Plato does not explicitly say that the Forms are in the intellect that is the Demiurge, he does say (29e1-3; 30c2-d1) that the Demiurge wanted to make the cosmos (1) like himself and (2) a likeness of the Living Animal upon which the cosmos is modelled. The implication, as Gerson puts it, is that by making the cosmos like the Living Animal, he thereby makes it like himself. Moreover, he believes that *Timaeus* 36e5-37a2 seems to emphasize the identity of the Demiurge with the Living Animal. According to my reading, the aim of Proclus’ comments on Plato’s *Prm*. 132c-d is not to identify the creative and the paradigmatic causes, which means that he would have proposed to abolish the distinction, but to show on the one hand that the paradigmatic causes have a creative aspect, and on the other that the creative or efficient causes have a paradigmatic aspect. So, the implication is that the Forms, as παραδείγματα, are not inactive and deprived of efficient causality and, correspondingly, the creative causes do not lack paradigmatic causality. For the reception of the efficient and the paradigmatic cause as distinct by the Platonic tradition, see Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Physicorum A-Γ*, CAG XVI, 5. 5-7: “Plato said that there were six principles of all things: matter, form, efficient cause, paradigmatic cause, instrumental cause, final cause” (transl. Osborne, C. 2006, Philoponus, *On Aristotle Physics* 1. 1-3, London: Duckworth); cf. 8. 1-3. See also Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum A-Δ*, CAG IX, 10. 33-11. 4.
likenesses are endowed with excellence by the divine source from which they are derived. We can also assume that within Proclus’ criticism, one can find the solution to the problem that, although Socrates has tried to discover the mode of participation in the Forms after examining their order and by reason of this, he finally did not manage to explain it in a complete way. As we already pointed out, Luna and Segonds aptly note that the term ὁμοίωσις (assimilation) does not occur in the Platonic text (Prm. 132c12-d5). In this Platonic context, there are only words which are either etymologically or semantically related to it, such as ὁμοιώματα (132d3), εἰκασθῆναι (132d4), ἀφωμοιώθη (132d6). It is Proclus’ suggestion that Socrates introduced the idea that participation takes place by assimilation. And it is Proclus who undertakes to offer a complete explanation of what a Platonist should understand when he reads that μέθεξις takes place by way of assimilation (ὁμοίωσις).

4. Proclus’ response to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ criticisms of the Forms as patterns

In the third part of his discussion of Socrates’ new hypothesis (910. 2-911. 17), Proclus attempts to re-interpret Socrates’ thesis by assuming that all the qualities that he previously suggested are missing from it, are tacitly included in it. He notes that perhaps Socrates, in calling participation (μέθεξις) an assimilation (ὁμοίωσις), has included all these concepts; generation, completion, preservation, unification. His argument regarding the cohesive and preservative power of the intelligible Forms is that “things that are assimilated to what ‘stands fixed’ are necessarily indissoluble, and are held together in their own reason-principles and are preserved in their essence by them (φρουρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’αὐτῶν); otherwise they would not be similar (ὁμοία) to the things that ‘stand fixed’, being borne along on the restless flow of generation and scattered in all directions from their original state; nor would those others, i.e. the intelligible Forms, be immovably patterns (ἀκινήτως παραδείγματα) if they were not patterns of other things that are of the same kind, i.e. immovable, so as to be ‘like’ (ὁμοία) the immovable essences” (910. 3-9). Proclus justifies this exegesis by reminding us that this is the reason why we say that there are no Ideas of particulars, but only of those things that are eternal.

89 See again note 9.
90 Proclus, In Prm. 910. 2-3; cf. 912. 3-5.
in the sphere of generated and unstable things.\textsuperscript{91} Earlier in his comments Proclus has declared that the Forms are of universal substances and of their perfections, for the most characteristic attributes of Forms are the good, the essential, and the eternal, the first being derived from the primary cause, the second from the One Being and the third from Eternity.\textsuperscript{92}

