Aristotle on The Cognition of Value

Authors

  • Hasse Hamalainen The University of Edinburgh

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p88-114

Keywords:

Aristotle, ethics, desire, value, cognition, phantasia, Ethica Nichomachea, De Anima

Abstract

In my paper, I defend an interpretation according to which Aristotle thinks in Nicomachean Ethics (EN) that the rational aspect of soul is needed in discerning which ends of desire would be good. Many interpreters have traditionally supported this, ‘rationalist’ line of interpreting Aristotle’s theory of value cognition.The rationalist interpretation has, however, recently come under a novel challenge from Jessica Moss (2011, 2012), but has not yet received a defence. Moss attempts to resurrect now virtually abandoned ‘anti-rationalist’ interpretation, which claims, in a contrast to the rationalist one, that discerning good ends may require no activity from the rational aspect, but only well-habituated non-rational desire. Moss’ interpretation appeals to certain Aristotle’s claims in De Anima (DA) 3, which, she thinks, show that non-rational phantasia suffices for discerning good ends if only accompanied with the habituated desire. Although I admit that her interpretation can successfully avoid some problems that earlier anti-rationalist interpretations faced with certain passages of EN, I also argue, however that it introduces some new problems, and (probably inadvertently) attributes philosophically incoherent views about moral responsibility to Aristotle. Therefore I conclude that even after Moss’ improvements to the anti-rationalist interpretation, the rationalist interpretation remains overall more plausible. 

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Author Biography

  • Hasse Hamalainen, The University of Edinburgh
    Phd Candidate at the Department of Philosophy

References

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Published

2015-05-20

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Articles

How to Cite

Hamalainen, H. (2015). Aristotle on The Cognition of Value. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, 9(1), 88-114. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v9i1p88-114