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Callicles as a Potential Tyrant in Plato's *Gorgias*

Daniel R. N. Lopes

This essay argues that Callicles is depicted by Plato in the *Gorgias* as a *potential* tyrant from a psychological standpoint. To this end I will contend that the Calliclean moral psychology sketched at 491e-492c points towards the analysis of the tyrannical individual pursued by Plato in books VIII and IX of the *Republic* based upon the tripartite theory of the soul. I will thereby attempt to show that (i) in the *Gorgias*, Callicles does not actually personify the ideal of the superior person advocated by himself insofar as he is still susceptible to shame, as evinced by Socrates' cross-examination (494c-495a); and that (ii) looking forward to the *Republic*, he can be understood for this same reason as being precisely on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical soul.

1- Introduction¹

In the *Gorgias*, Plato deals with the problematic relationship between rhetoric and justice in the Athenian democracy in respect of both political and ethical issues. One important issue that emerges throughout the dialogue is a common-place of Greek political thought, especially associated to the widespread anti-democratic criticism – namely, the rise of a tyrant within a democratic *polis*.² This *topos* appears obliquely in Polus' praise of Archelaus, tyrant of Macedonia from 413 to 399 a.C., as the most happy person, since Polus is portrayed as a teacher of rhetoric to people who aim at participating in the political affairs of a democratic city such as Athens; and straightforwardly in Callicles' conception of the better and superior individual and its close association with autocratic forms of political constitution, since he is depicted as an Athenian citizen actually involved in politics.

As the discussion proceeds, Callicles attempts to offer a psychological ground for his political theory (482e-484c) when Socrates asks him whether this better and superior person, identified now as the *phronimos*, should not only command the worse and inferior people, but

¹ For the purpose of this paper, I have used Tom Griffith's translation of the *Gorgias* (Cambridge, 2010) and G.M.A. Grube's translation, revised by C.D.C. Reeve, of the *Republic* (Indianapolis, 1997). I have made some slight modifications to their translations in order to better cohere with my text, but this is not to question the original translation (e.g. “temperance” instead of “moderation” for *sōphrosunē*, “appetites” instead of “desires” for *epithumiai*, and so on).

² Asheri *et al.* 2007, 475.

also herself – in other words, whether she should be *temperate* (*sōphrōn*) (491d-e). In response to Socrates (491e-492c), Callicles articulates a sort of moral psychology, as I will discuss in detail in Section 2.2, based on different psychic elements (*epithumiai*, *phronēsis*, *andreia*, and feelings like shame and fear) in order to argue that virtue and happiness consist in “luxury, intemperance and freedom” (τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, 492c4-5), rather than in temperance. If we combine the political and the psychological views advanced by Callicles throughout the dialogue, and assume that they articulate to some extent a kind of theory that intends to justify the exercise of the autocratic power by appealing to the notion of “the law of nature” (κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, 483e3) or “what is just in nature” (τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον, 484b1), we can fairly infer that by means of Callicles' character Plato offers also in the *Gorgias* a reflection on the rise of tyranny within democracy and the psychology of the tyrant. And, as I will try to show, this reflexion has a deep affinity with the analysis of tyranny and the tyrannical soul in books VIII and IX of the *Republic*.

The approach adopted in this essay will concentrate on the characterization of Callicles and aims to verify to what extent he is portrayed by Plato as a *potential* tyrant within a democratic polis from the *psychological* standpoint.³ My main contention is that the Socratic cross-examination reveals that Callicles does not fulfil the conditions of a tyrannical individual – as Callicles himself conceives it – since he is still susceptible to shame (especially regarding erotic behaviour and patterns of manliness) that would prevent him to pursue an unrestricted hedonistic life. Cinzia Arruzza has recently addressed the same issue on her rich and insightful book *A Wolf in the City* (Oxford 2019), but my interpretation differs significantly from her on

³ Ludwig 2007, 224-225 seems to suggest that Callicles would be an example of a *potential* tyrant in the *corpus Platonium*, but he does not develop the argument nor justify his assumption. On the other hand, Parry 2007, 394-396 points out the similarities between the Calliclean superior person and the tyrant of book IX of the *Republic*, but does not discuss the characterization of Callicles as such, only the reflexion on tyranny Plato advances through him. In her book on the *Gorgias*, Tarnopolsky takes an approach similar to that adopted here and considers Callicles as a case of “the tyrannical democrat”, and contends that “he doesn't fully identify with the tyrant because he can still be ashamed by some of the actions entailed by the tyrannical life of indiscriminate hedonism” (2010, 111). This is in a nutshell what I intend to show in Section 2 of this paper, but Tarnopolsky does not advance a thorough examination of books VIII and IX of the *Republic* in order to refine this contention, as I will attempt to do in Section 3, nor does she discuss the affinities between the Calliclean moral psychology (what I label here “the psychology of *pleonexia*”) and the psychology of tyrant in Book IX, as I will argue in Section 2. Besides, I am not concerned with Socrates' supposed intention by shaming Callicles (what Tarnopolsky calls the *respectful shame* aimed at by him as a positive means to avoid tyranny and keep the democratic collective deliberations working well and healthy, in opposition to the negative *flattering shame* that is pernicious to democracy and harmonious citizenship by stigmatizing and excluding certain parties from the political debate), but only with the diagnosis of Callicles' current psychic condition we can grasp throughout the Socratic cross-examination, and with the gap between his actual condition and his own ideal of happiness.

the following point: whereas she understands Callicles as a case of a “would-be tyrannical wolf” in a positive sense – that is to say, that Callicles fulfils the conditions to become an actual tyrant if the historical and political circumstances allow it – my focus is conversely on the current limitations of his psychic condition that would prevent him to become a real tyrant even if the the historical and political circumstances would allow it. From this standpoint, Callicles' susceptibility to shame would be the main sign of his inner debility, such that his *erōs* for the demos mentioned by Socrates at 481c-2 and 513c-d cannot be equated to the tyrant's *erōs* as described in Book IX of the *Republic*.⁴

In order to justify this reading I will not ground my interpretation on “Socratic” moral psychology we find scattered throughout the dialogue; on the contrary, my intent is to analyse Callicles' character by means of his own alternative moral psychology sketched in 491e-492c. If we take seriously Callicles' ideas as an alternative position to the views supported by Socrates in this field of philosophical inquiry in the *Gorgias*, and try to explore its consequences in the best way possible, we find a richer ground to trace other affinities with the *Republic*, especially regarding the reflexion on tyranny and the psychology of the tyrannical person developed in books VIII and IX. As far as I know, the first scholar who has stressed the philosophical importance of Callicles' idiosyncratic view on moral psychology was John Cooper in his study 'Socrates and Plato in Plato's *Gorgias*' (Princeton, 1999). So, in this essay I will follow his track and argue for what I will call “the psychology of *pleonexia*” advanced by Plato through Callicles' speeches. Put briefly, I will argue for two main claims in Sections 2 and 3, respectively: that (i) when we analyse Callicles' *ēthos* from the point of view of his own alternative moral psychology sketched in 491e-492c (i.e. the psychology of *pleonexia*), he does not actually embody the ideal of the better and superior individual he himself advocates, insofar as he remains susceptible to shame, as evinced by Socrates' cross-examination (494c-495a);⁵ and that (ii) when we look forward to books VIII and IX of the *Republic*, he can be understood, for this same reason, as being precisely on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical person. In other words, Callicles is depicted by Plato as only a *potential* tyrant within

⁴ This point of Arruzza's reading that I am disputing here appears clearly when she says that “Socrates himself suggests the connection between the two concepts when in the *Gorgias* he says of Callicles that he has two objects of love: the young Demos and the Athenian demos. As in the case of Callicles, the tyrannical man's eros is strongly related to an ideal of endless and unlimited appetitive jouissance” (2019, 181). I agree with Arruzza that Callicles falls short of his own ideal of superiority, but not because “he must flatter the very demos he simultaneously loves and despises” (2019, 181), but rather because he is still bounded to some values and patterns of behavior that his superior man would be able to surpass, as evinced by his susceptibility to shame. This is what I will try to show in the next section.

⁵ See also Tarnopolsky 2010, 110-113.

a democratic polis from the *psychological* standpoint. This methodological move from the *Gorgias* to the *Republic*, as I will try to show in Section 3, is granted by the theoretical affinities between the psychology of *pleonexia* advanced by Callicles, and the psychology of the tyrannical soul developed by Plato in books VIII and IX.

2. The characterisation of Callicles in the *Gorgias*

2.1. Callicles' inner disharmony

In his article on the *Gorgias*, Raphael Woolf argues that the two parts of Callicles' main speech in the dialogue (482c-484c; 484c-486d) are so irreconcilable that it is preferable to consider them as expressions of two radically different political ideals. To illustrate his point Woolf uses the labels 'Callicles 1' and 'Callicles 2' to identify the contradictions in his speech: the verbal manifestation of his psychic disharmony gradually revealed beneath the gaze of Socratic cross-examination.⁶ 'Callicles 1' represents the ideal of the better and superior person by nature, capable of overthrowing the laws and customs established by the majority in order to allow natural justice to prevail. 'Callicles 2', on the other hand, expresses the values of a person who is attached to the laws and customs of the city, who is an expert in what makes an individual become *kalos kagathos* and high reputed, who is skilled in the discourses that are required in public and private relationships, who is experienced in human pleasures and appetites. In the first case, therefore, Callicles disdains the *nomoi* of the majority, regarded by him as a congregation of the weak and inferior who are unable to prevail over others, and who therefore determine that "to have more" (τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, 483c3-4) is unjust and shameful, and that "the equal" (τὸ ἴσον, 483c5) is just and fine. In the second case, conversely, a good reputation is esteemed as one of the conditions for being successful in political affairs, which the philosophical life can obstruct. Woolf suggests that the contradiction in Callicles' speech

⁶ cf. Woolf 2000, 2-6. He contends that Callicles' psychic disharmony concerns only the inconsistency of his ethic and political opinions, as revealed by Socratic cross-examination (2010, 30-32). I believe, however, that his psychic disharmony is not only an intellectual problem, but also refers to the lack of control over his appetites, as the discussion on temperance and intemperance evinces – especially at 503d-505c. Although Woolf recognizes the importance of *erōs* in understanding the failure of Socratic elenchus when applied to an interlocutor such as Callicles, I will argue here that the disharmony of his opinions is ultimately *a verbal expression of the inner disharmony of his soul*, which follows from the predominance of the *epithumiai*. This reading also coheres with the representation of Callicles as an intemperate person, a point which will be especially important for my argument. For the inner contradiction of Callicles' ideas and desires, see also Tarnopolsky 2010, 31.

reflects the opposition between *nomos* and *phusis* advocated by him: ‘Callicles 1’ would therefore champion *phusis* while ‘Callicles 2’ champions *nomos*.⁷

Woolf’s reading emphasizes the gulf between the two political ideals expressed within Callicles’ speech, such that Callicles himself could be considered to be suffering from a classic case of ‘split personality’.⁸ Although I broadly agree with Woolf’s interpretation of the contradiction in Callicles’ main speech, I would like to take a further step and suggest a more comprehensive reading. I argue that Callicles is not suffering from a case of ‘split personality’ per se. Rather, Plato represents him as a character whose soul stands on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical, as I will show in Section 3. In this sense, the contradictions of his moral and political ideas would consist in a verbal expression of a deeper psychological disharmony proper to an individual in a process of inner transformation. The justification for this reading concerns the meaning of Callicles’ intemperance, as diagnosed by Socrates during the examination of his opinions. Let us therefore examine Socrates’ diagnosis of Callicles’ psychological disposition.

The discussion of political issues begun by Callicles’ main speech (482c-486d) gradually shifts towards the psychological domain. When Socrates asks Callicles whether the better and superior people should rule not only their cities, but also themselves, the discussion turns into a consideration of the value of temperance and intemperance for happiness (491d-e). Callicles identifies the “better and superior people” with the intemperate ones, those who maximize their own appetites and do not restrain them, being able to serve their appetites by means of *bravery* (*andreia*) and *intelligence* (*phronēsis*), and to fulfil them whenever they arise (491e-492a). The temperate, conversely, are regarded as “foolish” (τοὺς ἡλιθίους, 491e2), likened to rocks and corpses (492e). On Callicles’ moral view, the end of all actions consists in the fulfilment of one’s appetites and the attainment of pleasure, and human happiness and virtue in “luxury, intemperance and freedom” (τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, 492c4-6). This hedonistic conception of happiness advanced by Callicles implies the conflation of goodness

⁷ Shaw 2015, 134 offers a different approach to Callicles’ position by arguing that even though he criticizes conventional justice, his conception of *pleonexia* is based on the same notion of what is *good* shared by the majority (ultimately, pleasure); in other words, “Callicles’ criticism of conventional justice reveals his conventional views about good and bad. According to this reading, there would be no sharp distinction between ‘Callicles 1’ and ‘Callicles 2’ as claimed by Woolf. Nonetheless, even if Shaw is correct in this point, this does not undermine the contrast between the contempt to the democratic values represented by ‘Callicles 1’, and the attachment to the political and social life of Athens represented by ‘Callicles 2’. For the purpose of this paper this conflict between the political ideas voiced by Callicles is enough.

⁸Woolf 2000, 4 n. 6.

and pleasure, as he admits later in the dialogue at 495a. Insofar as the discussion turns from the political to the psychological domain, Socrates begins to examine temperance and intemperance in order to contrast these two types of person and decide which mode of life ought to be pursued if one intends to live well and be happy. Socrates then appeals to a Sicilian or Italian myth to illustrate his point (492e-494a). The intemperate person has never succeeded in satisfying her appetites because she seeks continually to fulfil them without ever succeeding, experiencing the most extreme pains. The temperate person, on the other hand, since it is impossible to get rid of appetites, is able to satisfy them moderately and so to calm down. Socrates associates temperance with the idea of orderliness (κοσμίως, 493c6; τοὺς κοσμίους, d2; τὸν τοῦ κοσμοῦ [βίον], τὸν κόσμον βίον, 494a3-4), while intemperance is compared, by contrast, to a psychological disorder (τῆς ἀκοσμήτου, 506e5; ἀκοσμίαν, 508a4).

The idea of *orderliness* is further clarified by the analogy between art and virtue advanced by Socrates later in the discussion. Just as the craftsman's works acquire form when each one of their parts adapts and harmonizes with the others, so the temperate soul is ordered when a certain arrangement and orderliness emerges in the relationship between its constitutive elements (503e-504e; 506e-507a). This implies that in such a disposition something ought to command (i.e. reason, although Plato does not indicate this explicitly) and another to be commanded (i.e. the appetites). In the intemperate soul, conversely, the appetites prevail over reason, such that the soul is deprived of this inner orderliness.

According to Socrates' diagnosis, the incoherence of the opinions advanced by Callicles, made apparent by his main speech (482c-486d), reflects this psychological disharmony of the intemperate soul, if he is actually an intemperate person in accordance with his own conception of virtue and happiness (491e-492c). Socrates' examination of Callicles will enable us to verify, as we will see in Section 2.3, in what condition his soul is regarding his own ideal of virtue. On this psychological reading of Callicles' case, *shame* will assume a central role in Socrates' dissection of Callicles' psychological disposition.

2.2. The role of shame in Calliclean moral psychology

At the beginning of the discussion, Socrates asserts that Callicles has three essential qualities that enable him to verify whether his own moral opinions are true or false: “knowledge, benevolence and frankness” (ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὖνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν, 487a2-3). These qualities are precisely those that will be tested by the Socratic elenchus and, subsequently, by examination of the interlocutor's soul. If Callicles really possesses the

“frankness” (*parrhēsia*) which he considers Gorgias and Polus to lack (482c-e), then he would not be affected by shame as both have been. Rather, frankness would enable him to defend his ideas without restraint and fear of censure.⁹ Indeed, shame plays a crucial role in Calliclean moral psychology outlined in 491e-492c, when the discussion shifts from the political to the psychological domain. As mentioned in Section 1, I will label it “the psychology of *pleonexia*”. The relevant passage is the following:

CALL: [...] the person who is going to live in the right way should allow his own appetites [τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ] to be as great as possible, without restraining them [μὴ κολάζειν]. And when they are as great as can be, he should be capable of using his bravery and intelligence [δὲ ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν] in their service, and giving them full measure of whatever it is, on any particular occasion, his appetite [ἡ ἐπιθυμία] is for. This is impossible for most people, in my view, which is why they are ashamed of themselves [δὲ αἰσχύνην], and condemn people like this as a cloak for their own powerlessness. They even go so far as to claim that lack of restraint is something disgraceful [καὶ αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν], as I was saying earlier, enslaving those people who are by nature better, and being themselves incapable of providing for the fulfilment of their pleasures [ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν], they praise temperance and justice because of their own lack of manliness [ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν]. (491e8-492b1)

This is the first formulation of a hedonist conception of happiness advocated by Callicles. I will label it *qualified hedonism* – the second one, *categorical hedonism*, will be asserted at 494c as we will see in this Section. He points out that it is not enough to simply maximise one’s appetites without restraint. Instead, the agent must have sufficient bravery (*andreia*) and intelligence (*phronēsis*) in order to serve and fulfil them. This implies that, whereas intelligence allows one to identify the means to fulfil one’s appetites and determine the right moment to do so, bravery is necessary to overcome the emotions that can impede their fulfilment, such as shame and fear. Shame is regarded as the psychological mark of the inferior people who, unable to satisfy their own appetites, claim that such intemperance is shameful. Since shame is a moral feeling instilled from childhood into the soul of the better and superior people by means of laws and customs established and enforced by the majority (483e-484a), the Calliclean virtuous person must be able to transcend this kind of shame and thus allow her natural superiority to prevail.

As mentioned in Section 1, John Cooper emphasizes in his study on the *Gorgias* the importance of the innovations on moral psychology introduced by this alternative view conveyed by Callicles' character. Since feelings like shame and fear might obstruct the process of fulfilling the appetites if the person does not have sufficient bravery to overcome them, it

⁹ On the political meaning of *parrhēsia*, see Tarnopolsky 2010, 96-97.

implies the recognition of different sources of motivation – namely, the appetites themselves, feelings like shame or fear, and the strength provided by bravery whose function is to overcome those impulses that hinder the fulfilment of the appetites.¹⁰ It can be considered also some strength afforded by intelligence (*phronēsis*) in keeping the agent on the right track – i.e. in pursuing the appropriate means conducive to the end – that leads ultimately to the satisfaction of the appetites.¹¹ According to such a view, the conflict between these different forces within the soul is perfectly reasonable, and we can figure out two *possible* scenarios for conflict within the soul, even though they are not explicitly explored by Plato in the *Gorgias*:

(a) when an appetite (*epithumia*) arises, the person decides to maximise it without restraint, but cannot identify through intelligence (*phronēsis*) the means and the right moment to fulfil it, despite having bravery (*andreia*) enough to overcome feelings like shame or fear. For example, a person has a very strong appetite for a very expensive dish she cannot pay for, and does not refrain from it but instead let it grow; she decides then to steal something else in order to get enough money to pay for it without fearing punishment or feeling ashamed of being regarded as a thief by other people if she is eventually caught in the act; but she is unable to discern the best way to steal it without being caught and/or the right moment to do it, and so decides to give up;

(b) when an appetite (*epithumia*) arises, the person decides to maximise it without restraint, but does not have bravery (*andreia*) enough to overcome feelings like shame or fear, despite being able to identify through intelligence (*phronēsis*) the means and the right moment to fulfil it. Take the same example above: one decides to steal something in order to get enough money to pay for an expensive dish, discerning the best way to steal it without being caught, and the right

¹⁰ Cooper 1999a, 61.

¹¹ Cooper 1999a, 61 considers unclear the role of intelligence in this psychological process – specifically whether it constitutes an alternative source of motivation or serves only to provide information. The difficulty concerns, I think, how to understand the relation between *phronēsis* and *andreia* in the following sentence from the next passage I will quote below: [...] καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς (“and not just intelligent people, but brave as well, being capable of carrying through the things they plan – people who won't give up from softness of spirit”, 491b2-3). If we take the adjective phrase ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν qualifying only ἀνδρεῖοι, then *phronēsis* could be reduced to the role of providing only information – in determining the things ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν – whereas *andreia* would provide the necessary strength to put in action what is determined by *phronēsis*. However, if we take this adjective phrase as qualifying both καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, then we could assume that *phronēsis* would provide not only the information required to accomplish what is decided the best thing to do in such or such circumstances, but also a complementary strength to the one coming from *andreia* when engaging in action. In other words, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν would be a result of the cooperation between *phronēsis* and *andreia*.

moment to do so; however, she is prevented from doing it by fearing punishment and/or by feeling ashamed of being regarded as a thief by other people if she is eventually caught in the act.

In sum, the first case (a) would consist in a conflict between *epithumia* and *phronēsis*, whereas the second (b), between *epithumia* and *shame* or *fear* due to lack of bravery (*andreia*). If Callicles' position admits this kind of inner conflict, it implies therefore the disunity of virtue, since an agent might have one virtue without necessarily possessing the other. This seems to be assumed by Callicles when identifying the kind of person he deems as *phronimos*:

CAL: [...] In the first place, the more powerful, who they are – I don't mean leather cutters and cooks, but those who are people of understanding [φρόνιμοι] where the affairs of the city are concerned, and the way in which they might be well run. *And not just people of understanding, but brave as well* [καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι], and capable of carrying through the things they plan [ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν] – people who won't give up from softness of spirit [καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς]. (491a7-b4; my italics)

As Cooper considers: “Like Protagoras, Callicles assumes that a person could have one of these virtues without the other. This is already clear from the way he describes the superior person as not only intelligent but also brave, ‘without slackening off from softness of spirit’ [καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, 491b3-4]: evidently, he considers that some people who have the requisite intelligence are disqualified from superiority by being soft-hearted and unmanly – by succumbing to the inducements of mass culture that can lead the naturally better type of person to be ashamed to make the demands that his intelligence would entitle him to, if only he throw off such inhibitions (483e-484a)” (1999, 54).¹² Put briefly, both intelligence and bravery are deemed necessary conditions for virtue in Callicles' view.

¹² Carone objects to Cooper's reading as follows: “Now, it is true that at 491a-b Callicles explicates what he meant by wise (*phronimos*) as referring to the people who are ‘wise in the affairs of the state and also brave, capable of fulfilling their conceptions’; thus, Cooper has interpreted this to mean that it is *courage* (only) that is needed to fulfil thoughts that one would have independently through wisdom. But it is not necessary to read the text this way; rather, the evidence analysed above seems instead to support the reading that one needs *both* wisdom *and* bravery to be able to carry out one's conception to the full” (2004, 74-75). However, Carone's counterargument does not invalidate at all the reading proposed by Cooper. What Carone remarks upon here is precisely the condition of the virtuous person according to Callicles – that is to say, the agent must have both *phronēsis* and *andreia* in order to fulfil the appetites whenever they arise (ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὖσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι ὧν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται, 492a1-3). It therefore seems undeniable that in Callicles' view *phronēsis* and *andreia* are necessary conditions for virtue, and that *phronēsis* alone is not sufficient condition for it (491b). And especially at 491b, it is plausible, from Callicles' standpoint, that a person who is not sufficiently brave due to softness of spirit might have correct reasonings concerning what is best to the city he governs. In any case, what Cooper is considering is the case of a non-virtuous person, who is unable to satisfy their appetites since he lacks sufficient

This psychological ground provided by Callicles in order to qualify the better and superior person considered by him as *phronimos* (and also *andreios*) gives support to his political ideas expounded in his main speech in the dialogue (482e-484c).¹³ It is this close connection between the political and psychological dimensions of Callicles' view that allows us to turn now to explore in detail what I have called “the psychology of *pleonexia*” – and as we shall see in Section 3, this is what will enable us to connect it with the discussion on tyranny and the tyrannical soul in the *Republic*. The most important notion in Callicles' political view is that of “to have more” (*pleon ekhein*, *pleonektein*, 483c2, c3, c4, c7, d1-2, d6). According to him, there is a natural distinction between the better and superior people (the minority) and the worse and inferior (the majority). The first ones are naturally able to have more than the others, but they are prevented from doing so by the laws established by the majority determining that *pleonexia* is unjust and shameful, whereas *to ison* is just and praiseworthy (483b-d). The worse and inferior people succeed in refraining the better and superior from having more than them not only by means of conventional laws, but also through *frightening* them (ἐκφοβοῦντες, 483c1) – probably by the threat of punishment in case they violate the laws shared by the civil community – and *enchaining* and *bewitching* them since childhood in order to keep them as slaves (κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, 483e6). For Callicles this political organization imposed by the majority is a subversion of what he calls “the nature of the just” (κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου, 483e2), “the law of nature” (κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, 483e3) or “what is just in nature” (τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον, 484b1), according to which the better and superior must rule over the worse and inferior, and have more than them. So, in order to prevail over the majority and make the just by nature rise, the Calliclean virtuous person must be able to overcome moral feelings such as fear and shame, and to trample on the mechanisms of enchanting and bewitching afforded by laws, prescriptions, and customs established against nature by the worse and inferior people (484a).

Thus, what the psychological argument elucidates (491e-492c) is that the desire for “having more” than the others (*pleonexia*) is due to the unrestrained appetites the better and superior people have, since happiness and virtue are deemed by them as consisting in maximizing and fulfilling the appetites whenever they arise. In other words, it is because their appetites are unrestrained (μὴ κολάζειν, 491e9) that they seek to have more than the worse and

andreia to overcome feelings like shame or fear. If the reading advanced by Cooper is not *necessary*, as Carone suggests, it is at least *reasonable*, since it does not contradict the Platonic text.

¹³ That part which represents ‘Callicles 1’ as proposed by Woolf (2000).

inferior people and to prevail over them; if they cannot succeed in doing so, they would be unable to provide satisfaction for their appetites and would live in a condition of suffering, pain, and misery. According to Calliclean moral psychology, therefore, *pleonexia* and intemperance are intrinsically intertwined; more precisely, intemperance is the psychological cause of *pleonexia*. The worse and inferior people, by contrast, praise temperance and justice precisely out of their incapacity to provide satisfaction for their pleasures due to lack of bravery or manliness (διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν, 492b1). In this sense, Callicles clearly considers that *shame* and *fear* are moral feelings instilled into the soul of the better and superior people since childhood through the mechanisms alluded to above, and that they are not in accordance with, and not appropriate to, their nature. Hence, in order that “the just of nature shines forth” (484a6-b1), bravery (*andreia*) is a necessary condition that enables them to overcome these moral feelings that could prevent them from fulfilling their unrestrained appetites, and consequently, from seeking to have more than the others for the sake of happiness.

Another relevant aspect of the psychology of *pleonexia* is the intrinsic relationship established between intemperance and injustice – that is to say, injustice from the point of view of *conventional* justice instituted by the worse and inferior people against nature.¹⁴ This connection is strongly emphasised by Plato throughout the *Gorgias*, particularly through Socrates' speeches, when justice and temperance are very closely associated (507d8-e1, 508a2, 508b1, 519a1).¹⁵ An intemperate person tends to commit unjust acts in order to fulfil indiscriminately her appetites, if these acts are deemed by her the appropriate means to achieve this ultimate end. She might be prevented from doing so, nevertheless, by *fearing* the punishment the civil community is entitled to inflict on her in case of criminal acts, and/or by *being ashamed* to seek satisfaction for certain kinds of appetite the worse and inferior people consider shameful and instruct others about their shamefulness since childhood. Therefore, the conception of “what is just in nature” (τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον, 484b1) advocated by Callicles comes to challenge precisely this relationship between intemperance and *conventional* injustice, subverting it by establishing an intrinsic connection between intemperance and *natural* justice. This is why the better and superior person must be able to overcome these moral boundaries imposed by the majority in order to make justice according to nature prevail.

¹⁴ Socrates points out this close connection between injustice and intemperance in the discussion with Polus about the function of punishment as a means by which justice attempts to “heal” the unjust and intemperate people of their vicious condition (τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας, 478a4-5; ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας, b1).

¹⁵ Callicles refers to this close association between *conventional* justice and temperance at 492a8-b1, b4-5 and c1.

To sum up, what I have called “the psychology of *pleonexia*” gives to Callicles' political ideas a psychological ground, illuminating and deepening the meaning of the natural superiority he advocated for the better and superior people over the worse and inferior. It seems obvious that Calliclean conception of “what is just in nature” is anti-democratic, especially emphasised in his contempt for the notion of “equality” (*to ison*) in opposition to the crucial notion of his own political view (*pleonexia*) (483b-d), and for the *nomos*, *logos* and *psogos* of the majority of people (492b), as we see in the following passage:

CALL: [...] But those who've had the chance, right from the beginning, either to be sons of kings or to have the natural ability to win some position of authority for themselves – as tyrant or part of a ruling élite – for those people, what could be more disgraceful or worse than temperance and justice? It's open to them to enjoy the good things in life – what is to stop them? – and yet they choose to bring in, as master over themselves, *the general population's law, reasoning and blame* [τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον]? (492b1-8; my italics)

Callicles distinguishes two basic political *scenarios* in which “what is just in nature” could be brought forth: either (i) a hereditary kingship (*basileia*), insofar as the ruler has already got the political power that enables him to seek his own interests (supposedly against the interests of his subjects); or (ii) a non-hereditary power – that might be of a single individual (*turannis*) or of a group of individuals (*dunasteia*) – conquered at some point due to the natural capacity of these people to prevail over the rest of the civil community.¹⁶ What matters here is that Callicles clearly envisages an autocratic power which would consist in the optimal means for the better and superior people – it is likely he considers himself as one of them – to seek the maximisation and satisfaction of their appetites for the sake of happiness. In the next section, I will discuss to what extent Callicles' character actually personifies the nature of the better and superior person praised by himself.

2.3. *Callicles' susceptibility to shame*

After providing a psychological ground for his political ideas, Callicles' view is confronted by Socrates' defence of the temperate as the best and happier way of life, and the intemperate as the worst and most wretched. As summed up in Section 2.1, Socrates resorts to

¹⁶ For the distinction between *turannis* and *dunasteia*, see Dodds 1959, 295. It is worth noting that in his main speech Callicles mentions Darius and Xerxes as embodying the notion of “the just of nature” – i.e. “the stronger ruling over, and having more than, the weaker” (ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλεον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατώτερου, 483d5-6); in Greek political thought, the Persian rulers were deemed as the paradigmatic examples of tyrannical power in opposition to democracy.

a foreign myth to show that the intemperate person is unable to satisfy her appetites because she seeks continually to fulfil them without ever succeeding so to experience the most extreme pains, whereas the temperate is able to satisfy them moderately and so to calm down (492e-494a). Callicles reacts with disbelief to Socrates' argument, and likens the temperate to a rock, "since she no longer rejoices or feels pain once satiated" (ἐπειδὴν πληρώση, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον, 494a8-b1); for him, "living a pleasantly life simply consists in having as much flowing in as possible" (ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιρρεῖν, 494ab1-2). It is implied here that Callicles regards pleasure as an experience concurrent with the process of satisfying them, such that the more one enlarges her appetites, the more pleasure she will have in fulfilling them; when one is satiated, in turn, she no longer feels pain or pleasure.¹⁷

This move leads Callicles to abandon *qualified* hedonism (491e-492c) and to commit himself on a more radical hedonistic conception of happiness when pressed by Socratic elenchus – namely, the *categorical* hedonism described as "to have *all* the rest of the appetites and to be able to rejoice satisfying them, and so to lead a happy life" (καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν, 494c2-3; my italics), and referred by Socrates later on as "to rejoice in all its forms" (τὸ πάντως χαίρειν, 495b4). Socrates understands that this radical formulation of hedonism entails that Callicles – or in general the intemperate person regarded by him as the virtuous – is committed to the satisfaction of *all sorts of appetite*, whatever they might be, in order to have a happy life. To verify to what extent Callicles is in fact attached to this extreme hedonistic conception of happiness, Socrates appeals to embarrassing examples such as the pleasures of scratching oneself and of the catamites (*kinaidoi*) to lead the argument to its utmost consequences.¹⁸ Let us see how Callicles reacts to Socrates' inductive reasoning:

¹⁷ It is worth noting that Socrates disagrees with Callicles regarding this sort of "physiology" of the appetites, and attempts to refute it arguing that the process of fulfilling the appetites consists rather in a blend of pleasure and pain, such that there is no experience of pure pleasure at all in repletive appetites such as hunger and thirst (cf. 496b-497a). I will not develop this point, however, since my focus is particularly on Calliclean moral psychology.

¹⁸ Cooper 1999a, 72-73 points out rightly that in the first formulation of hedonism (491e-492c) – *qualified* hedonism – Callicles does not affirm that the person who intends to live well must be able to satisfy *all* appetites, but that, when the appetites arise, she must allow them to be as great as possible and fulfil them. It could reasonably be the case that, pondering on the nature of some appetite, she prefers not to fulfil it by considering it unworthy or shameful. According to this *qualified* formulation of hedonism, it would not be incoherent if Callicles distinguished between the good and the bad appetites and, consequently, between the good and the bad pleasures. For the virtuous person would be that one who is able to enlarge and fulfil without restraint those appetites worthy of being fulfilled,

SOC: Bravo, Sir! Now, continue as you have begun, don't hold back out of *embarrassment* [ἀπαισχυνῆ]. And I mustn't be *embarrassed* either [ἀπαισχυνθῆναι], by the looks of it. So tell me this for a start: if you feel an itch and want to scratch, and are able to scratch to your heart's content, and spend your life scratching, is that living a happy life?

CALL: That's absurd, Socrates. You're just scoring points.

SOC: Yes, Callicles, that's how I unnerved Gorgias and Polus, and made them *embarrassed* [αἰσχύνεσθαι]. But you're a brave chap, you won't be unnerved or get *embarrassed* [αἰσχυνθῆς]. Just keep answering.

CALL: Very well. In that case I maintain that even the person scratching would be living pleasantly.

SOC: And if pleasantly, then also happy?

CALL: Absolutely.

SOC: And do you mean if he just scratches his head, or – well, how much further do I have to go with my questions? I mean, what will your answer be, Callicles, if someone asks you, step by step, about all the sort of thing, what about the life of a catamite. Isn't it horrible, *shameful* [αἰσχρός], wretched? Or will you bring yourself to say that these people are happy if they can get an unlimited amount of what they need?

CALL: Aren't you *ashamed* [αἰσχύνῃ] to drag the discussion down to such depths, Socrates? (494c4-e8; my italics)

To understand Callicles' embarrassment facing the examples Socrates picks out, firstly we must have in mind the status of the *kinaidos* in the Athenian society. Tarnopolsky summarises it as follows: “The catamite (*kinaidos*) was the passive partner in a male-to-male sexual relationship who, by virtue of his passive sexuality, was denied citizenship rights because he was deemed incapable of taking in the role of the active citizen, future soldier, and defender of Athens. He was also seen as a figure of shamelessness because he failed to put up the kinds of restraints or boundaries necessary to participate fully as a rational and active citizen, and instead passively gave in his shameful and excessive sexual desires” (2010, 22).¹⁹ Some points are worth noting here: (i) the evaluation of the *kinaidos*' behaviour is cultural and historically determined by the moral values shared by Athenian citizens in the 5th and 4th centuries BC, belonging therefore to the domain of *nomos* according to the opposition between *nomos* vs. *phusis* vindicated by Callicles; on a relativistic approach, nothing prevents that in other societies the *kinaidos* could have a different status from that one held in Athens; (ii) due

whatever they are, and to avoid the unworthy ones, whatever they are. The end of all actions would still be the satisfaction of the appetites and the pursuit of pleasure – but not *all* appetites, maybe just the majority of them. However, in the second formulation (494c) – *categorical* hedonism – Callicles supports hedonism without restriction: one who intends to live well must be able to fulfil *all* appetites, including those base ones picked out by Socrates in the quotation below (494c-e). This position entails that pleasure and goodness are absolutely the same thing, such that the undesired consequences highlighted by Socrates are unavoidable. Plato seems to suggest nonetheless that Callicles accepts these awful conclusions reached by Socrates only for the sake of coherence since he has asserted that pleasure and goodness are the same, and not because they reflect his real opinions on the matter (495a5-6). Put briefly, the refutation of *categorical* hedonism does not imply the refutation of *qualified* hedonism supported initially by Callicles at 491e-492c.

¹⁹ See also Arruzza 2019, 150 and 199.

to his passivity in a sexual relationship, the *kinaidos* betrays the ideal of manliness or bravery required to the Athenians citizens, and praised by Callicles;²⁰ (iii) the *kinaidos* induces in the other citizens disgust and shame precisely because his behaviour is deemed shameful; in other words, it is by their sense of shame that the Athenian citizens react with aversion and indignation when facing the *kinaidos*' behaviour; (iv) from the political point of view, the *kinaidos* is an *atimos*, that is to say, he is deprived of citizenship and excluded from the political life of the city, in opposition therefore to Callicles' intended career in Athenian politics.²¹

All these aspects make clear that Callicles' embarrassment is deeply associated with the values advocated by 'Callicles 2', according to Woolf's 'split personality' interpretation alluded to in Section 2.1 – i.e. that side of Callicles who is attached to the laws and customs of the city. Put briefly, his reaction towards the *kinaidos*' condition reveals clearly his deep attachment to the moral values that regulate the social and political life in Athens (especially regarding sexual behaviour and patterns of manliness), and in this sense Callicles is still liable to the domain of *nomos*. If Callicles had not felt shame, he would have assumed those outcomes highlighted by Socrates to be natural consequences of his hedonist conception of happiness without being ashamed by them; or he would have replied to Socrates without embarrassment that his hedonistic conception of happiness excludes this sort of base appetites like scratching oneself or the *kinaidos*' sexual desire by the simple fact that he is not affected by these kinds of appetites, such that they do not belong to the range of "all appetites" he must enlarge and fulfil in order to be happy. This shameless reaction would be proper to 'Callicles 1', who represents the ideal of the better and superior person by nature, capable of overthrowing the laws and customs established by the majority in order to allow natural justice to prevail, immune to moral feelings like shame instilled into her soul by laws, prescriptions, enchantments, and spells against nature – that side of Callicles aligned to *physis*.

That Callicles has been actually ashamed is evinced by Socrates' insistence in stressing the shameful condition of the *kinaidos*, deemed as the utmost consequence of the *categorical* hedonism, in order to evoke this emotion in his interlocutor. And it is precisely by having felt shame that Callicles comes to realize for the first time in the dialogue that pleasure and goodness are different things, and tries to detach himself – at least while pressed by Socratic

²⁰ See also Tarnopolsky 2010, 39-40.

