THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF 
PARTES PRUDENTIAE
IN CIC. INV. 2.160

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This paper is part of the research I developed during my post doctoral fellowship at the Università degli Studi di Torino (UNITO) in 2019, with the support of the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP). The author wishes to thank Ermanno Malaspina for all his help and support in that period, and also for his kind reading of an early draft of this paper.
INITIAL REMARKS

The concept of *prudentia* in Cicero has deservedly received a lot of scholarly attention lately. Fundamental insights have been offered into its different uses in Latin, its relation to Greek φρόνησις, its emphasis on the semantic field of sight and on *providentia*, its relation to divination, and its philosophical background.¹ One of its most important aspects, though, the understanding, linking and combining of past, present and future events in order to establish causal relationships and thus substantiate one’s decision-making process, needs to be more deeply addressed than has been done so far. I believe that some important aspects of Ciceronian *prudentia* have until now eluded scholars because of an understandable methodological concern to stick to the occurrences of the word (and its cognate *providentia*) in Cicero’s corpus. Nevertheless, by following the numerous philosophical treatments of the intellectual ability to correlate past, present and future in Cicero’s work, we will be able to get a clearer picture of Ciceronian *prudentia* in general and of the enumeration of its partes in *De inventione*. Also, we will be able to expand on Malaspina’s recent conclusion that the presentation of the parts of *prudentia* in *De inventione* is compatible with Chrysippus’ doctrine:² it will be shown that Panaetius is the most likely thinker to have adapted Chrysippus’ conceptions in his reworking of Stoic doctrine.

PRUDENTIA IN DE INVENTIONE

Cicero’s treatment of *prudentia* in his early work *De inventione* is found in his discussion of deliberative rhetoric, in Book 2. *Prudentia*, the first of the so-called cardinal virtues, is presented as a part of *honestum*, together with *iustitia*,* fortitudo* and *temperantia*. Cicero then proceeds to define each of them, starting with *prudentia*:

(a) Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum <ne>utrarumque scientia.
(b) Partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, prouidentia. Memoria est per quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quem ea perspic

¹ Martin 1982: 31-65; Ciferri 1993; Cape Jr. 2003; Santangelo 2013; Aubert-Bailot 2015; Traversa 2015; Aubert-Bailot 2017; Traversa 2017; Santangelo 2020; Malaspina 2020.
The definition in (a) bears the marks of Stoic doctrine. Indeed, it is a translation of one of the two Stoic definitions of φρόνησις that have come down to us in the doxographical tradition.\(^4\) But (b) is somewhat puzzling: it does not correspond to the parts of φρόνησις as posited in that tradition, though some similarities have been pointed out in the scholarship.\(^5\) Also, they are six in number\(^6\), whereas Cicero’s presentation offers only three. What to make of such discrepancy? And what is the rationale behind the tripartition? Malaspina, to my knowledge, was the first to note that a fragment by Chrysippus bears striking similarities to Cicero’s formulation, even though the faculty involved is not prudentia, but vis rationabilis.\(^7\) My investigation led me independently to a very similar conclusion. Indeed, the time-correlating or analogy process (as we might call it for convenience) is a recurrent topic in Cicero’s philosophica. By comparing and analyzing its occurrences, it becomes clear that ratio or animi pars rationalis is the faculty responsible for the analogy process, but different aspects of it can be used to refer to it, either more general, like animus, or more specific, like mens. The same is true for the parts or faculties responsible for the understanding of present and future: as an alternative for intellegentia and providentia one also finds mens and cogitatio. Mens, in turn, can be used either for the general faculty or for one of its specific parts. It can also be used to refer simultaneously to more than one time aspect, emphasizing instead the correlational nature of the process.\(^8\) The only invariable faculty is the one responsible for the understanding of the past, memoria. The overall impression is that the intellectual process itself is Cicero’s main interest, and that the variations in

\(^3\) Inv. 2.160. “Acumen is the knowledge of what is good, what is bad and what is neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence, and foresight. Memory is the faculty by which the mind recalls what has happened. Intelligence is the faculty by which it ascertains what is happening. Foresight is the faculty by which it is seen that something is going to happen before it happens.” Translation: Hubbell 2006 [1949]: 327, slightly modified.