In 910. 12-15 Proclus uses a specific language which clearly shows that he alludes to Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic theory of the Forms considered as patterns, as it is presented in his \textit{Metaphysics}.\textsuperscript{93} He says: “Let no one, then, criticise our term ‘pattern’ (\textit{παράδειγμα}) as being a metaphor taken from patterns in this realm (ἐπὶ τὰ τῇδε \textit{παραδείγματα}) which are patterns of the sensible things and inactive and requiring other agents to act on them”. Aristotle in \textit{Met.} 991a20-22 states: “But to say that the Forms are models in which the other things participate is to use empty words and poetical metaphors”.\textsuperscript{94} Alexander of Aphrodisias\textsuperscript{95} remarks that Aristotle discredits, with good reason, the term ‘participation’ used by the Platonists, on the ground that it is meaningless to say that the Ideas are models and that the things here below participate in them. He justifies Aristotle’s reference to the poets by saying that it is typical of poets to use metaphors. He then explains that the notion of a model is borrowed from painters, who are said to paint by reference to a model. According to Alexander, Aristotle shows that

\textsuperscript{91} Proclus, \textit{In Prm.} 910. 9-11; cf. 811. 36-812. 28 (especially 812. 4-6); 814. 2-11; 888. 31-35. According to Luna and Segonds (2013: Notes complémentaires 402 [p. 113, n. 6]), Proclus implies εἴδος and γένος, which are the eternal and unchangeable components of each individual thing. Cf. Asclepius, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 88. 24-27; Asclepius stresses that in case of things that are eternal among the generated and unstable things, there is no “by chance”, but always the need of a paradigm according to which the generated becomes like.

\textsuperscript{92} Proclus, \textit{In Prm.} 831. 26-28. Gerson (2011: 114) takes it that what Proclus is here trying to convey is that the nature that a Form has is a universal; thus, there are no Forms of particulars as such. But Gerson stresses that the Form itself cannot be a universal because a Form is one, a henad with respect to its instances and a monad with respect to One; see Proclus, \textit{In Prm.} 880. 30-36. I believe that what Proclus says here (\textit{In Prm.} 831. 26-28) is the same as \textit{In Prm.} 910. 9-11. In my view, what he says in the latter passage is that there are no Ideas of the particulars, but only of what the generated and unstable things have that is eternal. So, the most plausible interpretation is that he means the universal substances, εἴδος and γένος. But I do not think that in \textit{Prm.} 831. 26-28, he sets out to identify the nature of the Forms. Rather, he is saying that the Forms are of universal substances and their perfections and that these universal attributes (good, essential, eternal) are the most characteristic (οἰκειότατα) of the Forms; he is not saying that the nature of the Forms is to be universals. I agree with Gerson (2011: 114) that “this nature (sc. of a Form), only as it exists in an intellect, is universal”.

\textsuperscript{93} Cf. Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysica} 991a 20-22; 992a 27-29; 1079b24-27.

\textsuperscript{94} I follow the translation by Dooley (1989), in his translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

\textsuperscript{95} Alexander, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 101.16-20.
those who say the Ideas are models are speaking empty words by his question, “For what is it that does its work while looking at the Ideas?” The fact that the notion of a model is borrowed from painters establishes an analogy which makes the introduction of the agent or the efficient cause in the realm of the Ideas absolutely necessary. But those who use ‘participation’ in the case of the Ideas do not indicate any of those things in which the participant participates. Alexander takes it for granted that “in every instance in which a thing comes to be by reference to some model, it comes to be through the agency of something that makes it like the model and produces it”; but the crucial question in the case of the Ideas is, “what is it that produces the things in this world while looking at the Ideas?” He then justifies this criticism by using two arguments: 1) the argument from nature 2) the argument from the sciences. The first argument that Alexander puts forward is as follows: “we see that a particular man is generated by a particular man, and a horse by a horse, and so in all other cases; but none of these agents does what it does while looking at the Idea, but both the generation and the role of each agent is something natural; one agent implants the seed, the other receives it, nurturing and developing it in a kind of sequence”. The same explanation by Alexander, according to which when nature produces its products, works as an irrational power, is testified by Simplicius in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. From Alexander’s description it is quite clear that within nature there is no space and need for Ideas. This can also be verified by the contradistinction between nature and art. Nature does not need the kind of παράδειγμα used by the arts. At this point it is worth mentioning Simplicius’ exegesis of the Aristotelian παράδειγμα with regard to the contrast between nature and art. Simplicius believes that it is probable that Aristotle calls the enmattered form παράδειγμα, based on the idea that it is something