²¹ Socrates does not pick out this example at random; on the contrary, it is a veiled reference to the passive aspect of Callicles' *erōs* remarked upon at 481c-482c: Callicles is a passive partner both in the private and the public realm, as his erotic relationship with Demos son of Pyrilampes and with the Athenian *demos* testifies. See also Moss 2005, 150 and 164; Arruzza 2019, 181.

elenchus – from this extreme hedonistic view of happiness. In other words, by identifying himself with the *kinaidos* as the Socratic inductive reasoning aims to imply, Callicles feels disgust and, consequently, shame when facing this identification, insofar as he is still attached to the moral values of Athenian society ('Callicles 2'); and by having felt disgust and shame he realizes that pleasure and goodness cannot be the same.²² In fact, Socrates is successful in this move, for Callicles continues to assert the identity between goodness and pleasure only *to avoid a contradiction in his position* ("Ἰνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἢ ὁ λόγος, 495a5), and at 499b he finally admits that there are in fact better and worse pleasures.²³ Ultimately, it is shame that makes Callicles recognize that pleasure and goodness are not the same, undermining at least the *categorical* formulation of his hedonist view of happiness.²⁴

²² I therefore disagree with Tarnopolsky who considers Callicles' feeling of shame as a consequence of – and not as a cause of – the recognition of the conflict between the *categorical* hedonism and the moral values praised by 'Callicles 2': "When Callicles is first ashamed at the image of the catamite (*kinaidos*), his feeling of shame arises out of the gap that he now recognizes between his indiscriminate hedonism thesis, which entails such a way of life, and his admired and internalized other of the Athenian statesman and leader. One part of himself (the part that honors courageous leaders) looks down upon the other part that believes in indiscriminate hedonism and that now comes to light as a catamite (*kinaidos*). Here the experience of shame involves the experience of being seen inappropriately by an other but this other is in fact internal to his self or psyche" (2010, 84; my italics)

²³ Cooper 1999a, 69-70 argues against C. Kahn (1983, 106; and 1996, 136-137) that Callicles does not feel embarrassed by the catamite's example pointed out by Socrates, and that his acknowledgement of the distinction between goodness and pleasure at 499b is due rather to the cogency of the two subsequent arguments advanced by Socrates (495e-497d; 497e-499b). Cooper's reading relies on Callicles' positive answer at 495b9 (Ἐγὼ γὰρ), after Socrates having asked him again whether he would continue to embrace the shameful consequences of the *categorical* hedonism called by him as "to rejoice in all its forms" (τὸ πάντως χαίρειν, 495b4). The fact that Callicles does embrace them at this point of the discussion (495b-c) is understood by Cooper as a signal that he in fact deems good even this kind of appetite-pleasure of the catamites. Nonetheless, I think that Cooper's argument does not entail that Callicles has not felt ashamed when facing the disgusting example of the *kinaidos*; otherwise, why does Callicles declare that he will maintain the identity between goodness and pleasure only "to avoid a contradiction in his position" (495a5)? It is clear that Callicles is already willing to concede the distinction between goodness and pleasure just because he is embarrassed by the catamite's example, but does not do so at this point because being refuted by Socrates in the discussion, as Gorgias and Polus have been previously, is also a shameful situation for him. So, I think that Cooper is right when considering that the two subsequent arguments afforded by Socrates are decisive in making Callicles concede openly the distinction between goodness and pleasure (499b), but this does not preclude the possibility of Callicles having felt shame, and disgust, when acknowledging that the catamite's appetites must be included in his hedonist conception of happiness.

²⁴ Renaut analyses the different kinds of shame at play in the dialogue and concludes that it is a shame related to admitting failure that prevents Callicles from accepting to be refuted and therefore persuaded by Socrates. From this viewpoint, Callicles would represent a *philotimotic* character (2014, 102-116). I agree with Renaut that Callicles is concerned with his reputation at this point of the discussion and that his pride prevents him momentarily from admitting defeat to Socrates. Nonetheless, this feature does not entail that he embodies a *philotimotic* character without qualification, since his susceptibility to shame regarding the *kinaidos* evinces a much deeper trait of his personality which is intrinsically related to the formation of a tyrannical soul, as I am attempting to argue. According to my interpretation, Callicles' refusal to admitting failure here can be understood, *contra* Renaut, as only another sign of

How may I contend it is the feeling of shame that makes Callicles acknowledge the contrast between the *categorical* hedonism and some moral values shared by ‘Callicles 2’, and not the other way around? I have in mind particularly one passage of book III of the *Republic* in which Plato describes the peculiar power of *rhythm* and *harmony* in penetrating the soul of the children so to instil in it *euskhēmosunē* (“gracefulness”, “elegance”) (III 401d-402a). The point is that music can mould the perceptive and affective capacity of the children's soul, such that when they *perceive* (ἄν αἰσθάνοιτο, 401e3) that a product of craft or nature lacks something and is deficient, they react appropriately with *disgust* (ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων, 401e4) and blame the shameful/ugly things (τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ψέγοι τ' ἄν ὀρθῶς, 402a1-2), and praise in turn the fine/beautiful ones (τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ, 401e4). And Plato affirms emphatically that this kind of perceptual and affective response is moulded by rhythm and harmony before the children acquire *logos* (πρὶν λόγον δυνατός εἶναι λαβεῖν, 402a2-3). This psychological description could be applied somehow to Callicles' susceptibility to shame: his feeling of shame when facing the *kinaidos*' condition constitutes this kind of perceptual and affective response that is to some extent independent of reason; this would consist in an intuitive moral reaction towards a shameful thing due to the sort of education he has had in Athens that prescribes *kinaidos*' behaviour is shameful. The rational recognition of the conflict between the *categorical* hedonism and some moral values of ‘Callicles 2’ – and therefore the acknowledgement of the distinction between goodness and pleasure – is an *effect* of having been affected by shame and disgust when facing the *kinaidos*' condition.²⁵

If this reading is reasonable, Callicles' susceptibility to shame reveals a gulf between the ideal of virtue he advocates and his actual condition as an intemperate person. Callicles

‘Callicles 2’, that side of his personality who is still attached to the laws and customs of the city, including the concern with good reputation in the city (stressed especially at 484d1-2, τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν καγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα).

²⁵ This close association between the feelings of *disgust* and *shame* appears in Leontius' episode in book IV of the *Republic*. The inner conflict experienced by Leontius is used by Socrates to distinguish the domain of the appetites (*to epithumētikon*) and of the spirit (*thumoeides*) within the soul. When he has an erotic appetite to look at the corpses lying at the executioner's feet, he reacts with *disgust* (δυσχεραίνωι, 439e8) and feels ashamed by the sort of desire that was affecting him – described by the action of “covering his face” (παρακαλύπτωιτο, 440a1). As he does not succeed in get rid of this appetite, “he pushes his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, ‘Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of *the beautiful sight* (τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος)’” (440a2-4; my italics). This is clearly an ironic assertion because the decaying corpses are in fact something *shameful* to see, such that the *thumoeides* induces him to rebuke himself against the overwhelming strength of the *epithumia*. On shame as a manifestation of *thumoeides*, see Büttner (2006, 75 and 86-87), Cooper (1999b, 130-131), Lorenz (2006a, 152), Johnstone (2011, 157-158), Lopes (2017), McKim (1988, 36-37), Moss (2005, 138), Renault (2014, 18-19).

himself could not embody that “lion” that is able to transcend the laws and customs imposed by the majority (484a), represented by ‘Callicles 1’ according to Woolf’s reading; indeed he is still bound by *conventional* morality instilled in his soul from childhood, as his susceptibility to shame reveals (that side represented by ‘Callicles 2’). As expounded above, this kind of moral feeling is regarded by him as an impediment to the enlargement and fulfilment of the *epithumiai*, the reason why bravery (*andreia*) is a virtue required in order to overcome it. What Callicles’ shame evinces, therefore, is that he is not actually endowed with the necessary conditions to realize in full his ideal of virtue and happiness identified with “luxury, intemperance and freedom” (492c4-5). Nonetheless, this diagnosis does not imply that he is not intemperate *to a certain degree*, that the prevalent element of his soul is not the *epithumiai*, and that the enlargement and fulfilment of the appetites are not the ultimate end of his actions. And it reveals also that the psychological inhibitions imposed by moral feelings like shame prevent him from accomplishing in maximum degree his ideal of an intemperate life. It is from this *psychological* standpoint, therefore, that I contend that Callicles is portrayed by Plato in the *Gorgias* as a *potential* tyrant within a democratic *polis*, and not an *actual* one.

In the next section, I will attempt to show that the *Gorgias* – particularly the psychology of *pleonexia* – presents sufficient evidence that points towards the discussion of tyranny and the tyrannical soul advanced by Plato in books VIII and IX of the *Republic*. If this move is methodologically feasible, I think that the *Republic* might offer us further arguments that not only corroborate the general idea of Callicles as a *potential* tyrant as examined in Section 2, but also specify the precise condition of an individual such as Callicles in the degenerative psychological process from the timocratic to tyrannical soul – namely, *the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical*.

3. Revisiting Callicles’ characterization in the *Gorgias* according to the moral psychology of the *Republic*

If Callicles expresses an admiration for tyrannical power in his speech and aspires to political supremacy as tyrants often have, and if he is represented by Plato as a young politician in democratic Athens at the end of 5th century BC, it is reasonable to contend, broadly speaking, that the *Gorgias* presents *dramatically* what the *Republic* will develop *theoretically* in the investigation of the four degenerated forms of *politeiai* (timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and

tyranny): the rise of the tyrant within democracy.²⁶ From the psychological point of view, on the other hand, if Callicles is depicted as an intemperate person whose soul is governed by *epithumiai*, he can be seen to represent the transitional stage from the democratic to the tyrannical individual, if we make use of the new material Plato presents in books VIII and IX of the *Republic*. This tenet is what I will attempt to argue for from now on.

When Socrates resumes in book VIII the discussion on the four types of degenerate *politeiai* – and, by analogy, on the four types of degenerate soul – announced at the beginning of book V (449a), some refinement in the tripartite theory is introduced in order to explain the process of degeneration both in the political and the psychological domains. When describing the transitional process from the oligarchic to the democratic individual in book VIII, and from the democratic to the tyrannical in book IX, Plato introduces the distinction between types of *epithumiai* that is absent from book IV. They are basically divided into two classes: the necessary and the unnecessary appetites (VIII 558d9).²⁷ The first class concerns those appetites which are indispensable to life and good health, whereas the second one comprises those appetites which can be avoided by repression and education from childhood, and are detrimental both to the body and to the soul concerning *intelligence* and *temperance* (VIII 558d-559c). In book IX, Plato discerns a subgroup of the unnecessary appetites – labelled as *paranomoi* (IX 571b3-4) – that concerns those which are likely to be present within everyone but are repressed and controlled by laws and the better appetites in alliance with reason (IX 571b).²⁸ These appetites are those which appear in dreams when the reason sleeps and the savage part of soul prevails, *free of all constraint by shame and intelligence* (ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης

²⁶ On the tyranny as the negation of the democratic values in the Athenian political thought of the 5th century BC, see Arruzza 2019, 23-32.

²⁷ They are, in fact, different species of *epithumiai* concerning *to epithumētikon*. In book IX, on the other hand, Plato introduces the notion of pleasure and appetite relatively to each of the three parts of the soul (τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἰδίᾳ· ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί, IX 580d6-7). This advancement leads the discussion to a more complex approach that does not matter here. On the importance of the semantical fluidity of the term *epithumia* in order to understand the inner conflict of the degenerate souls in books VIII and IX, see Lorenz 2006b, 45-47.

²⁸ Parry 2007, 386 and 395 considers the tyrannical erotic passion, “itself a particularly intense sort of *erōs*”, as a fourth element alongside the necessary, unnecessary and *paranomoi* appetites. But I think that this erotic passion, identified as “an enormous winged drone” (IX 573a1) in the constitution of the tyrannical soul, consists rather in the culmination of the unnecessary appetites' regime in the psychological degenerative process, and as such *erōs* is not qualitatively distinct from the unnecessary class. When delimitating the domain of the *epithumiai* within the soul in book IV, erotic desire, alongside thirst and hunger, appears as a paradigmatic type of appetite that constitutes *to epithumētikon* (cf. IV 436 a-b, 439d; IX 580e). So, the increasing insatiability that characterizes the unnecessary appetites culminates in the rise of this overwhelming erotic passion, but within the proper domain of the unnecessary (including here the *paranomoi*).

λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνῃς καὶ φρονήσεως, IX 571c8-d1), appetites such as to attempt sexual intercourse with one's mother or with anyone or anything else, man or beast or god, to commit murder indiscriminately, or to gorge oneself on food (IX 571c-d).

3.1. *From the Oligarchic Individual to the Democratic*

According to such a degenerative genealogy²⁹, the oligarchic individual is the one who is commanded by the necessary appetites and pleasures (VIII 559c), whereas the democratic is that one who is full of pleasures and appetites and commanded by both the necessary and unnecessary ones indiscriminately (VIII 561a-b).³⁰ Plato uses a martial vocabulary in order to explain the psychological transition from the oligarchic to democratic person: when these two species of appetites clash within the soul of the young man, son of an oligarchic father, each one helped by an external alliance, a *dissension* (στάσις) is established as well as a *counter-dissension* (ἀντίστασις) resulting in an inner struggle against himself (VIII 560a1-2). When the democratic element yields temporarily to the oligarchic one in this inner conflict, some

²⁹ My approach to books VIII and IX is very akin to the “power struggle” interpretation held by Johnstone, according to whom “each stage in Socrates' catalogue of corrupt souls represents a further step in the breakdown of an effective means of controlling baser appetitive desires. In each case, there is a son who starts out resembling his father, has the baser appetites already present in him bolstered as a result of his contact with wider society, lacks the appropriate means of resisting this development, becomes internally divided and battles and struggles against himself, and finally transforms” (2011, 163). Hence, any interpretation of this degenerative process that reduces such a complex psychological phenomenon to a matter of a rational decision of the agent, as contended by Irwin, for instance (1995, 285-287), fails to give an appropriate account to the prominence of the appetites in the formation of the four different types of vicious person. As Irwin puts it: “People turn from Life 1 to Life 2 when it seems to them that Life 1 fails to achieve its own ends and that Life 2 offers a better prospect of setting reasonable ends that they can hope to achieve. The same pattern of rational choice and deliberation is repeated in the other deviant people” (1995, 286). Indeed, reason plays an important role in it, and the change in the set of moral beliefs throughout the transition from one type of person to another is a crucial factor in this degenerative process, as we shall see soon; but this does not imply that each step of the psychological decline is explained *only* by the rational choice of the individual. For the degenerative process of books VIII and IX as an extended conflict between reason and appetite, see Z. Hitz 2010, 103-131; Lorenz 2006a, 2006b; Cooper 1999b.

³⁰ The “drone” (*kēphēn*) – “the disease of the beehive” (σμήνους νόσημα, VIII 552c3) – is metaphorically the element of dissolution of the “harmonic” hierarchy both in political and psychological domain. Within the soul, it is represented by the spendthrift and unnecessary appetites or pleasures (VIII 554a, 554d, 558d-559c) that in the oligarchic person are forcibly held in check by carefulness (κατεχομένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας, VIII 554c1-2), but that in the process of transformation into the democratic are released so to prevail over the necessary and beneficial ones (VIII 559c-e). Finally, in the transformation into the tyrant “a great winged drone” (ὕπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα, IX 573a1) is identified with the tyrannical *erōs* that commands the soul with madness and frenzy, leading a life of complete anarchy and anomia (IX 573a-b, 574e-575a). The image of the drone as an element of corruption appears originally in Hesiod's *Works and Days* (302-306).

appetites – presumably, the unnecessary ones – are destroyed or banished, insofar as *a kind of modesty* arises in the soul of the young man (αἰδοῦς τινος ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, VIII 560a6-7). But due to the lack of an appropriate education offered by the oligarchic father, appetites akin to those once banished – i.e. the unnecessary ones that have been controlled by force (βίᾳ, VIII 558d4) – become increasingly numerous and stronger, such that they prevail over the oligarchic part and occupy “the acropolis of the young man's soul” putting an end to the *stasis* (VIII 560b6-7). This inner transformation of the soul is followed by *a change in the range of moral opinions* that regulate one's actions.³¹ A regime governed by the unnecessary appetites is only possible because the flawed education offered by the oligarchic father leaves the young man's soul empty of fine knowledge and activities and of true discourses which could resist such an attack. So, in the absence of a reason appropriately strengthened to pursue what is good for the soul as a whole and for each part of it, they are replaced by false and deceitful opinions and discourses (VIII 560b-c). This change in the set of moral beliefs is described as follows:

(a) [...] won't they call *modesty foolishness and temperance lack of manliness* [τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἡλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες [...] σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές], abusing them and casting them out beyond the frontiers like disenfranchised exiles? And won't they persuade the young person that measured and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean, and, joining with many useless desires, won't they expel it across the border? (VIII 560d3-7; my italics)

(b) They praise the returning exiles and give them fine names, calling *insolence good breeding* [ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν], *anarchy freedom* [ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν], *extravagance magnificence* [ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν], and *shamelessness bravery* [ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν]. Isn't it in some such way as this that someone who is young changes, after being brought up with necessary appetites, to the liberation and release of useless and unnecessary pleasures? (VIII 560e4-561a4; my italics)

The first contention I would like to make regarding Callicles' *ēthos* as analysed in Section 2 is the following: (A) *in accordance with this degenerative psychological process described in the Republic, he would represent a young man whose soul is precisely in the condition in which the resolution of the stasis between necessary and unnecessary appetites is already resolved*. This is not only because Callicles is portrayed in the *Gorgias* as an

³¹ I think that there is in fact a *mutual influence* between appetites and beliefs in this process of transformation from the oligarchic and democratic person. That is to say, it is by the fact that the unnecessary appetites increasingly grow within one's soul and conflict with the “oligarchic ones” that this shift in the range of her moral beliefs occurs (VIII 559e-560b); and it is by the support of these new moral beliefs, conversely, that she finds a rational justification for continuing to improve a life of unrestrained gratification (VIII 560b-561b). I therefore disagree with the “intellectualist” reading defended by Parry who contends that “the false and bold beliefs are *necessary and sufficient* for having the kind of character in which the unnecessary appetites rule” (2007, 391-392; my italics).

intemperate person whose *epithumiai* constitutes the prevalent element of his soul as in the case of the democratic individual in book VIII, but also due to the change in the set of moral beliefs that follow this transformation from oligarchic into democratic. These two passages of book VIII quoted above echo unmistakably the following passages of the *Gorgias* where Callicles intends to provide a psychological ground for his moral convictions, as we have analysed in Section 2:

- (i) By “the temperate” you mean “the foolish”. (τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας, 491e2)
- (ii) [...] being themselves incapable of providing for the fulfilment of their pleasures, [most people] *praise temperance and justice because of their lack of manliness* [...] (ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν, 492a7-b1)
- (iii) [...] luxury, intemperance and freedom – given the resources, that is what virtue and happiness are [...] (τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, 492c4-6)

Through the inversion of moral values advocated by Callicles in (i) and (ii), “temperance” (*sōphrosunē*) becomes “foolishness” (*ēlithiotēs*) and “lack of manliness” (*anandria*), since it is praised by those who are incapable of fulfilling their appetites and who therefore assert that intemperance (*akolasia*) is shameful. This is quite similar to the description of passage (a) of book VIII quoted above. Although “freedom” (*eleutheria*) is a basic value of democracy, meaning, generally speaking, both the condition of the free-born citizens in opposition to the slaves' and non-citizens', and the right of free speech in the public domain³², in Callicles' view it appears closely related to “intemperance” (*akolasia*) and “luxury” (*truphē*), as we seen in (iii). As Callicles does not make clear how he understands “freedom” and its role according to his own conception of happiness (the discussion with Socrates concentrates rather on intemperance), it is likely that it might mean something like we find in passage (b) of book VIII quoted above: that is to say, a psychological meaning of “freedom” designating the absence of restraint in pursuing the satisfaction of any appetite and seeking pleasure – so “anarchy”, “lawlessness” (*anarkhia*).³³ In Callicles' case, this appears above all in the *categorical* hedonism advocated by him (494c), according to which no qualitative discrimination is required in order to distinguish between better and worse appetites, since *all* appetites are equally worth being pursued and fulfilled. In the democratic individual of book VIII, in turn, this same feature appears in the indiscrimination between necessary and unnecessary appetites in seeking pleasure after the “liberation” of the unnecessary and

³² In the analysis of democracy as a type of *politeia*, Plato characterizes it by three main key-notions: *eleutheria*, *parrhēsia* and *exousia* (VIII 557b8-10).

³³ For the psychological meaning of “freedom”, see Lorenz 2006a, 164 n. 20.

spendthrift ones (εἰς τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσιν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν, VIII 561a4), such that “he puts his pleasures on an equal footing” (εἰς ἴσον δὴ τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς, VIII 561b3-4). Put briefly, “freedom” in the psychological sense would mean no qualitative discrimination between the appetites to be pursued, and therefore lack of restraint in pursuing their fulfilment and seeking pleasure – an euphemism for “anarchy”, as suggested by the semantical reversal of moral values in the constitution of the democratic individual in book VIII.³⁴

Another aspect of the democratic individual in book VIII that points towards the psychology of *pleonexia* advocated by Callicles in the *Gorgias* is the re-signification of “bravery” (*andreia*) as “shamelessness” or “lack of modesty” (*anaideia*), as we see in quotation (b) above. In the inner *stasis* that culminates with the constitution of the democratic individual, what prevents the democratic side – i.e. the unnecessary and useless appetites – from prevailing definitively over the oligarchic one – i.e. the necessary and beneficial appetites – is a kind of *modesty* that eventually arises in the soul of the young man (αἰδοῦς τινος ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, VIII 560a6-7). It is only when this moral feeling (*aidōs*) is finally neutralized in his soul that the democratic individual is fully constituted. Thus, a certain remaining sense of shame designed by *aidōs* is what restrains, at least momentarily, a full prevalence of the unnecessary appetites within the soul. *Andreia* is therefore identified with the absence of *aidōs*, and is closely associated with the lack of restraint in pursuing and satisfying the appetites whatever they might be; in other words, from the standpoint of the democratic person one is brave if she is not affected by *aidōs* in going after whatever she wants, and ultimately what she wants is what her appetites indiscriminately strive for. As we analysed in Section 2, this intrinsic relationship between *andreia* and shamelessness (or lack of modesty) is precisely what the psychology of *pleonexia* contends: *andreia* is deemed as a necessary condition to overcome emotions such as shame and fear that can impede the fulfilment of the appetites; shame, in particular, is regarded as the psychological mark of the worse and inferior people who, unable to satisfy their own appetites due to their “lack of manliness” or “cowardice” (*anandria*), prescribe that intemperance is shameful, and that temperance is praiseworthy (491e-492c). Hence, a brave person is also shameless and intemperate according to Calliclean moral psychology.

³⁴ For the distinction between the *characteristic motive* (the unnecessary appetites) and the *dominant motive* (the necessary and unnecessary appetites) of the democratic person, see Hitz 2010, 111-112 and 117.

Therefore, intemperance and hedonism are ultimately what link straightforwardly Callicles in the *Gorgias* with the democratic individual in book VIII of the *Republic*. And it is likely that Plato reminds his readers of Callicles in the following passage by this sort of allusive literary device:

And he doesn't admit any word of truth into the guardhouse, for if someone [τις] tells him that some pleasures belong to fine and good desires and others to evil ones [ὥς αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν] and that he must pursue and value the former and restrain and enslave the latter, he denies all this and declares that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally. (VIII 561b8-c4)

The attempt to dissuade the democratic man by *someone* unnamed (*tis*, VIII 561b9), showing him that there are both harmful and beneficial pleasures and that one ought to pursue only the good ones³⁵, fits exactly with what we see represented *dramatically* in the *Gorgias*. As we have discussed in Section 2, Socrates resorts to embarrassing examples such as scratching and the catamite (494c-e) in order to show Callicles the unavoidable consequences of equating happiness with the fulfilment of *all* appetites (494c). Socrates aims to persuade him that pleasure and goodness are different things (495a), and that one ought to do pleasant things for the sake of the good, and not the opposite, insofar as the end of all actions is the good (499e). Consequently, there are better pleasures – i.e. the beneficial ones – the fulfilment of which should be pursued, and worse pleasures – i.e. the harmful ones – that must be avoided (503c-d). Constrained by the embarrassing examples picked out by Socrates (494c-495a) and by the two subsequent arguments against hedonism (495e-497d; 497e-499b), Callicles finally agrees – but not without reluctance – with the distinction between pleasure and goodness (499b), although this agreement does not necessarily undermine a *qualified* hedonist conception of happiness, but only *categorical* hedonism, as we have examined in Section 2.3.³⁶

³⁵ See especially Pl. *Grg.* 503c6-d3.

³⁶ In fact, there is a slight difference between Callicles' case and the hypothetical situation alluded to in this passage of the *Republic* (VIII 561b-c), although this does not invalidate my point. In this passage of book VIII, Socrates says that the democratic individual claims “all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally” (ὁμοίως φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου, 8, 561c3-4) and that she is not persuaded that there are good and bad pleasures and appetites. In the *Gorgias*, on the other hand, Callicles acquiesces to the distinction between pleasure and goodness at 499b, and consequently abandons the *categorical* hedonism (494c2-3). However, as Cooper 1999a 72-73 argues correctly, to concede this distinction does not necessarily undermine the *qualified* hedonistic conception of happiness (491e-492c), since Callicles could reasonably continue to assert that happiness consists in the maximization and fulfilment of the majority of the appetites, but not *all* of them, excluding, for instance, those base appetites. In any case, though he assents to the distinction between pleasure and goodness at 499b, Callicles does not concede to Socrates, at any time during the dialogue, that the life of the temperate person is better than the life of the intemperate. On the contrary, he continues to resist

Therefore, this hypothetical situation referred to in book VIII of the *Republic* can be interpreted as an *allusion* to Callicles' recalcitrance as depicted *dramatically* in the *Gorgias*. This seems to be confirmed when Socrates says that a person who lives in this way, being delighted day by day by whatever appetite comes along, “often engages in politics, leaping up from his seat and saying and doing whatever comes into his mind” (πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, VIII 561d3-4). This reference to a democratic politician and his peculiar *parrhēsia* fits precisely Callicles' case, represented by Plato in the *Gorgias* as an ambitious politician in the context of the Athenian democracy with tyrannical aspirations. Moreover, in this same passage in the *Republic*, it is said that the democratic person, driven by whatever appetite currently afflicts him, “sometimes occupies himself with what he takes to be philosophy” (τοτὲ δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων, VIII 561d3). In the *Gorgias*, Socrates refers to Callicles' association *in wisdom* with Teisandros, Andron and Nausicydes (τέτταρας ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, 487c2), according to whom “people should not throw themselves into the philosophizing that sets store by extreme precision” (μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, 487c6-7), for an excess of wisdom could corrupt them (487d). This statement coheres with Callicles' speech, when he rebukes Socrates for indulging in philosophy more than he should, corrupting his noble nature (484c4-d2). Callicles considers philosophy worth pursuing only during one's youth “in view of education” (παιδείας χάριν, 485a3-5) and in a moderate manner (ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ᾄσῃται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, 484c6). Thus, we can reasonably infer that Callicles himself has somehow taken part in philosophy, however he understands it, such that we can fairly infer that his political and psychological views are somehow related to this “association in wisdom” with his fellows. In sum, this further textual evidence reinforces the *allusion* to Callicles' case in book VIII of the *Republic*.

However, to what extent can we understand Callicles as a *potential* tyrant, and not only as a democratic person according to the degenerative psychological process described in book VIII and IX of the *Republic*? This is the next question I will attempt to answer in the following section by examining the transformation of the democratic individual into the tyrant.

3.2. *From the Democratic Individual to the Tyrannical*

As discerned above, there is a subgroup of the unnecessary appetites labelled by Plato as *paranomoi* which are likely to be present within everyone, but “are repressed by laws and

Socrates' attempts to persuade him to the point that Socrates is forced to resort to a monologue (506c-509c). For the two formulations of hedonism in the *Gorgias*, see above n. 18.

better appetites in alliance with reason” (κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου, IX 571b5-6). Such *paranomoi* appetites are those which appear in dreams when reason sleeps and the savage part of soul prevails, “free of all constraint by shame and intelligence” (ὥς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνης καὶ φρονήσεως, IX 571c8-d1), and that can affect even those who seem to be of a moderate disposition (IX 571e-572a). The genesis of the tyrant, son of a democratic father and educated in his customs, occurs precisely when he is dominated by those appetites that lead him to complete lawlessness: a condition he regards as “an absolute freedom” (ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν, IX 572e1-2). This causes to arise in his soul a kind of *erōs* that becomes the “leader” (*prostatēs*) of the appetites (IX 572d-e). That “drone” (*kēphēn*) that was born in the oligarchic person (VIII 552c, 554d) and transformed into the democratic when his soul comes finally to be commanded by the unnecessary appetites (VIII 559c), converts itself into “an enormous winged drone” (ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα, IX 573a1), in which *erōs* leads the *epithumiai*. Under this psychological condition:

— [...] This leader of the soul adopts madness as its bodyguard and becomes frenzied. If it finds any beliefs or appetites in the man that are thought to be good or *that still have some shame* [ἐτι ἐπαισχυνομένας], it destroys them and throws them out, *until it's purged him of temperance* [ἕως ἂν καθήρῃ σωφροσύνης] and filled him with imported madness. (IX 573a8-b4)

As discussed in Section 3.1, in the transition from the oligarchic to democratic individual the necessary appetites prevail only temporarily over the unnecessary ones whilst a certain *modesty* (*aidōs*) arises at the soul of the young man (VIII 560a6-7). The outcome of the inner *stasis*, however, gives primacy to the unnecessary appetites. In the democratic person, on the other hand, the *paranomoi* appetites manifest only in dreams, since *shame* (*aiskhunē*) and *intelligence* (*phronēsis*) prevent him from acting on them in real life (IX 571c8-d1). Nevertheless, the tyrannical person under the control of *erōs* (IX 573d4-5) is no longer constrained at all by shame or by the laws or by the better appetites (IX 571b). Through this degenerative process that culminates in “complete anarchy and anomia” (ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ, IX 575a1-2), the unrestrained pursuit of satisfaction of all sorts of appetites, including now those labelled as *paranomoi*, is described by Plato in the following way:

— And just as the pleasures that are latecomers *outdo* [πλέον εἶχον] the older ones and steal away their satisfactions, won't the man himself think that he deserves to *outdo* [πλέον ἔχειν] his father and mother, even though he is younger than they are – to take and spend his father's wealth when he's spent his own shares?

— Of course. (IX 574a6-11; my italics)

The tyrannical soul is moved then by the desire of *outdoing* (*pleon ekhein*) others through the accumulation of goods and power, regarded as material conditions for the fulfilment of such appetites.³⁷ Inasmuch as these material conditions become difficult to provide, the dreadfulness of the agent's wrongdoings increases proportionally, resorting to, for instance, stealing from others, breaking into houses and looting temples (IX 574d). Under the control of the tyrannical *erōs*, there is no moral restriction on the choice of the means which are conducive to the supreme end – namely, the satisfaction of all appetites and the promotion of pleasure. The culmination of this degenerative process is described by Plato in the following manner:

And in all this, the old traditional opinions that he had held from childhood about what is fine or shameful – opinions that are accounted just [ἄς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιούμενας] – are overcome by the opinions, newly released from slavery, that are now the bodyguard of erotic love and hold sway along with it. When he himself was subject to the laws and his father and had a democratic constitution within him, these opinions used only to be freed in sleep. Now, however, under the tyranny of erotic love, he has permanently become while awake what he used to become occasionally while asleep, and he won't hold back from any terrible murder or from any kind of food or act. (IX 574d5-e4)

If the process described above is diachronic, then what occurs first is the replacement of the range of moral opinions about what is fine or shameful due to the overwhelming influence of the *epithumiai* within the soul of the democratic individual, since the unnecessary appetites have already consolidated their prevalence over the necessary ones, as examined in Section 3.1.³⁸ So, the opinions about what is just and unjust that prevented hitherto the agent from committing wrongdoings such as dreadful murders and gluttony, are now dominated by those ones which are not inhibited by the constraints of justice and become the bodyguard of *erōs*. Once the tyranny of *erōs* has been established, those kind of *paranomoi* appetites that hitherto manifested only in dreams (as referred to at IX 571c-d) motivate now actions without any moral or psychological constraint.

Thus, what is the connection between the psychology of *pleonexia* advanced by Callicles in the *Gorgias*, and this examination of the constitution of the tyrannical individual in book IX of the *Republic*? This is the second contention I would like to make regarding Callicles' *ēthos*: (B) *in accordance with this degenerative psychological described in the Republic, he would represent an individual whose soul is on the threshold between the*

³⁷ “Having more” and “outdoing” are the alternative translations used in this paper for the Greek expression *pleon ekhein*.

³⁸ For the causal relationship between beliefs and appetites, see above n. 31.

democratic and the tyrannical. It is in this sense that I contend that Callicles is portrayed by Plato in the *Gorgias* as a *potential* tyrant, and the reason why he does not constitute an *actual* tyrant from the psychological standpoint is precisely his susceptibility to *shame*, as we have examined in Section 2.3. Let us see the last part of my argument.

In book IX, Plato describes the formation of the tyrannical soul as a diachronic process, as highlighted above: (1) due to the strength of the unrestrained appetites within the democratic soul, the opinions that follow *erōs* as its bodyguard are released from slavery and dominate those concerned with what is fine and shameful which have been learnt in childhood; (2) in a second stage of degeneration, under the tyranny of *erōs*, those shameful impulses that were once confined only to dreams are now able to motivate actions in an attempt to satisfy the *paranomoi* appetites. Thus, by examining Callicles' case from the *Republic* standpoint, it is clear that he does not only disdain those moral beliefs that governed the oligarchic individual and have been increasingly challenged by the democratic (i.e. temperance, modesty, moderation and order: VIII 560d3-7), but even the very notion of *justice* that still regulated, at least to some extent, the democrat's behaviour. When Callicles argues for the opposition between *conventional* justice (established by laws and customs of the majority) and *natural* justice (482e-484c), he seeks to justify another kind of morality grounded on *phusis* that transcends the boundaries of the justice imposed on citizens by the civil community based on the notion of *equality* (*to ison*). By taking it as a means by which the worse and inferior people succeed in prevailing over the better and superior and in preventing them from “having more” (*pleon ekhein*, *pleonektein*), Callicles expresses contempt for the most important notion of democracy that underpins its constitution, and under which all are deemed equal with regard to the laws concerning private issues.³⁹ As Socrates says, democracy “distributes a sort of equality to both equals and unequals alike” (ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίστοις διανέμouσα, VIII 558c3-4).

The notion of equality is central also to the psychological analysis of the democratic individual pursued by Plato in book VIII of the *Republic*, as discussed in Section 3.1: the democrat pursues all pleasures *equally* and turns to each when they arise until they have been satisfied, without any qualitative discrimination (VIII 561b3: εἰς ἴσον δὴ τι; b6: ἐξ ἴσου; c4: ἐξ ἴσου). However, under the control of tyrannical *erōs*, the agent is guided by the insatiable desire for *pleon ekhein*, the accumulation of goods and power, in order to provide the material

³⁹ Th. 2.37.1: “the laws secure equal justice to all in their private disputes” (μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον) (Hornblower 1991, 299).

conditions for the fulfilment of her insatiable appetites. In such a psychological state, all means are deemed worth pursuing for the sake of this ultimate end, such that his actions are no longer constrained by *conventional* justice culminating therefore in several wrongdoings, such as breaking into someone's house or snatching someone's cloak late at night, or even trying to loot a temple (IX 574a-b).

This description of the psychological disposition of the tyrannical individual in book IX of the *Republic* summarises clearly the main features of the psychology of *pleonexia* presented in the *Gorgias*, as we have examined in Section 2. Put briefly, I have argued that according to Callicles' view the desire of “having more” than others (*pleonexia*) is conditioned by the unrestrained appetites the better and superior people are affected by, insofar as happiness and virtue are considered by them as consisting in maximizing and fulfilling the appetites whenever they arise. In this sense, intemperance is considered as the psychological cause of *pleonexia*. The description of the constitution of the tyrannical individual advanced by Plato in book IX of the *Republic* shares precisely this main tenet of Calliclean moral psychology: it is due to the insatiability of the appetites and to the lack of restraint on them by means of good education and moral feelings like shame (*aiskhunē*) or modesty (*aidōs*) that the tyrannical individual is constrained to seek to “have more” than others in order to fulfil them.⁴⁰ By introducing the distinction in books VIII and IX between the necessary, unnecessary and *paranomoi* appetites, Plato refines the psychology of *pleonexia* described in the *Gorgias* and advances the degenerative process of the soul through the analogy between the types of corrupted *politeiai* and their corresponding types of soul. The element of inner dissolution, represented metaphorically by the “drone” (*kēphēn*), is precisely the ongoing lack of restraint of the unnecessary and harmful appetites, which are “detrimental both to the body and to the soul concerning intelligence and temperance” (βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τε φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, VIII 559b10-11). This increasing degenerative process culminates in the madness of the regime of tyrannical *erōs*, in “the life of complete anarchy and anomia”

⁴⁰ Parry considers that the central role played by the tyrannical *erōs* in the *Republic* is a significant difference in relation to the psychological characterization of the tyrant offered by Callicles in the *Gorgias*: “This tyrant is different from Callicles’ ideal. In the *Gorgias* he was a sensualist whose drive for tyrannical power appeared to be a means to an end. In the *Republic* the tyrant is the full realization of the tyrannical *erōs*. This powerful and insatiable appetite is grandiose” (2007, 402). Nonetheless, this noticeable difference does not undermine the other striking evidence for the affinity between both dialogues regarding the treatment of tyranny and psychology of the tyrant, as I have attempted to show, and this is enough to my purpose in this essay.

(ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχία καὶ ἀνομία ζῶν, IX 575a1-2), in which all appetites, including the *paranomoi*, are worth pursuing in the search for “having more” than everyone.

Therefore, when we turn our attention to Callicles' contempt for the notions such as equality, temperance, conventional justice, we can assert that, at least in relation to the domain of moral beliefs, he satisfies the first condition for the characterization of the tyrannical individual (IX 574d-e) – namely, the complete reversal in the range of moral opinions about what is fine or shameful due to the overwhelming influence of the *epithumiai*, including the very notion of justice (ὡς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχυρῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιούμενας, IX 574d6-7).

Nevertheless, from the point of view of his affections, Callicles' susceptibility to *shame* as evinced by the Socratic cross-examination (494c-e) shows that at least in the dialogical dramatization of the *Gorgias* he is still constrained by this kind of non-rational force that the tyrannical person of the *Republic* has excised from his soul. In the democratic person, as mentioned above, those kind of *paranomoi* appetites manifests only in dreams and not in concrete actions as they are refrained by “shame and intelligence” (ὥς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύνῃς καὶ φρονήσεως, IX 571c8-d1). However, in the process of formation of the tyrannical individual, when madness and frenzy replace the role of reason – i.e. the condition of tyrannical *erōs* –, the remaining beliefs and appetites that were still endowed with some trace of shame are finally extirpated from the soul, purging it of any trace of temperance and filling it with madness (IX 573b1-4). In this psychological disposition, there is nothing that could prevent the tyrannical person from seeking to satisfying her appetites whatever they might be, whenever they arise, in whatever circumstances they might occur; there is no moral inhibition like shame (*aiskhunē*) or modesty (*aidōs*) that could refrain her from the *paranomoi* appetites and actions.

Therefore, at least as far as the depiction of Callicles' characterization in the *Gorgias* allows us to make use of the moral psychology of the *Republic*, Callicles is represented by Plato as a *potential tyrant from the psychological point of view* insofar as he is still susceptible to shame – more precisely, he is on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical soul. His embarrassing reaction towards the *kinaidos*' example provided by Socrates (494c-e) represents a signal of an affective attachment to some moral values shared by Athenian society regarding sexuality and manliness – therefore, regarding the proper domain of *sōphrosunē*.⁴¹ In other words, there remains some vestige of shame (*aiskhunē*) or modesty (*aidōs*) within his

⁴¹ Cf. Pl. *R.* IV 436 a-b, 439d; IX 580e.

soul inculcated by the vanishing education gotten from his oligarchic heritage – which praises the traditional values such as temperance, modesty, moderation and order (VIII 560d3-7)⁴² – that the democratic side of Callicles' *ēthos* does still preserve, albeit in a very weak fashion. It is by these reasons that his *erōs* for the demos mentioned by Socrates at 481c-2 and 513c-d in the *Gorgias* cannot be equated to the tyrant's *erōs* as described in Book IX of the *Republic*; at best, it alludes to his erotic passion for power in a democratic city, which is only a step in a long and complex psychological process of constitution of a tyrannical soul, according to the *Republic*.⁴³

4. Conclusion

To conclude, the inner disharmony of Callicles' soul would be described as follows from the standpoint of the moral psychology developed by Plato in the *Republic*:

(a) In the domain of *the moral beliefs* expressed by him throughout the Socratic elenchus, there is a conflict between those that seek to provide a justification for an exercise of an autocratic power by resorting to the notion of “what is just in nature”, and that praise “luxury, intemperance and freedom” as constituents of happiness and virtue (492c4-5); and those that are still attached to the moral values shared by the Athenian society – such as the contempt for the *kinaidos*' sexual behaviour –, and that praise the traditional ideal of *kalokagathia* and high reputation in public life. According to Woolf's reading, this contradiction in Callicles' views reflects precisely the opposition between *phusis* and *nomos* advocated by him in his main speech in the *Gorgias*: ‘Callicles 1’ champions *phusis* while ‘Callicles 2’ champions *nomos*. From the standpoint of the *Republic*, in turn, ‘Callicles 1’ would represent a step in the transformation of the democratic individual into the tyrannical, since he does not only reject the moral values gotten from his oligarchic heritage that the democrat challenges – such as temperance, modesty, moderation and order (VIII 560d3-7) – but even the very notion of *justice* that still regulates, at least to some extent, the democrat's behaviour, albeit leading an intemperate life. ‘Callicles 2’, on the other hand, would represent the remaining influence on

⁴² The fact that the oligarchic person, father of the democratic, praises traditional virtues such as temperance (*sōphrosunē*) does not imply that she is in fact temperate according to the description of temperance in the virtuous person in book IV (442c-d). As Hitz puts it, “The oligarch's *sōphrosunē* does not amount to all parts of the soul agreeing that reason ought to rule – the oligarch is a deeply conflicted person. At best, he is like Aristotle's continent person: someone who is good only by constraint and strength of will” (2010, 119).