\(^5\) Cf. Aubert-Baillot 2015: 82, n. 53; Malaspina 2020: 108, n. 16.

\(^6\) The six parts of φρόνησις in SVF 3.66 are: εὐβουλία (“soundness of judgment”), εὐλογιστία (“circumspection”), ἀγχίνοια (“sagacity”), νουνέχεια (“good sense”), εὐστοχία (“shrewdness”), and εὐμηχανία (“skill in devising means”).


\(^8\) Cic. Fin. 2.45; see also Rep. 4.1 (unfortunately, the fragment lacks context).
vocabulary, consisting in synonyms and near-synonyms, are due to emphasis, context, and specificity.

**THE ANALOGY PROCESS IN THE PHILOSOPHICA**

Having said that, we can proceed to the comparison of the passages dealing with the analogy process. Let us begin by presenting two parallel, complementary excerpts from De *finibus* and De *officiis*:

*Homines enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum a bestiis differunt, quod rationem habent a natura datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celerrimeque multa simul agitantem et, ut ita dicam, sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta coniungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum.*

*Sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum quantum sensu movetur ad id solum quod adest quodque praesens est se accomodat, paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum. Homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnexit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.*

Both discussions are more generic in scope than the one we find in *De inventione*: Cicero is dealing with a feature common to all humans, not with one of the four cardinal virtues. After exposing, in the immediately preced-
ing sections, what men and animals have in common, Cicero establishes reason (ratio) as the main trait that distinguishes them.

Crucially, animals live in an almost perpetual present, whereas humans, through their use of reason and intelligence (mens), are capable of looking at the past, establishing causes (causae rerum) and effects (consecutiones; consequentiae), observing precedents and antecedents (praegressus et quasi antecessiones [rerum]), making comparisons and analogies (similitudines) of situations and events past and present, projecting the future (omnemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum; facile totius vitae cursum videt), and making preparations for it (ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias).

The establishment of connections and correlations between present, past and future is presented in a much more concrete and clear fashion than in Cicero’s youthful treatise: in De inventione, prudentia is the sum total of (apparently) independent parts, each one dealing separately with a different time aspect; in De finibus and De officiis, Cicero seems more interested in describing the process itself and the various steps involved in it.11 It is clear that two features form its core: the observation of causes and effects, and, most importantly, the establishment of similitudines, that is, similarities, affinities, or analogies. But what exactly is the relation between ratio/mens and prudentia? Unsurprisingly, Cicero himself establishes the connexion in the subsequent sections of De officiis. The four cardinal virtues are presented as parts of honestum (or honestas), just like in De inventione. The main components of the intellectual virtue (described as prima pars honestatis and left unnamed) are said to be sapientia and prudentia.12 There follows a description of the working of prudentia (and sapientia) which, read with a passage from Book 2, makes it clear that Cicero relates prudentia and the analogy process as described above, and that it only differs from ratio in degree:

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\text{Ut enim quisque maxime perspicit quid in re quaque verissimum sit quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare rationem, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet.} \]

11 The rigidity and to a certain extent artificiality of the description of prudentia and its partes in De inventione are characteristic of the handbook format. Just as Cicero would later, in his rhetorical works, especially in De oratore, make use of a great range of synonyms, near-synonyms, paraphrases, circumlocutions, concrete formulations instead of more abstract terminology, so in his philosophical input clarity, concreteness, richness of vocabulary are a constant feature. Cf. Dyck 1996: 100–101.

12 In 1.15. In that same section Cicero had also mentioned sollertia.

13 Cic. Off. 1.15–16. “For when a man is extremely good at perceiving what is most true in each particular thing, and when he is able with great acuity and speed to see and to explain the reason, then he is rightly considered extremely sensible and wise.” Translation: Atkins 1991: 7–8.
If *ratio* is a trait common to all humans, *prudentia* (together with *sapientia*) applies only to those that use it in the most powerful, acute and swift way and are thus able to correctly assess situations, crises and emergencies, to predict likely outcomes and to make the best possible *ex tempore* decisions. The analogy process, in both its causal and time-correlating aspects, is clear in the need for establishing *ratio* ("reason", in the sense of "cause") and the linking and combining of present and future events as the basis for decision-making. The distinction in degree that can be deduced from these two quotations is made explicit in *De legibus*, in another passage that deals with the difference between men and animals: *sapientia* is described as *ratio* in its most developed and perfected manifestation.