96 Alexander, In Metaphysica, 101. 4-10.
97 Alexander, In Metaphysica, 101. 20-21. Dooley (1989: 139, n. 299) stresses that “to say that they are such, and that it is thus that things ‘participate’ in them, is to give no information about the Ideas as beings in which other things share; for a likeness does not share in its model in any real sense, i.e. actually having some part in, or of, it”. The point that Dooley stresses is the first obscurity of the theory which is discussed in detail in the first part of Plato’s Parmenides. The second difficulty lies in the fact that the term παράδειγμα compels its users to identify an agent analogous to the artisan, because it is borrowed from the realm of arts.
99 The original text has the word ἀρχή; Alexander, In Metaphysica, 101.28.
101 Alexander apud Simplicius, In Phys. 310. 36-311. 16.
which is produced as a model for art, since natural things are not being produced according to some model, but artefacts do need some model. He maintains that “having said a lot by way of introduction about the fact that art imitates nature, Aristotle now quite reasonably reminds us that the natural form is a model for art”.\textsuperscript{102} The second argument that Alexander puts forward is focused on the domain of the sciences: “Nor do those learned in the sciences produce the objects proper to the sciences while looking towards some idea”.\textsuperscript{103} We can infer that Alexander recognizes the existence of παραδείγματα both in the realms of nature and art. But while he borrows some criteria for the being of παράδειγμα from the realm of art and transposes them to the realm of nature—these criteria are the production, on the one hand according to something which is determined, and on the other, according to something which is like to the product (ὅμοιον)\textsuperscript{104}—, he emphasizes the absence of intellectual agent in the case of nature. Simplicius also recognizes the existence of παραδείγματα both in the realms of nature and art, but he connects the natural παραδείγματα only with the final causality that escorts the Aristotelian form, since for him nature aims at the enmattered form as an end, i.e. a παράδειγμα, which has to do with the completion of substance. He also places emphasis on the conception of the Aristotelian natural forms as παραδείγματα for the artefacts. So, Simplicius not only emphasizes the absence of prior knowledge, i.e. of contemplation by an intellectual agent, in the case of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian enmattered form, but he also stresses that only the forms in mind would properly be called παραδείγματα.\textsuperscript{105}

At this point it is worth examining the main points of Asclepius’ exegesis of Aristotle’s criticism of the Forms considered as παραδείγματα in his \textit{Metaphysics}. Regarding Aristotle’s criticism that the Platonists use metaphors like the poets Asclepius explains that those who search for the natures of things must not use metaphors and create new names.\textsuperscript{106} He underlines that according to Aristotle, when the Platonists utter the


\textsuperscript{103} Alexander, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 101. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{104} See again notes 69 and 70.

\textsuperscript{105} Simplicius (\textit{In Phys}. 313. 29-38) notes that the productive reason-principle (ποιητικὸς λόγος) is twofold, one producing in a cognisant manner, the other without cognition and self-contemplation, but still producing in an ordered and determined manner for the sake of some prior end. What comes-to-be by nature does so according to a model which is not established as something known by the producer, but because the producer makes the product like itself by being, not by choosing, just as the signet-ring makes the impression. Also, see again notes 71 and 72.

\textsuperscript{106} Asclepius, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 87. 34-88. 2. The translation of Asclepius is my own.
word ‘participation’ they use an empty voice, since this name does not signify anything and, further, they do not clarify how the things of this realm participate in the Forms. They say nothing about the efficient cause; they do not explain which is the efficient cause, given that the Idea cannot be identified as the efficient cause of anything. Asclepius sets out to answer Aristotle’s question “why Plato called paradigms the Ideas and what is it that does its work while looking at them”. His answer is focused on the Platonic theory of the Demiurge in the Timaeus. He points out that the Demiurge creates by contemplating the Ideas and he explains that nature creates its products in an analogous way. He then draws a further analogy between the way that the Demiurge creates and the doctor cures, i.e. creates health. As the Demiurge, i.e. the divine Intellect, contemplates the creative reasons or ideas (δημιουργικοί λόγοι) which are immanent in it, so the doctor induces health by contemplating the λόγους (reason-principles) of health which reside in his soul. Asclepius maintains that to use metaphors and call the Forms paradigms is not at all inconsistent because this is exactly the way in which the Demiurge produces, i.e. by contemplating the Forms. So, the beings There are paradigms, while the things of this realm are images. One of Asclepius’ main arguments against Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic use of the term παραδείγματα, is that Aristotle himself also uses metaphors, and what is more, in such an important part of his philosophy as it is its Logic, where he borrows important terms from Geometry (e.g. σχῆμα).