⁴³ For a discussion about the flattering kind of *erōs* represented by Callicles, see Arruzza 2019, 161-163.

him of a weak education based on these oligarchic values from his oligarchic father. His disgust and contempt for the *kinaidos*' behaviour could be understood, therefore, as some vestige of temperance (*sōphrosunē*) that conflicts with his major inclination towards intemperance.

(b) In relation to the domain of *epithumiai*, Callicles' susceptibility to *shame* reveals that he does not yet embody an indiscriminate intemperate life, insofar as this sort of moral feeling might resist a certain kind of appetite deemed by him shameful to be pursued, like that of the *kinaidos*' (494c-e). So, the remaining appetites and beliefs that still have some trace of shame (IX 573b1-3) consist in the last impediment to the constitution of the tyrannical soul, whose extirpation is considered by Plato as a necessary condition for the unrestrained exercise of *pleonexia* (IX 573d-575a). Hence, Callicles actually manifests this kind of psychological inhibition represented by shame – like the democratic individual of book VIII – that shall prevent him from trying to have more than the others in an indiscriminate way, as the tyrannical individual will be able to do.

(c) Therefore, the distinction between the kinds of *epithumiai* presented in books VIII and IX – the necessary, the unnecessary, and the *paranomoi* appetites – allows us to understand Callicles' case in the *Gorgias* in a much more complex manner. For it shows that his inner disharmony, as considered by Woolf, is not confined to the range of political and moral beliefs expressed through his speeches in the dialogue, but extends to a wider conflict between appetites – the unrestrained appetites of an intemperate person vs. the beneficial ones that still bear some trace of shame due to the remaining influence of the education gotten from his oligarchic heritage.

(d) If shame is likely to be ascribed to the *thumoeides* domain, as some evidence in the *Republic* seems to suggest⁴⁴, so these appetites endowed with shame reveal that the perceptive and affective education of *thumos* afforded by the education of his oligarchic father remains effective to some extent, albeit its undeniable weakness in instilling into the soul of his democratic son the right disposition that would lead him to respect appropriately, and to live according to, the moral values such as temperance, modesty, moderation and order (VIII 560d3-7). As I have discussed at the end of Section 2, Plato ascribes to *rhythm* and *harmony* the power of moulding the perceptive and affective capacity of the children's soul instilling into it *euskhēmosunē*. This musical education enables the children, even before acquiring *logos*, to intuitively react with disgust when perceiving that a product of craft or nature lacks something and is deficient, so to blame the shameful/ugly things, and to praise, in turn, the fine/beautiful

⁴⁴ See above n. 25.

ones (IV 401e-402a). From this point of view, Callicles' feeling of shame when facing the *kinaidos*' condition may be understood as this kind of perceptual and affective response ascribed by Plato to the *thumoeides* in the *Republic* that is to some extent independent from reason, and that might offer resistance against some sort of appetites perceived as shameful to be pursued.

(e) Therefore, there are two opposed sides in Callicles' disharmony: (i) the first concerns his moral and political views akin to tyrannical aspirations (*pleonexia*) ('Callicles 1'), and his tendency to intemperate behaviour in pursuing indiscriminately the enlargement and fulfilment of appetites without the constraint from moral feelings like shame; (ii) the other regards his moral and political ideas of democratic origin ('Callicles 2'), and his remaining appetites that still bear trace of shame, contrasting with the unrestrained ones from his intemperate behaviour, and preventing him to some extent from leading fully an intemperate life.

For these reasons, it seems reasonable to understand that Callicles is portrayed by Plato in the *Gorgias* as an individual on the threshold between the democratic and the tyrannical disposition, according to the psychological and political theory developed in books VIII and IX of the *Republic* – hence, a *potential* tyrant, but not an *actual* one.

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Learning through Love: A Lover's Initiation in the *Symposium*

Paul Woodruff

In the *Symposium* of Plato, Socrates reports that Diotima once described to him a process of initiation by which a lover rises from desiring one beautiful body to catching sight of what seems to be the Platonic form of beauty. Scholars have debated whether the lover is to make this ascent by a rational process or a non-rational one, or by both working either in concert or independently. This paper argues that love leads and guides a process in this initiation that necessarily involves rational activity. No teaching is necessary or appropriate, so that the process is an example of learning without being taught. The philosophical insight that results is life-changing, but it does not amount to the kind of knowledge that would fully satisfy a Socratic seeker after knowledge.

Socrates reports that Diotima has laid out for him the steps in an initiation into matters of love that leads to a life-changing vision of the beauty that “is always itself by itself with itself, one in form”.

So when someone rises from *these* [beautiful particulars and universals] through loving boys correctly (διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστέιν), and begins to see *that* beauty, he has almost reached the goal, for this is what it is to go correctly, or to be led by another, at matters of love (τὰ ἐρωτικά): always to go upward for the sake of *that* beauty, beginning from *these* beauties, using them as steps . . . (*Symposium* 211b5-c3).¹

The effect of the vision is to make the initiated lover immune to the sexual attraction of a beautiful boy, so long as he keeps his mind's eye on that vision:

Once you see *that* [beauty itself by itself], you will not judge beauty by gold or clothing or beautiful boys and youths (211d3-5).

¹ Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. “These beauties” refers to the various levels of beautiful things which participate in *that* beauty, which has the status of a Platonic Form. I will discuss the ascent from these beauties to that beauty below.

In a mystery religion, the ultimate vision or *epopteia* is supposed to change the way an initiate sees ordinary things.² Plato uses a similar model in describing the ascent from the cave through seeing things in a certain order (516ab); and the cave dwellers of the *Republic* who have clambered out and seen reality will not look at the shadows in the cave as they did before (516e8-517a4). So it is with the vision of the highest beauty in Diotima's account. To the successful initiate, boys will never look as good as they used to look. Plato soon drives the point home by having Alcibiades tell the party that Socrates had the uncanny ability to bundle up with him and give no sign of sexual desire (219ab). For Socrates, Alcibiades' beauty is merely on the level of opinion rather than truth (218e6).³

The passage raises a series of questions: What does it mean to love boys correctly? How is a lover to know how to love boys correctly? Could any lover learn what Socrates seems to know about love through the process Diotima prescribes? Can a lover gain philosophical insight through loving? Is something beyond loving required? Can love serve as the lover's guide, or does a lover need a person to guide him upward? In the *Republic*'s story of the Cave, the cave dwellers need someone to turn them around before they can make their ascent. Does the ascent through love require such a person? These boil down to my main question: Can one, through loving, and without a teacher, learn what Socrates apparently knows about love?⁴ In other words, is Plato behind what Diotima says in 211b5-c3?

A specific case of this problem is that of Socrates. How could he have reached the level indicated by Alcibiades' account? Socrates had no Socrates to guide him, and, most likely, he had no Diotima either, as he appears to have made her up.⁵ Socrates may believe that he has

² The use of *epoptika* at 210a1 shows us that Diotima means us to see the parallel to mystery religion.

³ Diotima's language in the ladder passage (210b5) is recalled by Alcibiades use of *καταφρονεῖ* at 216d8 for Socrates' contempt for physical beauty. This suggests that Plato means his audience to connect the passages.

⁴ Plato here writes only of men loving boys, but gender is irrelevant to Diotima's process. Loving a person correctly turns out to entail engaging that person in a dialogue about what could be morally improving for that person, and gender is irrelevant to dialogue—although in ancient Athens women would almost never be permitted to engage with men or each other in such a way. Age, however, is relevant, as younger people typically have more time, more scope, and more motivation for self-improvement. Accordingly, in my explication (though not in my translation) I will use the more gender-neutral word “youngster” for the object of love. For clarity, however, I will continue to use male pronouns; the argument depends on the singularity of the chosen youngster, and the gender-neutral “they” would obscure that.

⁵ Socrates' report of Diotima's teaching seems too closely tied to the context to be anything but fiction designed for the occasion. Her questioning of Socrates seems directed at Agathon, and at 205d10-e1 she refers directly to the idea behind Aristophanes' speech, which was probably original to the *Symposium*.

completed a process similar to the initiation that Diotima describes, and that this process has given him the uncanny understanding of love which he claims to have acquired from Diotima or from the god. But all of this is no use to us or to anyone – certainly not to Socrates’ audience at this symposium – unless the ascent is possible for lovers who don’t have a god or a Diotima or a Socrates to assist them. What *is* needed for the ascent?

The Philosophy–Eros Puzzle

Love is a desire that humans share with wild animals – the longing to exist forever and to be immortal so far as possible – and this is possible only through some form of reproduction (207c9-d3). Such a desire cannot be rational, since it is shared with wild animals, and yet, on Diotima’s account, it can lead to the highest level that humans can reach in philosophy. How is this possible? It appears that either we must concede that one can reach the highest level of philosophy by non-rational means, or we must modify our understanding of love in such a way that love counts as rational.⁶

In an elegant recent paper, Nally rejects both alternatives in favor of a third: philosophical activity is ancillary to love. Love is “merely what makes lovers full of want,” and only rational, philosophical activity can satisfy that want.⁷ Love does not do the work of philosophy; love is, instead, the workmate of philosophy (as Socrates suggests at 212b2-4). Love provides the motivation; philosophical discussion does the work.

I will show, however, that this is not the way Diotima represents the ascent. The puzzle turned on the distinction between the rationality of philosophy and the irrationality of any desire we might share with animals. What does “rational” mean in this context? It does not directly translate any of Plato’s words. A rational discussion, in a strong sense, would be one that is

Artful rhetoric of the time commonly produced speeches as coming from figures of myth. On the question whether Diotima is fictional or historical, see for example Prior, William. “The Portrait of Socrates in Plato’s *Symposium*”. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 31 (2006), pp. 148, ff. and Sheffield, Frisbee. *Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 66, n. 33.

⁶ The puzzle is clearly laid out with objections to both positions in Nally, E.G. “Philosophy’s Workmate: *Eros* and the *Erotica* in Plato’s *Symposium*”. *Apeiron* 55, 2022, pp. 329-57. She is right that the rationalist view leaves only volition in place of eros (p. 337), and she is also right that the non-rationalist view cannot satisfy the *logos* requirement (p. 336). But this is not decisive, as Diotima does not imply that the lover at the last stage can give a *logos* of beauty.

⁷ Nally 2022, p. 349.

informed by the kind of definitions Socrates seeks but does not find; since he does not find them (or at least does not use them), we need a less demanding concept for the philosophical work that Socrates does in the absence of knowledge of definitions. For our purposes, and for Plato's Socrates, I shall say that a rational discussion is the sort of conversation Socrates promises to have with Alcibiades, a conversation for two aimed at the improvement of the young man (218d1-2 with 219b1). Such conversations are essential parts of the lover's ascent to the final vision. They occur at the first level of initiation ("logoi about virtue," 209b8) and they recur during the higher initiation at the first stage ("gives birth to beautiful logoi," 210a7-8) and the third ("such logoi as make young men better," 210c1-2, 210d5). They aim at finding a practical approach to virtues in which the young men can improve; they do not appear to address the topics of love or beauty and so do not directly support the lover's ascent.

In this paper I will argue in favor of the non-rational view: Love does not reason with the lover, nor does the lover reason with the youngster about love. But if lovers reflect correctly on the love that is moving them, they will find that love is drawing them toward higher and higher levels of beauty. Recognizing these levels is an advance in philosophy, although this is like having a mystical vision. We shall see that it does not entail the ability to give a *logos* of beauty that can withstand Socratic questioning.

What Socrates Knows about Love

Socrates has said that he could not vote against Phaedrus' proposal that each of them speak in praise of love, since he claims to know nothing other than matters of love (*ta erotica*, 177d8), and he paraphrases this later as the claim that he is *deinos* ("terribly clever") on matters of love (198d1-2, cf. 27c3).⁸ He represents love as a complex subject – a combination of a felt need for something the lover does not have (201b1-2) along with resources the lover may use for a purpose that becomes clear only toward the end of Diotima's speech – having a vision of beauty itself by itself (210e4 with 204c8).

⁸ In the *Symposium*, he reports that Diotima has taught him the subject (201d5, 207a5), and he agrees that he needs a teacher for this (207e6). He makes a similar claim in the *Lysis*, but, except that he attributes his ability to the god: "In other respects I am shallow and worthless, but this I have as a gift from the god: I am capable of recognizing a lover and one who is loved". εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φαῦλος καὶ ἄχρηστος, τοῦτο δὲ μοί πῶς ἐκ θεοῦ δέδοται, ταχὺ οἶφ' εἶναι γινῶναι ἐρῶντά τε καὶ ἐρώμενον (*Lysis* 204b8-c2).

On the needy side of love, we remember from the *Apology* that Socrates says he knows he does not have wisdom (20c-e). On the resourceful side, Socrates knows enough about love to deliver Diotima's questions and her speech. More impressive, Socrates knows enough of love to lie safely in the arms of a beautiful youth, presumably because his mind is fixed on a higher beauty than that of a physical body.

His knowledge appears to be limited, however. He reports that Diotima thinks he could succeed at the first level of initiation, but she does not know whether he is capable of rising through the second (209e5-210a2). Full knowledge, she holds, entails the ability to give an account (*logos*, 202a). The climax of her speech is an attractive description of a vision of the beauty that is the ultimate goal of love. Here she characterizes beauty itself by itself almost entirely in terms of what it is not (211a1-b5). This negative description must fall short of the kind of *logos* that she says one must be able to give if one has knowledge (202a5).⁹ Her word for knowledge (*episteme*) and its cognates are absent from her account of the final stage of the ascent. Instead we have the weaker "discern" or "recognize" (γνῶ) at 211dc9, where Diotima says that the lover "in the end the lover has discerned what beauty itself is" and "attaining to" (ἐφαπτομένῳ) at 212a5: the lover has got as far as the truth. Even if he reached this highest stage in the ascent¹⁰, Socrates could claim only limited grasp of beauty. That means he could go on seeking a better understanding through philosophy, with love continuing as his motivation. This vision of beauty would not end his career as a philosopher or a lover, although it would suffice for him to say that love is the subject he knows best, and it would be enough to save him from sexual temptation. How could he have learned even this much without a teacher?

⁹ It lacks the substance to ground judgments as to the beauty of souls or customs or anything else that is thought to be beautiful and so cannot be the sort of *logos* Socrates demands of Euthyphro. For an argument that Plato's Socrates does not think his question to Euthyphro can be answered see Woodruff, P. "Wrong Turns in the *Euthyphro*". *Apeiron* 52.2, 2019. Pp. 117-136. As Socrates sees it, Euthyphro wrongly supposes that there is a *logos* for reverence that can guarantee that there will be nothing irreverent about the action he chooses to take. But Euthyphro's proposed action seems reverent in some respects and irreverent in others; it illustrates the point made in the *Republic* that anything reverent is also in some sense irreverent (*Republic* 5.479a).

¹⁰ Where should we place Socrates in the ascent? His ability to describe the ascent, along with Alcibiades' verdict, strongly suggests that he has reached the top (so Prior 2006). For a more complex reading see Blondell 2006. I take it that to be as Socrates is with Alcibiades, he must not only have had the highest vision, but he must keep it in his mind's eye, or he may sink back to the level at which he might be enthralled by a Charmides.

Who Is the Guide?

Diotima presents the ascent as an initiation, and initiation typically requires a leader to guide each candidate through various stages ending in the ultimate vision. On this model, the leader would be a former initiate who is either passing on wisdom to candidates or leading them through a series of vantage points from which they can see for themselves what they need to see in the correct order. Diotima may be referring here to mystagogues at the Eleusinian mysteries¹¹, which Plato's symposiasts would have experienced.

Diotima mentions a guide at the start: "if the leader leads correctly, [the candidate] must love one body and there beget beautiful *logoi*" (210a6-7); the grammar of the passage suggests that the guide is operating at all stages. On the other hand, her phrasing at 211c1 suggests that a lover may make the ascent with or without a guide: "for this is what it is to go correctly, or to be led by another, at matters of love". But some guidance has seemed necessary to many scholars, because the lover must take the steps in a fixed order, must move only upward, and must not linger at any stage. Towards the end, Diotima says that the lover has been educated toward matters of love by beholding the beautiful things in order and correctly (παιδαγωγηθῆ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὁρθῶς τὰ καλά, 210e3). The roots for the Greek word "educated" include the word for leading or guiding.

Perhaps a candidate would need a personal guide to steer him away from sexual desire. Rosen makes a strong case for this:

The prospective initiate has need of a guide, since the physiological Eros inclines us to all beautiful bodies, and for sexual rather than rhetorical purposes. In addition, the neophyte requires a guide to lead him away from women and toward a beautiful boy; the guide must see to it that Eros becomes "correct pederasty" with logos as its end. That is, the guide draws the initiate away from the possibility as well as the desire to procreate via the flesh. It is then up to the novitiate to 'understand' the beauty in one body is brother to the beauty in any other; the guide cannot perform this act of apprehension for him.¹²

¹¹ So Bury on 210a6-7, Bury, R.G. *Plato: The Symposium*. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons LTD 1909/1973. But scholars are not in agreement as to whether the evidence supports the presence of such mystagogues at Eleusis.

¹² Rosen, Stanley. *Plato's Symposium*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 265.

Most scholars have argued as Rosen does on behalf of a human leader or guide – an expert who is experienced in love.¹³ I will argue, against Rosen and the others, that the text does not show the necessity of a personal guide, although it allows the possibility of such a guide. We shall need to look closely at the text at stage three to see how Diotima proposes that lovers will turn from the desire to have sex to the desire to beget *logoi*; there no guidance is mentioned. As for falling in love with youngsters, as opposed to women, no guidance has been necessary for Plato's symposiasts. The culture is guide enough, hiding women away and putting boys on show in the gymnasias. In any case, if the aim of love is to give birth to beautiful *logoi*, then gender does not matter; anyone can beget good ideas on anyone. For most Athenians of the period, however, only men and boys would have been available for the begetting of *logoi*.

With or without a guide, the ascent may fail. The "if" clause ("if the leader leads correctly") would not be necessary if it were not possible for the leader to lead incorrectly. That would seem to rule out a guide who is an expert on love. How could a Diotima, knowing what she is supposed to know, lead anyone incorrectly? Eros, on the other hand, shuttling in between the divine and the human, the wise and the ignorant (203e-204b), may well lead us astray. Most lovers, distracted by love as sexual desire, stop long before they are drawn to share philosophy with their beloveds. But an initiated mystagogue, of the sort imagined by most scholars, would not lead incorrectly.

¹³ Only Mitchell (1993), of the scholars I have read, takes Eros to be the leader: "For us there is no mistaking this leader. It is Eros: the shape that love comes to have within the city, finally indistinguishable from the city itself" (Mitchell, Robert Lloyd. *The Hymn to Eros: A Reading of Plato's Symposium*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1993, p. 153). Reeve holds that there is no need for a leader, as the process does not involve teaching (Reeve, C. D. C. "Plato on Begetting in Beauty (209e5-212c3)," in Horn, Christoph. *Platon: Symposion*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012, p. 127). But Diotima does mention a leader, and the leader in an initiation need not be a teacher, as the candidates must see for themselves. Sheffield takes the more common view: "I take it that the guide is an ideal lover, one who knows about 'erotic matters,' much like Diotima or (the experienced) Socrates" (Sheffield, Frisbee. *Plato's Symposium: The Ethics of Desire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 119 n8). Osborne, who notes the role of love as a guide elsewhere in the dialogue, writes of this passage: "the guide will not only be an expert in love, but also a philosophy teacher (Osborne, Catherine. *Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 93). Griffith translates ἡγούμενος as "mentor" (Griffith, Tom. *Symposium of Plato*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989, *ad loc*). Bury in his commentary (1909/73, *ad loc*.) describes the guide as "an educational 'conductor'". Dover, on 210c6, explains the guide as the older partner who must lead the younger (1980, p. 155). A.E. Taylor holds that the director is needed only for the first step (Taylor, A.E. *Plato: The Man and His Work*. London: Methuen. 1926, p. 229n2). Blondell 2006 argues that the guide has dropped out before the final step. R.E. Allen rightly notes that the guide is leading throughout the long sentence describing the ascent (1991, 155n245). Shelley's 1818 translation omits the guide altogether.

Keep in mind also that only an extraordinary candidate could make the ascent. Diotima is not sure Socrates is up to the challenge, even though she thinks he meets the high standard for the preliminary initiation (“pregnant and godlike,” 209b1). No guide would be able to succeed with ordinary people. In interpreting each stage of the ascent, we must look for the ways in which a candidate or his guide could go wrong.

Preliminary Stage: Lower-Level Initiation

The lower-level initiation, preceding the ascent to the highest vision of beauty, ends with a young lover giving birth to philosophical *logoi* for the youngster he loves:

Whenever someone has been pregnant with these [sc. σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη] in his soul from early youth, being godlike¹⁴, and, having arrived at the proper age, he desires to give birth and beget (τίκτειν τε καὶ γεννᾶν). Then of course he will go about seeking the beauty in which he would beget, for he will never beget in anything ugly. Since he is pregnant, then, he is much more drawn to (ἀσπάζεται) bodies that are beautiful than to those that are ugly; and if he also has the luck to find a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-formed, he is even more drawn to this combination; from contact with such a person he immediately (εὐθὺς) teems with *logoi* about virtue – what qualities a good man should have and how he should live – and he will set about educating him (209a8-c1).

At this stage, no human leader or teacher or training manual is required. Because the lover is pregnant in soul – because he is carrying latent ideas about virtue – he desires to give birth – to express those ideas – and therefore seeks out an appropriate person with whom to do so. On meeting the right youngster, he is ready to give birth to *logoi* right away, εὐθὺς. For this preliminary initiation the lover does not require anything beyond the good fortune (or divine gift) of carrying latent ideas about virtue, along with the natural tendency to be attracted toward physical and moral beauty. Diotima supposes that the young Socrates is up to this level of initiation, but she doubts that he is ready to rise to the final vision by the process she is about to describe (209e5-210a2). This preliminary initiation is similar to stage one of the ascent.

¹⁴ Here I read θεῖος with the mss. and the papyrus (unlike Nehamas and Woodruff). Dover’s argument for taking Parmentier’s emendation (ἡθεος) is not strong enough, since the mss. and papyrus text makes good sense as is. For the meaning of θεῖος in such a context, see *Republic* 331e6, where Simonides is called σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ (“a wise and godlike man”). Simonides has been inspired to say something true, but what he says requires radical interpretation for Socrates to find the truth in it. The young lover, on this model, is inspired to deliver *logoi* that are a first step in understanding virtues; he carries these inspired *logoi* like a pregnancy until he is stimulated to deliver them by the beauty of a youngster.

Stage One: Loving One Body and Begetting Beautiful Logoi

One who goes about this business correctly must begin as a young man to go for beautiful bodies, and, first, if the leader leads correctly, he must love one body and there beget beautiful *logoi* and after that . . . (καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, εἴαν ὁρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος, ἐνὸς αὐτὸν σώματος ἐρᾶν καὶ ἐνταῦθα γεννᾶν λόγους καλοῦς, ἔπειτα δὲ . . .) (210a4-8).

The leader we are seeking to understand is mentioned explicitly in only this text, although a later passage (211c1) suggests that some kind of leading has taken place. A footnote on this passage in the Nehamas/Woodruff translation reads simply: “The leader: Love”.¹⁵ But most scholars take the leader to be a human being, such as Diotima or Socrates after his initiation. Many of these scholars have argued as Rosen does that the merely psychological guidance of love cannot suffice. What sort of guidance would suffice to lead the lover “to love one body and there beget beautiful *logoi*”? That depends on what is meant by “to love one body” and on what sort of *logoi* the lover is to beget.

Love for one *body*, by contrast with love for one boy or one soul, seems to imply sexual desire, which is, after all, the common meaning of *eros*. At least the expression does not rule out sexual desire. For all we know, at Stage One the lover is drawn to the youngster by sexual desire. And, as we have seen, it is the final vision that gives the lover the power not to feel sexual desire so long as he keeps his mind’s eye on that vision. For a lover at Stage One, such immunity to sexual desire is still in the future. And from Diotima’s brief description of Stage One, we have no reason to expect the lover to have turned his back on sexual desire. Rosen, remember, proposed that “the guide draws the initiate away from the possibility as well as the desire to procreate via the flesh”. But this is not necessary at the first stage, or indeed at any stage, since the final vision will do this work in the end.

What sort of *logoi* would the lover express at this stage: philosophical or erotic or both? If the first stage were part of conventional Athenian lovemaking at the time, the *logoi* would be speeches in praise of the boy or other charming attempts at seduction. Persuasion is said to be the child of Aphrodite (Sappho, Fragment 90.1a). How could a conventional lover know enough to do

¹⁵ Nehamas, Alexander, and Woodruff, Paul. *Plato: Symposium*. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989, p. 57, n. 90.

anything more philosophical than this? He is on the bottom step and has not yet taken any part of the ascent.

If, on the other hand, the first stage is already part of the unconventional approach to a beautiful youngster that Socrates would recommend, we would expect the *logoi* to include gentle arguments for education in virtue, such as we find demonstrated in the *Lysis*. The text leaves us uncertain; it might be meant to operate on both levels, philosophical and erotic, at the same time for different members of his audience.¹⁶

The preliminary initiation, however, introduced us to an inspired lover who is carrying ideas about virtue and gives them expression in the presence of the boy to whom he is drawn by love. No guide was necessary for that. And such *logoi*, probably, are what Diotima is proposing for Stage One. For the inspiration, the lover might need help from a divine being, such as Apollo or Socrates' daimonion, but this divinity cannot be the guide Diotima refers to, as that guide could go wrong. In the *Lysis* Socrates describes his ability to recognize a lover and beloved as god-given.¹⁷ As often in referring to a god, he may be invoking Apollo. More likely, however, he uses this locution to claim an ability for which he has no normal human explanation.¹⁸ So the guide is not a god.

The human candidates to be guides in this ascent would be people who have made the ascent themselves and so are experts on the process. Diotima is probably fictional. The other obvious human candidate is Socrates himself. Perhaps we are to infer from the passage that Socrates is prepared to guide young men correctly in matters of love through such an ascent as Diotima describes. But we find nothing in Plato's work (or Xenophon's) to support this hypothesis. Plato gives us one example of Socrates giving advice to a lover. In the *Lysis*, we see Socrates showing a young man how to address his youngster in philosophical terms. But this demonstration is anaphrodisiac – a far cry from sending a young man after beautiful bodies or bringing him together for the first stage in initiation.

¹⁶ Blundell opts for the more philosophical *logoi* of the type we see in *Lysis* (2006, 163). But double meanings are common in ancient tragic poems of the period; the *Bacchae* has many lines that an initiate will understand one way and a novice the other.

¹⁷ *Lysis* 204b8-c2.

¹⁸ Socrates often infers divine intervention whenever people seem to know something they have not been taught (e.g. *Ion* 542b3).

Socrates did claim to be a matchmaker, however. Since a matchmaker guides two people into their love affair, a Socratic matchmaker could be the guide for Stage One.¹⁹ Such guidance is attributed to Socrates in Mary Renault's *Last of the Wine*, where he brings a young man and his boy-love together at the right time.²⁰ But here too there is no indication of an ascent. We have no explicit, literal evidence to support the hypothesis that Socrates' matchmaking was of the kind needed for the first stage of the ascent.

For Stage One, the lover needs no guide to lead him to be attracted to the youngster's beautiful body. Such an attraction is natural. And Diotima represents the delivery of *logoi* in the presence of beauty as equally natural. For the first stage, I conclude, no leader is needed aside from Eros. Sexual desire alone will bring the young lover after the beautiful bodies and lead him to settle on one of them. Then that same desire will drive him to speak *logoi* to his intended, as beautifully as he can. So, even on the more philosophical reading of *logoi* at 210a8, the lover does not need either a human or a divine guide to do what he does. This leaves open the possibility that Socrates believes the lover is led where he goes by none other than Love. Later stages are more challenging, however, and they seem to call for sophisticated leadership.

Stage Two: Loving All Beautiful Bodies

What is required for the young lover to ascend to the second stage? The passage describing this ascent follows Stage One directly and is governed, as that text was, by "if the leader leads correctly" and the finite verb "must" (δεῖ):

Second, he must get in mind (κατανοῆσαι) that the beauty in any one body is brother to the beauty in any other, and that, if he must pursue beauty of appearance (τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν), he would be quite mindless not to consider the beauty in all bodies as one and the same (ἐν τε καὶ ταὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος). With this in mind, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies and despise that extreme surrender to one [body] and consider it unworthy (σμικρόν). (210a8-b6)

¹⁹ Plato's Socrates presents himself as engaging in matchmaking (προμνάεσθαι), connecting those who are barren of ideas with teachers such as Prodicus (*Theaetetus* 151b2), and Xenophon's Socrates is proud of his pandering (μαστροπεία, *Symposium* 3.10), but both texts use these terms with some irony or at least as figures of speech: Socrates is not bringing people together for sex. On Socrates as matchmaker, see Gordon, Jill. *Plato's Erotic World: From Cosmic Origins to Human Death*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 137-38.

²⁰ Renault, Mary. *The Last of the Wine*. New York: Pantheon, 1956.

What sort of guidance might a lover require to make this first ascent from the single body to all bodies? It is no small ascent.²¹ It takes our candidate from his first passion for a particular to an appreciation of a universal. This then appears to be a crucial step – from what could be merely the youthful excitement of a crush to a recognition of the superiority of the universal to the particular. Now we can see new meaning in the expression Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον (“love as philosopher” – 204b4): In coming to appreciate the universal, the lover is taking a major step in philosophy. Like Eros, he is in between being wise and being ignorant, but he is on the upward path.

“[The lover] must get in mind”: The verb I render as “get in mind” (κατανοῆσαι) could as well be translated as “observe” or “perceive”. It would not be used of the process of arriving at a conclusion from premises. The young lover sees no significant difference between the beauty of one body and that of another, and so realizes that his pursuit of physical beauty does not stop with the beauty apparent in a single body: he is drawn to physical beauty wherever he sees it. Where Love is leading him, he sees, is not to this one body, but to beauty in appearance quite generally. The young lover realizes, by looking around him, that the desire plucking at his heartstrings is pulling him not only here, but everywhere where there is such beauty.

This is not a surprising result for the culture of love that Socrates has in mind; pederasty spreads a wide net, as Plato notes in the *Republic*.²² There have been – and are – lovers of boys or young men who chase after (and may abuse) hundreds of boys. Most lovers, however, then as now, probably find sexual desire drawing them to a single person, at least one at a time. And probably the lover will want to share his beautiful *logoi* with one youngster at a time, in intimate consideration of that youngster’s good qualities and potential for moral improvement. But how can it be that a lover is drawn to a single person from the sea of beauty around him? Most of us experience love as love for an individual, and that experience bears crucially on the next stage, as we shall see.

²¹ I note, however, that this ascent from Stage One to Stage Two is generally ignored in the literature. Sheffield pays so little attention to it that she supposes the candidate is already committed to the idea that *to kalon* is one thing and shared by its many instances (2006, 117). If this were so, the candidate would not have paused with just one body to give *logoi* at Stage One, but started at least at Stage Two, if not higher.

²² *Republic* 5.474d3-5: “All youngsters in the bloom of youth both sting and arouse a man who is fond of youngsters and given to love, and he thinks they are all worth caring for and embracing”.

Scholars, believing that love cannot lead anyone so far as Stage Two, have supposed that the ascent is at least partly *elenctic* – i.e., that it is propelled by an examination of *logoi* under sharp questioning by someone with the skill in *elenchus* of a Socrates or a Diotima.²³ But there is no Socrates for Socrates, and probably no Diotima either, as we have seen. In any case, neither Diotima nor Socrates would lead the lover astray. But the text at Stage Two does not support the *elenchus* hypothesis. Nowhere in Diotima's account of soul-pregnancy or ascent is there mention of what goes on in Socratic *elenchus* – that is, proposing and testing of definitions through questioning. The lover with pregnant soul in 209b1 does not test definitions with or question the beautiful person; he educates him – evidently instructing him on how he thinks a good man lives.²⁴ Besides, my interpretive hypothesis – that the leader here is Love – is more economical than the interpretation that imports *elenchus* into the ascent. My interpretation has the advantage of explaining three issues that are otherwise puzzling:

First, the Love-Leader hypothesis explains why this is an initiation into the *Love* Mysteries, and why it is Beauty that beckons the initiate onwards, rather than consistency or virtue or even wisdom. If this were an *elenctic* initiation into philosophical discourse about such virtues as justice, or if the chief attraction were wisdom, we would have no more need here than in the *Gorgias* or *Republic* to bring Love and Beauty front and center.

Second, the Love-Leader hypothesis explains how Socrates could have started on the ascent on his own, since we know of no human teacher he could have had for love, aside from the probably fictional Diotima. He did not need a human teacher. He had Love.

Third, the hypothesis explains why the leader is mentioned in a conditional clause. There would be no point in the conditional, “If the leader leads correctly,” if the leader could not go wrong. And, obviously, love can lead us wrong (to sexual abuse), or at least not far enough (ending at sex).

An additional advantage is that this interpretation connects Diotima's speech with those that have gone before: Love's guidance has been a theme in most of the earlier speeches: *Phaedrus*

²³ On the hypothesis of *elenchus* in the ascent, see Sheffield (2006, 124-25 with the citations at 124n 12). Osborne proposes that the philosopher-leader for Socrates' ascent is Diotima (194, p. 93), but Diotima is merely describing the ascent here, not leading Socrates, and she has doubts that he is up to this stage of initiation (210a2).

²⁴ The distinction between educating and *elenctic* questioning is vital for Socrates: in using *elenchus* he does not represent himself as acting the part of a pedagogue.

represented Eros as an ideal guide for one's whole life (173c5-d1), Eryximachus as our pilot (187a1), Aristophanes as our guide and commander (193b2), and Agathon as our pilot (197d8) as well as our "best and most lovely guide" (197e2). Socrates has, however, made one important change, through his characterization of love as imperfect. Of those earlier speakers who represented love as a guide, only Eryximachus allowed for love to lead us astray. Socrates' Diotima does, through the "if" clause.²⁵

Stage Three: Loving a Boy with a Suitable Soul, along with Stage Four: Beholding Beauty in Practices and Customs

After this he must think that the beauty in souls is more valuable (τιμιώτερον) than the beauty in a body, so that if someone is suitable (ἐπιεικὴς ὢν) in his soul²⁶, even if he has but little bloom in his body, [our lover] must be content to love and care [for his development²⁷] and to give birth to *logoi* and seek for those *logoi* that will make young men better²⁸, so that of necessity he will behold (θεάσασθαι)²⁹ the beauty in practices and customs (τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καλὸν) and see that all this is akin to itself, with the result that he will consider the beauty of a body to be a small matter. (210b6-c6)

In this passage, Diotima presents two ascents that reach stages parallel to One and Two. In the first stage, the lover was drawn to one body and there begot beautiful *logoi*. At the end of

²⁵ On love's guidance, see Osborne 1994, p. 92.

²⁶ "Someone is suitable (ἐπιεικὴς ὢν) in his soul" (210b8): For the meaning of ἐπιεικὴς, see the use of the cognate adverb at 201a8, for which Dover suggests the translation "reasonably".

²⁷ "Love and care [for his development]": ἐρᾶν καὶ κηδεσθαι. We should supply "for his development," because the second verb, κηδεσθαι, is one Socrates sometimes uses to mean "to take pains to help another person improve by refuting or correcting beliefs they have that are wrong" (*Gorgias* 487a6, *Republic* 344e5, cf. *Apology* 24c7). It does not mean "care for": in the sense of "cherish". At this point, it appears that Diotima might be referring to a process like the elenchus.

²⁸ "To give birth to *logoi* and seek for those *logoi* that will make young men better": τίττειν λόγους τοιούτους καὶ ζητεῖν, οἵτινες ποιήσουσι βελτίους τοὺς νέους (210c1-c3). A plainer translation would be: "to give birth to and seek out such *logoi* as will make young men better". But this is not one operation, but two that take place sequentially. After giving birth to a litter of *logoi*, the lover and beloved will seek to find which of them will have a morally improving effect. The Greek is puzzling enough that Ast and Bury athetize καὶ ζητεῖν. Bury (*ad loc.*) admits that scholars have defended the text, but he writes "this is futile". Allen and Robin both retain it; Dover follows Ast and Bury, as does Griffith. But it is better generally to retain a difficult text, and this one fits nicely with the meaning of κηδεσθαι: the young lover should seek out which of the *logoi* are worth keeping. If this is right, then *elenchus* may be indicated at this point for testing the *logoi* against one another.

²⁹ "Behold" (θεάσασθαι): to watch actively, as an audience watches the action in theater or in a sports arena, or as philosophers may contemplate what they take to be real; the first occurrence of this verb. It could be translated as "contemplate" or "consider". It occurs also at 210e3, 211d2, 211d7, and 212a2. The cognate verb θεωρεῖν occurs once (210d4). I have translated both verbs as "behold".

the second stage, the lover was drawn to all beautiful bodies, apparently to every beautiful youngster he sees. Now at Stage Three the lover is back in discussion with an individual, this time one who has something like beauty of soul³⁰, which the lover recognizes as superior to beauty of body. In the presence of this beauty, the lover is again giving birth, but now we are told what his offspring are: they are *logoi* about moral development. Then, by considering those *logoi*, the lover cannot help rising to Stage Four, at which he beholds and appreciates the beauty of morally improving practices and customs – plainly a universal in our sense.

The passage presents several problems: Why is the chosen youngster said to be merely *suitable*, rather than *beautiful* in soul? How does the lover see that his youngster is suitable? And why does the lover turn back to one person, tearing himself away from all those beauties of body that had excited him at Stage Two? And, most important, how does he come to see that beauty of soul is superior to beauty of body?

I will propose a set of related answers to these questions.

To be suitable is to be suitable for something; the youngster must be suitable for the role he will play in the begetting of *logoi*; he must be a proper partner in a discussion of improving practices and customs. If the youngster already had beauty of soul, he would already have virtue, and he would not be a candidate for moral improvement. But everyone at the human level is such a candidate, in Plato's view; Socrates sees himself as a candidate for improvement, because he does not have the wisdom he seeks, which is necessary for full virtue.³¹ Henceforth the beauties that the lover beholds as he ascends from stage three will not belong to the individual, but to such universal entities as practices and customs. Those are the beauties that will help the youngster improve his imperfect soul in the direction of beauty. In choosing moral improvement as a topic for discussion, the lover is following his desire to do what is best for the youngster he loves, realizing that what is best for his loved one is improvement in the moral sphere.

To recognize a youngster's special suitability for discourse, what better way than to engage him in discussion? This the lover was probably doing already in Stage One. Lecturing at a student is no way to assess the student's capacity for anything, and Plato does not see much value in

³⁰ Something like beauty of soul: Even if the youngster lacks physical beauty, the lover is drawn to him by something the lover finds attractive if not beautiful in the full sense: the youngster's suitability for philosophical discussion.