Various discussions of the analogy process describe it as of divine origin. The first one is the aforementioned passage in *De legibus*. A second discussion appears in a quotation from Cicero’s lost *Consolatio*, cited in his *Tusculanae Disputationes* in the context of an argument for the immortality of the soul. The point is that its different faculties—*memoria* for the retainment (*tenet*) of the past, *mens* for the foresight of the future...
(provideat) and cogitatio for the grasping (complecti) of the present—cannot be found, and therefore do not exist, in the four elements of earth, water, air or fire.

Therefore, the soul can only come from god and, as such, be celestial, divine, and eternal. Interestingly, the argument is said to derive from Aristotle’s notion of quintessence,\(^\text{17}\) not from the Stoics, a detail we will discuss later. A third discussion is found in Book 2 of De natura deorum.\(^\text{18}\) Even though it does not feature the relation of past, present, and future, it describes the functioning of animus and its parts (mens, ratio, consilium, and prudentia), and presents its working in the framework of Stoic dialectic. It is from the conjoining, apprehending and judging of causes and effects in any given case that arise logical conclusions, definitions and descriptions of any given thing. The whole process leads ultimately to scientia.

Finally, in the disputation in utramque partem of De divinatione, the character Quintus Cicero is responsible for the discussion of the Stoic doctrine on divination, in Book 1. The resemblances to the analogy process are evident in Quintus’ explanation of the functioning of divination by dreams and by frenzy:

\begin{quote}
Cum ergo est somno sevocatus animus a societate et a contagione corporis, tum meminit praeteritorum, praesentia cernit, futura providet; iacet enim corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus.\(^\text{19}\) Quae autem pars animi rationis atque intellegentiae sit particeps, eam tum maxime vigere, cum plurimum absit a corpore.\(^\text{20}\)
\end{quote}

\(^{17}\) Cic. T. D. 1.65.  
\(^{18}\) Cic. N. D. 2.147. \textit{iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis rationem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere. De quo dum disputarem, tuam mihi dari vellem, Cotta, eloquentiam. Quo enim tu illa modo diceres, quanta primum intellegentia, deinde consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et comprehensio esset in nobis; ex quo videlicet indicamus quid ex quibusque rebus efficatur, idque ratione conclusimus, singulasque res definimus circumscripimus; ex quo scientia intellegitur quam vim habeat qualis<que> sit, quae ne in deo quidem est res uilla praestantior. [“Coming now to the actual mind and intellect of man, his reason, wisdom and foresight, one who cannot see that these owe their perfection to divine providence must in my view himself be devoid of these very faculties. While discussing this topic I could wish, Cotta, that I had the gift of your eloquence. How could not you describe first our powers of understanding, and then our faculty of conjoining premisses and consequences in a single act of apprehension, the faculty I mean that enables to judge what conclusion follows from any given propositions and to put the inference in syllogistic form, and also to delimit particular terms in a succinct definition; whence we arrive at an understanding of the potency and the nature of knowledge, which is the most excellent part even of the divine nature.” Translation: Rackham 1967 [1933]: 265.}

\(^{19}\) Cic. Div. 1.63. “So when the soul is separated by sleep from union with the body and the contagion it derives from there, then it remembers the past, sees the present, and foresees the future; for the body of a sleeping man lies like that of a dead man, but the soul is active and alive.”

\(^{20}\) Cic. Div. 1.70. “But that part of the soul which participates in rationality and intelligence is at its most active when it is furthest away from the body.”
All the features of the analogy process we have pointed out so far can be observed here:

1) the *animus* (1.63) and its rational and intellectual part (1.70) are responsible for the process; 2) in the first passage, we have the concrete description of the process, involving past, present, and future; 3) verbs and nouns denoting vision abound (1.63: *cernit* and *providet*; 1.70: *observatione, cerni, videant*); 4) the observation and correlation of cause and effect are at the core of the process (1.126: *causa aeterna rerum; cur, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur; causas [...] rerum futurarum*). The difference resides in the insertion of divination as the vehicle for the process, which is then associated with, and explained by, the Stoic conception of fate (1.126). In other words, the analogy process as described by Cicero corresponds to the intellectual process proposed here by Quintus, but, crucially, with the rejection of fate and divination.