Asclepius highlights Aristotle’s criticism that the Platonists have duplicated the beings since they supposed other οὐσίας and other εἴδη as different to the things that are obvious (φανερά), and derived the causes from these beings, i.e. the Ideas. But the Ideas are neither efficient causes, nor formal causes since the form exists within the thing of which it is form, nor that for the sake of which (οὗ ἕνεκα) and the end (τέλος). Asclepius emphasizes that the latter is the most properly said cause (κυριωτάτη αἰτία) for everything.

108 Asclepius, In Metaphysica, 103. 5-7; 103. 13-17.
109 Asclepius, In Metaphysica, 88. 2-7.
110 We can realize that by acknowledging that nature creates in an analogous way to the Demiurge, Asclepius deviates from Alexander and Simplicius’ view, namely that nature does not act as an intellectual or rational agent who must first conceive of the paradigm in his mind and then set it up as a target, i.e. as a τέλος.
111 Asclepius, In Metaphysica, 88. 7-14.
113 Asclepius, In Metaphysica, 103. 29-104. 4.
that is produced according to nature, art, scientific knowledge and choice. He further dissociates the final causality from the Ideas by assuming that these are not final causes according to the Platonists, since they do not say that the Ideas are causes of being good (εὖ εἶναι) for the things which come to be according to them but causes of being *simpliciter* (τὸ ὅλως εἶναι). Asclepius\textsuperscript{114} asserts that this is due to the fact that the Platonists do not say that the Ideas are τέλη (ends) but only παραδείγματα, which is reasonable because the τέλος of anything does not pre-exist, but is only conceived of in advance, whereas it comes into existence later within the thing of which it is τέλος. On the contrary, the Ideas pre-exist and do not come-to-be or exist within the things of which they are causes. In my view, the most important thesis in Asclepius’ analysis is the differentiation between τέλη and παραδείγματα. The same thesis is implied by Simplicius when he poses some questions about the relation of the Aristotelian form to the notion of παράδειγμα, in his Commentary on the *Physics*. Simplicius\textsuperscript{115} states that the natural thing is produced according to something determined and like it, and if it were produced according to the producer, the producer would be the model. However, the commentator points out that Aristotle did not name that as the model, but the product (τὸ γινόμενον). Still, it could not be possible to claim that natural things are not produced according to some model, since we agree that the producer is the model for the product in the sense that it is produced according to it as something determined and already there similar to the product. It is important that Simplicius encourages us to pay attention to the distinction between τέλος and παραδείγμα: “if the form is said to be a model because nature makes everything by aiming at it, then for this reason it would be an end (τέλος) and not a model (παράδειγμα)”\textsuperscript{116} On the contrary, we have seen that Proclus combines the assimilative with the perfective power of the Forms, since he considers them as causes of completion and attributes to them the task of conferring goodness upon their images, i.e. the things of this realm.