³¹ See Woodruff 2022a, p. 60, ff. with p. 144. ff.

straight lecturing. What Socrates proposes to Alcibiades (apparently after his initiation) is not a lecture but a shared discussion, a taking counsel together (219a8-b2).³² So the youngster must be suitable – i.e., willing and intelligent enough – for shared discussion. Since the goal of the discussion now is the youngster’s moral improvement, he must be suitable for that too. He must have the beginnings of beauty of soul – decency and moral ambition – on which he can build toward the virtue that must be his overall goal. By engaging the youngster in discussion, the lover will discover how well suited the youngster is for discussion – without needing any help from a guide.

Decency and moral ambition will be harder to discern, but for this the lover must not accept help from a teacher or guide. Socrates never takes any one’s word for qualities of soul in another. He tests Charmides by questioning him, and he does not find him beautiful inside. In the case of Theaetetus, he has reliable testimony as to his beautiful mind, but Socrates does not assent to this until the boy has shown his talent in following logical argument. His is the only soul Socrates ever pronounces beautiful, but its beauty is intellectual rather than moral.³³ Intellectual beauty is much easier to identify. The problem remains: how to discern even the beginnings of moral beauty.³⁴ The answer is that we see the best in those we love. More on this in answering the fourth question.

Our third question concerned the return of the lover from the universal (all beautiful bodies) to the particular – to the suitable youngster with whom he is discussing practices and customs. This is not a surprising result; all the speakers in this dialogue have addressed love in dyadic relationships; none has shown any interest in the serial predation that Stage Two suggests. Still, we need to know how this turn comes about. Is a personal guide necessary, or even possible, for this to occur? Again, one answer comes from the lover’s engaging the youngster in discussion; discussion of the kind Socrates proposes to Alcibiades is not a group affair. It requires an

³² “Now you take counsel yourself (αὐτὸς οὕτω βoθλεύου) on what you think best for you and me,” [said Alcibiades].

“But,” [Socrates] said, “on this you are speaking well. For in future we will do what seems best to the two of us as we take counsel together (βουλευόμενοι), both on this and other topics”. Note the use of the dual (219a6-b2).

³³ *Theaetetus* 185e, with 1568b-c.

³⁴ Moral beauty is virtue, and virtue is extremely hard to detect. Many other dialogues indicate that virtue is hard to identify. Physical beauty is manifest to see in our world—ιδεῖν λαμπρόν—whereas virtues such as justice are represented only by vague images (*Phaedrus* 250b1-6).

individual partner. No guide is required for this here, which the lover must have accepted at Stage One without a guide.

Discussion by itself, however, does not appear to be sufficient to reveal the youngster's potential for moral improvement, his basic decency and moral ambition, his near beauty of soul. Nor does it explain how the lover comes to see that even the beginnings of beauty of soul are superior to beauty of body. That was our fourth question. Again, I cannot imagine what a guide could say that would make the lover see and value this sort of beauty. A more likely story is this: All along the lover has been drawn by love to one youngster out of a throng of beauties. If the lover reflects on his experience of love, he must see that he has singled out this youngster for qualities that do not meet the eye, since many others are at least equally beautiful in body. Through engaging the youngster in discussion he is at least catching a glimpse of the qualities of his soul. Whether the youngster is superior, average, or inferior in his physical appearance, the lover prefers him to the others. But on what basis? The beauty he sees in his beloved with the eye of love must be superior in its attractive power to any beauty he could see with his physical eyes in all the others. His love for this particular youngster is clear evidence that beauties of the soul trump beauties of the body. This he could not realize if he were not in love.³⁵

A guide could help him here by asking questions. Why does he love this person and not the others? What are his hopes for the person he loves? Why has he chosen to engage him in *logoi* on ethical subjects? If he takes these questions seriously enough, the lover will reflect on his love in a way that will bring beauty of soul into the range of his mind's eye. Of course, the lover can ask these questions of himself, with the same result. As I said at the start, a guide may be useful, but is not necessary.

In short, through being in love, and reflecting on that love, the lover is drawn to ascend to the point at which he sees beauty in the practices and customs that lead to moral improvement. That is the crucial step in the ascent to the final vision, which is now close at hand

³⁵ Seeing moral beauty with the eye of love is the theme of Sonnet 71 by Sir Philip Sydney:

Who will in fairest book of nature know
How virtue may best lodg'd in beauty be,
Let him but learn of love to read in thee,
Stella, those fair lines which true goodness show.

Stage Five: The Great Sea of Beauty

After practices, [one must] lead (ἀγαγεῖν) on to branches of knowledge, with the result that he will now see the beauty of knowledge and be looking mainly not at beauty in a single example – as a servant would who favored the beauty of a little boy or a man or a single practice (being a slave, of course, he’s low and small-minded) but he is turned to the great sea of beauty³⁶, and gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting philosophy (ἐν φιλοσοφία ἀφθόνῳ), until . . . (210c6-d6).

The infinitive “to lead” (ἀγαγεῖν) indicates that this passage also is governed by the same “must” from Stage One (δεῖ, 210a4). The earlier infinitives take the lover as subject, i.e., the candidate for initiation. But then who is it who is to be led? The lover may be supposed to lead himself, or he may be supposed to lead the youngster he loves. If the leader here is the one Diotima mentioned in 210a6-7, then the sentence has made an awkward change of subject. On any interpretation the verb falls awkwardly.³⁷ But the ascent at this point is easy to understand. In seeking to identify beautiful practices, the lover must find that he is seeking to know what practices make a soul more beautiful – that he is, in fact, seeking one sort of knowledge. And he will probably also find that seeking any sort of knowledge is one of the practices that make a soul more beautiful. These results would spring naturally from his *logoi* at Stage Four. No guide is necessary. This passage does not provide evidence that a personal teacher other than the lover is at work in

³⁶ “The great sea of beauty”: The individual youngster seems to have dropped out here as an object of love interest. But with whom else is the lover engaged in the discussion that is necessary for giving birth to ideas? Vlastos has claimed that “We are to love the persons so far, and only insofar, as they are good and beautiful” (1981, 31). This cannot be entirely right. Persons are never entirely good and beautiful, but lover and youngster must have a continuing and loving relationship in order that their discussions may continue, and that relationship depends on the lover’s recognizing the youngster’s potential for growth in virtue. This is more clear in the *Phaedrus*, where love leads the happy pair to a life and even an afterlife of shared philosophy (ὁμονοητικὸν . . . βίον, 256b1), on which see Woodruff 2022b.

³⁷ To avoid changing grammatical subject in mid-sentence, Nehamas and Woodruff translated ἀγαγεῖν as “to go”. This is not acceptable Greek, unless it is a way of saying “to lead oneself”. This latter is a likely reading, I think, although I have not found a classical parallel for it. Bury (*ad loc.*) supplies the leader from 210a6 as subject, but this upsets the flow of the long sentence and the ascent, for which the lover must be the subject. Dover (155) suggests that the subject is now the older lover, who is leading his younger beloved to the sciences. But then it would be the beloved, not the lover, who receives the ultimate vision, and that is absurd. A further alternative is Rosen’s (267): “reflection upon the customs of the city will lead the neophyte ‘to the sciences’”. That seems likely.

the ascent.³⁸ The lover simply needs to pay attention to what love is leading him to do; at this stage it is leading him to prize knowledge.

Stage Six: The Vision

One who has been thus far educated in matters of love, beholding the beautiful things in order and correctly, and is now reaching the goal of matters of love, suddenly catches sight of a beauty marvelous in its nature, the very object for the sake of which he endured all earlier labors . . . (210e2-e7)

The final ascent leads to the culmination of the lover's "education in love"³⁹, parallel to the *epopteia* or final vision to which initiates are led in a mystery religion.⁴⁰ For this phase of the ascent there is no process, no time for dialogue; the lover simply, suddenly catches sight of the vision that will change his way of seeing beauty in the world. As we have seen, this also changes his behavior: A successful initiate can turn away, as Socrates does, from an offer of sex with a gorgeous youngster.

Diotima leaves this last ascent somewhat mysterious, as is appropriate for a process modeled on initiation into a mystery religion. We can, however, supply an explanation: The lover has now gathered in his mind's eye many kinds of beautiful objects from young bodies to branches of knowledge. During the ascent he has found that these kinds have something in common: They are all attractive, and each one attracts him to a higher level of beauty. Recognizing the attraction at each stage is like stepping up from one level to another (211c3). Each step had led him to the next one in order.

As he reflects on that experience, he suddenly finds his mind's eye filled with the beauty that lies behind all these lesser beauties. Those lesser beauties he could describe in positive terms. But for this beauty he must use mainly negative language, as befits the culmination of initiation into a mystery.

³⁸ Scott LaBarge (in conversation) suggested that the leader here is Parmenides, who encourages Socrates to think in terms of the forms. But Socrates had arrived at the hypothesis of forms before he met Parmenides, without having had a teacher on the subject of forms.

³⁹ ὅς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγῇ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος . . . (210e2-5). Plato uses forms of *paidagogein* for education (*Theatetus* 167c8, *Laws* 641b7), not merely for leading a child around. Scholars agree that this verb indicates that the lover has received an education during his ascent. But the text here does not identify a teacher.

⁴⁰ Diotima's use of *epoptika* at 210a1 shows us that she means us to see this parallel.

Objections

On the interpretation I propose, a process of reflection on one's experience of love motivates the ascent at each of the stages I have described. But this process is nowhere explicit in the text. I answer that the text is so brief that any interpretation will suffer from this objection. My account is warranted by its explanatory power: it explains the text better than interpretations that would import personal guides or teachers. It works especially well for the later parts of the text, which attribute the lover's success to his loving correctly (211b5-6). One phrase implies that one can ascend with or without a guide (211c1). Most important, this interpretation explains how Socrates, without a Socrates to guide him, could have reached the stage at which he is able to resist Alcibiades' sexual advances.

A further objection is more serious. If love alone is sufficient to lead a lover to the ultimate vision of beauty, why has it not done so for most of us? We have all experienced love, but few if any of us have reached the stage at which a vision of the highest beauty would make us immune to sexual desire. We ordinary lovers would not be morally safe in bed with Alcibiades.

The answer, I think, is that this fact explains why the ascent is so difficult, why there is so great a risk of failure, and why few people will be good enough to make it to the top. The process Diotima describes is available only to very special people; remember, she doubts that even Socrates would be able to make the ascent (210a2). Moreover, the ascent is risky at every stage. The clause, "if the leader leads correctly," presupposes that the leader can go wrong. And *eros* often does lead us astray when it leads to merely sexual satisfaction. This risk of a detour into sex is not eliminated until the highest stage, since it is only the final vision that does that work (211d3-5). So I must be clear about my thesis: love is a guide, but a fallible guide, that may fail or may lead the best of us to lofty philosophical insights. Personal guides may also have a role in some cases but they are not required.

The Role of Philosophical Activity

What now of Nally's thesis that love and philosophy have the same goal, with love providing the motivation and philosophy independently doing the heavy lifting (Nally 2022)? The

question turns on the role of philosophical activity in the ascent. “Philosophical activity” means discussion of philosophical questions, such as “What is Beauty?” and “What is Virtue?” and “What practices or customs are morally improving?” The answer I propose is that the ascent Diotima describes does not call for heavy lifting at all. Instead, it is powered by the steady pull and attractive force of Beauty itself. Beauty is manifest in many things, such as physical bodies, that can distract us from our goal, but the lover who is attentive to his experience of love will not rest at any of the lower stages, but continue to ascend. True, philosophical activity is essential to the ascent, but it is an essential part of the activity that love calls for.

We cannot easily separate philosophical activity from the experience of love. The lover engaged his youngster in philosophical activity even at the preliminary stage. And that activity is crucial to the ascent at several stages. It explains how the lover finds his youngster suitable, and how he picks the youngster out of the large field of those with beautiful bodies. Moreover, philosophical discussion of moral improvement necessitates the lover’s ascent to a vision of the beauty that customs and practices will have if they are morally improving.

These discussions are not ancillary to the activities of love; they are essential parts of the activity to which love leads the lover, as we have seen. Loving the youngster, the lover wants to do what is best for him, and that is to engage him in discussions about moral improvement. These discussions are more for the sake of the youngster than the lover. If they help the lover to a higher vision of beauty, that is incidental to these discussions, which are about the youngster’s improvement, rather than about beauty or love.

We can imagine a philosophical discussion of beauty that would be distinct from the moral discussions to which love prompts the lover. That would be a discussion of the nature of beauty through attempts at definition; it might proceed by question and answer about beauty, beginning perhaps as the *Hippias Major* begins, but reaching much further heights, leading to an argument that Beauty itself must be transcendent. Such an argument would be ancillary and truly a workmate to the ascent through love, which reached the highest vision without a dialogue on the subject of beauty. Here, however, we have only the ascent through love and not the slightest suggestion of a philosophical argument for this vision of a transcendent beauty.

We should not expect such a positive argument for transcendence in Plato’s work; the ascent in the *Republic* does not work that way. To leave the Cave the cave-dwellers need not a positive teacher but an annoying person who forces them to look away from what they like to see,

and instead to look behind them – a person they would want to kill (517a4-6). Socrates never presents himself as a teacher or a leader toward the truth; instead, he likens his work to the annoyance of a stinging gadfly. Nor does he ever identify – at least not without irony – any wise teacher who can help him or anyone else advance toward wisdom. He seeks wisdom, he says, because he knows he is not wise. Such wisdom as he has – the human wisdom of knowing he is not wise – is worth a trifle or nothing (*Apology* 23a7). And yet he has advanced, and urges others to advance, toward wisdom. Apparently, he believes that we do not need formal teaching in order to learn. The Theory of Recollection, as presented in the *Meno* and *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, illustrates one way that we can learn without being taught. If my argument in this paper is correct, the *Symposium* shows us another way we can learn without being taught. Love is not wise, and so cannot be a teacher. But Love can be a guide, albeit an erratic one, to advances in philosophy.

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Temporal Truth and Bivalence: an Anachronistic Formal Approach to Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* 9

Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos

Regarding the famous Sea Battle Argument, which Aristotle presents in *De Interpretatione* 9, there has never been a general agreement not only about its correctness but also, and mainly, about what the argument really is. According to the most natural reading of the chapter, the argument appeals to a temporal concept of truth and concludes that not every statement is always either true or false. However, many of Aristotle's followers and commentators have not adopted this reading. I believe that it has faced so much resistance for reasons of hermeneutic charity: denying the law of universal bivalence seems to be overly disruptive to logical orthodoxy – the kind of logical orthodoxy represented by what we now call classical propositional logic, much of which Aristotle clearly supports in many texts. I intend to show that the logical-semantic theses that the traditional reading finds in *De Interpretatione* 9 are much more conservative than they may seem to be at first glance. First, I will show that they complement, and do not contradict in any way, the orthodox definitions of the concepts of truth and statement that Aristotle advances in other texts. Second, by resorting in an anachronistic vein to concepts and methods peculiar to contemporary logic, I will show that a trivalent modal semantics conforming to those theses can be built for a standard formal language of the classical propositional calculus. It is remarkable that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence that may be defined on the basis of this trivalent modal semantics are coextensive with their orthodox counterparts, the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence of classical bivalent and extensional semantics.

Introduction

The so-called Sea Battle Argument, which Aristotle presents in *De Interpretatione* 9, was one of the most famous topics of discussions about determinism in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. As a matter of fact, it was as famous as it was and has always been highly controversial. There has never been a general agreement not only about its formal validity and the truth of its premises, but also, and mainly, about what the argument itself really is, that is, about what its premises really are and what its conclusion really is.

This may seem curious to a lay reader of *De Interpretatione* 9, for the letter of the chapter naturally and strongly suggests what should be its correct exegesis. The most natural reading of the chapter is the one now improperly qualified as *traditional*. There it finds the exposition of an argument by reduction to absurdity of what we now call the *law of universal bivalence*: every statement is either true or false. According to the traditional reading, Aristotle

takes this argument to be an impeccable foundation of the following contention: bivalence is a universal attribute of statements about the present and the past, but not of statements about the future – for it is not an attribute of statements that affirm or deny the reality of contingent future facts.

I take this reading to be *improperly* called the traditional one because there is good historical evidence that it has not been adopted by most of Aristotle's ancient and medieval followers and commentators.¹ It has also been contested by many highly-regarded contemporary commentators of *De Interpretatione* 9.²

I believe that the traditional reading faces so much resistance because denying the law of universal bivalence seems to be overly disruptive to logical orthodoxy – the kind of logical orthodoxy represented by what we now call classical propositional logic, much of which Aristotle clearly supports in many texts. In particular, denying the universal validity of the law of bivalence would be incompatible with the definition of truth that Aristotle proposes in the *Metaphysics*;³ it would compromise the universal validity of the law of excluded middle, also expressly stated in the *Metaphysics*;⁴ and it would compromise the essential link between the concept of statement and the attribute of being true or false, a link that Aristotle expressly mentions in defining this concept in *De Interpretatione* 4.⁵

In a recent long and detailed article, I sustained the traditional reading against its competitors.⁶ However, my concern here is not the issue of what would be the correct reading of the chapter, but rather the issue of whether the logical-semantic theses that this reading finds in *De Interpretatione* 9 are really so weird as to deserve so much resistance. It is remarkable that even some contemporary logicians who adopted the traditional reading of the chapter – such as Quine, for example – believe there is no way to systematize the logical-semantic theses

¹ In the 6th century AD, Simplicius testified that this reading was rejected by those he called the Peripatetics (cf. Simplicius, *Commentary to Aristotle's Categories*, 406, 5-16; 406, 34-407, 14). Around the same time, Boethius, who would become one of Aristotle's most influential commentators in the Middle Ages, accused the Stoics of wrongly ascribing to Aristotle the thesis that statements about contingent futures are neither true nor false (cf. Boethius, *Second Commentary to Aristotle's De Interpretatione*, 208, 1-11).

² For example, Anscombe 1956, Strang 1960, Rescher 1963, Fine 1984, and Judson 1988.

³ Cf. *Metaphysics* IV 7, 1011b25-27; IX 10, 1051b3-5.

⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* IV 7.

⁵ Cf. *De Interpretatione* 4, 17a1-5; also, *Categories* 4, 2a4-10.

⁶ Cf. Santos 2021.

they find stated or implicated in the Sea Battle Argument in such a way as to build on them a reasonable logical semantics for propositional logic.⁷

Contrary to these assessments, I intend to show that *De Interpretatione* 9, according to the traditional reading, defends a set of logical-semantic theses that is much less disruptive than it may seem at first sight - either to logical orthodoxy or to the whole body of Aristotelian texts.

The Sea Battle Argument: premises, conclusions, and implications

Let us begin by sketching broadly the argumentative movement that the traditional reading finds in *De Interpretatione* 9, in order to identify the logical-semantic theses that the Sea Battle Argument presupposes, intends to substantiate, or implies. According to this reading, in the first stage of the argument (18a34-b25), Aristotle aims to prove that the law of universal bivalence implies a thesis that, in the second stage (18b26-19a22), he aims to show to be absurd. From these partial conclusions, he infers, by *modus tollens*, the negation of the law of universal bivalence.

The thesis that, in the first stage of the argument, Aristotle intends to show to be implied by the principle of bivalence is determinism: everything that exists or happens has always been determined to exist or happen, exactly when it exists or happens, for whatever reasons (logical, physical, metaphysical, or of any other kind). Conforming to the broader concept of necessity, usually adopted by Aristotle, determinism is the thesis that everything that exists and happens exists or happens by necessity.

In the second stage of the argument, Aristotle does not demonstrate, in the proper sense of the word, the falsity of determinism, but intends to show that it has unacceptable consequences, in light of something that he believes our experience of the world reveals to be incontestable. For him, it is self-evident that there are facts that, although it is possible for them to occur in the future, will never occur, facts that are now neither determined to occur nor determined not to occur in the future, facts whose future reality or unreality is contingent – for instance, possible deliberate human actions. Now, since determinism is false and follows from the law of universal bivalence, Aristotle concludes that this law does not hold for all statements, for it does not hold for those that affirm the contingent reality of future facts.

⁷ Quine qualifies as “a fantasy” Aristotle’s acceptance of the law of excluded middle while denying the law of universal bivalence (cf. Quine 1953, p. 65).

In the last stage of the argument (19a23-36), to point up *why*, and not only *that*, the law of bivalence is not universally valid, Aristotle turns his reductive argument into an equivalent one in the form of a *modus ponens*. The way he justifies the first premise of this argument, that is, the way he explains why statements about contingent futures are neither true nor false commits him to hold that only *temporal* definitions of truth and falsity are genuinely germane to *temporal statements*, i.e., statements that assert the obtaining of state of affairs at definite times. I advocate that these temporal definitions specify and complement, and do not contradict in any way, the *temporally neutral* definitions proposed in the *Metaphysics*.

Finally, Aristotle lays down a law whose significance in the context of the Sea Battle Argument I think has not yet been sufficiently stressed (19a36-39). He replaces the law of universal bivalence with a weaker analogue, which may be called the *law of universal weak bivalence*: although not every statement is at any moment true or false, at any moment *every* statement necessarily is *or will be* true or false.

Here it is not relevant to scrutinize how Aristotle argues that determinism is unacceptable, but rather to look into the first and last stages of the Sea Battle Argument. Foremost, it should be noted that the alethic modalities involved in *De Interpretatione* 9, according to the traditional reading, are *temporally relative* modalities, of which Aristotle also makes use in other texts, such as *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, and *On the Heavens*.⁸

In the temporally relative sense of modal terms, something is said to be necessary, possible or impossible *in relation to moments of time*. In this sense, it is necessary at a moment *m* that a fact is real at a moment *m** if and only if it is determined at *m* that this fact is real at *m**; it is impossible at a moment *m* that a fact is real at a moment *m** if and only if it is determined at *m* that the fact is not real at *m**; temporally relative possibility and temporally relative contingency are defined similarly, in compliance with the usual cross-definitions of alethic modalities.

Temporally relative modalities are theoretically fruitful to the extent that at least in principle there can be facts that at a given moment are determined to be real at a given time, but at another moment were not yet determined to be real at that time. For instance, from an indeterminist point of view, two years ago it was not necessary for me to be out of São Paulo now; however, two minutes ago, when I was more than a thousand miles far from São Paulo, it has certainly become necessary for me to be out of São Paulo now.

⁸ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 2, 1139b5-11; *Rhetoric* III 17, 1417b38-1418a5; *On the Heavens* I 12 *passim*.

In conjunction with the principle of non-contradiction, the definitions of temporally relative modalities imply the so-called law of the necessity of the present: if a fact is real at a definite moment, then it is necessary at this moment that it occurs at this very moment. By the principle of non-contradiction, if something is real at a time, then it is impossible for it not to be real at that same time.⁹

Assuming the past to be irreversible, the definitions of temporally relative modalities also imply the so-called law of the necessity of the past: if a fact was real at a moment *m* before moment *m**, then it is necessary at *m** that it was real at *m*. From the moment a state of affairs obtains, it becomes necessary that it has obtained at that moment. From the time when the Greeks sacked Troy, for example, it became forever impossible for the Greeks not to have sacked Troy at that time.¹⁰

The Sea Battle Argument has explicit and implicit premises. The explicit ones are the principle of non-contradiction, the definition of truth, and indeterminism. The implicit ones are the modal laws of the necessity of the present and the past, and another modal law, actually a very trivial one: what follows from something necessary is also necessary.¹¹

Let us now sketch in a free manner the Aristotelian proof that the law of universal bivalence implies determinism. Suppose that every statement is now true or false, and consider the statement that a fact will occur at some future time –for example, the statement that there will be a sea battle tomorrow. If that statement is now true, then, by the necessity of the present, it is now necessary for it to be now true. But if it is now true, then there will be a sea battle tomorrow, by the definition of truth. Since what necessarily follows from what is necessary is also necessary, if the statement that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is now necessarily true, then it is now necessary that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, it is now already determined that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

We can prove similarly that if this statement is now false, then it is now necessary that there will be no sea battle tomorrow. Hence, if the statement that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is now either true or false, it follows that either it is now necessary that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or it is now necessary that there will be no sea battle tomorrow.

⁹ According to the traditional reading, Aristotle states the law of the necessity of the present in *De Interpretatione* 9, 19a23-27. For the sake of argumentative fair play, it should be noted that the sense of this passage is as controversial as the traditional reading itself.

¹⁰ The law of the necessity of the past is clearly implicated in *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 2, 1139b5-11.

¹¹ This law is stated in *Eudemian Ethics* II 6, 1223a1.

There is no doubt that this argument is formally valid and can be made completely general, holding for any moment of time, any statement, and any occurrence of any fact at any moment. It is reasonable to assume that any occurrence of any fact at any moment can at least in principle be stated in some possible language. Therefore, if every statement is true or false, then everything that happens at a moment *m* has always been determined to happen at *m*, and everything that does not happen at a moment *m* has always been determined not to happen at *m*. The assumption of the universal validity of the law of bivalence implies that nothing happens or fails to happen contingently. The consequent being plainly false, Aristotle goes on, the initial assumption must be plainly false. Not every statement is always true or false.

From an indeterminist point of view, the first and second stages of the Sea Battle Argument are enough to justify the denial of the law of universal bivalence. Nonetheless, they do not make clear *why* the statement of a future contingent occurrence of a state of affairs must be neither true nor false. Paradoxically, the answer to this question can be extracted from the definition of truth that Aristotle lays down in the *Metaphysics*, paradoxically the same definition that seems to imply the law of universal bivalence.

A literal and unbiased reading of the definitions of truth and falsity formulated in the *Metaphysics* reveals that they are indeed temporally neutral. They assert that a statement *is* true if and only if what it states to be real *is* actually real, and it *is* false if and only if what it states to be real *is* actually unreal. All we can conclusively infer from this definition is the logical equivalence between the truth of a statement and the reality of what it says to be real, as well as the logical equivalence between the falsity of a statement and the unreality of what it says to be real.

At the same time, Aristotle remarks that while the logical relation between the truth or falsity of a statement and the reality or unreality of what it affirms to be real is obviously symmetrical, there is between them an *asymmetrical causal relation*. As he points out, it is not because it is true to say that you are pale that you are pale, but it is because you are pale that it is true to say that you are pale.¹² Reality is *the* cause of truth, unreality is *the* cause of falsity, not vice-versa.

In the context of *De Interpretatione* 9, from the conjunction of logical equivalence and causal asymmetry between truth and reality, it follows that statements about contingent futures can be neither true nor false. In fact, if it is not determined at a given moment whether a necessary cause will be real or unreal, then it is not determined at that moment whether its

¹² Cf. *Metafísica* IX 10, 1051b6-9

effect will be real or unreal. Therefore, if now it is not determined that a sea battle will take place tomorrow, then now it is not determined that the statement that a sea battle will take place tomorrow is now true; hence, by the necessity of the present, now the statement is not true. Similarly, if now it is not determined that a sea battle will not take place tomorrow, then now it is not determined that the statement that a sea battle will take place tomorrow is false; therefore, by the necessity of the present, now the statement is not false. Statements about indeterminate futures are now neither true nor false.

So, the conjunction of logical equivalence and causal asymmetry between truth and reality imposes the adoption of the following *modal* definition of temporal truth: a statement is true at a given moment if and only if at that moment *it is necessary* to be real what the statement says to be real. And similarly concerning falsity.

Laying these definitions of temporal truth and falsity is tantamount to avowing that the so-called Tarski's T-scheme, and its analogue concerning falsity, are not universally valid in the domain of temporal statements. In this domain, not every statement S is such that, for any moment, S is true (false) at that moment if and only if S (not-S). The T-scheme and its analogue concerning falsity hold for statements about the present, the past, and the necessary future, but not for statements about contingent futures. So, Aristotle is free to refuse the equivalence between the law of excluded middle and the law of universal bivalence, an equivalence that is trivially implied by the T-scheme and its analogue concerning falsity. In other words, he is free to refuse universal bivalence without prejudice to the universality of the law of excluded middle.

After explaining why statements about contingent futures are neither true nor false, Aristotle postulates a weaker version of the law of universal bivalence. The *law of universal weak bivalence* asserts that every statement either is *or will be* true or false. Statements about contingent futures are neither true nor false, but they will necessarily be true or false at the right moment. The statement that there will be a sea battle tomorrow is now neither true nor false, but it will certainly be true or false tomorrow at midnight at the latest.

Assuming that the Sea Battle Argument is a good one, the definition of an appropriate semantics for propositional logic must satisfy a number of conditions. We saw that a remarkable one is that the axes of this semantics must be temporally relative concepts of truth and falsity, concepts that are to be temporally relative in the strictest sense: at least in principle, statements can be true (false) at a given moment and not be true (false) at another moment. For the importance and novelty of this condition to be properly measured, it is necessary to clarify

how it is to be precisely understood. To do so, it is necessary to dispel one among the many ambiguities that pervade the use of the Greek expression *logos apophantikos*, which I translate by the word "statement", ambiguities that also pervade the use of this English word.

I call a *sentence* every symbol capable of conveying statements. We can distinguish two kinds of sentences capable of conveying affirmations and negations that states of affairs obtain at definite times. On the one hand, there are sentences in which the reference to definite times is made using deictic symbolic resources – such as verbal tenses and adverbial expressions like "now", "tomorrow", and "in the future". I label these sentences, like "Socrates is sitting" and "There will be a sea battle tomorrow", as *temporally relative sentences*. Utterances of the same temporally relative sentence at different moments can, without changing the meanings of its parts, have different truth conditions, since these utterances affirm or deny the occurrence of the same state of affairs, but possibly at different times.

On the other hand, there are sentences in which the reference to definite times is made using expressions that always refer to the same times at all moments when they are uttered, such as expressions for dates and those referring to particular events. I label these sentences, like "There will be a sea battle on September 14, 2022" and "Socrates' death precedes Plato's death", as *temporally absolute sentences*. For simplicity, I will consider only sentences in which no non-temporal deixes occur. With that proviso, all utterances of a temporally absolute sentence have the same truth condition, since all of them affirm or deny that the same state of affairs occurs at the same definite time.

The ambiguity of the word "statement" that matters here accounts for the fact that there are two acceptable but incompatible answers to the question of which statement the utterance of a temporally relative sentence conveys. In a sense, we can say that the sentence "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" has the same meaning at all moments when it is uttered. This common meaning may be called the statement it expresses, namely, the statement that there will be a sea battle the day after the moment when the sentence is uttered, whatever that moment may be. It is in this sense of the word "statement", *the temporally relative sense*, that Aristotle uses the word in *Categories* 5, for instance.

Nevertheless, it is also acceptable to say that a statement is defined by its *whole* truth conditions. In this *temporally absolute sense* of the word "statement", different utterances of the sentence "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" can convey different statements. When that sentence is uttered on September 13, 2022, it conveys the same statement as the sentence "There will be a sea battle on September 14, 2022"; when it is uttered the day after September

13, 2022, it states the same as the sentence “There will be a sea battle on September 15, 2022”. I call a *temporally relative statement* what a temporally relative sentence conveys in the temporally relative sense; I call a *temporally absolute statement* what any sentence conveys in the temporally absolute sense.

It is nothing but a triviality to admit that temporally relative statements can have different truth values at different moments. However, it is not a triviality what Aristotle’s refusal of the law of strong bivalence requires. It requires that also the logical-semantic treatment for temporally absolute statements resorts to temporally relative concepts of truth and falsity. Before the Greeks sacked Troy, the temporally absolute statement conveyed by an utterance now of the sentence “The Greeks sacked Troy” was neither true nor false, on the plausible assumption that, before it occurred, the sacking of Troy could have been prevented by contingent choices of the Greek commanders or some chance events. From the moment of the sacking, however, the necessity of the present and the past ensured that this same statement became forever true.

Now, supporters of the traditional reading like myself must assume that it is in the temporally absolute sense that Aristotle uses the word “statement” when formulating the law of weak bivalence in *De Interpretatione* 9. It is not difficult to see that, from an indeterminist point of view, the law of weak bivalence may not hold for some temporally relative statements.

From this point of view, for example, it is plausible to assume that as long as there are human beings, the occurrence or non-occurrence of a sea battle, which depend on acts of choice and many kinds of chance events, will never be determined to happen or not to happen a year before it happens or not happen. Insofar as it is at least possible that, as Aristotle believes, the human species will exist throughout infinite time, it follows that at no moment the temporally relative statement conveyed by the sentence “There will be a sea battle within a year” will be true or false, since at no moment it will be determined whether a sea battle will or will not occur within a year. As a consequence, for the sake of hermeneutic charity, the traditional reading of *De Interpretatione* 9 is committed to postulating that statements at stake in the context of the chapter are temporally absolute statements.

However, from the indeterminist point of view, it seems that the law of weak bivalence does not necessarily hold even for all temporally absolute statements. Assuming that time is infinite, as Aristotle does, it seems not to hold for temporally absolute statements that assert the reality at some indefinite moment in the future of a state of affairs that will never be real in the future, although it will be *always* possible for it to be real in the future. The future reality

of this state of affairs will be at every moment contingent, so that the statement that it will be real in the future will remain forever neither true nor false.

Therefore, the law of weak bivalence implies that no state of affairs can be such that its future occurrence remains eternally contingent without ever becoming either real or impossible. As a matter of fact, it is equivalent to a weak version of the so-called principle of plenitude.

The strongest version of the principle of plenitude asserts that whatever is possible at a moment is either real at that moment or will eventually become real in the future. In *De Interpretatione* 9, Aristotle expressly rejects this version (19a7-18). It is obvious, he says, that many states of affairs are now possible to be real in the future, but will never become real. This cloak, he says, now may be and may not be cut in the future, but it may wear out and cease to exist before being cut.

The weak version of the principle of plenitude is a little less ambitious. It does not imply that something which is *now* merely possible must eventually become real, but it claims that nothing can remain *eternally* possible without ever becoming real. Excluded by the strongest version of the principle of plenitude, the possibility of being cut the Aristotelian cloak that will never be actually cut, for instance, is rescued by its weak version and so does not challenge the law of weak bivalence. It is now possible for the cloak to be cut; however, from the moment it wears out and ceases to exist before being cut, it will become impossible for it to be cut, and from that moment the statement that the cloak will be cut will be always false. There are good textual reasons to believe that Aristotle admits some weak version of the principle of plenitude, and there are also good reasons to believe that he admits precisely the weak version that is equivalent to the law of weak bivalence.¹³

DI9 Formal Semantics

In sum, according to the traditional reading of *De Interpretatione* 9, the Sea Battle Argument presupposes or implies the following logical-semantic theses:

- (1) truth and falsity belong primarily to temporally absolute statements;
- (2) truth and falsity are temporally relative attributes of temporal statements;
- (3) at each moment, there are for a temporal statement, in principle, three alternatives: to be true, to be false, or to be neither true nor false;

¹³ Cf. Santos 2021, 113-125.

(4) a statement is true (false) at a definite moment if and only if it is necessary for it at that moment to be true (false) at some moment;

(5) statements that are true (false) at a definite moment will remain true (false) forever after that moment;

(6) at every moment every statement is *or will be* true or false.

A deliberate and open anachronistic logical exercise can reveal how close these theses are to classical propositional logic. Indeed, they can underpin the definition of a reasonable formal semantics (which I will call *DI9 semantics*) for a standard formal language of what we now call classical propositional calculus; and it can be proven that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence defined on the basis of DI9 semantics are coextensive with their classical counterparts, the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence of classical semantics.

Theses (3) and (4) above imply that DI9 semantics should be a *trivalent modal* semantics. It will be defined through a possible worlds strategy. It must entail a definition of truth that makes true at a given moment in a given world exactly those statements that are true or will be true in all possible worlds compatible with the totality of what is real or has already been real at that moment in this world, that is, in all possible continuations of the totality of real occurrences of states of affairs up to that moment in this world.¹⁴

Let L be a standard language of the classical propositional logic whose primitive connectives are those of negation ($\sim$) and disjunction ($\vee$). The set of formulas of L is recursively defined in the usual way from an infinite number of atomic formulas and those connectives.

A DI9 interpretation for L should be an assignment of one of the values T, F and O to each ordered pair (A, j) , A being a formula of L and j being a real number. The ordered set of real numbers will be used as a formal proxy for the ordered set of moments of time (in deference to Aristotle's belief in the continuity and infinity of time). Values T and F will be called *truth values*. It is worth noting that the value O is not meant to be a third *truth* value. It is meant to represent formally the (provisory) *absence* of truth value.

¹⁴ The idea of formally dealing with temporal truth and truth value gaps of statements about the future by resorting to a possible worlds strategy, similar in some important respects to the one employed here in defining DI9 semantics, goes back to Thomason 1970. However, Thomason and his followers do not deal with standard languages of the classical propositional logic, whose formulas are intended to stand for temporally absolute statements. They are concerned with tense languages, whose formulas are intended to stand for temporally relative statements and may include tense operators, corresponding to ordinary expressions like "it was the case that", "it will always be the case that", etc.

The initial step in defining the concept of DI9 interpretation is to define the concepts of DI9 valuation for L and DI9 classical interpretation for L.

Definition 1. A DI9 valuation for L is a function α from the Cartesian product of the set of atomic formulas of L and the set of real numbers to the set of values $\{T, F, 0\}$ such that, for any atomic formula A of L,

- 1) for all numbers j and h such that $j < h$, if $\alpha(A, j) = T$, then $\alpha(A, h) = T$; if $\alpha(A, j) = F$, then $\alpha(A, h) = F$;
- 2) there is a number j such that $\alpha(A, j) = T$ or $\alpha(A, j) = F$.

Let us call a *dated fact* the truth condition of a temporally absolute statement, that is, the (real or unreal) obtaining of a state of affairs at a definite time. In the temporally absolute sense, an utterance now of “Socrates died in Athens”, for example, states a real dated fact, because Socrates actually died in Athens at a time before now; and an utterance of the same sentence at a given moment before Socrates’ death stated an unreal dated fact because Socrates actually did not die in Athens before that moment. If now it is neither necessary for a sea battle to take place tomorrow nor necessary for it not to take place tomorrow, then the dated fact stated by an utterance now of “There will be a sea battle tomorrow” is now neither determined to be real nor determined to be unreal.

DI9 valuations are intended to be formal proxies for possible worlds. Given any DI9 valuation α and any number j, the set of atomic formulas A of L such that $\alpha(A, j) = T$ stands formally for the set of elementary dated facts that are real at the moment j, or were real until j, or are already determined at j to be real after j in the world α ; the set of atomic formulas A of L such that $\alpha(A, j) = F$ stands formally for the set of elementary dated facts that are unreal at the moment j, or were unreal until j, or are already determined at j to be unreal after j in the world α ; and the set of atomic formulas A of L such that $\alpha(A, j) = 0$ stands formally for the set of elementary dated facts that are neither determined at j to be real after j nor determined at j to be unreal after j in the world α .

The first condition in Definition 1 stands formally for the thesis that an atomic statement having a truth value at a given moment in a given world will keep this truth value forever after that moment in this world. The rationale behind this thesis is the law of the necessity of the past, which ensures that a real (unreal) past dated fact will remain a real (unreal) past dated fact

forever. The second condition stands formally for instances of the law of weak bivalence: in every world, at any moment any atomic statement has or will have a truth value.

Definition 2. If α is a DI9 valuation for L , then the *DI9 classical interpretation* for L associated to α is the function α^* from the set of formulas of L to the set of truth-values $\{T, F\}$ such that:

- 1) if A is an atomic formula of L , then $\alpha^*(A) = T$ if and only if there is a j such that $\alpha(A, j) = T$;
- 2) If A is $\sim B$, then $\alpha^*(A) = T$ if and only if $\alpha^*(B) = F$;
- 3) if A is $B \vee C$, then $\alpha^*(A) = T$ if and only if $\alpha^*(B) = T$ or $\alpha^*(C) = T$.