If we extrapolate on that point, an easy conjecture is that Chrysippus’ division of the *vis rationalis* was included in the wider context of his doctrine, which encompassed fate, the eternal causes and effects implicit in it, and divination as a sort of human access to it, allowing the foresight of the future. It is clear that, in his use of the process and its mechanisms in his *opus philosophicum*, Cicero rejected the metaphysical aspects of such doctrine, which he refuted in Book 2 of *De divinatione*, and kept the element of human rationality. The process still has its origin in god, but is essentially predicated upon human intelligence, lacking any metaphysical component.

Such procedure, needless to say, is completely in keeping with his Academic *modus philosophandi*. But the evidence seems to indicate that things are a little more complicated than that: in my view, the most likely

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21 Cic. *Div.* 1.126. “From this we recognize that Fate is not what it is called superstitiously but what it is called scientifically, the eternal cause of things, why things that are passed have happened and why impending events occur and why what follows will be. So it comes about that on the one hand it can be known by observation what effect generally follows each cause, even if it doesn’t always follow (for it is difficult to affirm that); on the other hand, it is probable that these same causes of future effects are perceived by those who see them in frenzy or in sleep.” Translation: Wardle 2006: 66, 68, 86.
scenario is that the description of the process as we find it in Cicero’s many treatments of the subject is an appropriation (and almost certainly adaptation to Cicero’s needs) of a formulation first proposed by Panaetius, for a number of reasons.

We have evidence in Cicero and other sources that Panaetius either suspended his judgment on,22 or flatly denied the existence of, divination.23 The same seems to be true for other important tenets of Stoic doctrine: Panaetius is said to have challenged Stoic notions such as ἐκπύρωσις and the cycles of the universe,24 astrology,25 the (temporary) survival of the soul after death,26 συμπάθεια and fate,27 and even, to some extent, the gods.28 It is conceivable that, having disposed of divination and of fate, Panaetius would reframe providence in a human, rational framework. And that is exactly what he seems to have done, as Martin pointed out some decades ago, in his Περὶ Προνοίας,29 a treatise that Cicero wanted to borrow from Atticus’ library in 45 BC.30

[...] tout en admettant que l’homme était partie d’un grand Tout, il [sc. Panétius] a refusé la transcendance de la πρόνοια et la contrainte qu’elle pouvait faire peser sur l’individu, allant jusqu’à lui enlever sa liberté, dans la mesure où elle pouvait être mal comprise. En faisant de l’homme le centre de son propre intérêt, Panétius lui a redonné la possibilité d’agir, dans un premier temps, pour son propre compte. C’est certainement ce point de vue qu’il défendait dans un traité, maintenant totalement perdu, Περὶ Προνοίας. [...] Panétius a refusé toute contagio des astres avec la terre ; il a refusé le principe de la sympathie universelle au nom de la raison qui ne peut admettre qu’on puisse rapporter à l’univers ce qui arrive aux êtres particuliers. Mais nier la divination et toutes les sortes de mantique qui étaient attachées étroitement à l’idée de sympathie, était porter atteinte à la Providence divine pour laisser à l’homme la réalisation de sa propre destinée. L’in-

23 D. L. 7.149 (= Pan. Test. 139 Alesse).
27 Even though there is no direct evidence for that in Panaetius, Schmekel (apud Alesse 1997: 269) deduced that the rejection of divination implied the rejection of συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων and εἰμαμενήν. 
29 Cf. Martin 1982: 25–28. It is to be noted that, even though Cicero’s most common translation of πρόνοια is providentia, in more than one occasion he offers the alternative rendering prudentia.
dividu pouvait se développer et agir, selon une expression rationnelle de la πρόνοια, sans qu’un événement, indépendant de lui, pût, une fois pour toutes, déterminer le cours de son existence, sans qu’il perdît son libre-arbitre.

