Futuros contingentes: história de uma outra batalha





De interpretatione, batalha naval, futuros contingentes


The problem of future contingents is examined here through the vantage point of another controversy, the one over which answer Aristotle should be credited with. Two answers are attributed to Aristotle. According to the first one, which is nowadays often referred to as the traditional answer, Aristotle argued that, to prevent determinism as the valid conclusion of the argument presented at the beginning of De interpretation 9, one has to deny the universal validity of the principle of bivalence; according to the other, Aristotle accepted the validity of the principle of bivalence, but averted the conclusion of determinism by introducing the notion of indefinite verum. Both answers are examined with a view to shedding some light on this chapter that has kindled so much discussion.


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Author Biography

Marco Zingano, Universidade de São Paulo. Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas

Professor Titular.


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How to Cite

Zingano, M. (2021). Futuros contingentes: história de uma outra batalha. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 15(1), 207-260. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v15i1p207-260