Conditions 1) and 2) in Definition 1 clearly guarantee the existence and uniqueness of $\alpha^*(A)$, for all formulas A of L . It is worth noting that DI9 classical interpretations are interpretations for L in the sense of classical semantics for classical propositional logic; we will prove later that the converse is also true.

The function α^* is intended to be the formal proxy for the relation between any statement and the only truth value that it has or eventually will have in the world α . Proposition 2 below will show that this intention succeeds.

Next, I define the formal counterpart of the concept of a possible continuation of the whole chain of dated facts that were real in the world α until the moment j , including j .

Definition 3. Let j be any number. A DI9 valuation β for L is a *j-extension* of a DI9 valuation α for L if and only if, for any atomic formula A of L and any number h , if $h \leq j$, then $\beta(A, h) = \alpha(A, h)$.

Finally, I define the notion of a DI9 interpretation for L , which is meant to be a generalization of the notion of a DI9 valuation for L conforming to the logical-semantic theses (1) – (6) above.

Definition 4. For any DI9 valuation α for L , the *DI9 interpretation* $I\alpha$ for L is the function from the Cartesian product of the set of formulas of L and the set of real numbers to the set of values $\{T, F, 0\}$ such that

- 1) if A is an atomic formula, then $I\alpha(A, j) = \alpha(A, j)$;

2) if A is $\sim B$, then

2.1) $I\alpha(A, j) = T$ if and only if $I\alpha(B, j) = F$;

2.2) $I\alpha(A, j) = F$ if and only if $I\alpha(B, j) = T$;

2.3) $I\alpha(A, j) = 0$ if and only if $I\alpha(B, j) = 0$;

3) if A is $B \vee C$, then

3.1) $I\alpha(A, j) = T$ if and only if, for any j -extension β of α , $\beta^*(B) = T$ or $\beta^*(C) = T$;

3.2) $I\alpha(A, j) = F$ if and only if, for any j -extension β of α , $\beta^*(B) = F$ and $\beta^*(C) = F$;

3.3) $I\alpha(A, j) = 0$ if and only if $I\alpha(A, j) \neq T$ and $I\alpha(A, j) \neq F$.

Each DI9 interpretation assigns one and only one value to each formula of L . The crucial step in its recursive definition is the third one, concerning disjunctions. It expresses formally the claim that a disjunction is true in a world at a given moment if and only if in any possible continuation of this world from that moment on at least one disjunct is or will be true; a disjunction is false in a world at a given moment if and only if both disjuncts are or will be false in all possible continuations of this world from that moment on; and a disjunction is neither true nor false in a world at a given moment if and only if (i) at least one disjunct is or will be true in some possible continuation of this world from that moment on, and (ii) both disjuncts are or will be false in some other possible continuation of this world from that moment on.

Definition 5. A DI9 interpretation $I\beta$ for L is a j -extension of a DI9 interpretation $I\alpha$ for L if and only if, for any formula A of L and any number h , if $h \leq j$, then $I\beta(A, h) = I\alpha(A, h)$.

Proposition 1. If a DI9 valuation β for L is a j -extension of a DI9 valuation α for L , then the DI9 interpretation $I\beta$ for L is a j -extension of the DI9 interpretation $I\alpha$ for L .

Proof. Let us assume that a DI9 valuation β for L is a j -extension of a DI9 valuation α for L . We prove by induction on the length of A that

(i) $I\beta(A, h) = I\alpha(A, h)$, for any formula A of L and any h such that $h \leq j$.

If A is an atomic formula, then (i) follows trivially from Definitions 3 and 4. If A is a negation, then (i) follows trivially from the inductive hypothesis and Definition 4. Now let A be a

disjunction $B \vee C$. It follows immediately from the initial assumption and Definition 3 that the set of j -extensions of α is the set of j -extensions of β , and it follows immediately from Definition 4 that the value that a DI9 interpretation I_γ assigns to a disjunction $B \vee C$ is a function of the values that the DI9 classical interpretations associated to the j -extensions of γ assign to B and C . Hence, $I_\beta(B \vee C, h) = I_\alpha(B \vee C, h)$.

It will then be proven that DI9 interpretations fulfill in the whole domain of formulas of L relevant conditions that DI9 valuations fulfill in the restricted domain of atomic formulas of L .

Proposition 2. If A is a formula of L , α is a DI9 valuation for L , and W is a truth value, then

(i) $\alpha^*(A) = W$ if and only if there is a number j such that $I_\alpha(A, j) = W$.

Proof. Let A be a formula of L , α be a DI9 valuation for L , and W be a truth value. We prove (i) by induction on the length of A . If A is an atomic formula, then (i) follows trivially from Definitions 2 and 4. If A is a negation, then (i) follows trivially from the inductive hypothesis and Definitions 2 and 4. Now let A be a disjunction $B \vee C$. By Definition 2, $\alpha^*(B \vee C) = T$ if and only if $\alpha^*(B) = T$ or $\alpha^*(C) = T$. By inductive hypothesis, $\alpha^*(B) = T$ or $\alpha^*(C) = T$ if and only if there is a j such that $I_\alpha(B, j) = T$ or $I_\alpha(C, j) = T$. By Proposition 1, there is a j such that $I_\alpha(B, j) = T$ or $I_\alpha(C, j) = T$ if and only if there is a j such that, for any j -extension β of α , $I_\beta(B, j) = T$ or $I_\beta(C, j) = T$. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a j such that, for any j -extension β of α , $I_\beta(B, j) = T$ or $I_\beta(C, j) = T$ if and only if there is a j such that, for any j -extension β of α , $\beta^*(B) = T$ or $\beta^*(C) = T$. By definition 4, there is a j such that, for any j -extension β of α , $\beta^*(B) = T$ or $\beta^*(C) = T$ if and only if there is a j such that $I_\alpha(B \vee C, j) = T$. Hence, $\alpha^*(B \vee C) = T$ if and only if there is a j such that $I_\alpha(B \vee C, j) = T$. It can be similarly proven that $\alpha^*(B \vee C) = F$ if and only if there is a j such that $I_\alpha(B \vee C, j) = F$.

Proposition 3. Let A be a formula of L and α be a DI9 valuation for L . There is a number j such that $I_\alpha(A, j) = T$ or $I_\alpha(A, j) = F$.

Proof. Trivial, by Definition 2 and Proposition 2.

Proposition 4. Let A be a formula of L , α be a DI9 valuation for L and W be a truth value. If j and h are numbers such that $j \leq h$, then

(i) if $I\alpha(A, j) = W$, then $I\alpha(A, h) = W$.

Proof. Let A be a formula of L , α be a DI9 valuation for L and W be a truth value. Let j and h be numbers such that $j \leq h$. We prove (i) by induction on the length of A . If A is an atomic formula, then (i) follows trivially from Definitions 1 and 4. If A is a negation, then (i) follows trivially from the inductive hypothesis and Definition 4. Let A be a disjunction $B \vee C$ and $I\alpha(B \vee C) = T$. By Definition 4,

(ii) for all j -extensions β of α , $\beta^*(B) = T$ or $\beta^*(C) = T$.

Let γ be any h -extension of α ; by Definition 3, γ is also a j -extension of α , and so, by (ii), $\gamma^*(B) = T$ or $\gamma^*(C) = T$; therefore, by Definition 4, $I\alpha(A, h) = T$. It can be similarly proven that If $I\alpha(A, j) = F$, then $I\alpha(A, h) = F$.

Proposition 2 shows that the function α^* is the formal proxy of the assignment to any statement, either atomic or molecular, of the truth value it has or will have in the world α . Proposition 3 represents formally the fact that in every world at any moment every statement has *or will have* a truth value. Proposition 4 represents formally the fact that a statement that is true (false) in a world at a moment remains true (false) in this world forever after that moment.

Now we prove that DI9 semantics vindicates the definition of truth and falsity of *De Interpretatione* 9.

Proposition 5. Let A be a formula of L , α be a DI9 valuation for L , j be any number and W be a truth value; $I\alpha(A, j) = W$ if and only if, for any j -extension β of α , $\beta^*(A) = W$.

Proof. Let A be a formula of L , α be a DI9 valuation for L , j be any number and W be a truth value. Let $I\alpha(A, j) = W$. By Proposition 1, for any j -extension β of α , $I\beta(A, j) = W$, and so $\beta^*(A) = W$, by Proposition 2. Now let $\beta^*(A) = W$, for any j -extension β of α . We prove by induction on the length of A that

(i) $I\alpha(A, j) = W$.

If A is a negation or a disjunction, then (i) follows trivially from the inductive hypothesis and Definition 4. Now let A be an atomic formula. We define the functions γ and δ from the Cartesian product of the set of atomic formulas of L and the set of real numbers to the set of values $\{T, F, 0\}$ as follows: for any atomic formula B of L and any number h such that $h \leq j$, $\gamma(B, h) = \delta(B, h) = \alpha(B, h)$; for any number h such that $h > j$, $\gamma(B, h) = T$ if and only if $\alpha(B, j)$

$= T$, and $\gamma(B, h) = F$ if and only if $\alpha(B, j) \neq T$; for any number h such that $h > j$, $\delta(B, h) = F$ if and only if $\alpha(B, j) = F$, and $\delta(B, h) = T$ if and only if $\alpha(B, j) \neq F$. It can be easily seen that γ and δ are DI9 valuations for L and j -extensions of α . By definition, for all $h > j$, $\gamma(A, h) \neq T$ if $\alpha(A, j) \neq T$, and $\delta(A, h) \neq F$ if $\alpha(A, j) \neq F$. Hence, by Definitions 1 and 4, if $I\alpha(A, j) \neq W$, then there is a j -extension β of α such that, for all k , $I\beta(A, k) \neq W$.

Proposition 5 represents formally the fact that a statement is true (false) in a given world at a given moment if and only if it is or will be true (false) in all possible continuations of this world from that moment on – in other words, if and only if it is *necessary* at that moment for it to be true (false) in this world.

Finally, we prove that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence can be defined in DI9 semantics which are coextensive with the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence in classical semantics.

Definition 6. A DI9 interpretation $I\alpha$ for L *satisfies* a formula A of L at a number j if and only if $I\alpha(A, j) = T$.

Definition 7. A formula A of L is a *DI9 logical consequence* of a set Γ of formulas of L if and only if, for any number j , every DI9 interpretation for L that satisfies all elements of Γ at j also satisfies A at j .

Definition 8. A formula A of L is a *DI9 logical truth* if and only if A is a DI9 logical consequence of the empty set.

Definition 8 trivially implies that a formula A of L is a DI9 logical truth if and only if A is satisfied by every DI9 interpretation at every number.

Informally, Definition 6 says that a world satisfies a statement at a given moment if and only if this statement is true in this world at that moment. Definition 7 says that a statement is a DI9 logical consequence of a set of statements if and only if, for any moment, this statement is true at that moment in every world in which all elements of this set are true at that moment. Definition 8 implies that a statement is a DI9 logical truth if and only if it is true in every world at every moment.

Proposition 6. If a formula A of L is a tautological consequence of a set Γ of formulas of L in the sense of classical semantics, then A is a DI9 logical consequence of Γ .

Proof. Let A be a tautological consequence of Γ , j be any number and $I\alpha$ be any DI9 interpretation that satisfies all elements of Γ at j . By Proposition 1, for all j -extensions β of α and all elements B of Γ , $I\beta$ satisfies B at j and so, by Definition 2, $\beta^*(B) = T$. Since, for all j -extensions β of α , β^* is an interpretation in the sense of classical semantics and A is a tautological consequence of Γ , it follows that, for all j -extensions β of α , $\beta^*(A) = T$. By Proposition 5, $I\alpha(A, j) = T$.

Corollary. All tautologies are DI9 logical truths.

Proposition 7. Let Ic be any interpretation for L in the sense of classical semantics and α be the DI9 valuation for L such that, for all atomic formulas A of L and all numbers j , $\alpha(A, j) = Ic(A)$; we have that

(i) for all formulas B of L and all numbers j , $I\alpha(B, j) = Ic(B)$.

Proof. Let Ic be any interpretation for L in the sense of classical semantics and α be the DI9 valuation for L such that, for all atomic formulas A of L and all numbers j , $\alpha(A, j) = Ic(A)$. We prove (i) by induction on the length of B . If B is an atomic formula, then (i) follows trivially from Definition 4. If B is a negation, then (i) follows trivially from the inductive hypothesis and Definition 4. Let B be a disjunction $C \vee D$. By the inductive hypothesis, for all numbers j , $I\alpha(C, j) = Ic(C)$ and $I\alpha(D, j) = Ic(D)$. By Proposition 1, for all numbers j and all j -extensions β of α , $I\beta(C, j) = Ic(C)$ and $I\beta(D, j) = Ic(D)$. By Proposition 2, for all numbers j and all j -extensions β of α , $\beta^*(C) = Ic(C)$ and $\beta^*(D) = Ic(D)$. By Definition 2, for all numbers j and all j -extensions β of α , $\beta^*(C \vee D) = Ic(C \vee D)$. By Proposition 5, for all numbers j , $I\alpha(C \vee D, j) = Ic(C \vee D)$.

Proposition 8. If a formula A of L is a DI9 logical consequence of a set Γ of formulas of L , then A is a tautological consequence of Γ in the sense of classical semantics.

Proof. Let A be a DI9 logical consequence of Γ . Let Ic be any interpretation for L in the sense of classical semantics such that $Ic(B) = T$, for all elements B of Γ . Let α be the DI9 valuation for L such that, for all atomic formulas C of L and all numbers j , $\alpha(C, j) = Ic(C)$. By Proposition 7, for all formulas D of L and all numbers j , $I\alpha(D, j) = Ic(D)$. Hence, for all elements B of Γ and all numbers j , $I\alpha(B, j) = Ic(B) = T$. Since A is a DI9 logical consequence of Γ , $I\alpha(A, j) = T$, for all numbers j , and so $Ic(A) = T$, by Proposition 7.

Corollary. All DI9 logical truths are tautologies.

All DI9 classical interpretations for L are obviously interpretations for L in the sense of classical semantics, and Proposition 7 ensures that every interpretation for L in the sense of classical semantics is a DI9 classical interpretation for L. Therefore, Propositions 6 and 8 imply Proposition 9.

Proposition 9. A formula A of L is a DI9 logical consequence of a set of formulas Γ of L if and only if, for all DI9 classical interpretations α^* for L, $\alpha^*(A) = T$ if, for all elements B of Γ , $\alpha^*(B) = T$.

Corollary. A formula A of L is a DI9 logical truth if and only if, for all DI9 classical interpretations α^* for L, $\alpha^*(A) = T$.

Informally, Proposition 9 says that a statement is a DI9 logical consequence of a set of statements if and only if it is or will be true in every world in which all elements of this set are or will be true. Its corollary says that a statement is a DI9 logical truth if and only if it is true in every world at some moment. Hence, for a statement to be true in every world at *some* moment is a sufficient (and obviously necessary) condition for it to be true in every world at *every* moment.

Conclusion

To sum things up, the scruples of Aristotle's sympathizers in endorsing the traditional reading of *De Interpretatione* 9, as well as the criticisms of his opponents who endorse this reading, are unjustified, for the logical-semantic theses that it finds in the chapter are actually much more conservative than they may appear at first glance.

Concerning the replacement of strong bivalence by weak bivalence, the traditional reading qualifies but does not break the essential link between the concept of statement and the attribute of being true or false. According to it, not every statement is at all times true or false, but every statement that is neither true nor false at a given moment will necessarily be true or false at some other moment. Insofar as a statement is a representation of reality, a kind of representation that can and must be right or wrong, then it is essential for every statement to be at least potentially true or false, and it is also essential for it to be actually true or false at some moment, at the right moment, that is, at the moment in which it is already determined to be real

or unreal what it asserts to be real. By force of the weak version of the principle of plenitude, in all cases such a moment will necessarily come.

Concerning the definitions of truth and falsity provided by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, the logical semantics of *De Interpretatione* 9 is not disruptive at all. Those definitions disregard distinctions of temporal reference between statements. For that reason, they cannot supply an answer to the issues at stake in the Sea Battle Argument. Since, by definition, the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the necessary and sufficient condition of truth or falsity of a temporal statement is temporally localized, how is to be temporally localized the truth value of this statement? How truth values should be assigned to statements about the future, before the time when, by definition, the necessary and sufficient conditions of their truth or falsity are to be fulfilled?

In *De Interpretatione* 9, Aristotle supplies a consistent answer to these questions. There he does not contradict but complicates the definitions of the *Metaphysics* in order to make them appropriate to be applied in the domain of temporal statements. He does so by introducing temporally relative concepts of truth and falsity, and defining them through the temporal modalization of the T-scheme and its analogue concerning falsity: S is true (false) at a given moment if and only if it is *necessary* at that moment that S (not-S).

Still, Aristotle preserves a weak version of these schemes: it is *at some moment* true (false) that S if and only if S (not-S). As a consequence, the semantics of *De Interpretatione* 9 is even compatible with a weak variant of extensionalism: the truth value of a molecular statement is *in a way* a function of the truth values of its atomic parts.

In fact, we saw that a crucial step in the definition of the truth conditions of molecular statements in DI9 semantics is the association of truth functions to propositional connectives and the setting of recursive rules by means of which the only truth value that any molecular statement has *or will have* in a given possible world can be assigned solely on the basis of the truth values that its atomic parts have *or will have* in this world. Thus, in the semantics of *De Interpretatione* 9, a disjunction can, to be sure (and to Quine's scandal), be true at a given moment without any of its disjuncts being true *at that moment*, but it can never be true without any of its disjuncts being true *at some moment*.

Finally, the anachronistic formal treatment of classical propositional logic based on DI9 semantics made clear that *De Interpretatione* 9 is no doubt disruptive to classical semantics of classical propositional logic, but it is not disruptive at all to classical propositional logic itself. The adoption of a temporally relative concept of truth applicable to temporally absolute

statements and the restriction of the law of strong bivalence are no doubt disruptive on the metalinguistic level, on the level of semantic theory. Nevertheless, they are not disruptive at all on the level of the object language of classical propositional logic itself, as far as they keep untouched the extensions of the classical concepts of propositional logical truth and propositional logical implication. Through different paths, at the end of the story, classical semantics and DI9 semantics eventually agree about what is to be taken as true, and what is to be taken as implied by what, solely in virtue of the meanings of the standard propositional connectives of classical propositional logic – no matter how differently they conceive these meanings to be.

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How Does Aristotle Understand the Paradox of the *Meno*?

Nathan Elvidge

I focus on the distinction between universal and particular knowledge or knowledge simpliciter in *APr* 2.21 and *APo* 1.1 as Aristotle's explicit response to the paradox of the *Meno*. I attempt to derive a picture of Aristotle's understanding of the philosophical problem underlying that paradox by asking what that problem would have to be in order for this distinction to make sense as a response to it. I consider two ways of taking the distinction, and argue that both point towards a problem about deriving knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals as the fundamental problem underlying Aristotle's understanding of the *Meno* paradox.

I. Introduction

The *Meno* contains Socrates' argument for his famous theory of recollection, that all learning is really just the recollection of knowledge we have learned in a previous life. The argument begins with a paradox that would appear to render all inquiry impossible. The would-be inquirer is, on Socrates' formulation of the paradox, stuck between two horns of a dilemma:¹

A: One cannot inquire about what one already knows.

B: One cannot inquire about what one does not already know.

Socrates calls this argument "eristic"², and apparently sees his theory of recollection as successfully evading the problem. He demonstrates this by leading an uneducated slave boy through a geometrical problem by asking him questions, taking the boy's ability to learn through this method as some kind of confirmation that the knowledge must have been recollected.³

It is clear that Aristotle does not agree with the theory of recollection.⁴ Yet he seems to treat the paradox of the *Meno* with a degree of seriousness that suggests that he does not see it

¹ 80e.

² 80e.

³ 86a-b.

⁴ C.f. 99b25-30.

as mere sophism, but as raising a real philosophical problem worth addressing.⁵ I seek to investigate what this philosophical problem might be by analysing Aristotle's explicit response to the *Meno*: the distinction between universal and particular knowledge (hereon, "the Distinction"), given in *APr* 2.21 and *APo* 1.1.

It is, admittedly, difficult to say how explicit a response to the *Meno* paradox the Distinction is supposed to be. The *APr* reference to the *Meno* is quite ambiguous; some take it as critical of Plato⁶, others as highlighting resemblance between Plato's and Aristotle's views⁷, and still others as signalling agreement with Plato.⁸ Yet it can be no accident that Aristotle's only two explicit mentions of the *Meno* coincide in these passages with the only two explicit discussions of this curious and somewhat counterintuitive Distinction. Further, the reference in the *APo* is much clearer in intent. Aristotle there concludes his discussion of the Distinction by saying "otherwise the puzzle in the *Meno* will result; for you will either learn nothing or what you know".⁹ This seems to be explicitly claiming that some version of the paradox of the *Meno*, however it is understood, will arise if we deny the Distinction. I propose to take this literally, asking how the *Meno* paradox is supposed to result from denial of the Distinction, and what that tells us about Aristotle's understanding of it.¹⁰

II. *Two ways of taking the Distinction*

We should begin by noting some ambiguities over the objects of the Distinction. In both passages, Aristotle explains the Distinction with reference to an example of a man who knows a universal, such as:

- (1) All triangles have 2R.

but who is ignorant of some particular falling under the universal, C, a particular sensible triangle. Since he is ignorant of C, not knowing that C exists, he does not have what *APr* 2.21

⁵ Fine G., *The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus*, Oxford: OUP, 2014, 204 argues this based on Aristotle's description of the paradox as an *Aporema*.

⁶ Jenkinson 1984, 107.

⁷ Ross, W. D., *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949, 474.

⁸ Gifford 1999, 22-23.

⁹ 71a30. All translations from Barnes 1984.

¹⁰ Thus, I do not consider the interpretation of Gifford (1999, 13) who denies that the *APr* 2.21 passage responds directly to the puzzle of the *Meno*.

calls “particular knowledge” and *APo* 1.1 calls “unqualified knowledge”.¹¹ To have unqualified/particular knowledge that C has 2R seems to entail knowing (1) while also knowing that C is a triangle, and thereby knowing that C has 2R. Yet, in virtue of knowing (1) alone, our hypothetical man still has *universal* knowledge that C has 2R. This universal knowledge appears to be a kind of implicit knowledge of a particular that falls under a universal. Universal knowledge appears to be constituted or entailed by knowledge of a universal, even when that knowledge of the universal is accompanied by ignorance of the particular. Thus, one in this situation will know and not know the same thing at the same time, in difference senses. This idea, I call the principle of “universal knowledge of particulars”:

UKP: knowledge of a universal entails universal knowledge of the particular falling under it.

Now, to speak of knowing a particular might be ambiguous between knowing a particular object or knowing a particular proposition. Do we know of this particular triangle, C, that it has 2R, or do we know the proposition “C has 2R,” or perhaps both? Aristotle does not explicitly discuss the distinction or connection between the two kinds of knowledge in these passages, and it is possible that he is simply not sensitive to this distinction. However, as far as I can tell, Aristotle is primarily talking about knowledge of objects. Unqualified/particular knowledge appears to be things like knowing that this particular mule is sterile or that this shape here is a triangle and that it has 2R.¹² Further, particular knowledge is described as the kind of knowledge that is “proper” to particulars¹³, making it natural to think that universal knowledge disagrees with particular/unqualified knowledge not in *content* so much as in manner or kind of knowledge. So, at first pass, the Distinction looks like it distinguishes two ways of knowing things about particular objects such as individual sensible triangles and mules.

There is, however, one notable place where Aristotle appears to treat the Distinction as applying to (distinguishing two ways of knowing) not a particular thing but the *universal*: “knowing that every triangle has its angles equal to two right angles is not simple – it may obtain by having universal knowledge or by particular”.¹⁴ What could it mean to know a universal by particular knowledge, the kind of knowledge “proper” to particulars? A clue might

¹¹ Aristotle’s use of the term *episteme haplos* to describe knowledge of particulars has raised some questions (Gifford 2000, 171; see LaBarge 2004, 210-213 for response) but I cannot pursue them here.

¹² 67a20; 67a36.

¹³ 67a27; 67b5.

¹⁴ 67a17.

be found in Aristotle's rejection of an alternate solution at 71a31-71b5. Some people, Aristotle reports, denied that you genuinely know that *every* pair is even, but only those pairs of which you already knew, citing as apparent proof pairs which you hadn't previously considered, and therefore allegedly didn't know were even. To this Aristotle responds that we know universals by demonstrations applying to every triangle or number *simpliciter*, not only ones we know of.

The presupposition underlying the rejected argument seems to be that properly knowing a universal requires knowing every particular falling under that universal, meaning that ignorance of a single pair defeats your claim to know that all pairs are even. Perhaps this is what it means to know a universal by particular knowledge. One knows a universal by particular knowledge only if one knows every particular that falls under it. For example, I know that Biden is male, I know that Trump is male, and so on, where each of these is a particular piece of knowledge about a particular individual. In this way I might in a sense know the claim that every president is a man, without knowing any general universal relationship holding between "president" and "man". In this sense, my knowledge is not properly universal but "*de re*"¹⁵, constituted by and reducible to a plurality of pieces of particular knowledge.

Particular knowledge of the universal is, on this reading, contrasted with universal knowledge of universals, which is presumably much closer to a more natural sense of knowledge of universals, whereby they are known as relations between concepts or something similar. I think that what is important for Aristotle is that universal knowledge, unlike particular knowledge, does not require knowing each particular that falls under that universal.

So, we have two ways of understanding the Distinction between universal and particular knowledge, one on which it applies to the universal, and one on which it applies to the particular falling under a universal. Which is right? There does not appear to be an explicit debate on this point in the literature, although one finds both sides represented. Fine and Bronstein¹⁶, for instance, appear to assume that universal knowledge primarily concerns the particular; Charles and LaBarge seem to presume that it applies to the universal;¹⁷ and Barnes appears to read Aristotle as inconsistent¹⁸, first proposing the Distinction as applying to universals, but then failing to follow the line of thought, and switching to discussion of it as applying to the conclusion.¹⁹

¹⁵ Borrowing an imperfect term from Ferejohn 1988, 103.

¹⁶ Fine 2014, 201-3; Bronstein D., *Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 26.

¹⁷ LaBarge 2004, 181; Charles 2010, 132-3.

¹⁸ Barnes J., *Posterior Analytics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 88.

¹⁹ Barnes 1993, 88.

However, there is no need to assume that the Distinction applies to either the universal or the particular at the exclusion of the other. For if universal and particular knowledge are different *ways* of knowing something, not necessarily requiring different *contents*, then it is natural to assume that both universals and particulars could in principle be known with both kinds of knowledge. It is relatively easy to see how this could work. Particular knowledge of a *de re* universal entails particular knowledge of the particulars. Therefore, universal knowledge of the particulars requires genuinely universal knowledge of the universal. However, it is still possible that Aristotle intended the Distinction to apply *primarily* to either the universal or the particular. This might only be a matter of emphasis, but even such emphases can be important in shedding light on Aristotle's understanding of the *Meno*. Both options, I believe, can undergird a plausible story as to how the Distinction is supposed to respond to the *Meno*, and I believe that these two stories converge on a common theme regarding the underlying problem they see Aristotle as addressing. Thus, I will not here attempt to settle whether the Distinction applies (exclusively or primarily) to the universal or the particular. Instead, I consider each option in turn.

III. *If the Distinction applies to particulars*

If universal and particular knowledge are (primarily) ways of knowing a particular, then it would appear that Aristotle's emphasis is on *affirming* that there is a sense in which we *do* already know the particular when we only have the universal. This would indicate that Aristotle accepts (a perhaps qualified version of) horn B of the original dilemma while rejecting A. You cannot learn that which you *unqualifiedly* do not already know, but this is unproblematic since you do in a sense already know what you are learning; you know it by universal knowledge. You *can* however learn what you already know, so long as you only know it by universal knowledge.

Now, this picture commits us to thinking that the kind of learning in question does not produce knowledge that is new in *content*, only in *kind*. You already knew (by universal knowledge) that C has 2R, and when you learn that C has 2R, you are really just making explicit the knowledge which you already implicitly possessed, progressing it from universal to particular knowledge. One may think this problematic, and though I can think of various ways one might respond, I shall not pursue the point since I think there is a much more important problem with this view: namely, that it has Aristotle reject the much more reasonable horn A and accept the less plausible horn B.

Socrates' reasoning for A is, "for since he knows it there is no need of the inquiry".²⁰ This appears eminently reasonable, and Aristotle in places signals agreement with this.²¹ The reason given for B, by contrast, is that one who does not know the conclusion of the inquiry "does not even know what he is to look for".²² There is perhaps a shred of reasoning here, but one that is very specific to inquiry *per se*. The point seems to be that one cannot design a program of inquiry unless one knows something about the hoped-for conclusion of that inquiry. Yet this sort of reason plainly does not apply to the kind of learning with which Aristotle is concerned. Aristotle's examples describe a would-be learner starting with ignorance of a particular, who then learns about that particular as soon as he recognizes it as an instance of a kind about which he knows a universal. This kind of learning can presumably happen at random as and when one recognizes things as falling under universals, and does not require any intentional program of inquiry.

Why, then, would Aristotle accept the less reasonable horn of the dilemma, even in a qualified version, while rejecting the much more palatable horn? He must, on this view, think that there is some truth to B preventing him from denying it outright, and whatever grain of truth there is in B must be part of the picture of genuine difficulty that Aristotle sees as underlying Meno's paradox. Thus, specifying his reasons for accepting (his more palatable form of) B is of great importance in saying what Aristotle's basic understanding of the problem of the *Meno* is.

Indeed, failure to adequately specify Aristotle's reasons for accepting his qualified B is plausibly the biggest gap in the literature. Fine and Bronstein, for instance, both see Aristotle as committed to his version of B because of his endorsement of UKP. Fine interprets Aristotle as seeing in the *Meno* the genuine point that all learning requires some level of prior cognition.²³ Yet, she notes, drawing on Barnes²⁴, that Aristotle's explicit reply appears to presuppose a "matching" prior-cognition requirement²⁵, that we must have prior cognition *of the thing we are learning itself*, and it is not clear why we would need a matching requirement. Likewise, Bronstein identifies the original error of the *Meno* as treating knowledge in an all-or-nothing kind of way.²⁶ To this, Bronstein interprets Aristotle as responding by defining

²⁰ 80e.

²¹ C.f. *EN* VI.9 "men do not inquire about the things they know about". 1142b1.

²² 80e.

²³ Fine 2014, 191.

²⁴ Barnes 1993, 87.

²⁵ Fine 2014, 209.

²⁶ Bronstein 2016, 13.

universal knowledge as a kind of intermediate in between full unqualified knowledge and a total cognitive blank²⁷, a kind of knowledge sufficient to facilitate learning and consistent with its content being learned.

Yet, again, we are left in want of a satisfactory explanation why being even in a total cognitive blank about a *conclusion* should prevent us from learning it. Indeed, Aristotle seems to quite explicitly state that to learn from deduction, one need merely know the premises.²⁸ It is therefore hard to see what would prevent someone who knew (1) and also:

(2) C is a triangle.

From deducing the conclusion:

(3) C has 2R.

Now, part of the problem here might be our ability to know (2), and we will have to talk about this in due time, but it is not immediately obvious how that could help motivate the Distinction. For, either way, it would remain far more natural to say that in order to know (3), we need to know (1) and (2). Why do we specifically already need to know (3)?

Fine and Bronstein both offer a suggestion whereby they see Aristotle as committed to saying that we must in some sense fore-cognize the to-be-learned conclusion precisely *because* learning it requires knowing the premises from which it follows, which *by UKP* entails that we in a sense already have knowledge of the conclusion.²⁹ Perhaps, that is, knowledge of (1) (or of (1) and (2) together) somehow constitutes universal knowledge of (3). We might then think that, since learning (3) requires knowing the premises, and since the premises constitute universal knowledge of (3), we can only make the deduction once we already possess universal knowledge of (3). However, this suggestion renders UKP logically upstream of Aristotle's acceptance of B, making it a solution to a problem that it creates in the first place. Denying UKP would remove both problem and solution and presumably leave us with a much more natural picture of learning-by-deduction whereby *new* information is learned by deduction from the premises.

It is perhaps possible that Aristotle is dialectically engaging with those who have some primitive intuitive sense that knowledge of the universal entails knowledge of the conclusion. Perhaps, that is, UKP is designed to capture this intuition by explaining in what sense it might

²⁷ Bronstein 2016, 13.

²⁸ 71a6.

²⁹ Fine 2014, 209; Bronstein 2016, 27.

be true to say that knowledge of the universal entails knowledge of the particular. However, as Barnes notes, Aristotle gives no explanation why knowledge of the universal would even *seem* to entail knowledge of the conclusion, and his attempt to show in what sense it does “foists an entirely unnatural sense upon it”.³⁰

The unnaturalness of UKP has notably been challenged by Morison, who gives an example of a girl, Angela, who knows she should not eat cookies, but is unaware that her parents have just baked some. Morison says that it would actually be more natural than not to answer affirmatively when asked whether Angela knows that she ought not to eat *these* cookies.³¹ However, I doubt that such an affirmation is actually attributing *knowledge* in any real sense to Angela, so much as conveying an expectation that if/when she sees the cookies, she will know not to eat them. As evidence of this, consider that the sense of naturalness of this answer seems to depend on an expectation or possibility that she will at some point encounter the cookies. If I were to ask of some cookies that I know she will never encounter, whether she knows not to eat them, the question would seem strange.

On the whole, I think Barnes is right to point out how unnatural it is to think that someone who knows a universal thereby has genuine knowledge of all the particulars falling under that universal, even if only implicitly. For instance, if I know that all atoms are made of protons, and there are 10^{80} atoms, do I implicitly know 10^{80} things? Given, then, how counterintuitive UKP seems, we should hope and expect to see Aristotle’s adoption of it as motivated by some real philosophical problem.

There must therefore be some deeper reason why Aristotle thinks it necessary to affirm that there is a sense in which we do already know the particular when we only have the universal, some reason why learning about the particular by applying a universal would be impossible if it weren’t for the fact that the universal in some sense already carries knowledge about that particular.

This much might be confirmed by reflecting on what kind of knowledge universal knowledge of a particular is meant to be. There appears to be a scholarly consensus that it is knowledge in potency. There is good reason for this consensus. The *APr* passage contrasts universal knowledge with “knowledge actualized” (*energeia*), for instance, and the idea is affirmed explicitly in the *APo* 1.24 discussion of demonstrations:

³⁰ Barnes 1993, 88.

³¹ Morison 2012, 38.

in grasping the prior of the propositions we in a sense know the posterior too, i.e., we grasp it potentially. E.g., if you know that every triangle has two right angles, you know in a sense of the isosceles too that it has two right angles - you know it potentially -, even if you do not know of the isosceles that it is a triangle.³²

W.D. Ross briefly suggests without explanation that this idea, that knowledge of the universal is knowledge in potentiality of the particular, could be a possible solution to the *Meno* paradox.³³ This suggestion seems to me to have some merit, and I think this could be supported by comparison with Aristotle's somewhat parallel discussion of potential and actual knowledge in *Met* M.10:

Knowledge, like knowing, is of two kinds, one potential, one actual. Potentiality, being (as matter) universal and indefinite, is of what is universal and indefinite, but actuality, being definite, is of something definite, and being individual, is of an individual.³⁴

This passage is notoriously difficult, and while I cannot here offer a full exegesis, I wish to make a couple of simple points about it. Aristotle here addresses a puzzle arising from the universality of knowledge. If the principles of things are knowable, and knowledge is of what is universal, then the principles must be universal. But "if principles must be universal, so must what comes from them be universal, just as in proofs", and so nothing will ever be real. His solution is to qualify the claim that knowledge is of what is universal by saying that knowledge of individuals is the actuality of knowledge of universals. But then this requires that knowledge of universals is potential knowledge of particulars.

Now, Aristotle is arguably primarily concerned here with the metaphysical constitution of substances, but his reference to proofs does make it look like there is an epistemic version of his worry that only universals can come from universals, which in turn raises a worry over the possibility of deriving knowledge of particulars from universals. Perhaps, then, the claim that knowledge of the universal implicitly contains (as knowledge-in-potency) knowledge of the particular is supposed to help bridge the gap between knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars.

Indeed, if the ultimate problem that Aristotle sees as underlying (his version of) *Meno*'s paradox is a problem about our ability to derive knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals, such that it can only be done if our knowledge of the universal somehow contained implicit knowledge of the particular, then it would become clear why the Distinction is

³² 86a23-27.

³³ Ross 1949, 506.

³⁴ 1087a14-19.

necessary to prevent the paradox from arising. For without the Distinction, we would presumably think that unqualified/particular knowledge is the only kind of knowledge of particulars on the table. If, then, knowledge of the universal has to somehow contain knowledge of the particular, and particular/unqualified knowledge was the only kind of knowledge available, then we would already know the particular unqualifiedly and so could not learn it.

IV. *If the Distinction applies to universals*

If we suppose that the Distinction applies primarily to the universal, then Aristotle would seem to be distinguishing “*de re*” knowledge of the universal – which entails unqualified/particular knowledge of all the particulars falling under it – from “universal” knowledge, which does not. It would then be natural to take Aristotle, with LaBarge and Charles, as denying that all knowledge of universals must be *de re* in this sense and thereby *denying* that knowledge of the universal entails unqualified knowledge of all particulars falling under it.³⁵

If the alternative to the Distinction is the worry that all apparently-universal knowledge must be *de re* (hereon, the “*de-re*-universals view”), then it is clear why denying it would land learning-by-deduction in trouble. For, as LaBarge notes, if we have *de re* knowledge of a universal, then we would already know everything that could be learned from it.³⁶ This would be to read Aristotle as denying B while accepting a version of A, that one cannot learn something if one already *unqualifiedly* knows it.

Indeed, as Charles notes, we could even plausibly see something like the theory of recollection as following from the *de-re*-universals view.³⁷ For, in order to learn a particular by applying a *de re* universal, knowledge of that particular must have already been known as part of the *de re* universal, and we must be simply recollecting it. Given, then, that we can apparently learn about any particular from a universal, we must have some kind of complete knowledge of every particular stored in the soul, waiting to be recollected.

However, as with the first reading, there appears to be something missing from this picture of the philosophical problem to which Aristotle is responding. Aristotle cannot be taken as simply and straightforwardly responding to the worry that all apparently-universal knowledge is really *de re*, he must be addressing some deeper problem motivating this worry.

³⁵ LaBarge 2004, 188; Charles 2010, 132-3.

³⁶ LaBarge 2004, 210.

³⁷ Charles 2010, 133.

There are a number of indications that this is the case. For one thing, while the *de-re*-universals view certainly would create problems for the possibility of learning-by-deduction, it is hard to see how this problem relates to the problem in the *Meno*. This is noted by LaBarge, who concludes, with evident regret, that Aristotle is “willfully taking Meno’s paradox out of context and ignoring the serious threat to the possibility of knowing universals which Plato’s version of the paradox represents”.³⁸

Second, we noted that UKP seemed to be the most counterintuitive and philosophically interesting part of Aristotle’s response to the *Meno*, but this interpretation seems to render it almost entirely superfluous. Against the *de-re*-universals view, Aristotle’s denial that knowledge of the universal entails knowledge of the particulars falling under it would appear to be loadbearing. But this denial is, as Barnes notes³⁹, rather obvious, and we do not need UKP to see its truth. Thus, his Distinction and UKP seem to concede rather too much to the objection. Aristotle, for instance, illustrates UKP with examples whereby one knows a universal while being ignorant of a particular falling under it, but the very possibility of such an example immediately defeats the position to which he is by hypothesis responding.

Third, as Gifford points out⁴⁰, Aristotle on this view would need to provide evidence for the possibility of genuinely universal knowledge as he has described it, but instead he appears to just assume it possible. This would render his work question-begging if it is taken as intended to show the *de-re*-universals view false.

The only defence I can see against the last two problems would be to claim that Aristotle means to defeat the *de-re*-universals view by showing how, with UKP and his Distinction, he can capture whatever intuition underlies the temptation to think that all universals must be known *de re*.

