A Definição do Voluntário na Ethica Eudemia II.9

Abstract

This article intends to discuss the relation between the three clauses which appear in the definition of the voluntary action in Ethica Eudemia II.9: i) it depends on the agent himself not to do the act, ii) he does it not in ignorance and iii) he does it because of himself. If the first clause could be satisfied irrespectively of the other two, there would be some difficulty to make this definition consistent with Aristotle’s contention in chapter 6 of the same book of Ethica Eudemia, from which it can be inferred that every act which depends on the agent is caused by himself and every act which is caused by himself is voluntary. So that it is not possible for an act to depend on the agent and not be voluntary. To solve this difficulty, it is proposed, rather tentatively, that the act mentioned in the first clause is to be interpreted not in particular, but in general terms. So interpreted, the role of Aristotle’s first clause would be to restrict the range of the application of the definition to certain kinds of movements, namely, to those kinds which we could have not done, thereby excluding men’s natural activities.