Some circumstantial evidence is provided by Polybius, who, like Cicero would later do, also used πρόνοια in a political framework. It is at least plausible that Cicero found the intellectual framework for the concept in Panaetius and an authority for its use in political contexts in Polybius.\(^{31}\) Finally, there is the fact that Panaetius is Cicero’s main source for the writing of De officiis.

As for the argument attributed to Aristotle in the Consolatio, we must determine exactly what is attributed to the Stagirite. It is totally in keeping with my hypothesis that, having rejected Stoic/Chrysippean theology and kept the rational process, either Cicero or Panaetius could choose a doctrine on the gods that allowed them to keep the divine origin of the soul without compromising the predominantly human element of intelligence. As argued before, that would be in keeping with Cicero’s Academic stance. As for Panaetius, even though he believed in the mortality of the soul, nothing prevented him from using and adapting Aristotelian doctrine for his own needs, and there is evidence that he used to proceed like that in his reworking of Stoic doctrine. According to Philodemus, Panaetius was both a φιλοπλάτων and a φιλαριστοτέλης, who occasionally diverged from Zenonian doctrine and followed Academic or Peripatetic notions.\(^{32}\) Having discarded orthodox Stoic views on the gods, it is at least plausible that Panaetius would turn to one of his masters for a different system, which would allow him to keep the divine origin of λόγος, but would free it from fate, divination and any other metaphysical component intrinsic to Stoic doctrine.

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\(^{31}\) Even the idea of foresight has an antecedent in Polybius. Cf. Pol. 6.10.12: Εκείνος μὲν οὖν λόγῳ τινὶ προϊδόμενος πόθεν ἕκαστα καὶ πῶς πέφυκε συμβαίνειν, ἀβλαβῶς συνεστήσατο τὴν προειρημένην πολιτείαν [“Lycurgus used calculation to predict how the nature of each of these systems of government would dictate its beginning and its outcome; he drew up his constitution without having suffered.” Translation: Waterfield 2010: 379.] and Cic. Rep. 2.2: Nam neque ullam ingenium tantum exitisse dicebat, ut quem res nulla fugeret, quisquam aliquando fuisse, neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore providere, ut omnia compleceterentur sine rerum usu ac vetustate. [“Our commonwealth, in contrast, was not shaped by one man’s talent but by that of many; and not in one person’s lifetime, but over many generations. He said that there never was a genius so great that he could miss nothing, nor could all the geniuses in the world brought together in one place at one time foresee all contingencies without the practical experience afforded by the passage of time.” Translation: Zetzel 1999: 33.], with Zetzel 1995: 159: “providere is presumably a response to Polybius’ προϊδόμενος of Lycurgus in 6.10.12 […]”\(^{32}\) Pan. Test. 1, col. Ixx Alesse.
CONCLUSION

The examination of the evidence shows that from an early age Cicero was familiarized with the analogy process, which involved two basic components: 1) the observation, linking, combining of past, present and future events; and 2) the establishment of causation and, most importantly, *similitudines*. The goal of the process is to make well-founded projections about the future and substantiate one’s decision-making. The many different formulations of the analogy process in Cicero’s works point to differences in stress and specificity:

Cicero can refer the process either to *animus*, *ratio* or to its different components, among which *prudentia*. *Animus* is used in metaphysical frames of reference, either in the context of an argument for the immortality of the soul or in the description of the working of divination by dreams or by frenzy; *ratio* is employed to describe the nature of humans in general, as opposed to animals; *mens*, *intellegentia* and *cogitatio*, as is to be expected, emphasize the intellectual capacity and the reasoning involved in the process; *consilium* focus on the result of the process, decision-making; finally, *prudentia* can be applied either to life in general, in the context of ethical choices, or to specific fields, like oratory and politics.

The evidence also seems to point to a reworking of Stoic doctrine as the origin of the analogy process. Both the Chrysippean fragment quoted by Chalcidius and the rationale behind divination *quies* or *per furorem* attributed by Quintus Cicero to Chrysippus in *De divinatione* make it clear that the latter also made use of the process in different contexts and with different emphases. The fact that Cicero kept the human, rational aspect of the analogy process and rejected the metaphysical aspects inherent in Chrysippus’ doctrine is either his own innovation or, more likely, an appropriation and adaptation to his own needs of the reworking of Stoic doctrine which he found already in Panaetius.
REFERENCES