Yet, again, absent some deeper philosophical problem motivating the *de-re*-universals view, it is hard to see why we should take the intuitions behind it so seriously as to propose such a counterintuitive idea as UKP in order to capture them. In order to think that without the Distinction we would be left with the *de-re*-universals view, we have to presuppose that a more natural picture, whereby we learn particulars by deduction from genuinely universal universals, cannot be assumed as a viable option. And whatever the problem with this picture is supposed to be, it cannot be a problem about the possibility of genuinely universal knowledge, since as we saw Aristotle just assumes such knowledge possible.

³⁸ LaBarge 2004, 201.

³⁹ Barnes 1993, 88.

⁴⁰ Gifford 1999, 15.

The most plausible explanation would again seem to be that there is an issue over inferring knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals in the background. For all the faults of the *de-re*-universals view, it is at least clear how we could infer knowledge of particulars from knowledge of a *de re* universal – that knowledge is simply contained within the universal. And again, the most plausible reason I can see for worrying that universals must be *de re* is if one *already* thought that deducing knowledge of a particular from knowledge of a universal required the deduced knowledge to somehow already be present in the deduced-from knowledge. Then, given that we can know apparently any particular falling under a universal by immediate deduction, we will naturally think that our knowledge of the universal must contain knowledge of all particulars falling under it, and if one did not have the Distinction, it would be natural to assume that it must contain particular/unqualified knowledge of all those particulars.

V. *Why is there a problem?*

Let us summarize what we have said so far. If we take the Distinction as applying primarily to the particular, then it would appear that Aristotle's emphasis would be on affirming that knowledge of the universal entails a certain sense of implicit knowledge of the particular falling under it. The fact that he sees this affirmation as necessary to avoid Meno's Paradox would seem to suggest that he sees some kind of difficulty in a more natural picture of deduction, such that if knowledge of the universal did not in some sense contain knowledge of the particular, then we could not derive knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals.

If, on the other hand, the Distinction applies primarily to the universal, then Aristotle's emphasis would be on denying that knowledge of universals must be *de re*. Yet, again, there must be some deeper worry motivating the threat of the *de-re*-universals view, and the most plausible candidate for such a worry is again a concern about how we could derive knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals, where again the driving thought of that worry seems to be the idea that knowledge of the universal must somehow contain knowledge of the particulars, and the Distinction illuminates a benign way for this to work.

On both accounts, then, the primary philosophical problem that Aristotle sees as possibly threatening a *Meno*-style paradox appears to be a worry about our ability to derive knowledge of particulars from knowledge of universals, whereby it seems that such derivations require knowledge of a universal to somehow contain knowledge of the particulars. The solution, then, is to deny that knowledge of universals entails unqualified/particular knowledge

of particulars, and to define a middle-ground kind of knowledge – universal knowledge – by which the particulars are implicitly contained in the universal, a kind consistent with their being learned.

This allows us to see the two emphases we identified earlier not as separate interpretations of a single response, but perhaps rather as two dimensions of the response to a single basic problem. This would in turn allow us to see Aristotle not as rejecting one horn of Socrates' dilemma while accepting the other, but as steering a path between both, rejecting both horns as stated, but accepting qualified versions of both which, with their due qualifications, do not jeopardize learning. This further explains why it might *seem* that knowledge of the universal has to entail knowledge of the particular, and allows us to dignify Aristotle's claim that without his Distinction, the paradox of the *Meno* results. Without the Distinction, the universal would have to entail either unqualified knowledge of the particular, in which case we will learn what we already know, or else no knowledge of the particular, in which case we cannot learn it from the universal.

Yet, we might still wonder why Aristotle would think that the universal needs to implicitly contain the particulars in this sense. One possibility was already touched upon in our discussion of *Met* M.10, whereby we proposed that Aristotle sees an epistemic gap between universals and particulars, where the idea that knowledge of universals is knowledge-in-potency of particulars is perhaps needed to help bridge the gap. A related suggestion might be that it could have something to do with the distinction between knowledge of propositions and knowledge of particular items, where perhaps UKP is supposed to help clarify how we move from universal propositional knowledge to knowledge of concrete particulars.⁴¹

However, these suggestions are speculative, and I think a more concrete clue could be found in the discussion of a phenomenon known as “simultaneous learning” that immediately precedes the *APo* 1.1 discussion of the Distinction. Simultaneous learning appears to be something of an exception to the rule, introduced at the beginning of *APo* 1.1, that “all teaching and all intellectual learning come about from already existing knowledge”.⁴² It happens when we recognize something as falling under a universal. In Aristotle's example, we already knew (1), but we learn (3) simultaneously with (2) when we realize that this is a triangle. This idea

⁴¹ Note that these two suggestions, which I do not explore further, are not inconsistent with the suggestion in my ensuing discussion of simultaneous learning. It is possible that there are multiple problems with deriving particulars from universals, or that one of these problems grounds another.

⁴² 71a1.

is also referenced in the *APr* 2.21 passage, in a way that strongly indicates that Aristotle sees it as relevant to his solution to the *Meno*:

The argument in the *Meno* that learning is recollection may be criticised in a similar way. For it never happens that a man has foreknowledge of the particular, but in the process of induction he receives a knowledge of the particulars, as though by an act of recognition. For we know some things directly; e.g. that the angles are equal to two right angles, if we see that the figure is a triangle. Similarly in all other cases.⁴³

What could simultaneous learning have to do with the *Meno* paradox? We earlier stated that there must be some reason why (3) cannot be straightforwardly deduced from (1) and (2), and the discussion of simultaneous learning provides an answer. For, Aristotle specifically denies that we learn conclusions like (3) through such deductions, “the last term does not become familiar through the middle”.⁴⁴ The point seems to be that we don’t already know (2) when we come to learn (3), we learn it simultaneously with (3), and so we can’t have deduced (3) from (2) with (1).

From here, the idea that knowledge of the universal must contain knowledge of the particular starts to look understandable. For, the learner learns (3) when he previously only knew (1) and apparently did not learn anything new, making it plausible to assume that his knowledge of (3) must have been somehow implicit in (1). I believe that this is also the grounds of the commonality between Aristotle’s example and that in the *Meno*. In the *Meno*, Socrates and Meno marvel at the slave boy’s ability to learn a conclusion which he did not consciously already know, and which he had apparently not been taught. They conclude that the knowledge must have come from within him, and “the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection”.⁴⁵ In like manner, we may wonder where Aristotle’s learner gets his knowledge about C from, which he apparently also spontaneously acquires “as though by an act of recognition”⁴⁶, and we might also conclude that it must have in some sense come from within him. We naturally need to specify a sense of “within” that does not preclude such knowledge being learned. For Socrates, this sense is that the knowledge is latent and innate; for Aristotle, I suggest, the knowledge is within in the sense of being implicit in what is already known, as universal knowledge or as potentiality. To know something by universal knowledge or in

⁴³ 67a21-26.

⁴⁴ 71a23.

⁴⁵ 85c-d.

⁴⁶ 67a24.

potentiality is consistent with learning it, as Aristotle repeatedly emphasizes, since the act of learning is simply that whereby it is actualized and made particular.

VI. *The scope of the problem.*

One difficulty with this view is that it sees Aristotle as responding to a rather narrow problem of applying universals to particulars, when both the original paradox in the *Meno* and Aristotle's reformulation of it at 71a29 look like they refer more broadly to all inquiry or learning. It is of course possible that this just is the scope of the problem Aristotle sees in the *Meno*, and that the 71a29 reference to learning is supposed to be taken as implicitly qualified by context.

However, it is also possible that this is a particular instance of a more general problem. The requirement that the conclusion of a deduction must be implicit in the premises appears at least in principle universalizable to all deductions. It is relatively straightforward to see how this could work. The above-quoted *APO* 1.24 claim that premises contain potential knowledge of conclusions appears to apply broadly to all deductions. And even when we have both a major and a minor premise, we still need to put the two together to get new knowledge.⁴⁷ Again, it will be perfectly reasonable to wonder where this new knowledge came from and to conclude that it must have come from 'within' in some sense that is consistent with its being learned, namely, it was already held as potential in the premises.

Perhaps, then, Aristotle's focus on the case of particulars falling under a universal is meant to be primarily explanatory or a matter of emphasis rather than exhaustive of the problem. For instance, perhaps Aristotle thinks that the question of how particulars can be implicit in the universal is more obscure than the question of how one universal can be implicit in another. Alternatively, perhaps the focus is on knowledge of particulars because, as he says in *Met* M.10 and *APr* 2.21⁴⁸, such knowledge is the most actual, and therefore presumably most real, kind of knowledge. If, on this reading, such knowledge is in jeopardy, then perhaps all knowledge is.

Either way, the paradox that is supposed to result from denying the Distinction bears more than a passing resemblance to the paradox in the *Meno*. I therefore think that this idea of a problem about deriving particulars from universals, or conclusions from premises more

⁴⁷ 67a36.

⁴⁸ 67b5, 1087a14-19.

generally, is a promising candidate for the problem Aristotle ultimately sees as underlying the paradox of the *Meno*.

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The Problem of Modal Upgrading in Aristotle's Apodictic Syllogistic

David Botting

This is another contribution to the unending controversy over the two Barbaras. My approach to the problem is hopefully quite new: I wish to view the issue through the prism of modal upgrading. Modal upgrading occurs when a subject term that has only been predicated of assertorically in the premises of a syllogism is predicated of apodictically either: i) in the syllogism's conclusion, or; ii) in some proposition that is derived from either the premises of the syllogism alone or the premises in combination with other propositions that do not refer to the proposition's subject term. I call the proposition after it has been upgraded the upgraded proposition.

When it is the conclusion that is the upgraded proposition, it is obviously a different predicate being predicated of the proposition's subject than was predicated in the premises. Aristotle endorses this kind of upgrading; it is effectively what happens in any valid mixed modal syllogism when the minor premise is not apodictic (e.g., Barbara LXL).

In other cases the upgraded proposition is not a conclusion but still follows from the premises alone. In these cases it is the same predicate being predicated of the same subject in the upgraded proposition as in the premises, although the quantities of the propositions are different (one is universal, another particular); e.g., the upgrading of "All C are B" to "Some C is necessarily B". Aristotle rejects this kind of upgrading and takes its occurrence as sufficient to deny the validity of the given syllogism (e.g., Barbara XLL).

I will describe a third type where both the predicate and subject remain the same and the quantity of the proposition remains the same as in the premise, e.g., the upgrading of "All C are B" to "All C are necessarily B". In these cases it will turn out that the upgraded proposition is not derived from the premises alone, or at least, not syllogistically from the premises alone. This kind of upgrading too is reason for denying the validity of any syllogism from which the upgraded proposition follows as a consequence. I will show that Barbara LXL entails this kind of modal upgrading and should be rejected for this reason.

Armed with this notion of modal upgrading I want to attack the problem of the two Barbaras in Aristotle's apodictic syllogistic. Aristotle himself endorses mixed modal Barbara when the major is necessary and the minor is assertoric, thereby endorsing the first kind of modal upgrading, but rejects Barbara when the minor is necessary and the major is assertoric on the grounds that it leads to the second kind of modal upgrading. Theophrastus endorses the *peioram rule* which rejects both Barbaras on the grounds that the conclusion can only be as strong as the weakest premise. Łukasiewicz endorses both Barbaras. I will argue that *both* Barbaras lead to unacceptable modal upgrading and should be taken to be invalid for that reason. Hence, I agree with Theophrastus about the two Barbaras; however, I do not endorse the *peioram rule* because I think that the negative mixed modal syllogisms generally avoid this problem and is mostly correct.

1. What is modal upgrading?

In this paper I want to discuss the phenomenon of *modal upgrading*. There is what I will call "weak modal upgrading" and "strong modal upgrading". In weak modal upgrading a

subject term to which some predicate term is said to belong assertorically in a syllogism's premises is shown in the syllogism's conclusion to be such that a different predicate term is said to belong to it necessarily. There is, then, an upgrading from something belonging assertorically to something else belonging necessarily for the same subject term; for example, All C are B is upgraded to All C are necessarily A. Strong modal upgrading is similar except that it is not a different predicate term that is said to belong necessarily but the same predicate term; for example, All B are A is upgraded to Some B are necessarily A or to All B are necessarily A.

Aristotle would accept weak modal upgrading as a corollary of the mixed modal syllogism Barbara LXL, viz.,

All B are necessarily A
 All C are B
 Therefore, all C are necessarily A

The minor term, to which the middle term is said to belong assertorically in the minor premise, has the major term said to belong necessarily to it in the conclusion (30a15-23). In summary: "All C are B" is weakly modally upgraded to "All C are necessarily A".

That Aristotle would not accept strong modal upgrading is shown in his proof that the mixed modal syllogism Barbara XLL is not valid, viz.

All B are A
 All C are necessarily B
 Therefore, all C are necessarily A

Observe that modal upgrading does not occur in the syllogism itself, there being no subject term that is at the same time subject of both an assertoric and an apodictic predication; C is the only term that occurs twice as subject, and on both occasions the predication is apodictic. This, however, is what Aristotle says about it (30a25-8):

[I]f the major premiss is not necessary, but the minor is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary. For if it were, it would result both through the first figure and through the third that A belongs necessarily to some B. But this is false; for B may be such that it is possible that A should belong to none of it. Further, an example also makes it clear that the conclusion not be necessary, e.g. if A were movement, B animal, C man: man is an animal necessarily, but an animal does not move necessarily, nor does man.

The modal upgrading is from the major premise "All B are A" to "Some B is necessarily A". This is strong because the same terms are involved, although the quantity of the proposition

has changed from “All” to “Some”. We can show that “Some B is necessarily A” is true if the conclusion of Barbara XLL is true by the third-figure modal syllogism Darapti LLL:

All C are necessarily A	(our original conclusion)
All C are necessarily B	(our original minor premise)
Therefore, some B is necessarily A	

Since “All B are A” is only assertoric, it ought to be possible also that no B is A, but this is inconsistent with some B being necessarily A. Because he rejects this modal upgrading, Aristotle rejects Barbara XLL.

There would be an even stronger upgrading were necessary belonging a reflexive relation, that is to say, if for all A, A belongs necessarily to A. Then we would upgrade with the same terms and the same quantity through Barbara LXL:

All A are necessarily A
All C are A
Therefore, all C are necessarily A

As Storrs-McCall (1963, 50) aptly describes, this amounts to “the collapse of all modal distinctions whatsoever”; there would not be anything that belongs without belonging necessarily. Likewise, I will call this case “modal collapse”. The moral is that necessary belonging cannot be a reflexive relation.

I will now describe a case weaker than modal collapse which I will call “partial modal collapse”. Unlike the strong modal upgrading in Barbara XLL, it does not depend on the premises alone. Unlike modal collapse, it does not imply that when A belongs to B it does so necessarily. What it implies is that under certain conditions, if A does belong to B necessarily, B will belong necessarily to whatever it belongs to. In other words, from

All B are necessarily A
All C are B

it will not only follow (by Barbara LXL) that

All C are necessarily A

which is the familiar and so-far accepted case of weak modal upgrading, but, under certain conditions, it will also follow that

All C are necessarily B

which is a case of strong (and thus illegitimate) modal upgrading where the terms and the quantity remain the same (i.e., from “All C are B” to “All C are necessarily B”). This kind of upgrading I call “partial modal collapse”.

The problem here is that although the fact that necessary belonging is not symmetrical means that it is not a theorem that if “All B are necessarily A” then “All A are necessarily B”, it cannot be ruled out either that both may be true, and if they are, we get the same consequences as if the relation were reflexive. Under the conditions where both are true it can be shown in several ways that partial modal collapse is the consequence. The simplest way to show this is that if necessary belonging is transitive then “All B are necessarily A” and “All A are necessarily B” it follows that “All B are necessarily B” (and that “All A are necessarily A”) and we get the same results as if necessary belonging were reflexive. We can also show it by combining “All A are necessarily B” with our original conclusion “All C are necessarily A” as follows:

All A are necessarily B
 All C are necessarily A
 Therefore, all C are necessarily B

This is the pure modal syllogism Barbara LLL. The moral now seems to be that if “All B are necessarily A” then, if partial modal collapse is to be avoided, it *cannot* be true that “All A are necessarily B”. The relation of necessary belonging must be not only irreflexive but anti-symmetric.

Partial modal collapse does not follow from the initial premises alone but the initial premises with the addition of “All A are necessarily B”; this, along with the fact that the proposition has the same predicate and quantity, is what makes it the strong kind of modal upgrading I described above. Unfortunately, any strategy to rule out “All A are necessarily B” is going to be inconsistent with Aristotle’s use of conversion and ekthesis. For if all B are necessarily A, it follows by conversion that some A is necessarily B, and then under circumstances where A is co-extensive with B it is difficult to see how it can fail to be the case that all A are necessarily B, and if A is not co-extensive with B we can always take terms that *will* be co-extensive with B and derive “All B are necessarily B” using that term. A collapse-making proposition can always be derived from the initial premises by conversion and ekthesis, though it cannot be derived syllogistically from those premises.

So, Barbara LXL has partial modal collapse as a consequence: whatever belongs, belongs necessarily to whatever it belongs to as long as something necessarily belongs to it. It

is this “as long as . . .” that differentiates this from the obviously unacceptable modal collapse that would result were necessary belonging a reflexive relation. As such, it is not so obviously unacceptable, and a number of recent accounts of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic endorse this kind of modal upgrading. It is to these accounts that I now turn.

2. Is partial modal collapse acceptable?

It may be thought that what I have said so far is not very interesting. After all, the validity of Barbara LXL has been problematic from the start; Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus denied its validity, arguing that the very same terms that serve to show the invalidity of Barbara XLL work just as well for Barbara LXL, that is to say:

All men are necessarily animals
All moving things are men
Therefore, all moving things are necessarily animals

It is possible that all moving things are men, but it does not seem possible that all moving things are necessarily animals, because then it would follow by conversion that some animal necessarily moves, and Aristotle quite specifically says when proving the invalidity of Barbara XLL that no animal or man moves necessarily.

We can see from this example that partial modal collapse might actually be seen as some kind of solution to this problem. The problem with this example, it might be said, is simply that the minor premise “All moving things are men” is false, or to be more precise it is incompatible with the truth of the major premise “All men are necessarily animals”, for from them we can infer a conclusion “All moving things are necessarily animals” that those making this case would say is false, and obviously so. (I would argue that this conclusion could be true, and likewise both premises, but it would be question-begging at this point to insist on it.) What cannot be denied is that if we change the accidental term “moving thing” into an essence term like “Greeks” we get Barbara LLL:

All men are necessarily animals
All Greeks are necessarily men
Therefore, all Greeks are necessarily animals

The validity of Barbara LXL is preserved by making semantic restrictions on what terms can be used in the premises. Barbara LXL is just a coyer version of Barbara LLL hiding the apodicticity of its minor premise under its petticoats. Note that under these semantic

restrictions this kind of modal upgrading of the minor premise is true independently of the conditions I said were necessary for partial modal collapse; instead, all that is required is that the terms be of a certain kind.

Malink (2013) offers this kind of account and at (2013, 122) he explicitly endorses partial modal collapse: “[E]very subject of an essential predication is predicated essentially of everything of which it is predicated. In other words, if there is an A that is predicated essentially of B, then B is predicated essentially of everything of which it is predicated”. Without going through his argument, his idea is that all the terms must be essence terms, and any true predication of an essence term must be an essential and hence necessary predication. Rini (2011) also notes that if all the terms are what she calls “red” terms (which are effectively the same as Malink’s essence terms) Barbara LXL will imply Barbara LLL and be valid.¹ Taking a slightly different route, van Rijen (1989) produces much the same results by assuming that all the terms are “homogenous”, even going further than Malink by embracing “All A are necessarily A” as a logical truth (given that trivially A is homogeneous with A). Thom (1996) also embraces the reflexivity of necessary belonging, at least for certain kinds of terms. Not everyone, then, finds “modal collapse” to be as “dire” as Storrs-McCall does, and as I have earlier presented it to be. Malink does reject reflexivity and modal collapse, but embraces partial modal collapse. Whether or not these consequences are as dire as I have presented them depends in a large part on the independent plausibility of making semantic restrictions of one kind or another (i.e., essence terms for Malink, homogeneous terms for van Rijen). But I will argue that it is misguided to make these kinds of semantic restrictions on the terms.

I will now give several objections to making such restrictions. None, perhaps, will be thought compelling by Malink and Rini. But collectively they will show how much the modal

¹ Rini’s claim is one of sufficiency, not necessity. The only term that Rini seems to take as “red” in order for Barbara LXL to be valid is the major term. In other words, she considers that for a necessary predication to be true the term predicated must be a “red” term. Unlike Malink, she does not require the minor or middle terms to be red, and so for her Barbara LXL does not in general imply Barbara LLL as it does for Malink. The reason for this is that, again unlike Malink, Rini takes necessity to modify the term, whereas Malink takes it to modify the copula. By taking it as a term, Barbara LXL becomes a trivial substitution-instance of Barbara XXX. However, I don’t see how this is going to rule out Theophrastus’ counter-example, since in the counter-example the only term that is not “red” is moving, and this does not appear as a predicate in a necessary predication (in fact, it does not appear as a predicate at all). Furthermore, at (2011, 78) she notes that Aristotle does use accidental terms in the subject position of true apodictic premises, so presumably she believes that the minor premise “All moving things are men” in the counter-example could be true. This being so, although she mentions Theophrastus briefly at (2011, 74 n.2) I am not sure how she would respond to him except by simply accepting the conclusion that all moving things are necessarily animals.

sylogistic differs from the assertoric syllogistic once we allow for semantic restrictions on the terms, and point out that no such differences are advertised by Aristotle.

The first is that the modal syllogistic is not purely formal—you cannot tell, without looking at the terms, whether both premises can be true at once, or whether the conclusion follows. This is not a new objection: as Rini notes, Barnes objects that there is no sign of any classification of predicates in the text. In response, Rini concedes this for the assertoric syllogistic, but claims that the modal syllogistic is different (Rini 2011, 3). But if there is this difference, isn't this something we would expect Aristotle to say? Yet Aristotle says nothing. There is no textual evidence at all that Aristotle places semantic restrictions on the terms he uses, and in fact, when Aristotle gives terms (e.g., for proofs of invalidity like that in Barbara XLL) Aristotle regularly includes accidental terms (e.g., moving), suggesting that he does not make such restrictions since if Barbara XLL is only meant to work with essence terms, showing that it is invalid in a case where one of the terms is not an essence term is not going to prove what Aristotle wants. Semantic restrictions are read into the modal syllogistic with the aim, commendable in itself, of getting it to work. Instead of textual evidence there is a kind of inference to the best explanation: if the only way that we can explain why Aristotle endorses and rejects the moods and figures of the modal syllogistic that he does is to make semantic restrictions on the terms, that in itself, Malink and Rini could argue, is good reason for thinking that Aristotle was making such restrictions.

My second point is that if we take all terms and all predications as essential, as Malink demands, then what we have is in a certain sense epistemologically circular. The kind of propositions that the premises and conclusion must be, on Malink's view, are propositions that we can tell to be true or false simply by looking at the terms. In fact, this is true also if the propositions include accidental terms, because Malink would not allow any apodictic propositions that include accidental terms to be true [which, following the line of thought of the previous paragraph, makes it odd that Aristotle should include such terms when giving counter-examples (and this is why Rini, unlike Malink, allows for some accidental terms in some positions)]. Why, then, try to show that the conclusion is true by deriving it from true premises, especially when the truth of those premises are known in exactly the same way? Why not simply look at the terms in the conclusion? This does not, of course, mean that there is not the required logical relation between the premises and the conclusion: I am only questioning Aristotle's motivation for the modal syllogistic under the semantic restriction proposed.

My third and fourth points are points of technical detail. Normally when we examine a syllogism we are allowed to suppose that both premises are true. But according to Malink that is not so, and if the minor premise is not an essential predication then it is false, in which case it is of course not surprising that the conclusion should also be false. This third point is, admittedly, much the same as my first. But here is my fourth point: on Malink's view, it is not only that the conclusion can be false, it *must* be false when the reason for the minor premise's falsity is an accidental subject term. Whereas in the assertoric syllogistic a syllogism may have false premises and a true conclusion, this is not always the case in the modal syllogistic; if the minor premise is false and its falsity is due to an accidental term, then the conclusion must be false.² Again, Malink would probably accept this; again, I would argue that this is something you would expect Aristotle to advertise.

² Let me spell out the difference between the assertoric and the apodictic syllogisms in cases where some of the premises are false. In both kinds of syllogism, a true conclusion may follow from both premises being false. This is intuitively obvious: just take a true conclusion and invent a middle term for which neither premise is true. In the assertoric syllogism the converse is also true, that is to say, whenever both premises are false (but concludent) a conclusion may validly be drawn from them which may (or may not) be true. This is only sometimes the case with the apodictic syllogistic, depending on how the false premise is false; if it is false because it includes an accidental term, then the conclusion will also be false unless the accidental term is the middle term (I will come back to this).

In the assertoric syllogistic a true conclusion is still possible irrespective of how the minor premise is false; for example, both

All men are animals
 All horses are men
 Therefore, all horses are animals

and (replacing the minor term with an accidental term)

All men are animals
 All moving things are men
 Therefore, all moving things are animals

are valid assertoric syllogisms with true major premises, false minor premises and (we can suppose) true conclusions. Again, this reflects the fact that the assertoric syllogistic is formal and so indifferent as to how a premise is false.

In the modal syllogistic these come out differently depending on how the minor premise is false:

All men are necessarily animals
 All horses are necessarily men
 Therefore, all horses are necessarily animals

is analogous to the assertoric syllogism with the same terms, but making the same replacement in this syllogism as we did in the assertoric syllogism we get the syllogism

All men are necessarily animals
 All moving things are necessarily men
 Therefore, all moving things are necessarily animals

My fifth objection is more contentious and is the subject of the next section. I believe that Aristotle takes explanations, and modal syllogisms, to be extensional. In other words, any term in a syllogism can be replaced by another term with the same extension without loss, even to the extent that an essence or “red” term can be replaced by an accidental or “green” term.³ If this is right, it is possible to have true apodictic propositions with either or both terms accidental, which makes a nonsense of any kind of semantic restriction.⁴ It would also explain why, when Aristotle gives terms, he does not spurn accidental terms or consider the apodictic propositions that include them to be false by definition. In fact, I do not see Aristotle anywhere recognising the kind of things we describe as intensionality or referential opacity. For him, both belief contexts and modal contexts are extensional.

3. *Are modal syllogisms extensional?*

Before considering modal syllogisms, let us just consider an ordinary syllogism:

You know the one approaching/the veiled man
Coriscus is the one approaching/the veiled man
Therefore, you know Coriscus

This syllogism is identified in the *Sophistical Refutations* as a fallacy of accident; the problem, it is said, is that the predications are not essential. Let us then consider the apodictic syllogism

Necessarily you know the one approaching/the veiled man
Coriscus is necessarily the one approaching/the veiled man

and here both the minor premise and the conclusion turn out to be false by definition on Malink’s view of apodictic propositions.

In summary: if one of the extreme terms is an accidental term, the conclusion must be false, because it contains an accidental term and all apodictic propositions containing accidental terms are false. This extends to the case where both premises are false: if the major premise is false and contains an accidental major term, then, even if the minor premise is also false, you cannot have a true conclusion. If it is the middle term that is the accidental term, then the conclusion (since the middle term does not appear in it) can be true.

³ Just to make clear, when substituting one term for another all the occurrences of the term in the syllogism must be substituted. In a syllogism every term occurs twice, and obviously if you only replace one of them you will have a fallacy of four terms and not a syllogism at all.

When it comes to scientific explanations I do not think that Aristotle can achieve full referential transparency or thinks that he does, but I do believe that he wants and thinks he can achieve transparency in the minor term. Aristotle wants to gain knowledge about things, not about the terms used to describe them. If this is right the minor term can be anything, even an accidental term.

⁴ If this is right then even Rini’s more modest restriction that the predicate term of an apodictic proposition must be “red” is false.

Therefore, necessarily you know Coriscus

or, since it better illustrates the form Barbara LLL,

The one approaching/the veiled man, necessarily you know
Coriscus is necessarily the one approaching/the veiled man
Therefore, Coriscus, necessarily you know

Setting aside worries about whether these premises are actually true, this argument is presumably not fallacious. Yet we tend to have the intuition that this is no improvement on the non-modal syllogism—even if Coriscus is necessarily and not just contingently the one approaching, we still do not know this, and since we do not know that Coriscus is the one approaching, the conclusion is just as false in this case (Schreiber 2003, 122). This intuition is influenced by the thought that knowledge/belief contexts are intensional.

I do not think that intensionality is the cause of the fallacy here; if we add the premise that you know that Coriscus is the one approaching, then it doesn't matter at all whether things belong essentially or accidentally. Thus, I think that all the contexts are referentially transparent in this example. In a sense, you *do* know Coriscus even if you do not know that Coriscus is the one approaching.

Let us formulate a kind of modal syllogism with “know” in place of necessity. Barbara KKK would be

The one approaching/the veiled man, you know
You know that Coriscus is the one approaching/the veiled man
Therefore, Coriscus, you know

Here you do know that Coriscus is the one approaching so this would be valid even if the contexts were not referentially transparent (and even if none of the predications are essential, as is the case here). Barbara KXK would be

The one approaching/the veiled man, you know
Coriscus is the one approaching/the veiled man
Therefore, Coriscus, you know

On analogy with Barbara LXL, I think that Aristotle should think that Barbara KXK should be valid as well. The reasoning is analogous too: if C belongs to B then there is some C and some B that are identical, and the same properties – such as A belonging to it by necessity, or being known – must hold of what is identical. Failures to preserve truth after substitution of identicals are only apparent, and that includes substitution into modal propositions. The

intuitions that lead us to postulate referentially opaque contexts only mislead us, in Aristotle's view.

Now, however, I have a problem. After all, Aristotle introduces this example as a fallacy, and I have just argued that not only is the conclusion true (when taken transparently) but that the argument is valid! It would seem that I am committed to denying that this is a fallacy at all. Given that "Coriscus is the one approaching" is true, why is it a mistake to conclude that you know Coriscus, if this is referentially transparent? It seems that you do know Coriscus, and that this is so irrespective of whether it is an essential or an accidental predicate of Coriscus that he is the one approaching.

The difference then must be this: if being the one approaching were an essential predicate then it would always be true that if you know Coriscus then you know the one approaching, but if it is an accidental predicate then it is not always true, but true only while Coriscus is, in fact, approaching, before or after which it is false; "the one approaching" cannot *always* be substituted *salve veritate* for "Coriscus". Similarly if the one approaching is not always such that you know them. The problem comes in the use of an accidental predicate to refer to whatever it is that has it. Although this particular instance of the argument has true premises and a true conclusion, and every instance in which the conclusion is false there will also be a premise that is false (which implies that it is semantically valid), not every instance or token of the argument will have true premises, and for this reason the syllogism fails to be *apodictic*. While we may say of propositions that they are true-at-a-time and of arguments that they are sound-at-a-time, apodicticity requires each and every instance of the argument to render its conclusion necessarily (in the sense of a necessary consequence) true.

On this analysis, for the syllogism to be apodictic (in the sense above of having no unsound tokens) both premises must be apodictic, which is to say that

The one approaching/the veiled man, necessarily you know
 Coriscus is necessarily the one approaching/the veiled man
 Therefore, Coriscus, necessarily you know

is not fallacious (*contra* Schreiber). But I am not quite sure that this analysis is right, or at least that it is Aristotle's, because Aristotle would seemingly also allow the Barbara LXL version of this argument:

The one approaching/the veiled man, necessarily you know
 Coriscus is the one approaching/the veiled man
 Therefore, necessarily Coriscus, you know

If so, it does not matter for Aristotle that it is an accident of Coriscus that he be the one approaching; it only matters that it is necessary of the one approaching that he is known, that is to say, the major premise and not the minor. When there is such a necessary connection between the middle term and the major term, it follows that in attributing the middle term to something (i.e., the minor term) you are *eo ipso* attributing the major term to it.⁵ And you can see why if modal contexts are extensional: identicals must always have the same properties. (In the end, I think that Aristotle settles for having referential transparency in the minor term – the term that gives what we are trying to explain something about – and requires the major premise to express an intensional connection between terms; explanations are in this case only partly extensional, while modal syllogisms themselves may still be fully extensional.) However, this conflicts with my claim that there should not be any false tokens of a premise. Call this the *False Token Problem*.

The important point for the purposes of this paper is not how best to understand the fallacy of accident, but to point out that if we take modal syllogisms to be as extensional as we take assertoric syllogisms to be, then this makes sense of why Aristotle is so keen to endorse Barbara LXL, and the reason why he deals with the example of fallacy of accident in the way he does – not as we would do as involving opaque contexts, but as lacking a required kind of predication – seems to support the view that he does take modal syllogisms to be extensional.

Perhaps further textual evidence that Aristotle endorses an unrestricted extensionality comes in *Physics* I.7 where he discusses sentences with the word “becoming”. For he says there that “A man becomes musical” and “What is not-musical becomes musical” express the same facts. Now, arguably “what is not-musical becomes musical” is an apodictic proposition, or at least “whatever becomes musical is not-musical” is such. This is the familiar kind of “Hesperus is Hesperus” and “Hesperus is Phosphorus” problem that is familiar to us and that we tend to

⁵ In the Port Royal Logic, *all* syllogistic inferences are taken to be like this, that is to say, in attributing the major term one is explicating part of the meaning of the middle term. This is implausible as a general account because it implies that all major premises are necessary. Also, I doubt that all necessary connections are explicative in this sense. In a case like the one here where the major premise is necessary, though, this does seem to be the way we should conceive of the inference. Perhaps these ‘explicative’ inferences are co-extensive with the class of demonstrative inferences; when Aristotle talks about demonstration in *Posterior Analytics* I.6 he talks about the “mediating link” being necessary, by which I think he is referring to the link between the middle and major terms, which amounts to saying that the major premise must be necessary. However, most scholars would not count the inference as demonstrative unless the minor premise were also necessary, appealing to textual evidence in other parts of I.6 and in I.4, in which case demonstrative inferences are a proper subset of the inferences I am considering here. I am not so convinced that the minor premises of demonstrations need to be necessary, but it is outside the scope of this paper to argue the point.

solve by saying that Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same reference but different senses. Aristotle himself says that although numerically identical the man and the not-musical are different in form (190a13-21). Nonetheless, if it is necessary that what is not-musical becomes musical then it also seems to be necessary that a man becomes musical (and that Hesperus is Phosphorus); otherwise, they would express different facts. This means that there seem to be some properties that belong necessarily although they might not have done; it is a metaphysical necessity of the world described by the sentence that the man is becoming musical. This seems to suggest that sentences with “becoming” are extensional. This does not alter the fact that whilst the man persists through the change from not-musical to musical, the not-musical perishes.

Now, it may be thought that an extensionality unrestricted to types of terms might be inconsistent with what Aristotle says with respect to Barbara XLL. The problem is twofold:

- 1) A proposition in which one or both terms are accidental cannot for that reason be said to be false—it may be true. Its truth or falsity is a substantive fact about the world. But in his proof of Barbara XLL’s invalidity Aristotle says “an animal does not move necessarily, nor does man”, which seems to imply that it is plainly true that an animal does not move necessarily and plainly false that an animal does move necessarily. These do not seem to be treated as substantive facts, yet if I am right it is perfectly possible that an animal move necessarily: all that is required is that the animal be identical with something that does move necessarily.
- 2) More fundamentally, we would expect Barbara XLL to be valid! After all, if in the minor premise B is said to belong necessarily to C, and all Bs are A, then we should be able to substitute A for B and prove that all C is necessarily A. In fact, there have been those, like Łukasiewicz, who have endorsed both Barbaras as a result of this kind of extensionalist reasoning.⁶

I will take these in turn.

As for (1), it should be noted that if it is plainly true that a man does not move necessarily, then it is plainly false that “Some man moves necessarily”. Thus, Aristotle is normally taken to be giving an ordinary counter-example with true premises and a false conclusion. But what Aristotle says is that “man is an animal necessarily, but an animal does not move necessarily, nor does man”. That animal moves necessarily is the upgraded

⁶ See Patterson (1995, 76-80) for further discussion.

proposition. Why mention this here if this argument is just meant to be a counter-example with an obviously false conclusion? The point seems to be that the original premises did not say that animal moved necessarily, and since man is necessarily animal, and since it does not follow from the premises that animal moves necessarily, then it must also not follow that some species of animal, e.g., man, moves necessarily. It is not that either of these propositions *must* be false; if it were, the fact that the major premise is upgraded would not matter a jot—the fact that from “All animals are moving” it could be deduced that “All animals are necessarily moving” involves an upgrade from the assertoric to the necessary would matter less than the simple fact that from a truth could be deduced a falsity, should we assume that “All animals are necessarily moving” is straightforwardly false.

Hence, if this were what Aristotle intended, the argument that we would get with these terms would be a straightforward *reductio* kind of argument, an argument with an impossible conclusion, with modal upgrading a mere sideshow. But, as Ross says, Aristotle does not present it as this kind of *reductio*. Ross refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias (128.31-129.7) and it is worth quoting what Alexander says in full:

It should be noted that he does not say that it is impossible for A to hold of some B by necessity. For nothing prevents what holds of all of something from also holding of some of it by necessity. But since the holding of all is not necessary, holding of some of something by necessity is not directly contained in holding of all of it. For it is possible that it holds of all of it in such a way that it is also possible that it holds of none. For a universal affirmative unqualified proposition is not prevented from being true in this way.

If it is not impossible for A to hold of some B by necessity, it is not impossible for moving to hold of some man by necessity. It is the modal upgrading that is the problem: the major premise “All B are A” is strongly upgraded to “Some B is necessarily A” which rules out it being possible that A holds of B in “in such a way that it is also possible that it holds of none”. So, Aristotle’s bare statement that man does not move necessarily gives a false impression that is dispelled when we look at the detail.

Now, it could be objected that although in general it is the modal upgrading that makes this figure invalid, in order to illustrate why this is problematic Aristotle chooses terms for which the argument does in fact turn into an ordinary *reductio*. I agree that my alternative reading is not compelling. But it is at least plausible, or at least becomes plausible as soon as we believe that in Barbara LXL Aristotle does intend the minor premise to be *merely* assertoric and not just an apodictic proposition in disguise. It is also worth adding that once we accept such statements as necessary, there is no longer any great surprise that Aristotle allows for the

conversion of “All B are necessarily A” and “Some B is necessarily A” into “Some A is necessarily B” because such statements can be true if read extensionally.⁷ Our reasons for endorsing Barbara LXL and for endorsing these rules of conversion are the same.

As for (2) I think that deep down Aristotle probably does want to endorse Barbara XXL, only, noticing the problem of strong modal upgrading, he realises that he can’t. He fails to notice that modal upgrading occurs in Barbara LXL too, probably because the crucial premise “All A are necessarily B” is not derived syllogistically from the premises but by a combination of conversion and ekthesis.

4. *Partial modal collapse again*

If I am right about extensionality, then Malink and Rini are wrong about placing semantic restrictions on the modal syllogistic and, even more fundamentally perhaps, wrong to assume that an apodictic proposition with an accidental term in the ‘wrong’ place must for that reason be false. Partial modal collapse, which is acceptable under such restrictions, is unacceptable without such restrictions.

Conclusion: both Barbaras are invalid because leading to unacceptable forms of modal upgrading. To put it another way, weak modal upgrading is only apparently weak, since it itself is upgraded to partial modal collapse. Obviously, the two mixed modal Dariis will also be invalid for the same reason. So will any mixed modal syllogism that reduces to a mixed modal Darii, namely the third-figure syllogisms Datisi, Darapti, and Disamis.

At this point we might expect a complete collapse of mixed modals and universal adoption of Theophrastus’s *peioram* rule that the conclusion cannot have a stronger modality than the weakest premise; if one premise is assertoric, the conclusion must also be assertoric. However, the *peioram* rule seems to apply only to the affirmative mixed modals. Aristotle seems to be right in his judgments about the negative first-figure mixed modals Celarent LXL (which is judged to be valid) and Celarent XXL (which is judged to be invalid).

