Ação, Caráter e Determinismo Psicológico em Aristóteles e Alexandre
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v1i1p1-16Abstract
Alexander presents in his De fato XXVI – XXXII an argument for determinism based on the moral character or disposition the agent has which makes him to act in a determinate way. The response Alexander offers to such an argument appeals basically to the idea that the agent is still responsible for what he does because he was fully responsible for the acts that caused the acquisition of the character, although he now cannot act but in only one way. This response generates its own difficulties, for the assessment of which a new reading of Mantissa 22 and 23 is proposed.Downloads
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Published
2007-01-01
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How to Cite
Zingano, M. (2007). Ação, Caráter e Determinismo Psicológico em Aristóteles e Alexandre. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 1(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v1i1p1-16