The same approach adopted by Proclus in terms of the relationship between the Forms as παραδείγματα and the final causality, also characterizes Syrianus’ exegesis of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{114} Asclepius, *In Metaphysica*, 104. 4-8.  \\
\textsuperscript{115} Simplicius, *In Phys.* 312. 9-15.  \\
\textsuperscript{116} Simplicius, *In Phys.* 312. 15-18. Simplicius’ assumption here is compatible with his view that only the forms in mind would properly be called παραδείγματα.
\end{flushleft}
Aristotle’s criticism of Plato. Syrianus\(^\text{117}\), in his comments on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* 1079b 24-27, states that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic doctrine that the Forms are παραδείγματα and specifically of the use of this term, can be discussed only if we take the Forms in an impressionistic and literal-minded sense (φανταστῶς καὶ μορφωτικῶς)\(^\text{118}\); in that case the expressions seem to be metaphors taken from painters or other craftsmen in this realm of existence. Syrianus refutes Aristotle’s criticism about the absence of reference to the efficient cause within the Platonic theory of Forms as παραδείγματα, by invoking the *Timaeus* and states: “if someone thinks of a demiurgic Intellect which is creator (ὑποστάτην) and cause of all things, postulating that it generates everything by virtue of its very being, in accordance with its own peculiar nature (ἰδιότητα), and accords it providential care, one would not seek further either the efficient cause of everything or (to understand) in what sense we call the creative agent (τὸ ποιοῦν) and its contents the paradigm of the ordered world”.\(^\text{119}\) More specifically, by alluding to *Timaeus* 39e, Proclus’ teacher asks how Aristotle can raise the question “what is it that creates looking towards the paradigm?”, as if nothing of this sort had been said by Plato.\(^\text{120}\) In his words we can recognize that he establishes a direct connection between the creative agent (τὸ ποιοῦν) and the quality of being παράδειγμα, claiming that there is a sense in which we call the creative agent παράδειγμα.

Immediately afterwards, Syrianus explains that the Platonic Forms are not only final but also efficient causes, by developing an argumentation which is very similar to that of Proclus, if not the same: “For the separable Forms, according to his theory (sc. Plato’s theory), are final causes and objects of striving for all things, and causes of the well-being (τοῦ ἐὖ) and order and eternity\(^\text{121}\) of the cosmos; but it is then obvious to anyone who looks at the text with proper understanding that they would also be creative causes of things in this realm; for it cannot be that one thing is cause of something’s essence and form, and another thing of its being brought to completion”.\(^\text{122}\) We can see that for Syrianus, in the case of the Platonic Forms as patterns, the separation of the final


\(^{118}\) The word μορφωτικῶς probably means the type of knowledge which is based on the shape and the external appearance, the phenomenon; cf. Dillon and O’ Meara (2006): 198, n. 191.


\(^{121}\) For this emendation see Dillon and O’ Meara (2006): 198, n. 193.

cause from the efficient and the formal cause is not plausible and we must reject it. It is possible for us to recognize that this assumption is based on the perfective conception of what has come into being, which leads to the thesis that the cause of being must be identified with that of the completion of substance (οὐσία), i.e. the form (εἶδος). So, it is these three kinds of causality, efficient, formal and final, that concur and co-exist within the separate and eternal Platonic Forms. This concurrence of the three causes is already known to us since it is established by Aristotle in his Philosophy of Nature.123

Furthermore, Syrianus first reminds us of what Plato says in the *Phaedrus* (“all the heaven and all generation will collapse and come to a stand”)124 and then he sets out to complement Plato’s sentence by implying that this would happen if there were not this incorporeal Form which inclined towards itself, and primarily exerts its activity towards itself, while secondarily it stirs up and sets in motion those things that are dependent on its beauty.125 He concludes as follows: “in this way, then, the separable Forms, even in his system, will be seen to possess also a creative causality, whether he cares to admit it or deny it”.126 His reasoning is reinforced by the following argument; since the cause of being, i.e. the efficient or creative or generative cause, is the first in the series of all causes, it would not be reasonable for something to have the power to endow things with goodness (εὖ), order, eternity, and be a purveyor of power, without already having the primal causality.127 It is striking that according to Syrianus, the incorporeal Form which is inclined towards itself is active in a twofold sense, i.e. not only because it acts upon the things that are dependent on it, but also because it exerts its activity towards itself, and what is more, primarily. It only secondarily exercises its role to stir up and set in motion the things that are inferior to it. But there is also a third sense in which the separable Forms are active according to Syrianus’ exegesis of the Platonic theory; they


124 Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 245e; Dillon and O’Meara (2006): 198, n. 194. Plato in *Phaedrus* assigns this power to the self-moving principle, i.e. soul. It is interesting that Syrianus transfers this power from the self-moving soul to the separable Forms. It seems that in his exegesis here, the Forms become the ultimate cause of generation and movement.