Here is Celarent LXL:

No B is necessarily A

⁷ The main reason for thinking such necessary propositions cannot be true comes from inferring from the fact that they are necessary to the fact that they are not contingent, and Aristotle would say, for example, that it is contingent of animals that they move. I deny this inference, and again insist that it is natural to deny it if we accept Barbara LXL, for the assertoric proposition may be the actualization of a potentiality, and so the necessary belonging of the major term will also depend on a potentiality’s being actualized while it is still possible that the opposing potentiality were actualized. Claiming that propositions may be simultaneously necessary and contingent leads to complications that cannot be essayed here, but will be raised again in further footnotes.

All C are B
 Therefore, no C is necessarily A

This does not seem to lead to any kind of strong modal upgrading and seems to be valid.
 Here is Celarent XLL:

No B is A
 All C are necessarily B
 Therefore, no C is necessarily A

This is invalid.

Ferio LXL is subalternate to Celarent LXL and is valid for the same reason as Celarent LXL is. Ferio XLL is subalternate to Celarent XLL and is invalid for the same reason as Celarent XLL is.

This completes the first figure mixed modal syllogisms. As I have shown, Aristotle is right about the negative syllogisms but wrong about the affirmative syllogisms.

This being the case, we would expect second and third-figure mixed modal syllogisms that reduce to Celarent LXL or Ferio LXL to be valid and those that reduce to Celarent XLL or Ferio XLL to be invalid.

In the second figure Cesare LXL and Camestres XLL reduce to Celarent LXL and are valid. Cesare XLL and Camestres LXL reduce to Celarent XLL and are invalid. Festino XLL reduces to Ferio LXL and is valid. Festino LXL reduces to Ferio XLL and is invalid. All the reductions rely on converting the universal negative, i.e., the modal conversion rule that if “No B is necessarily A” then “No A is necessarily B”. As long as this conversion rule is valid, Aristotle’s judgments on these moods also holds.

In the third figure Ferison LXL and Felapton LXL reduce to Ferio LXL and are valid. Here the conversion needed is an ordinary assertoric conversion of the minor premise from “Some C is B” or “All C are B” respectively to “Some B is C”. Ferison XLL and Felapton XLL reduce to Ferio XLL and are invalid.

On the basis that negative mixed modal syllogisms have so far turned out to have one valid instance and one invalid instance, we would expect the same to be true of the second-figure mood Baroco and the third-figure mood Bocardo. Unfortunately, these cannot be proved by conversion. Here is a proof of Baroco XLL by *reductio*:

1. All A are B
 2. Some C is necessarily not B
 3. Some C is necessarily not A
 4. All C are possibly A
- from (3) *reductio*

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 5. All A are possibly B | from (1) belonging→possibly belonging |
| 6. All C are possibly B | from (5,4) by Barbara MMM |
| 7. Contradiction! | (6) and (2) are incompatible |

The minor premise “Some C is necessarily not B” is not consistent with “All C are possibly B”. Therefore, it is inconsistent with what we took as the *reductio*, i.e., “All C are possibly A”. Since “All C are possibly A” is false the original conclusion “Some C is necessarily not A” is true. The only syllogism we have relied on here is the uncontroversial Barbara MMM:

All B are possibly A
All C are possibly B
Therefore, all C are possibly A

Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks that Baroco XLL is invalid. What makes this doubly puzzling is that he thinks that Baroco LLL is valid.⁸ Yet, as can be seen from the proof, the even weaker major premise that “All B are possibly A” is sufficient for the conclusion, which is to say that Baroco MLL is equally valid (as Aristotle recognizes) and can be proved by the same proof. One can only suppose that Aristotle has made a mistake (as many commentators have observed).⁹

⁸ Aristotle does not actually give a proof but says that is proof by *ekthesis*. Probably, he shies away from a *reductio* proof because it involves propositions concerning possibility that he has not discussed at this point in the *Prior Analytics*. Patterson (1995, 73) gives a proof of Baroco LLL by *ekthesis* and is further discussed by Rini (2011, 81).

⁹ This was my initial impression but now I am not so sure because of what I have already said about modal *reductio* arguments. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that sometimes both “All B are necessarily A” and “Some B is possibly not A” are both true. I know that this is in violation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, but just suppose. This would be surprisingly consistent with Aristotle’s practice in his proofs of mixed modal syllogisms. Cases where the necessary statement is concluded from other necessary statements, that is to say, in pure modal syllogisms, will *not* be cases of this kind (although I admit I am not sure why), and so in the proofs that the conclusion does indeed follow from those necessary premises, in assuming for *reductio* that the conclusion is false it is valid to assume its ‘contradictory’ is true. For example, in the case of Baroco LLL, we can prove its validity by assuming that the falsity of the conclusion is identical with the truth of its contradictory, and showing that when the contradictory of the conclusion is true this results in inconsistency. But in a mixed modal syllogism where one premise is merely assertoric, then the conclusion *may* be a case of such a kind that although it is valid to assume from the fact that the conclusion is false that its contradictory is true, it is not valid to infer that the conjunction of this with the original premise produces a contradiction—whether it does or not depends on whether the assertoric premise is true as a necessity or as the actualisation of a contingency: if it is true as a necessity this case collapses into a case of Baroco LLL, but if it is true as the actualisation of a contingency, then *ex suppositione* it is possible that the conclusion and its contradictory are both true. This would explain why you cannot give the same *reductio* proof in the case of Baroco XLL as in Baroco LLL. [If what I am suggesting is true, then these ‘contradictories’ – viz., the conclusion and what is taken for *reductio* – behave logically like sub-contraries, which is to say that they can both be true but cannot both be false, in which case from the falsity of one (i.e., the conclusion)

Baroco LXL is invalid as Aristotle says. Go through the *reductio* again: the assertoric “Some C is not B” is perfectly consistent with “All C are possibly B”.¹⁰

Bocardo is more difficult. Even Bocardo LLL is difficult. Here is Bocardo LLL:

Some A is necessarily not B
 All A are necessarily C
 Therefore, some C are necessarily not B

The proposition for *reductio* would once again be “All C are possibly B” but it is not obvious how we can combine this with another premise to produce a contradiction. Malink (2013, 183) offers the following proof by ekthesis (modified slightly):

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Some A is necessarily not B | |
| 2. All A are necessarily C | |
| 3. All D are A | from (1) by ekthesis [D is the subset of As that are necessarily not B] |
| 4. No D is necessarily B | from (1) by ekthesis |
| 5. All D are necessarily C | from (2,3) by Barbara LXL |
| 6. Some C is necessarily not B | from (4,5) by Felapton LLL |

The problem with this proof, from my point of view, is the appeal to Barbara LXL at (5), which I obviously believe to be invalid. This, in itself, does not mean that Bocardo LLL is

it can be validly inferred that the other (i.e., the *reductio*) is true. If so, taking the sub-contrary as *reductio* is in itself valid. The problem is not at this stage but at the final stage when what is cited as a contradiction is not logically contradictory, and so it cannot in general be deduced from this that the thesis is true. I am proposing that in the case of pure modal syllogisms there is a genuine contradiction here, but that in mixed modal syllogisms this cannot be assumed, or, as works out nearly the same, that in pure modal syllogisms the *reductio* is a genuine contradictory.]

Strange, I know, but there is also this to consider: when Aristotle uses *reductio* proofs to prove the validity of syllogisms with possible conclusions (i.e., the valid XQM figures) Aristotle does *not* assume the conclusion’s contradictory for *reductio* but what appears to be its *contrary*, though in fact I think what Aristotle intends in these places is the external negation of the conclusion; that is to say, the *reductio* of “All C are possibly A” in the proof of Barbara XQM for example is not taken to be the contradictory “Some C is necessarily A” or even – as is closer to the text – its apparent contrary “No C is necessarily A” but the external negation “Not(All C are possibly A)”. Aristotle’s practice in these places seems to indicate some reluctance to assume contradictories for *reductio*.

I have an idea of why Aristotle may want to deny the Principle of Non-Contradiction for these cases, but defending this is an issue for another time. And I certainly do not claim that Aristotle says anything like this in the *Prior Analytics*. I only note the remarkable consistency of his practice with this assumption, and how it would explain things in the modal syllogistic that are otherwise extremely puzzling, e.g., his claim that Baroco LLL is valid but that both Baroco XLL and Baroco LXL are invalid.
¹⁰ Note that the proof of Baroco LXX works much the same as the proof of Baroco XLL. It is now an apodictic major premise that is downgraded to a possibility in (5) and (4) now predicates belonging instead of a possibility. Now (6) is derived by Barbara MXM. This agrees with Aristotle’s judgment on this mood.

invalid. However, we can generate a partial modal collapse here as we did in Barbara LXL. Suppose that all C are necessarily A as well as that all A are necessarily C. Then we have:

All C are necessarily A
 All D are necessarily C [this is (5) from the previous proof]
 Therefore, all D are necessarily A

“All D are A”, which we got from the original premises by ekthesis, has been modally upgraded to “All D are necessarily A”. I think this result is just as unacceptable here as before. Bocardo LLL is thus invalid. Hence, the mixed modal Bocardos are equally invalid. The symmetry is broken: not all negative mixed modals are as Aristotle claims (overlooking his mistake, if it is one, over Baroco XLL).

It is surprising that the problem of partial modal collapse in Barbara LXL has so far gone unremarked. Thom comes tantalizingly close to realising the problem, inadvertently providing another argument against the validity of Barbara LXL, and one that I think that Malink might find harder to ignore than the one I have so far given. Thom observes that an proof similar to the one given against the validity of Barbara XLL could also be given against Barbara XLX, and yet Barbara XLX is surely valid since it is implied by Barbara XXX. His argument is:

All B are A
 All C are necessarily B
 Therefore, all C are A (by Barbara XLX)

but

All C are A
 All C are necessarily B
 Therefore, some B is necessarily A (by Darapti XLL)

As with Barbara XLL, “All B are A” has been strongly modally upgraded to “Some B is necessarily A”, the difference between the proofs being that in Barbara XLL it is Darapti LLL that is used in the proof, while in Barbara XLX it is Darapti XLL. Thom then presents a trilemma: either Barbara XLX is not valid, or Darapti XLL is not valid, or Aristotle’s proof of the invalidity of Barbara XLL does not work. It does not seem conceivable that Barbara XLX could not be valid, and Aristotle endorses Darapti XLL, so Thom concludes that although Barbara XLL is invalid, Aristotle’s attempted proof *does not* show this; if it did, it would also prove that Barbara XLX is invalid, and Barbara XLX is valid (Thom 1996, 124-5).

It should be obvious where I think the problem here is: Darapti XLL is *not* valid, whereas Darapti LLL is, and this is why Barbara XLX is valid and Barbara XLL is not. We can now construct a hypothetical syllogism: if Barbara LXL were valid, Darii LXL would also be valid; if Darii LXL were valid, Darapti XLL would be valid; and if Darapti XLL were valid, Barbara XLX would be invalid. Yet Barbara XLX is not invalid but valid. Therefore, Darapti XLL is not valid but invalid, and so equally are Darii LXL and Barbara LXL. Thom took the wrong option.

This is my second argument against the validity of Barbara LXL, namely that it is inconsistent with the validity of Barbara XLX. The weak point is perhaps the derivation of Darapti XLL from Darii LXL because it requires converting the conclusion. First of all, we have to reverse the order of the premises of Darapti XLL to give

All C are necessarily B
All C are A

from which in turn we can get Darii LXL by converting the minor premise, giving

All C are necessarily B
Some A is C

From this what follows is that some A is necessarily B, and not that some B is necessarily A, which is what we want. To get the right conclusion we have to use Aristotle's rule of modal conversion that if some A is necessarily B then some B is necessarily A.

Interestingly, Rini (2011, 95-97) also rejects Darapti XLL, arguing that what Aristotle argues for in the text is only the unconverted conclusion "Some A is necessarily B", noting that Aristotle does not in the text (31a31-33) perform the conversion to "Some B is necessarily A".¹¹ For Rini, such a conversion would be invalid, since she makes it a restriction on valid conversions that the subject term is not an accidental term, and this is not guaranteed by the truth of the premises. She gives as a counter-example:

Every man is moving
Every man is a necessary animal
Some animal is necessarily moving

¹¹ Strictly speaking, what Aristotle argues for then is not Darapti according to Rini (nor is it even a syllogism, since in syllogisms the conclusion is always the predication of the major term to the minor term) but a valid non-syllogistic argument for a necessary consequence of the same premises as in Darapti.

According to Rini, the premises are true but the conclusion is false, although “Some moving thing is a necessary animal” is true.

Let’s look again at Barbara XLX:

All B are A
All C are necessarily B
Therefore, all C are A

The argument was that if we make the conclusion “All C are A” the assertoric major premise of Darapti XLL, we could draw the conclusion “Some B is necessarily A” which is a strong modal upgrading of “All B are A”. If Rini is right, then we cannot draw this conclusion, but only the unconverted conclusion “Some A is necessarily B”. Note that even for Malink there are no semantic restrictions on at least the assertoric propositions in Barbara XLX; A, at least, might be an accidental term without invalidating the syllogism, and when such a term is the subject term of an affirmative apodictic proposition, while (unlike Malink) Rini allows that the proposition might be true, Rini would disallow the proposition’s modal conversion. So “Some A is necessarily B” should not be converted.

Could we then avoid this second argument by adopting something like Rini’s restriction on modal conversion? I don’t think so. If “All B are A” is compatible with its being possible that no B are A, it is also compatible with its being possible that no A are B (by conversion of the universal negative), and this is incompatible with the conclusion of Rini’s alternative for Darapti “Some A is necessarily B”. Hence, there is still an unacceptable strong modal upgrading. Rini is right to reject Darapti, but does not reject it for the right reasons; once rejected for the right reasons, Darii LXL, Barbara LXL, and the entire affirmative half of the mixed modal syllogisms goes with it. They are all invalid.

There is also another problem with Darapti XLL: you can derive Darii XLL from it, which Aristotle rejects for the same reason that he rejects Barbara XLL. Since, as we have shown, we can derive Darapti XLL from Darii LXL, it follows that from the purportedly valid Darii LXL we can derive the invalid Darii XLL. Obviously, this must be impossible; since Darii XLL is invalid, Darii LXL must be invalid too.

The derivation is given in Johnston (1990). Here again is Darapti XLL:

All C are A
All C are necessarily B
Therefore, some B is necessarily A

Converting the minor premise gives us:

All C are A
 Some B is necessarily C
 Therefore, some B is necessarily A

which is the invalid Darii XLL. However, from the same premises, converting the major and swapping the major and minor premises gives us:

All C are necessarily B
 Some A is C
 Therefore, some A is necessarily B

and then converting the conclusion gives us “Some B is necessarily A”, which is Darii LXL. So, if Darii LXL is valid, then also Darapti XLL is valid, and if Darapti XLL is valid, so is Darii XLL. But Darii XLL is invalid. Therefore, so also is Darii LXL, and Barbara LXL goes with it. There is a general problem here: because in the third figure the middle term is in the same position in both premises, we can always reverse the order of the premises and then convert the conclusion to give either an XLL form or an LXL form.

Van Rijen also contains a proof of Darii XLL that, although it does not derive Darii XLL from Darii LXL, uses Darii LXL at one point in the proof. After converting the minor premise of Darii XLL to “Some B is necessarily C” use ekthesis to produce the two propositions “All D are B” and “All D are necessarily C”. Thus:

1. All B are A
2. Some C is necessarily B
3. Some B is necessarily C from (2) by conversion
4. All D are B
5. All D are necessarily C

The proof then proceeds:

6. All D are A from (1) and (4) by Barbara XXX
7. Some A is D from (6) by conversion
8. Some A is necessarily C from (5) and (7) by Darii LXL
9. Some C is necessarily A from (8) by conversion

(8) is the conclusion that we want. Clearly, if Darii LXX is invalid some part of the proof must be invalid. It cannot be Barbara XXX. It is not likely to be ekthesis or conversion. We have to reject Darii LXL.

1. Conclusion

The argument of this paper is this:

1. Barbara LXL leads to partial modal collapse.

2. Partial modal collapse is unacceptable.
3. Therefore, endorsing Barbara LXL leads to unacceptable consequences.
4. Therefore, Barbara LXL is invalid.
5. Therefore, its subaltern mood Darii LXL is invalid.
6. Therefore, everything that reduces to Darii LXL is invalid, viz., in the third-figure, the moods Darapti, Disamis, and Datisi.
7. Additionally, Bocardo LLL is invalid.
8. Therefore, Bocardo LXL and Bocardo XLL are also invalid.

There are, I suppose, a number of ways of responding to my argument. Malink might take this to support the semantic restrictions that he wants to place on the terms; after all, if the only way to save the modal syllogistic is to make such restrictions, isn't that a fairly good reason for making them, and even good reason for thinking that Aristotle made them? So far, my main objection to this has been my conviction that Aristotle intends the modal syllogistic, just like the assertoric syllogistic, to be extensional. However, the fact that Aristotle fails to make the modal syllogistic extensional, plus the outstanding *False Token Problem*, might give us doubts whether this was something he ever intended in the first place. As for Thom's argument Malink must, like Thom, think that Aristotle's purported proof of the invalidity of Barbara XLL is invalid. It is not clear how he would respond to the problem of the proofs given above for the validity of the invalid Darii XLL.

However, I now have a new objection. Note that Malink applies his restrictions across the board, that is to say, every true apodictic proposition posits a necessary connection between non-accidental terms. But it is worth observing that this is not required in the *negative* part of the modal syllogistic. For the most part (the possible exceptions being Baroco LXL and Bocardo LLL) the negative mixed modal syllogistic works as Aristotle describes and without the need of any such restrictions; accidental terms create no problems at all in the negative part of the modal syllogistic but only in the affirmative part. So restricting the terms in the negative part seems unmotivated.¹²

Another anticipated response is to reject the conversion rule for affirmative apodictic propositions. After all, didn't I say that it was this conversion rule that was inconsistent with the possibility that necessary belonging was anti-symmetric? Isn't this one more reason on the already considerable pile for rejecting this much-disputed conversion rule, or for restricting it in something like the way Rini does? If we cannot derive "Some A is necessarily B" by

¹² I can anticipate one move that Malink might make, and that is that the conversion of "No B is necessarily A" to "No A is necessarily B" is not valid unless we restrict the terms. This might, I suppose, motivate the restriction in Cesare and Camestres and other places which rely on the conversion rule. It still does not motivate it in Celarent itself. Anyway, I reject such a restriction.

conversion from “All B are necessarily A” is there any reason to suppose that “All A are necessarily B” can be true when A and B are co-extensive?

My response to this is that rejecting the rule would be necessary but nowhere near sufficient. You would have to come up with a semantics of “All B are necessarily A” such that “All A are necessarily B” cannot be true. They would have to be logically inconsistent. But if you did develop such a semantics you would then have to deal with the fact that in definitions both of these propositions appear to be true: man is necessarily a rational animal, and a rational animal is necessarily a man.

Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is not, perhaps, the “realm of darkness” reported. The negative part of the modal syllogistic is reasonably well lit, with just a couple of errors. The affirmative part is largely plain wrong. But I think that I have an explanation for why it is as it is: Aristotle simply failed to notice that Barbara LXL leads to a modal upgrading just as much as Barbara XLL, and he failed to notice it because, unlike Barbara XLL, the apodeictic proposition to which the assertoric proposition is upgraded does not follow syllogistically from the premises. To save Barbara LXL and the rest of the affirmative modal syllogistic, you must avoid the very possibility that “All A is necessarily A”; so, if “All B is necessarily A”, you must avoid the very possibility that “All A is necessarily B”. Otherwise the consequence is partial modal collapse: whatever belongs, belongs necessarily to whatever it belongs to as long as something necessarily belongs to it. Malink might find this consequence palatable but I do not.

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Percepción Moral y Conocimiento Práctico en el Estoicismo

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In a paper published in 1998, Ricardo Salles argues that the Stoic theory of action cannot account for practical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about what action is appropriate to be carried out in certain circumstances. The aim of this paper is to propose a solution to this problem. For this aim, I argue that the Stoics developed a perceptual theory of moral knowledge. According to this theory, the moral properties instantiated in objects, people, and actions are known through perception. After explaining this theory, I argue that it allows us to show that the Stoics deemed perception as a source of practical knowledge.

Introducción

En un artículo publicado en 1998, Ricardo Salles argumenta que la teoría estoica de la acción posee un serio problema.¹ Este problema radica en su incapacidad de explicar cómo un agente adquiere conocimiento práctico. Por ‘conocimiento práctico’ me refiero al conocimiento que tiene un agente sobre qué acción es apropiada de realizar en las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra. El argumento de Salles puede resumirse de la siguiente manera. Según la teoría estoica de la acción, las representaciones mentales (*φαντασίαι*) involucradas en la producción de la acción se caracterizan por representar una acción como apropiada de realizar. Dado que los estoicos sostuvieron que las propiedades evaluativas (e. g., la de ser apropiada) no se conocen por medio de la percepción, dichas representaciones no pueden tener su origen en la percepción. Sin embargo, las circunstancias específicas en las que una acción resulta apropiada de realizar sólo pueden conocerse por medio de la percepción. En consecuencia, hay un vacío en la teoría estoica de la acción con respecto a cómo es que un agente adquiere el conocimiento de que determinada acción es apropiada de realizar luego de percibir las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra.

El problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción es resultado del aparente estatus epistémico problemático de las representaciones mentales que, según dicha teoría, intervienen en la producción de la acción. Pues, “si bien se refieren a estados de

¹ Véase Salles (1998).

cosas particulares y concretos, no son estados perceptuales ni derivables de meros estados perceptuales” (Salles 1998, p. 115). Pese a que estudios posteriores en epistemología y filosofía de la mente estoicas han tenido desarrollos importantes, todavía no se ha propuesto una solución al problema que plantea Salles.² Así pues, dicho problema sigue vigente a pesar de que su artículo fue publicado hace más de veinte años.

El propósito de este trabajo es proponer una solución al problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción. Mi solución consiste en mostrar, *pace* Salles, que los estoicos sí consideraron que las propiedades evaluativas en general y las propiedades morales en particular pueden conocerse por medio de la percepción. Por lo tanto, la percepción es la que provee al agente del conocimiento sobre qué acción es apropiada de realizar en las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra. El presente trabajo se divide en tres apartados. En el primer apartado, expondré las razones por las cuales Salles sostiene que la teoría estoica de la acción es incapaz de dar cuenta del conocimiento práctico. En el segundo apartado, disputaré dichas razones mostrando que los estoicos desarrollaron una teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral. En el tercer apartado, mostraré cómo dicha teoría permite resolver el problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción.

1. El problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción

El argumento de Salles (1998, pp. 106-13) comienza con una presentación de la interpretación estándar de la teoría estoica de la acción.³ De acuerdo con esta interpretación, hay tres condiciones necesarias para la producción de la acción humana. En primer lugar, una representación impulsiva (φαντασία ὁρμητική). Este tipo de representaciones mentales se caracterizan por poseer contenido evaluativo que establece que una acción determinada es apropiada de realizar. En segundo lugar, el asentimiento (συγκατάθεσις). Tener una representación impulsiva no es suficiente para que se produzca una acción, pues es necesario que el agente asiente a dicha representación, es decir, que acepte o tome como verdadero lo

² Dos posibles excepciones son Stojanovic (2014) y Klein (2021). El primero trata de mostrar que hay representaciones cognitivas (καταληπτικαὶ φαντασῖαι) de propiedades morales. El segundo hace una revisión radical de la interpretación tradicional de la teoría estoica de la acción para mostrar la presencia de una suerte de silogismo práctico en dicha teoría. Aunque ninguno de los dos se enfrenta al problema del conocimiento práctico, sus propuestas podrían ampliarse con algunas de las observaciones hechas en el presente trabajo para tratar de ofrecer una solución a este problema.

³ La interpretación estándar fue planteada por Inwood (1985, pp. 42-101). Con ligeras extensiones o modificaciones, la han seguido Annas (1992, pp. 89-102), Brennan (2003), Gómez Espíndola (2016, pp. 118-9), Mayer (2018), Ramos-Umaña (2022, pp. 68-9) y Sorabji (2000, pp. 29-54).

representado en ella. En tercer lugar, el impulso (ὁρμή). Los impulsos son estados conativos dirigidos a la realización de la acción que es representada como apropiada en una representación impulsiva.⁴ Dado que el problema del conocimiento práctico radica en la primera condición, en lo que sigue me centraré en las representaciones impulsivas.

El fragmento estoico que ha sido clave para determinar la naturaleza de las representaciones impulsivas es el siguiente:

T1.1 Estobeo, *Ecl.* 2.86,17-88,2 [BS 24.1] (trad. Boeri y Salles, con modificaciones)⁵

Dicen que lo que pone en movimiento al impulso no es otra cosa sino la representación impulsiva de lo que es inmediatamente apropiado (καθήκοντος).

A partir de este pasaje se ha concluido que el contenido de las representaciones impulsivas tiene la siguiente estructura proposicional: “es apropiado (καθήκον) que ϕ ”, en donde ϕ es una acción particular (Inwood 1985, p. 60-4; Salles 1992, p. 111). No obstante, esta no es la única estructura que puede tener el contenido de las representaciones impulsivas. En primer lugar, ser apropiado no es la única propiedad evaluativa que pueden representar las representaciones impulsivas. También se representan otras como el ser propio (οἰκεῖον), elegible (αἰρετόν), conveniente (συμφέρων), beneficioso (λυσitteλής), etc.⁶ En segundo lugar, las acciones no son las únicas cosas de las que se predicen propiedades evaluativas. Según sugieren algunas fuentes, ciertos objetos (*e. g.*, el alimento) pueden representarse como poseyendo alguna propiedad evaluativa capaz de mover el impulso para su persecución.⁷ Así pues, no hay una estructura específica que deba tener el contenido de una representación para que sea impulsiva. Es suficiente con que represente una acción o un objeto con alguna propiedad evaluativa relevante para la acción.

⁴ La relación entre estos tres elementos es controvertida. Según algunas fuentes, el impulso es el resultado del asentimiento dado a una representación impulsiva (Clemente de Alejandría, *Strom.* 6.8.69.1 [BS 24.3]; Plutarco, *De Stoic. rep.* 1057A [BS 24.2]). Según otras fuentes, el impulso es el asentimiento mismo a una representación impulsiva (Estobeo, *Ecl.* 2.88,1-6 [BS 6.15]). Según otras, el impulso es el resultado inmediato de experimentar una representación impulsiva, de modo que el asentimiento es posterior o simultáneo al impulso (Séneca, *Ep.* 113.18; Cicerón, *Fat.* 40). Sobre esta discusión véase Stevens (2000).

⁵ En este trabajo indicaré las referencias [BS] al compendio de fragmentos de Boeri y Salles (2014) cuando estén disponibles. Salvo que se indique lo contrario, las traducciones son mías.

⁶ Algunas fuentes que dan cuenta de esta diversidad son Estobeo, *Ecl.* 2.86, 17-8 [BS 24.1]; Plutarco, *De Stoic. rep.* 1057A [BS 24.2]; Cicerón, *Acad.* 2.24-5; 38; Alejandro de Afrodísia, *Fat.* 178, 17-28 [BS 24.8]; 84, 9; Epicteto, *Ench.* 43; *Diss.* 1.18.1; 1.28.5-6; 3.22.43. Sobre las diversas propiedades evaluativas que se predicen en las representaciones impulsivas, véase Sorabji (2000, p. 30), Brennan (2003, p. 268) y Mayer (2018, p. 115-6; 132).

⁷ Véase Filón de Alejandría, *Leg. Alleg.* 1.30 [BS 24.4]; Cicerón, *Acad.* 2.24-5, *Tusc.* 4.12 [BS 25.8]; Plutarco, *Col.* 1122A-F; Epicteto, *Diss.* 2.3.3-4 [BS 24.12].

El carácter evaluativo del contenido de las representaciones impulsivas es lo que, según Salles (1998, pp. 113-5), las hace epistémicamente problemáticas. De acuerdo con él, las representaciones impulsivas no son perceptuales ni se producen a partir de representaciones perceptuales. La razón de ello es que, a diferencia de las propiedades como blanco y caliente, las propiedades evaluativas que ellas representan no pueden conocerse por medio de la percepción. Esto es problemático porque las circunstancias específicas en las que acciones y objetos particulares resultan apropiados, propios, beneficiosos, etc. sólo pueden conocerse por medio de la percepción. Al ser incapaces de proveer conocimiento de las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra el agente, las representaciones impulsivas no pueden proveer el conocimiento de que una acción particular resulta apropiada de realizar en tales circunstancias.

Consideremos el siguiente ejemplo (Inwood 1985, p. 61; Boeri y Salles 2014, p. 554). Un niño atrapado en una casa en llamas provoca la formación de la representación impulsiva de que es apropiado salvarlo. En tanto impulsiva, esta representación no es perceptual ni derivable de representaciones perceptuales. En principio, la percepción no es lo que nos permite determinar que es *apropiado* salvar al niño. No obstante, las circunstancias específicas en las cuales es apropiado salvar el niño, a saber, que está atrapado en una casa en llamas, sólo se conocen por medio de la percepción. Dado que la representación impulsiva no tiene origen perceptual, no es claro cómo podría proveer el conocimiento de que la acción de salvar al niño es apropiada. Si el agente no sabe que hay un niño en una casa en llamas, tampoco sabrá que es apropiado salvarlo.⁸

Salles considera que el problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción podría resolverse “si fuese posible mostrar que el contenido de las [representaciones impulsivas] es una mera construcción lógica a partir de los datos que los sentidos registran” (1998, p. 128). Tras argumentar en contra de esta posibilidad, Salles concluye que “el problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica no parece tener solución” (1998, p. 128). La solución que quiero proponer a este problema consiste precisamente en mostrar, *pace* Salles, que el contenido de las representaciones impulsivas sí tiene un origen perceptual. Pero veamos antes las razones que ofrece Salles para descartar esta hipótesis.

⁸ Frede (1986, pp. 104-5) y, siguiéndolo, Blackson (2017) proponen una interpretación alternativa de la teoría estoica de la acción a la que no se le presenta este problema. En contra de la interpretación estándar, ellos consideran que no es necesario que las representaciones impulsivas posean contenido evaluativo. No obstante, esta interpretación alberga otros problemas sobre los cuales no me detendré en este trabajo.

Salles ofrece dos argumentos para mostrar que las representaciones impulsivas no son perceptuales ni se producen a partir de representaciones perceptuales. El primer argumento consiste en mostrar que las representaciones impulsivas poseen cierta propiedad que está ausente en todas las representaciones perceptuales. El segundo argumento consiste en mostrar que las propiedades evaluativas que son representadas en las representaciones impulsivas no son perceptibles. Examinemos individualmente cada uno de estos argumentos.

El primer argumento se basa en la distinción estoica entre representaciones perceptuales (αἰσθητικαί) y no perceptuales (οὐκ αἰσθητικαί) (DL 7.51 [BS 6.1]). De acuerdo con Salles (1998, p. 115-20), esta distinción radica en que las representaciones perceptuales no poseen contenido proposicional y las representaciones no perceptuales sí lo poseen. Puesto que las proposiciones son entidades imperceptibles, estas sólo pueden captarse por medio de representaciones que no sean perceptuales. Así pues, el mero hecho de que una representación tenga la propiedad de poseer contenido proposicional excluye que sea perceptual. Dado que, como se señaló anteriormente, las representaciones impulsivas poseen contenido proposicional, estas representaciones deben pertenecer a la categoría de representaciones no perceptuales.

El principal problema de este argumento es que descansa en cierta interpretación del concepto estoico de representación que es obsoleta a luz de estudios más recientes. Varios especialistas han demostrado que para los estoicos todas las representaciones, tanto perceptuales como no perceptuales, poseen contenido proposicional.⁹ La diferencia entre representaciones perceptuales y no perceptuales radica, más bien, en que sólo las primeras se producen por medio del influjo causal de los objetos externos sobre el aparato perceptual. En esa medida, las representaciones perceptuales son aquellas que nos permiten captar objetos y propiedades que son perceptibles (Sexto Empírico, *M.* 8.409-10 [BS 2.5]). Esta es hoy en día la interpretación más aceptada del concepto estoico de representación.

En trabajos posteriores, el mismo Salles (Boeri y Salles, 2014, p. 125) acepta dicha interpretación y abandona aquella según la cual las representaciones perceptuales carecen de contenido proposicional. Esto no significa, sin embargo, que el problema del conocimiento práctico que plantea Salles haya sido superado. El mero abandono de la interpretación en cuestión no es suficiente para mostrar que las representaciones impulsivas son (o pueden ser) perceptuales. Para ello es necesario mostrar que las propiedades evaluativas que son

⁹ E. g., Shogry (2019), de Harven (2019), Caston (*en prensa*), Schwab, W. y Shogry, S (2021), Veres y Macheck (*en prensa*).

representadas en ellas son el tipo de propiedades que podemos captar por medio de la percepción. Esto es precisamente lo que el segundo argumento de Salles busca rechazar. Este argumento, a diferencia del primero, es uno que Salles todavía parece sostener.

El segundo argumento se basa en la teoría estoica de la formación de conceptos (ἐννοιαι). De acuerdo con Salles (1998, pp. 120-8), los estoicos distinguieron dos tipos de conceptos: los evaluativos y los no evaluativos. Mientras que los segundos se forman a partir de la percepción, los primeros son innatos. A favor de esta distinción, Salles presenta los siguientes pasajes:

T1.2 Plutarco, *Comm. not* 1070C-D [BS 6.25]

Esto también en lo relativo a los bienes y los males, lo elegible y lo evitable, lo propio y lo ajeno, cuya evidencia debe ser más clara que la de las cosas calientes y frías, blancas y negras. Pues, las representaciones de estas cosas advienen externamente de las percepciones, pero aquellas tienen un origen connatural (σύμφυτον) a partir de los principios que se encuentran en nosotros.

T1.3 Epicteto, *Diss.* 2.11.2-3 [BS 6.23] (trad. Boeri y Salles)

Pues bien, no llegamos [a la vida] por naturaleza con ningún concepto de “triángulo rectángulo” o de “semitono”, sino que somos instruidos en cada uno de ellos gracias a un método técnico y, por eso, los que no los conocen tampoco creen conocerlos. ¿Pero quién, inadvertidamente, no tiene un concepto innato (ἔμφυτον) de bueno y malo, bello y feo, conveniente e inconveniente, felicidad, apropiado y concerniente [a nosotros], de lo que hay y de lo que no hay que hacer? Es por eso que todos usamos [estos] nombres e intentamos aplicar las preconcepciones a los casos particulares: “lo hizo bien, de manera debida o indebida; fue desafortunado o afortunado; es justo o injusto”.

Según la lectura de Salles, estos pasajes afirman que todos los seres humanos poseen los conceptos evaluativos de forma natural desde su nacimiento. En esa medida, la percepción no parece desempeñar ningún papel en nuestra captación de las propiedades evaluativas. Por lo tanto, las representaciones impulsivas, en tanto que representan propiedades evaluativas, deben tener su origen, no en la percepción, sino en ciertos conceptos innatos que poseen todos los seres humanos. Mi solución al problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción intentará cuestionar esta interpretación innatista de la formación de conceptos evaluativos.

Salles no es el único que ha sostenido que, para los estoicos, las propiedades evaluativas no son perceptibles.¹⁰ No obstante, Salles es el único que ha puesto en evidencia las consecuencias problemáticas de esta tesis para la teoría estoica de la acción y, en particular, para su explicación del conocimiento práctico. Carecer de una explicación de cómo es que un sujeto adquiere el conocimiento de qué acción es apropiada realizar al

¹⁰ Véase Striker (1980, pp. 70-2) y Brennan (2005, pp. 75-6).

percibir las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra es problemático por, al menos, dos razones. Por un lado, el agente puede condenarse a un estado de parálisis o inactividad. Dado que no sabe qué acción es apropiada de realizar en las circunstancias en las que se encuentra, el sujeto puede optar por no realizar ninguna acción en absoluto. Por otro lado, el agente puede actuar ignorando las razones que lo movieron a actuar. Dado que no sabe qué acción es apropiada de realizar en las circunstancias en las que se encuentra, el agente puede optar por realizar acciones arbitrariamente sin que haya una razón que dé cuenta de por qué dichas acciones eran apropiadas (para él) en dichas circunstancias. Evitar estos problemas es parte de lo que debe hacer una explicación adecuada del conocimiento práctico.

2. *Percepción moral*

El principal reto al que se enfrenta la tesis defendida por Salles de que los conceptos evaluativos son innatos es el hecho de que hay pasajes estoicos que afirman explícitamente el carácter empirista de la epistemología estoica. Según estos pasajes, los estoicos rechazaron la posibilidad de conceptos innatos:

T2.1 Sexto Empírico, *M.* 8.56-60 [BS 6.8]

Todo pensamiento (νόησις), en efecto, se produce a partir de la percepción o no independientemente de la percepción, o bien a partir de experiencia directa o no sin experiencia directa. [...] Y en general no es posible descubrir nada en la concepción (ἐπίνοιαν) que uno mismo no haya conocido por experiencia directa. Pues esta se captará por semejanza de las cosas que se han presentado en la experiencia directa, o por aumento, o por disminución, o por composición.

T2.2 Aecio, *Placit.* 4.11.1-2 [BS 6.4]

Dicen los estoicos: cuando un ser humano nace tiene la parte rectora de su alma como una tablilla lista para la escritura; en ella se registra cada uno de los conceptos. El primer modo de registro es el que se da a través de los sentidos. En efecto, cuando las personas perciben algo, por ejemplo, algo blanco, tienen un recuerdo de ello cuando se ha marchado. Y cuando se producen muchos recuerdos del mismo tipo, entonces afirmamos que tenemos experiencia, pues experiencia es una multiplicidad de representaciones del mismo tipo. Algunos conceptos se producen naturalmente (φυσικῶς) de acuerdo con los modos mencionados y sin especialización (ἀνεπιτεχνήτως); otros, en cambio, se producen a través de nuestra educación (διδασκαλίας) y cuidado (ἐπιμελείας). Ahora bien, estos últimos se denominan meramente “conceptos” (ἔννοιαι), los primeros también “preconcepciones” (προλήψεις).

Con un tono claramente empirista, T2.1 afirma que ningún concepto y, en general, ningún pensamiento puede producirse sin percepción. Asimismo, T2.2 afirma que al nacer la mente es una *tabula rasa*, la cual se va llenando con los conceptos que se producen a partir de la percepción. Ahora bien, la distinción entre preconcepciones (προλήψεις) y conceptos *simpliciter* (ἔννοιαι) que se menciona en T2.1 debe interpretarse en términos del empirismo

que expresa ese pasaje. El hecho de que las preconcepciones se produzcan naturalmente (*φυσικῶς*) no significa que sean conceptos innatos.

La diferencia entre preconcepciones y conceptos *simpliciter* radica en que las primeras se producen naturalmente y sin especialización, mientras que los segundos requieren de educación y cuidado. Esto no significa que las primeras sean innatas y los segundos empíricos, sino que la formación de las preconcepciones no requiere de ninguna educación especializada. Basta con que un sujeto interactúe perceptualmente con su entorno para que se produzcan naturalmente sus preconcepciones. Así se forma, por ejemplo, el concepto BLANCO. Después de muchas representaciones perceptuales de objetos blancos, la mente forma naturalmente dicho concepto. Gracias a ello el sujeto puede utilizar ese concepto para, entre otras cosas, discernir perceptualmente las cosas blancas. Por el contrario, la formación de conceptos *simpliciter* sí requiere de una educación especializada. Por ejemplo, el concepto TONO precisa de una educación musical (*Acad.* 2.20). Gracias a esta educación, el sujeto aprende a captar perceptualmente ciertas propiedades de las canciones como, por ejemplo, el tono en el que se encuentran.¹¹ A medida que el sujeto aprende a captar el tono de las canciones que escucha y después de muchas representaciones perceptuales de canciones, su mente forma el concepto de TONO. Una vez desarrollado este concepto, el sujeto puede discernir perceptualmente el tono de las canciones.

