Aristotle, Protagoras, and Contradiction: Metaphysics Γ 4-6

Authors

  • Evan Keeling USP, Dep. of Philosophy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i2p75-99

Keywords:

Aristotle, logic, non-contradiction, Protagoras,

Abstract

In both Metaphysics Γ 4 and 5 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed to the view that all contradictions are true. Yet Aristotle’s arguments are not transparent, and later, in Γ 6, he provides Protagoras with a way to escape contradictions. In this paper I try to understand Aristotle’s arguments. After examining a number of possible solutions, I conclude that the best way of explaining them is to (a) recognize that Aristotle is discussing a number of Protagorean opponents, and (b) import another of Protagoras’ views, namely the claim that there are always two logoi opposed to one another. 

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References

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Wedin, M. V. 2004b. .On the Use and Abuse of Non-Contradiction: Aristotle’s Critique of Protagoras and Heraclitus in Metaphysics Gamma 5’. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26: 213–239.

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Published

2013-11-09

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Articles

How to Cite

Aristotle, Protagoras, and Contradiction: Metaphysics Γ 4-6. (2013). Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 7(2), 75-99. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v7i2p75-99