Types of Predication in Aristotle (Posterior Analytics I 22)

Abstract

Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we turn to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence (to autôi einai katêgoresthai), that is of the genus and the specific differentia; 2) essential predication (to autôi einai katêgoresthai), that is either of the genus or of the differentiae (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents per se; 4) the predication of simple accidents (hôs sumbebêkota katêgoresthai); 5) accidental predication (kata sumbebêkos katêgoresthai). However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication (haplôs ). In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been – and in our opinion wrongly so – challenged in modern times.