125 Syrianus, *In Metaphysica*, 118. 6-9.

126 Syrianus, *In Metaphysica*, 118. 9-11. It is interesting that Syrianus insists on the creative causality of the separable Forms, whether Plato “cares to admit it or deny it”.

127 Syrianus *In Metaphysica*, 118. 12-15: “For as long as they are bestowers of both appetite and power immediately or rather of power through appetite, or of power alone, and they are also in addition to this causes of goodness and order and eternity, how can they not also be the prior possessors of the primal cause of being?”.
act on each other. He maintains that the separable Forms, on Plato’s view, have eternally the same relation to one another as have the visible spheres in the aether. The common order they share is due alternatively to three possible reasons: “either their likeness stems from chance, or there is some one cause prior to both of them of their single order, or the one class bestows a share of its own order upon the other”.\textsuperscript{128} But there can be no element of randomness among the ruling causes, nor can there be anything higher, in Plato’s theory, than the separable Forms—for he denies the existence of a non-multiple \([\text{ἀπλήθυντον}]\) and supra-essential \([\text{ὑπερούσιον}]\) One. So, the only remaining possibility is the third, i.e. that the one class of entities bestows on the other its own inherent order.

In terms of their relation to the things of this realm, Syrianus believes that it is the separable Forms that act on sensible things, for it is not proper to suppose the reverse. He further asserts that \textit{the beings There} (\τἀκεῖ) are paradigms and demiurgic or efficient causes of things of this realm, if, as is the case, they are both final causes and purveyors (χορηγά) of power and eternity.\textsuperscript{129}

Proclus deepens and expands Syrianus’ reasoning by offering an insightful and bold reading of the Platonic notion of paradigm. He first draws a clear-cut distinction between the eternal intelligible paradigms, i.e. the Forms, and the paradigms in the realm of sensible things. Then, he analyzes with an acute vision the different characteristics of each category with the aim of highlighting all the parameters of the ontological superiority of the eternal paradigms. The paradigms in this realm which are paradigms of the sensible things are inactive and because of this lack of activity, they themselves require other agents to act upon them. We can assume that the Forms, as eternal intelligible paradigms, are not only active but also completely self-sufficient, so as to act autonomously upon the sensible things and cause their generation, completion, preservation, cohesion and unification. Proclus emphasizes that we have to take careful note of the specific way in which Socrates spoke of the Forms as paradigms. Socrates, after all, did not actually call the Forms patterns, but “patterns, \textit{as it were}” (\ ödeπερ παραδείγματα). This qualification, according to Proclus, on the one hand removes from the patterns familiar to us their sterile (\ἀγονον) and lifeless (\ἀπεψυγμένην) aspect, while on the other reveals the primally active (πρωτουργόν) and image-generative (τῶν εἰκόνων γόνιμον) principle within the Forms.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{128}Syrianus, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 118. 16-20.

\textsuperscript{129} Syrianus, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 118. 20-26.

\textsuperscript{130} Proclus, \textit{In Prm.} 910. 16-19.
It is worth considering what Proclus means when he speaks of the patterns that are familiar to us. Does he speak about the forms that exist in the mind of the artisan, which according to Simplicius\textsuperscript{131}, would more properly be called παράδειγματα, or about the natural forms which are παράδειγματα for the products of art? From the Aristotelian perspective a natural form would never be sterile and lifeless, because natural forms are productive of their like, as is implied in the \textit{Physics}.\textsuperscript{132} On the other hand, from the Platonic perspective the forms which are inherent in the intellect would not be easily characterized as lifeless, since in the \textit{Sophist} is definitely established the unbreakable bond between life and intelligence.\textsuperscript{133} I believe that Proclus speaks here of the patterns neither in the sense of the Aristotelian forms nor in the sense of the intelligible forms, such as the forms that are within the mind of the artisan, which are quite close to the Platonic Forms. I suppose that he means the patterns in their original meaning, i.e. the patterns that are used by the painters\textsuperscript{134}; those that are sterile and lifeless because they are just placed in front of the artisan’s view as models of his painting-art, and he has to look at them and copy them in a mandatory way. They do not produce anything and they stand there with no trace of life. I also believe that from the Aristotelian perspective we can place in this category of the sterile and lifeless forms, the artistic forms, considered \textit{qua} forms (and not compounds), to the extent that they do not propagate themselves.\textsuperscript{135}

