Some remarks against non-epistemic accounts of immediate premises in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

Authors

  • Breno Zuppolini Federal University of Sao Paulo

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p29-43

Keywords:

Aristotle, demonstration, syllogism, immediacy, priority

Abstract

Most interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics believe that the term ‘ameson’ is used to describe the principles or foundations of a given system of justification or explanation as epistemically prior to or more fundamental than the other propositions in the system. Epistemic readings (as I shall call them) arguably constitute a majority in the secondary literature. This predominant view has been challenged by Robin Smith (1986) and Michael Ferejohn (1994; 2013), who propose interpretations that should be classified as non-epistemic according to the definition above. My aim in this article is purely negative. I intend to show that these non-epistemic interpretations are liable to serious objections and are in conflict with some important features of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration.

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References

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Published

2023-10-31

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Articles

How to Cite

Zuppolini, B. (2023). Some remarks against non-epistemic accounts of immediate premises in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 17(2), 29-43. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v17i2p29-43