Tenemos, pues, pasajes (T2.1 y T2.2) que contradicen la evidencia de Salles (T1.2 y T1.3) a favor de la formación innata de conceptos evaluativos. Salles (1998, pp. 124-5) reconoce este problema y, siguiendo a Bonhöffer (1890, 200-3), lo soluciona restringiendo los elementos innatistas de la epistemología estoica a la formación de conceptos evaluativos. De esta manera, el empirismo estoico tiene el papel protagónico solamente en la formación de los conceptos no evaluativos. Hay, sin embargo, una forma más adecuada de resolver este problema.

La manera en la que Salles parece interpretar el innatismo estoico es en la forma de un *innatismo de condición cognitiva*.¹² Según este tipo de innatismo, los seres humanos nacen equipados con conceptos evaluativos en el sentido en que su mente ya posee dichos conceptos y no necesita de la percepción o algún otro mecanismo para formarse. Sin embargo, hay otra interpretación del innatismo estoico. Esta interpretación tiene la ventaja de ser compatible con la evidencia a favor del carácter empirista de la epistemología estoica. Se

¹¹ Este fenómeno en el estoicismo es estudiado por Shogry (2019), y Veres y Macheck (*en prensa*).

¹² Este tipo de innatismo es discutido por Fine (2014, pp. 140-7) al distinguir diversas formas de innatismo.

trata de la interpretación de Scott (1988) según la cual los estoicos defendieron un *innatismo disposicional*. De acuerdo con este, todos los seres humanos nacen con la disposición a desarrollar conceptos evaluativos. Los seres humanos no nacen equipados con ellos, sino con ciertos principios naturales que posibilitan que puedan formarse conceptos evaluativos. De acuerdo con mi interpretación, que acepta el innatismo disposicional, estos principios son de los que se mencionan en T1.2.

El innatismo disposicional pone en cuestión la tesis de que, para los estoicos, los conceptos evaluativos son innatos. No obstante, esta interpretación no es suficiente para mostrar que los conceptos evaluativos que figuran en el contenido de las representaciones impulsivas tienen su origen en la percepción. Es preciso mostrar que la percepción es el mecanismo a través del cual se activan, por así decirlo, los principios innatos que posibilitan la formación de conceptos evaluativos. Para mostrar esto, debemos considerar ahora un concepto central de la ética estoica: el de apropiación (*οἰκείωσις*).¹³ Este concepto fue acuñado por los estoicos para dar cuenta de ciertos principios naturales básicos que poseen todos los seres vivos. Estos principios básicos garantizan su supervivencia al hacer que persigan lo que les provee bienestar (*e. g.*, alimento) y eviten lo que es dañino para su constitución natural (DL 7.85-6 [BS 22.1]; Cicerón, *Fin.* 3.16-9 [BS 22.2]). Para cumplir este rol, los principios básicos naturales proveen a los seres vivos con la capacidad de discernir las cosas que son propias a su naturaleza:

T2.3 Plutarco, *De Stoic. rep.* 1038C

La apropiación (*οἰκείωσις*) parece ser una percepción (*αἴσθησις*) y cognición (*ἀντίληψις*) de lo que es propio (*οἰκείου*).

Este pasaje indica que los principios naturales básicos que poseen todos los seres humanos desde su nacimiento les dan la capacidad de percibir y, de ese modo, adquirir conocimiento perceptual de que ciertos objetos de su entorno poseen la propiedad evaluativa de ser apropiados a su naturaleza (*οἰκεῖον*). Esto significa que, cuando un sujeto percibe su entorno, se activan los principios naturales básicos. Al activarse por medio de la percepción, estos principios producen los conceptos evaluativos que dotan al sujeto con la capacidad de discernir perceptualmente diversas propiedades evaluativas en su entorno. Así pues, en el

¹³ Aunque Scott (1998, p. 141-2) vincula el innatismo disposicional estoico con el concepto de apropiación, no lo vincula con la posibilidad de que las representaciones con contenido evaluativo tengan origen perceptual.

concepto estoico de apropiación (οἰκειώσις) encontramos un primer indicio de que los conceptos evaluativos pueden tener, *pace* Salles, un origen perceptual.

Consideremos ahora otros pasajes estoicos de diversas fuentes que afirman expresamente que los sujetos pueden percibir y conocer perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas:

T2.4. Cicerón, *ND* 2.145

Y la percepción humana (*sensus hominum*) en mucho sobrepasa a la percepción de los animales. En primer lugar, porque los ojos, en aquellas artes en las que el juicio es de los ojos —en las formas pintadas moldeadas y esculpidas, y también en el movimiento y el gesto de los cuerpos—, discierne muchas cosas con detalle. [Los ojos] juzgan la belleza, el orden y, por decirlo así, lo conveniente de colores y figuras. También otras cosas más importantes, pues conocen (*cognoscunt*) las virtudes y los vicios (*virtutes et vitia*): conocen al airado y al tranquilo, al alegre y al dolido, al fuerte y al débil, al valiente y al tímido.

T2.5 Plutarco, *De Stoic. rep.* 1042E-F (cf. *Comm. not.* 1062C-D)

[Crisipo] dice que los bienes y los males (τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά) son perceptibles (αἰσθητὰ) cuando escribe lo siguiente en *Sobre el fin*: [...] pues no sólo las pasiones (πάθη), como el dolor, el miedo y similares, son perceptibles junto con el aspecto (σὺν τοῖς εἶδεσιν), sino que también es perceptible el robo, el adulterio y semejantes, y, en general, la insensatez, la cobardía y otros muchos vicios (κακιῶν); y no sólo la alegría, el obrar benéficamente y muchas otras acciones rectas (κατορθώσεων), sino también la prudencia, la valentía y las restantes virtudes (ἀρετῶν).

T2.6 Diógenes Laercio (DL) 7.173

Se dice que, afirmando [Cleantes] que, según Zenón, el carácter (ἦθος) de una persona era cognoscible (καταληπτὸν) por su aspecto (ἐξ εἶδους), unos jóvenes ingeniosos le llevaron un afeminado endurecido en el campo y le pidieron que develara su carácter. Al dudar, pidió al sujeto que se fuera. Al marcharse estornudó, entonces Cleantes dijo: “Lo tengo: es blando” (μαλακός).

T2.7 Aulo Gelio *NA* 7.1.2-4 [BS 17.8] (trad. Boeri y Salles)

[...] Crisipo argumentaba en el libro cuarto del tratado *De la providencia*: “No hay absolutamente nada más tonto que estas personas que creen que podría haber cosas buenas si no hubiera igualmente cosas malas. En efecto, dado que las cosas buenas son contrarias a las malas, es necesario para ambas partes que se opongan la una a la otra y que prácticamente se mantengan en mutua oposición apoyándose entre sí en la medida en que ningún contrario existe sin el otro. En efecto, ¿por qué medio podría percibirse (*sensus esse posset*) la justicia, si no existieran injusticias? [...]”.

Todos estos pasajes prueban que, para los estoicos, los seres humanos pueden percibir las propiedades evaluativas en general y las propiedades morales en particular. Así pues, cuando un sujeto percibe un objeto, la representación perceptual resultante representará no sólo sus propiedades físicas sensibles (*e. g.*, su forma y color), sino también sus propiedades evaluativas (*e. g.*, si es propio o ajeno a su naturaleza).

Según los pasajes citados, se puede percibir el carácter un sujeto, es decir, los vicios o las virtudes morales que posee. Asimismo, se puede percibir en las emociones y las acciones de un sujeto la manifestación de sus virtudes o vicios. En general, puede percibirse cualquier propiedad evaluativa que posea una persona, un objeto o una acción particular. Si las propiedades evaluativas son perceptuales, entonces los sujetos pueden conocer perceptualmente las propiedades evaluativas que posee un sujeto, un objeto o una acción. Por ejemplo, el hecho de que Arístides posea la virtud de la justicia es algo que se puede conocer por medio de la percepción. En esa medida, las representaciones perceptuales de Arístides no sólo nos relevan su aspecto (*e. g.*, su constitución física y sus rasgos faciales), sino también sus propiedades morales.¹⁴

De hecho, la metafísica estoica abre la posibilidad de que las propiedades evaluativas sean perceptibles, pues los estoicos consideraron que estas propiedades son de naturaleza corpórea. De manera más concreta, las propiedades evaluativas son cualidades o disposiciones en las que encuentra una entidad corpórea (Estobeo, *Ecl.* 1. 138, 14-139, 8 [BS 14.10]; Séneca, *Ep.* 117.2 [BS 8.5]). Aunque no todas las cosas de naturaleza corpórea son perceptibles (*e. g.*, los dioses y los diminutos poros de la piel), la metafísica estoica reconoce que las propiedades evaluativas tienen poderes causales que, en principio, les permiten interactuar con el aparato perceptual de un sujeto y, de ese modo, causar representaciones perceptuales. Así pues, el sujeto puede percibir las propiedades evaluativas de un objeto siempre y cuando se den las condiciones apropiadas para que el sujeto tenga contacto perceptual con el objeto (*e. g.*, condiciones de iluminación, que el objeto tenga un tamaño adecuado, que objeto se encuentre a una distancia cercana, etc. Véase Sexto Empírico, *M.* 7.424 [BS 7.6]).

Hemos visto, pues, que los estoicos desarrollaron una teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral. No obstante, es importante detenernos en este punto para distinguir dos tesis que, aunque son compatibles, no se implican mutuamente. En primer lugar, la tesis de que los sujetos pueden percibir y, por ende, conocer perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas en virtud de que han desarrollado los conceptos evaluativos que les permiten discernir

¹⁴ El concepto estoico de *representación cognitiva* (καταληπτική φαντασία) es relevante en este punto, pues los estoicos caracterizaron el conocimiento como el resultado de asentir a este tipo de representaciones (Sexto Empírico, *M.* 7.151 [BS 7.8]). No obstante, he omitido deliberadamente referirme a este concepto a lo largo de este trabajo para evitar meterme en la puntillosa discusión que hay en torno a este concepto. En efecto, el concepto de representación cognitiva es uno de los más controvertidos entre los especialistas. Sobre dicho concepto, véase Caston (*en prensa*), Stojanovic (2014) y Pineda (2023, pp. 339-48).

perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas en su entorno. En segundo lugar, la tesis de que la percepción es el origen de los conceptos evaluativos que le dan al sujeto la capacidad de discernir perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas en su entorno. Ahora bien, las teorías perceptuales del conocimiento moral tienen dos variantes: las puras y las impuras. Mientras que las variantes impuras están comprometidas sólo con la primera tesis, las variantes puras están comprometidas con ambas.¹⁵

Los pasajes citados anteriormente son evidencia de que los estoicos sostuvieron la primera tesis. En efecto, estos pasajes muestran que los estoicos pensaban que podemos percibir propiedades evaluativas, lo cual supone que poseemos los conceptos evaluativos que nos permiten discernir perceptualmente estas propiedades. No obstante, esto no es suficiente para mostrar que los estoicos sostuvieron también la segunda tesis. El hecho de que poseamos los conceptos evaluativos que nos permiten discernir perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas no implica que el origen de estos conceptos sea la percepción. De acuerdo con esto, la evidencia que tenemos hasta ahora nos permite sostener que los estoicos defendieron una variante impura de la teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral. No obstante, creo que hay evidencia para pensar que los estoicos estaban comprometidos también con la segunda tesis y, por ende, que la teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral desarrollada por los estoicos es de la variante pura.

Antes de presentar evidencia a favor de la segunda tesis, es importante advertir que la variante impura de la teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral es suficiente para resolver el problema del conocimiento práctico en la teoría estoica de la acción. De hecho, la variante impura es compatible con la postura de Salles de la siguiente manera. Podemos rechazar la segunda tesis bajo el supuesto que los conceptos evaluativos son innatos. Al mismo tiempo podemos sostener la primera tesis y decir que los conceptos evaluativos, pese a que no tienen su origen en la percepción, nos dan la capacidad de discernir perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas en nuestro entorno. De esta manera, nuestras representaciones impulsivas son el resultado de nuestra capacidad de discernir perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas en nuestro entorno, capacidad que nos ha sido dada de forma innata. De esta manera, el problema planteado por Salles puede solucionarse dentro de sus propios términos. No obstante, creo que hay evidencia textual para pensar que los estoicos estaban comprometidos con la tesis más fuerte de que los conceptos evaluativos tienen su origen en la percepción.

¹⁵ Sobre las variantes de la teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral, véase Werner 2017, pp. 2-4.

De acuerdo con la variante pura de la teoría perceptual del conocimiento moral, un sujeto tiene la capacidad de discernir perceptualmente, por ejemplo, el bien en las acciones que observa *porque* previamente ha desarrollado el concepto BIEN por medio de la percepción. La pregunta que surge aquí es, ¿cómo es que la percepción le permitió desarrollar dicho concepto? Es aquí en donde debemos regresar al concepto de apropiación (οικείωσις). Como se dijo anteriormente, los principios naturales básicos que poseen todos los seres humanos desde su nacimiento les dan la capacidad de percibir y, de ese modo, adquirir conocimiento perceptual de que ciertos objetos u acciones poseen la propiedad evaluativa de ser apropiados a su naturaleza (οικείοι). Cuando por medio de la percepción se activan estos principios naturales básicos, se forman los primeros conceptos evaluativos que le permiten al joven humano discernir perceptualmente propiedades evaluativas básicas en su entorno. Esta, por así decir, percepción básica de la propiedad evaluativa de lo apropiado a su naturaleza es lo que le permite al sujeto desarrollar conceptos evaluativos complejos como el concepto BIEN. Los siguientes pasajes confirman que esta es la manera en la que se produce dicho concepto:

T2.8 Cicerón, *De fin.* 3.33 [BS 26.41] (trad. Boeri y Salles, con modificaciones)

Dado que los conceptos de las cosas surgen en nuestras almas si algo ha sido conocido o por experiencia, o por combinación, o por semejanza o por comparación racional, es gracias a este cuarto y último modo que el concepto de bien ha surgido. Pues, cuando el alma por medio de una comparación racional asciende desde aquellas cosas que son de acuerdo con la naturaleza, entonces llega al concepto de bien.

T2.9 Séneca, *Ep.* 120.3-4

Ahora, pues, vuelvo a lo que quieres discutir, cómo ha llegado a nosotros el primer concepto de bien y rectitud. La naturaleza no ha podido enseñarnos esto. Ella nos ha dado las semillas del conocimiento, pero no el conocimiento. Algunos afirman que hemos encontrado casualmente el concepto, pero es increíble que la forma de la virtud llegue a alguien por casualidad. A nosotros [estoicos] nos parece que lo obtenemos con la observación y comparación entre sí de acciones frecuentes.

El segundo pasaje apoya la tesis de que el innatismo estoico es disposicional, pues afirma que la naturaleza nos equipó, no con el concepto de bien, sino con las semillas (*semina*) para formarlo. Estas semillas corresponden a los principios naturales con los que todos los seres humanos nacen y gracias a los cuales pueden percibir propiedades evaluativas básicas. Ahora bien, de acuerdo con ambos pasajes, el concepto BIEN se produce a partir de la percepción de diversos objetos y acciones que tienen la propiedad evaluativa básica de ser

apropiados a nuestra naturaleza. Una vez se ha albergado en la memoria muchas representaciones perceptuales de objetos y acciones apropiadas a nuestra naturaleza, la mente tiene la capacidad de compararlas racionalmente y abstraer lo que tienen en común. De esta manera, la mente forma el concepto BIEN. De modo análogo deben producirse otros conceptos evaluativos como VIRTUD y VICIO.

Lo anterior muestra que el concepto BIEN se forma de la misma manera que el concepto BLANCO. Después de muchas representaciones perceptuales, la mente forma estos conceptos. A partir de esto podemos concluir que la diferencia expuesta en T1.2 y T1.3 entre conceptos evaluativos y no evaluativos no consiste, como sostiene Salles, en que los primeros son innatos y los segundos empíricos. Ambos son empíricos. La diferencia radica, por ende, en otro lugar. De acuerdo con mi interpretación, dichos pasajes señalan que nuestro conocimiento de las propiedades evaluativas depende de los principios naturales que poseen todos los seres humanos de manera innata. Sin ellos, los sujetos no podrían aprender a discernir perceptualmente la presencia de estas propiedades en su entorno. En contraste, el conocimiento de las propiedades no evaluativas no parece requerir de estos principios. La constitución natural del aparato perceptual es suficiente para captar la presencia de estas propiedades en el entorno (Cicerón, *Acad.* 2.19-20). A veces es necesario, como señala T1.3, que el sujeto tenga una educación especializada para poder desarrollar conceptos no evaluativos sofisticados (e. g., TRIÁNGULO y TONO). Pero cuando se trata de las propiedades evaluativas, la naturaleza humana es capaz de desarrollarlos sin ningún tipo de educación especializada. ¿En qué consiste entonces la educación moral? Como dice T1.3, en saber distinguir qué cosas poseen y qué cosas no poseen cierta propiedad evaluativa.

3. La percepción como la fuente del conocimiento práctico

He mostrado, pues, que no hay razones para pensar que las representaciones impulsivas no son perceptuales ni se producen a partir de representaciones perceptuales. Por un lado, la posesión de contenido proposicional no impide que las representaciones impulsivas sean perceptuales. Por otro lado, los conceptos evaluativos que figuran en el contenido de una representación impulsiva tienen su origen en la percepción. Es preciso preguntarse ahora si las representaciones impulsivas son, de hecho, perceptuales o derivables de representaciones perceptuales. De esta manera podemos establecer si la percepción es la fuente del conocimiento práctico, es decir, del conocimiento de que determinada acción es apropiada de realizar en las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra el agente.

Hay circunstancias en las que es evidente que las representaciones impulsivas son perceptuales. Cuando un sujeto percibe un objeto, la representación perceptual de dicho objeto representará, entre otras cosas, sus propiedades evaluativas. Esta representación es impulsiva. Si representa al objeto con la propiedad evaluativa de ser propio a su naturaleza, moverá su impulso a perseguirlo; si lo representa con la propiedad evaluativa de ser ajeno, entonces moverá su impulso a evitarlo.¹⁶ En estas circunstancias, el mero hecho de percibir un objeto con una propiedad evaluativa relevante para la acción le permite al agente adquirir el conocimiento qué acción es apropiada de realizar frente a dicho objeto. Sin embargo, hay otras circunstancias en las que no es tan obvio que las representaciones impulsivas sean perceptuales.

Las representaciones impulsivas que se refieren a acciones potenciales y objetos que no están presentes no pueden ser perceptuales. Por ejemplo, si un sujeto que tiene hambre se forma la representación impulsiva de que una ensalada es propia, tendrá el impulso a buscar una ensalada. Asentir a dicha representación impulsiva lo moverá a sacar una ensalada del refrigerador, a comprar una ensalada o cocinar una él mismo. Cualquiera que sea la acción específica, no es necesario que el agente perciba directamente una ensalada para poder representarla como propia. En estos casos es difícil ver cómo la percepción provee el conocimiento de qué acción es apropiada realizar. No obstante, aunque la representación impulsiva en cuestión no sea perceptual, debe producirse de alguna manera a partir de representaciones que sí son perceptuales.

De acuerdo con el empirismo expresado en T2.1, toda representación tiene su origen directa o indirectamente en la percepción. Ahí y en otros lugares (DL 7.52-4 [BS 6.3]), los estoicos mencionan diversos mecanismos a través de los cuales la mente puede producir representaciones no perceptuales a partir de representaciones perceptuales obtenidas previamente. Aunque ninguna fuente menciona explícitamente qué mecanismos podrían estar involucrados en la formación de representaciones impulsivas, cualesquiera que sean estos mecanismos tendrán que recurrir, al final del día, a representaciones perceptuales. Estas representaciones perceptuales tendrían que ser de objetos u acciones representados previamente con alguna propiedad evaluativa. Por ejemplo, la mente podría recurrir a

¹⁶ Filón de Alejandría, *Leg. Alleg.* 1.30 [BS 24.4]: “La representación se forma de acuerdo con el acceso de lo externo al impresionar la mente a partir de la percepción. El impulso, hermano de la representación, se forma de acuerdo con la capacidad tensional de la mente, que, extendiéndose a través de la percepción, capta el objeto externo y se dirige hacia el, intentando alcanzarlo y obtenerlo”. (Cf. Cicerón, *Tusc.* 4.12 [BS 25.8]).

representaciones perceptuales obtenidas previamente de ensaladas representadas como propias. A partir de estas, la mente podría formar una representación “imaginativa” de que una ensalada (aún no percibida) es propia.

En este tipo de casos, la percepción es también la fuente del conocimiento práctico. Al percibir las circunstancias específicas en las que se encuentra, el agente busca en su memoria representaciones perceptuales adquiridas previamente de acciones que fueron apropiadas de realizar en circunstancias similares. El conocimiento adquirido por tales representaciones perceptuales pasadas es lo que le permite al agente saber qué acción es apropiada en las circunstancias actuales. Así pues, las representaciones impulsivas que se refieren a acciones potenciales y objetos que no están presentes son fuentes de conocimiento práctico en virtud de haberse producido a partir de representaciones perceptuales que fueron fuentes de conocimiento moral o práctico en el pasado.

Un caso más complicado es el de la representación impulsiva de que es apropiado salvar a un niño atrapado en una casa en llamas. En tanto que se refiere a una acción potencial, esta representación no podría ser perceptual. No obstante, es la percepción de un niño atrapado en una casa en llamas lo que le permite al agente formarse la representación de que es apropiado salvarlo. Hay dos hipótesis de cómo podría formarse la representación impulsiva en este caso. La primera es que la representación perceptual del niño en la casa en llamas lo representa con una propiedad evaluativa muy específica del tipo *apropiado de salvar*. En esta primera explicación el conocimiento práctico de que es apropiado salvar al niño es el resultado directo de la percepción. La segunda hipótesis es que la representación impulsiva se produzca a partir de dos conjuntos de representaciones: la representación perceptual del niño atrapado en la casa en llamas y las representaciones perceptuales adquiridas previamente de acciones similares representadas como apropiadas en el pasado. En este caso, el conocimiento práctico de que es apropiado salvar el niño proviene de representaciones perceptuales que fueron fuentes de conocimiento moral o práctico en circunstancias similares a las actuales. Cualquiera que sea la explicación, ambas recurren a representaciones perceptuales de propiedades evaluativas para dar cuenta del conocimiento práctico.

A modo de conclusión conviene recordar que el problema del conocimiento práctico surge, según Salles, porque las representaciones impulsivas no pueden proveer el conocimiento de las circunstancias específicas en las que una acción particular resulta apropiada de realizar. Esto como consecuencia de no ser perceptuales ni producidas a partir

de representaciones perceptuales. En contra de esto, he mostrado que las representaciones impulsivas pueden ser perceptuales y producirse a partir de representaciones perceptuales. Cuando son perceptuales, las representaciones impulsivas proveen conocimiento de las circunstancias específicas junto con lo que es apropiado hacer en ellas. Cuando se producen a partir de representaciones perceptuales adquiridas en el pasado, son estas últimas las que permiten al agente formarse la representación impulsiva de lo que es apropiado realizar en las circunstancias actuales.¹⁷

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A Note on Aristotle's *De Anima* A 1, 403a10-16

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In this paper I discuss passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle's *De Anima*. In this passage Aristotle deals with whether the soul could be separate from the body and presents an analogy with geometrical entities. This passage is highly obscure and it presents many textual difficulties. The interpretation I offer resolves the textual problems without requiring emendations to the text as many commentators suggest.

In this paper I am going to present an interpretation of passage 403a10-16 from Aristotle's *De Anima* A 1. This passage is highly obscure as it presents many difficulties and so far none of the commentators has been able to offer a generally acceptable and satisfactory interpretation of it. I am going to show that the passage not only can be satisfactorily interpreted, but also without emendating the ancient text as some commentators suggest.¹

At first, let me make a brief remark. Ian Mueller in his paper "Aristotle on Geometrical Objects" argues that geometrical objects are composed of intelligible matter² (which according to Mueller, is the quantitative and continuous in one, two or three dimensions, which are the line, the surface and the solid respectively) as well as certain properties (like for example the property of being straight). Thus, a straight line, for example, consists of intelligible matter (the quantitative and continuous in one dimension, i.e. the line) as well as the property of being straight. Therefore, geometrical objects have to be understood as form-matter compounds, where form is the defining property and matter is, as mentioned above, intelligible matter.³ In this paper I am going to adopt Mueller's interpretation about the ontological status of geometrical objects. Let us first quote and translate the passage.

¹ See Bostock, David, "Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics", in Shields, Christopher (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 486, McKay, Robert, "Touching the bronze sphere at a point: a note on *De Anima* I. 1, 403a10 – 16, *Apeiron*, Vol. XIII, 1979, p. 89, Ross, W. H., *Aristotle De Anima*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961, p. 168

² Intelligible matter is mentioned by Aristotle as the matter of mathematical objects (see *Metaphysics* Z 10, 1036a9-12).

³ See Mueller, Ian, "Aristotle on Geometrical Objects" (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52, 1970, pp. 165-169 / "Aristotle on Geometrical Objects" repr. in J. Barnes et al., (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle vol.3*, Duckworth, London, 1979, pp. 103-105.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ
παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μη-
θέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ
εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλ-
κῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμὴν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἄνεται οὕτως χωρι-
σθέν τὸ εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ αἰ μετὰ σώματος τινος
ἔστιν.

If some of the functions and affections of the soul are peculiar to it, it would be possible that it can be separated. But if none of these are peculiar to it, then it would not be possible to be separable, but it would rather be like the case of the straight *qua* straight which has many properties belonging to it, like, for example, to touch the bronze sphere at a point. But if the property of being straight is separated, then it will not touch [the bronze sphere]. Actually, it is inseparable, since it always belongs to some body.

Aristotle, in this section of *De Anima* A 1, deals with the question whether it would be possible for the soul to exist separately from the body. What we understand from the text, is that if some of the properties of the soul were peculiar to it, then it would be possible for it to be separated. This is because if the soul had properties peculiar to it, it would still have those properties even if it was separable. But on the other hand, if none of its properties are peculiar to it, then it would be inseparable. Now, a main problem of the passage is that it is rather unclear which the analogy Aristotle offers is. What appears to be the case is that the soul is analogous to the “straight. But then again what is this “straight”? Is it a straight magnitude (e.g. a straight line)? Is it the property of being straight? Or is it something rather different? What most of the commentators believe is that what Aristotle in this passage analogizes the soul to the straight line⁴, but as we subsequently going to show, this cannot be the case. Puzzling as well, are lines 403a14-16 where Aristotle discusses the inseparability of the “straight” from the body where it belongs. What is not entirely clear in those lines is whether the “straight” in line 403a15 has the same meaning with the one it has in line 403a12. Finally, another problem has to do with the claim that something straight *qua* straight is touching a sensible (bronze) sphere at a point. This appears to be rather problematic since sensible objects of the sublunar area do not fulfill ideal geometrical attributes and thus something straight *qua* straight cannot touch a bronze sphere at a point.⁵ Based on this last remark, we can distinguish between two main lines

⁴ See e.g. Aquinas, Thomas, *Sentencia libri de anima* 1.2.82-101, Hamlyn, D. W., *Aristotle De Anima, Books I and II (with passages from book I)*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, pp. 78-79, Hicks, R. D., *Aristotle De Anima: With Translation, Introduction and Notes*, Cambridge University Press, 1907, p. 196, McKay op. cit. 89.

⁵ It can be seen in certain passages in the Corpus that the sensible objects of the sublunar area do not fulfill ideal geometrical properties being perfectly straight or perfectly curved. The first passage is *De Caelo* B 7, 287b14-21. In this passage Aristotle addresses that the elements of the sublunar area do not

of interpretation. According to the first one, Aristotle indeed refers to sensible objects, while according to the second one, this cannot be the case due to the imperfection of sensible objects of the sublunar area.

As we mentioned, according to the first line of interpretation, Aristotle indeed refers to sensible objects, namely that a straight sensible object is touching the bronze sphere at a point. This is because what Aristotle is actually interested in this passage is the separability of the soul, so it is of no importance for him whether a sensible straight object can actually touch a bronze sphere at a point or not. Accordingly, we may understand the text in two different ways. The first one would be the reading proposed by Polansky, namely that a sensible straight object, by being straight, touches the bronze sphere at a point, but, as Polansky says, “apart from sensible matter, lines are merely formal (the essence or definition of line) or mathematical, and therefore they cannot touch a perceptible sphere at all”.⁶ The second one would be Philoponus' reading⁷ namely that a sensible straight object touches the bronze sphere at a point but “straightness”, if separated, will not touch.

Although it is true that Aristotle's primary concern in this passage is the separability of the soul, I believe that both the above ways of understanding the text are rather problematic. Regarding the first reading, it could easily work (and even better as well) without the phrases “*qua* straight” and “at a point”. Still Aristotle mentions those phrases which makes us think that what he is speaking about is mathematical entities and not sensible objects. As for the second reading, the analogy between the soul and the “straight” could work equally well if Aristotle had presented a pure geometrical example where a geometrical straight line touches a geometrical sphere at a point, without making a false claim, namely that a straight sensible

have the smoothness and the accuracy of aether which the heavenly bodies are constituted of. The second passage is *Metaphysics* B 2, 997b35-998a4, where Aristotle mentions that the ruler does not touch the sensible circle at a point. There is, however, Jonathan Lear, who believes that there are sensible objects fulfilling ideal geometrical properties (see Lear, Jonathan, “Mathematics in Aristotle” *Philosophical Review*, XCI, 1982, pp. 175-181) and that in passage 403a10-16 what we have is a perfectly straight sensible object that touches a perfectly round bronze sphere (ibid. 180-181). As for passage 997b35-998a4 Lear argues that there is a supposed Platonist speaking and the thesis presented is one that is not accepted by Aristotle himself (ibid. 175-176). However, whether a view of a platonist expressed in this passage or not, the most natural reading of it suggests us that this thesis is one that Aristotle agrees with, hence this what most of the scholars argue to be the case (see e.g. Pettigrew, R., ‘Aristotle on the Subject Matter of Geometry’, *Phronesis*, 54 (3), 2009., pp. 245-246, Katz, Emily, “Geometrical Objects as Properties of Sensibles: Aristotle’s Philosophy of Geometry”, *Phronesis*, 64, 2019, p. 467). Moreover, passage 287b14-21 is very explicit. Therefore, I believe it is safe to argue that there the sensible objects do not fulfill ideal geometrical properties being perfectly straight or perfectly curved and so a sensible straight line cannot touch a bronze sphere at a point.

⁶ See Polansky 2007 pp. 52-53.

⁷ See Philoponus, Johanes, *Philoponi in Aristotelis De Anima* 49,18 – 50,3

object touches the bronze sphere at a point. So there is no reason for Aristotle to purposely present a mistaken example since he could easily have avoided it. For the above reasons I believe it is preferable to choose a different path from the aforementioned one in order to interpret the passage.

As for the second line of interpretation, one of its supporters is Robert McKay. McKay⁸, in his interpretation, supports the view that what is analogous to the soul is the straight line and he argues that the textual difficulties can be overcome, if we a) omit the word “χαλκῆς” from the text and b) understand the phrase “μετὰ σώματός τινος” to mean “μετὰ μεγέθους τινος”, since, as he says: “For while many attributes belong to the straight line many attributes (like touching the sphere at a point) belong *qua* straight line – as a consequence of its οὐσία and in separation from anything incidental to it – nevertheless they don’t belong to it in separation from magnitude and length: they clearly could belong to nothing but a geometrical magnitude”.

Regarding McKay’s first suggestion, even though by omitting the word “χαλκῆς” we have a straight line and a geometrical sphere which indeed touch one another at a point, the textual difficulties cannot be fully overcome. This is because a straight line is itself a magnitude. We can say that a straight line belongs to a two or a three-dimensional magnitude, but it would be absurd to say that it belongs to a one-dimensional magnitude, since it is itself a one dimensional magnitude. As we see then, McKay’s interpretation fails to deal with the problems satisfactorily enough. Furthermore, it requires emendations to the text.

Another supporter of the same line of interpretation is David Bostock. Bostock argues that the passage as it is, contains errors. The reason is because in lines 403b17-19 Aristotle says that “We were saying that the affections of the soul, insofar as they are such as anger and fear, are inseparable in this way from the physical matter of the animals and not in the way the line and the plane are”. Bostock argues that the two passages contradict one another and it is passage 403a10-16 that is more likely to be wrong. Indeed, if what is analogous to the properties of the soul in passage 403a10-16 is the straight line and/ or the plane, it, in fact, contradicts what is being said in lines 403a17-18. What Bostock suggests is that the meaning required is quite the opposite of the one that it appears to be. The correct meaning, according to Bostock, is that if the soul is as envisaged then it would be analogous to a physical embodied straight edge which does not touch the bronze sphere at a point, since a physical embodied straight edge (being physical) cannot be perfectly straight.⁹ However, his interpretation involves a series of

⁸ op. cit. 89

⁹ op. cit. 485-486.

emendations to the ancient text and this makes it rather weak.¹⁰ Still, as aforementioned, if what is analogous to the properties of the soul in passage 403a10-16 is the straight line and/or the plane, then its meaning contradicts what Aristotle says in lines 403b17-19 and this definitely constitutes a problem. However, as I am going to show, the properties of the soul, in passage 403a10-16, are not analogous to the straight line and/or the plane and the two passages do not contradict one another.

Contrary to what most of the commentators believe, I maintain that the analogy Aristotle offers, is, as Philoponus (op. cit. 50, 3-4) suggests, between the soul and the property of being straight. This, I believe, is the most reasonable reading, since the soul according to Aristotle is the form of animals and, similarly, the property of being straight is the form of a straight geometrical object (like a straight line or a plane). Accordingly, the animal would be analogous to the straight line.

We subsequently have to understand the example Aristotle presents in lines 403a12-13 about the “straight *qua* straight” and the bronze sphere. As I have already argued the phrase “τὸ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ” cannot mean an enmattered straight (sensible) object, which, by being straight, touches a bronze sphere at a point, since there are no sensible objects fulfilling ideal geometrical properties. Also, the “straight *qua* straight” cannot refer to the property of being straight, since the property of being straight itself cannot touch a magnitude. The most reasonable thing would be to assume that the straight *qua* straight refers to some straight geometrical magnitude. However, if this is the case, then what we would expect to see in the text is that what this geometrical straight magnitude touches at a point is a geometrical sphere. In contrast, what Aristotle mentions, is not a geometrical sphere but rather a bronze sphere something which is indeed very problematic.

I believe that the way for the problem to be overcome lies on the notion of “*qua*”. In *Metaphysics* M 3, a chapter where Aristotle exposes his theory of mathematical objects, he uses the notion of “*qua*” in order to address what objects are the ones mathematicians deal with. As he says what a geometer studies is the sensible objects in a given way, namely *qua* solids, or *qua* planes, or *qua* lines.¹¹ Emily Katz argues that although there are no sensible objects having ideal geometrical properties, such as being perfectly straight or perfectly curved, there are sensible objects *qua* geometrical that fulfil such ideal properties. These sensible

¹⁰ As Bostock himself admits: “I cannot pretend that this set of emendations looks very plausible from a paleographic point of view, but I do think that something among these lines is needed”. (op. cit. 486)

¹¹ See 1077b23-34.

objects, as Katz argues, are the constructive drawings which are used in geometry in order to investigate the properties of a geometrical object and are very precise. According to Katz, even though such a drawn figure as it is, is not going to have such ideal geometrical properties because of its matter, the drawn figure *qua* geometrical (after the sensible properties are abstracted from it)¹² will have such ideal geometrical properties.¹³ I believe that perhaps Katz's interpretation can be extended, as well, to solid objects that have been precisely constructed. If so, then what Aristotle says in lines 403a13-14, namely that something straight *qua* straight touches the bronze sphere at a point, it can be understood as that what touches the sphere is a sensible straight object *qua* (perfectly) straight. Similarly, when Aristotle talks about the bronze sphere what he probably intends to mean is the bronze sphere *qua* geometrical sphere, and thus perfectly spherical. After all, the bronze sphere has been constructed in the model of geometrical sphere.

Finally, a further problem we have to deal has to do with the closing phrase of the passage in lines 403a15-16 (“εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινος”). First of all let us say that the ancient Greek word “σῶμα” can refer either to a physical body or to a geometrical solid. Since, as we have seen, sensible objects do not fulfil ideal geometrical properties such as straight lines, we have to eliminate the possibility that the word “σῶμα” in this passage refers to a physical solid. However, even if we accept the other alternative, namely that the word “σῶμα” refers to a geometrical solid the text still remains problematic. Geometrical solids are three-dimensional whilst the property of being straight can belong either to one-dimensional objects (lines), or to two-dimensional objects (planes), or, else, to three-dimensional objects (solids). Therefore, it would be more plausible for the text to have the word “μέγεθος” (magnitude) instead of the word “σῶμα”. Certainly then, what is being said in the closing phrase of the passage is mistaken. As we have seen, McKay suggests that we have to understand the phrase “μετὰ σώματός τινος” to mean “μετὰ μεγέθους τινος”. However, McKay's suggestion requires at best an emendation to the text, and at worst to understand the word “σῶμα”, which is something always three-dimensional, to mean “μέγεθος”, which is either one-dimensional, either two-dimensional, or three-dimensional. None of the above options seems to be attractive.

¹² “Abstraction” which is often mentioned in *Corpus* in relation to the objects of mathematics (see e.g. *De Caelo* Γ 1 299a15-17, *De Anima* Γ 8, 403a5-6, *Metaphysics* K 3 1068a28-29, *Nicomachean Ethics* Z 8, 1142a16-20) it appears to be procedure by which we disregard in thought certain properties from a given object (see *Metaphysics* K 3 1068a28-b3). Many scholars, as Katz in particular (op. cit. 483-492) argue that “abstraction” is related to Aristotle's “*qua* theory”, with “abstraction” being the procedure, while an object *x qua z* the outcome.

¹³ op. cit. 492-495.

I think that there is a less painful way to overcome this difficulty. What I believe to be the most probable solution is to assume that what Aristotle has in mind here is a stereometrical case where what touches the sphere at a point is some plane or a straight edge of a solid. It is reasonable then to suppose that this is what perhaps leads him to mistakenly mention the word “σῶμα” instead of the word “μέγεθος” which would be the proper one.¹⁴

According to the above remarks, it is evident that the soul is analogous to the property of being straight, the animal is analogous to a straight magnitude and finally the properties of the soul are analogous to the properties a straight magnitude has by being straight.¹⁵ Thus, the meaning of passage 403a10-16 would be the following one: If the soul has some properties that are peculiar to it then it would be possible for it to exist separately from the body. In contrast, if the soul has no properties peculiar to it, then it would be inseparable. In that case we are going to have a case analogous to that of a straight magnitude. A straight magnitude, being straight, has many properties, like touching a bronze sphere *qua* geometrical sphere at a point. However, the property of being straight if separated from the magnitude it belongs to, will not keep the property of touching the sphere at a point anymore. The property of being straight is in fact inseparable from the magnitude it belongs to.

Undoubtedly, passage 403a10-16 is very puzzling due to its textual difficulties. No wonder, then, that the already existing interpretations are rather problematic. In this paper, my task was to overcome those textual difficulties offering a coherent interpretation of the passage without needing to emendate the text. I believe I have managed to do so satisfactorily enough and this shows it is possible that we make good sense of the text as it stands and we do not need to entertain the idea that it contain errors.

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¹⁴ Adopting the above reading, it would be misleading to see the phrase “ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ” to refer to what the soul is analogous to. The meaning of the opening lines would rather be the following one: If the soul does not have properties peculiar to it, it would be inseparable and this case would be analogous to the one of a straight line which, *qua* straight has many properties belonging to it like touching the bronze sphere *qua* geometrical sphere at a point.

¹⁵ Therefore, since the properties of the soul are analogous to the properties of a straight magnitude and not to the straight line and/or the plane, it becomes evident that passage 403a10-16 does not contradict to what is said in lines 403b17-19.

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