Proclus, in 910. 19-911. 17, prompts us not to separate apart the pattern (παράδειγμα) and the creative principle (ποιοῦν), but rather combine them in one and contemplate both together. He proposes such a combination by putting the emphasis on the affinities we can trace between them. The paradigm, on the one hand, by virtue of its very essence brings into being that which is modelled upon it. The creative principle, on the other hand, in creating by virtue of its very being as a creative principle (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦν) and in making like to itself whatever comes into being and providing to it secondarily whatever is within itself primally, also establishes itself in the rank of paradigm. So, the former is creative in a paradigmatic manner (παράδειγματικῶς ποιοῦν), while the latter is a paradigm in a creative manner (ποιητικῶς παράδειγμα ὄν). Proclus

\textsuperscript{131} See again Simplicius, \textit{In Phys.} 314. 15-21.


\textsuperscript{133} Plato, \textit{Sophista} 248e-249a.

\textsuperscript{134} Cf. Alexander, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 101. 5-10; Asclepius, \textit{In Metaphysica}, 88. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{135} Aristotle, \textit{Physica}, 193b8-11.
sets out to determine which are the main tasks, on the one hand of the paradigm and on the other of the creative principle. It is proper to a paradigm to be capable of creating something like itself, and to a creative principle to produce Becoming rather than Being. For this reason, in the *Philebus*\textsuperscript{136} Plato says that everything that creates gives birth to whatever comes to be and in the *Timaeus*\textsuperscript{137} he says that the paradigm is a paradigm of an image. Both the paradigm and the creative cause are relative terms (πρός τι); the creative cause is spoken of in relation to generation, the paradigm in relation to image. Nevertheless, each is implied in the other, the creative principle in the paradigm under its paradigmatic aspect, and the paradigm in the creative principle under its creative aspect.

Proclus assumes that there is one unification that brings together in those things\textsuperscript{138} both the paradigmatic cause and the creative, except that there are creative causes of many things in so far as they are generated, whereas there are no paradigms of them. Such things are individual entities, which come to be as individuals, but yet do not have paradigms as such. We see that his line of reasoning uses a unification as starting point, i.e. some kind of ἐνέργεια, and most probably a unifying principle\textsuperscript{139}, as the agent that brings together the paradigmatic and the creative cause. But in its next step the same reasoning proceeds to a restriction of this unificatory approach and a separation between the two types of causes. The paradigmatic cause and the creative cause are not co-extensive since the things of which they are causes are not all common; the creative causes are causes of many things, which in so far as they are generated, have creative causes, but they do not have paradigmatic causes. So, we can infer that the unification takes place within each cause but does not entail that the domains where these two types of causes exercise their activity will coincide. Immediately after the introduction of this important distinction which moderates the idea of the unification of the paradigmatic and the creative cause,

\textsuperscript{136} Plato, *Philebus* 26e1-27a7. More specifically, in this passage Plato regards it as necessary that anything that comes to be, comes to be due to some cause, and that everything that is creative agent always has by nature the leading position, while that which is created follows after it as it comes into being.

\textsuperscript{137} Plato, *Timaeus* 29b1-4.

\textsuperscript{138} It is worth considering what ἐν ἐκείνοις (911.6) stands for. Luna and Segonds (2013: 114) consider it to mean the Forms. In my view, there are two possibilities. Either it stands for the things that have both paradigmatic and creative causes, or it stands for the paradigmatic and creative causes themselves. In the second case the unification is justified because each one of them has two aspects which must be combined in one and contemplated both together. Of course, one of the most indicative cases of the unification of the paradigmatic and creative cause is the Forms.

\textsuperscript{139} See the translation of Proclus, *In Prm.* 911.6 by Morrow and Dillon (1987: 269).
Proclus chooses to moderate the newly introduced distinction between them. His suggestion is that we must not make an absolute distinction between the paradigmatic and the creative cause, but only in the manner previously described. Then he returns to the matter of the relation of the Forms to the things of this realm, in order to stress the self-sufficiency of the causal activity of the Forms considered as paradigms; let us not say that the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the paradigms on the things of this realm requires the aid of any other types of Form, such as those in Soul or in Nature. According to Proclus, the activity of the paradigms, i.e. of the divine Forms, is present transcendentally everywhere to everything, and the secondary beings need the abundance of the divine Forms which is endowed with generative power (τῆς γονίμου περιουσίας τῶν θείων εἰδῶν), while the divine Forms give completely of themselves to all things assimilation in respect of their whole essence.

Conclusions

From Proclus’ analysis we can make some important inferences which illustrate his contribution to the evolvement of the Platonic conception of παράδειγμα.

We have seen that Proclus asserts that being a pattern, being a paradigm, is essential to an intelligible Form.140 So, if the paradigm by virtue of its very essence brings into being that which is modelled upon it, then the intelligible Form, being essentially a pattern, by virtue of its very essence brings into being that which is modelled upon it.

The way in which Proclus interprets the creative principle (τὸ ποιοῦν) in 910. 22-26 reminds us of how both Alexander and Simplicius interpret the Aristotelian form considered as παράδειγμα. The common characteristic is that the creative principle establishes itself in the rank of paradigm, since it makes like to itself whatever comes into being and provides to it secondarily whatever is within itself primally.141 So, the Platonic Form, being a paradigm, becomes a creative principle (ποιοῦν) in the Aristotelian sense, according to Proclus.

Proclus makes the distinction between what is proper to a paradigm and what is proper to a creative principle. The former is capable of creating something like itself, the latter to produce Becoming rather than Being. But he classifies both these categories, the

140 See again note 12.
paradigm and the creative principle, under the relative terms (πρός τι). The creative principle is spoken of in relation to generation and what comes to be; the paradigm in relation to image. He further recognizes a creative aspect to the paradigm and a paradigmatic aspect to the creative principle, assuming that the one is implied in the other. Based on Aristotle, we are acquainted with the notion of a creative principle which functions as a paradigm when it creates what comes to be like itself. But the notion of a paradigm which creates its images has a special significance when this paradigm is a Platonic Form. The implication would be that the images in this case are endowed by a divine agency with a series of charismatic qualities such as completion, preservation, cohesion, and unification.

Although Proclus maintains that the creative principle and the paradigm have in themselves, the former a paradigmatic aspect and the latter a creative, he finally assumes that there is a unifying principle above them that brings together in those entities the paradigmatic and the creative cause. So, the cause of their interrelation, and more precisely of their union, is on the one hand internal and on the other, distinct of them and above them\textsuperscript{142}. But there is an important difference between the domain of the efficient causality and that of the paradigmatic causality, since the former is ampler than the latter; many things have creative causes in so far as they are generated whereas they do not have paradigmatic causes. The individuals (καθ’ἕκαστα) come to be as individuals but do not have paradigms as such.

So, the distinction between the paradigmatic and the creative cause must not be absolute, but conditional. This conclusion concerns primarily the intelligible and divine Forms. Hence, the activity of these Forms, being paradigms of the things of this realm, does not require the aid of any other types of Form, such as those that are in Soul or in Nature. Proclus construes their activity through the notion of their transcendental presence everywhere in everything. The relation between the inferior and the superior is determined in two ways. On the one hand the secondary entities need the ontological abundance of the divine Forms which is endowed with generative power, while on the other, the divine Forms respond to this need by offering completely of themselves to all things, assimilation in respect of their whole being. But we must assume that this reciprocation between the divine Forms and the secondary things does not concern the

\textsuperscript{142} I agree with Morrow and Dillon (1987: 269) rather than Luna and Segonds (2013: 114) regarding the translation of Proclus, \textit{In Parm.} 911. 6-7.
particulars in an unmediated way. This offering of assimilation in respect of their whole being by the Forms can reach the particulars only through the eternal properties which determine their nature, such as γένος and εἶδος.

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