Standing on the shoulders of medieval men: a study of 'man' in the *Leviathan*

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Abstract

Scholars of Thomas Hobbes can be loosely divided into two camps: those who believe Hobbes retained strong medieval elements in his philosophy and those who argued that Hobbes’s philosophy marks a clear break from both Ancient philosophy and Christianity. However, regardless of their position, Hobbesian scholars always acknowledge the presence of Christian elements in Hobbes’s work. This work adds to these debates on Hobbes, but focuses solely on Hobbes’s conceptualization of 'man' rather than his broader political philosophy. Methodologically, it analyzes the presence of Christian elements by juxtaposing Hobbes’s conceptualization of 'man' to St. Augustine, a man who undergoes conversion in Confessions. This juxtaposition reveals that St. Augustine’s path to conversion bears strong similarities to the 'hypothetical' man that agrees to covenant in the *Leviathan*. This further demonstrates that, although Hobbes challenges the old Christian and medieval order with his Leviathan, his understanding of man remains rooted in Medieval thought.

Keywords: Leviathan, St. Augustine, Confessions, Medieval, Christian.

Introduction

The Leviathan sprang, fully armored, into modernity. Yet, because its creation was not *ex nihilo*, it is possible to trace some of the cultural and religious conditions present at the time of its naissance. Indeed, the scholarship on Hobbes can be divided between those who believe Hobbes retained strong Christian and medieval elements in his thought (i.e. Oakeshott, A.P. Martinich) and those who argue that Hobbes’s philosophy marks a clear break with both the Ancient tradition of natural law (i.e. Schopenhauer, Strauss, Curley) and with Christianity (i.e. Schmitt, Voegelin). Yet, regardless of their final position, Hobbesian scholars always acknowledge the presence of Christian elements in Hobbes’s work.

This article presents a method for distinguishing Christian and Medieval assumptions from modern ideas in Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. Methodologically, this work will juxtapose St. Augustine, the man that undergoes religious conversion in

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Confessions, with the theoretical 'man' that agrees to covenant in the Leviathan. This juxtaposition reveals how the path towards conversion that St. Augustine follows in Confessions became mutatis mutandis the model assumed by Hobbes when he conceptualized the path that any man must undergo in order to agree to covenant in the Leviathan.

This does not mean that Hobbes employed St. Augustine’s path to conversion intentionally. Rather, the presence of Augustinian elements in the Leviathan demonstrates that Hobbes built the Leviathan on a medieval understanding of man as a being in need of redemption that can reason through his fear of death, temper his will from pride, and will himself into obedience. Thus, while Hobbes challenges the old order with his Leviathan, his understanding of man remained nevertheless rooted in medieval thought.

Affinities between Christian themes and Hobbes’s Leviathan have been the focus of numerous philosophical debates. Among those are the exchanges between Leo Strauss, who argued that Hobbes excludes revealed theology and natural law from politics, and Michael Oakeshott, who stressed the manner in which Christianity, be it in the form of myth, finds its way into the Leviathan. Also relevant here is the exchange between A. P. Martinich and E. Curley about whether or not Hobbes is not only a theist, but also an orthodox Christian committed to the Church of England. Parts of the insights that emerge from these debates will find their way interspersed in the exegesis that follows. But the broader arguments these thinkers put forth is largely outside the scope of this work. This is because they are primarily focused on the broader political philosophy found in the Leviathan, rather than the kind of assumptions Hobbes makes about the process underwent by the 'man' that commits to the Leviathan.

Instead of focusing on the broader philosophical arguments, this essay follows a different approach: one that takes the reader away from the constructed Leviathan and back to its building blocks. The focus here is changed from the larger political role the Leviathan attributes to Christianity to the micro level of the man in the Leviathan’s foundation. For this reason, it is more accurate to think of this work as existential in focus because it focuses on the level of man's existence, the choices he makes in the
Leviathan, and how these compare to St. Augustine's in his *Confessions*. The guiding question for this comparison is: Since Hobbes's philosophy marks the beginning of modern thought and of liberalism, 'how modern is Hobbes's man?'

To answer this question, I compare Hobbes’s man in the *Leviathan* with St. Augustine's experience of conversion in the *Confessions* because it is one of the most widely known and revered by all Christian denominations, including the Anglican Church to which Hobbes showed most affinity. Yet, by focusing on St. Augustine, I do not mean to imply that other experiences of conversion to Christianity are less valid. Indeed, the model of Christian conversion consisting in the realization that one is 'fallen,' and fears death, followed by one's repentance and commitment to humble obedience, is not unique to St. Augustine, but his *Confessions* do preserve one of the most well documented and referenced accounts. Thus, in what follows, I show that Hobbes built his *Leviathan* on an understanding of man as a being who understands that his condition is in need of amelioration, who acknowledges death as his greatest fear, who commits to tempering his will from pride, and finally wills himself into obedience. This comparison will show that while Hobbes challenges the old medieval order with his *Leviathan*, his understanding of man remained in many ways rooted in medieval thought.

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1 Thomas Hobbes's commitment to Christianity is difficult to establish in part because of the lack of agreement about the standards according to which one could judge what it means to be a 'Christian.’ If one delineates between one who is Christian, and one who is not, along the lines of reason and revelation, as Strauss and Curley do, then Hobbes does not leave much room for Christianity. However, if one is allowed to contend that Christianity does not only involve direct revelation but that one can go about her life, and follow the Church's moral code without experiencing a single instance of direct revelation and still be “a good Christian” as A.P Martinich argues, then Hobbes's commitment to Christianity can be discussed further.

Further complicating the debate of whether or not Hobbes is a Christian is the lack of agreement about what understanding of Christianity one adopts. Indeed, part of what allowed Christianity to survive for millennia was its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Thus, if one is willing to regard Christianity itself as more fluid in its beliefs over time, even in its most rigid beliefs (e.g. there was a time when even the Catholic Church did not believe in immediate hominization), rather then only choose one historical period as the standard against which to judge what is ‘proper’ Christian - then one could also contend, as A. P. Martinich did, that Hobbes's intention might be to transform Christian beliefs in the hope of making them accommodate the new scientific discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo (p. 15).
Man must accept redemption

Both St. Augustine in the *Confessions* and the Hobbesian man in the state of nature are in a state that is sufficiently unpleasant as to require immediate remedy. Indeed, *Confessions* begins with St. Augustine attempting to identify with Adam to better understand man’s original sin and his fall from grace. Like Adam, St. Augustine engages in dialogue with God (Book I, 6); but unlike Adam, he is further removed from God. For, while Adam eats the forbidden fruit, St. Augustine’s pleasure “in doing something forbidden” (Book II, 4), he confesses, has no ulterior motive. And, while Adam knew that God would look for him after he had sinned, St. Augustine feels farther removed from God and even fears being forsaken. As he writes: “Do not hide your face away from me” (Book I, 5). He also confesses his sins from infancy, even though he does not remember them: “no trace of it remains in my memory” (Book I, 7). St. Augustine thus understands himself, in retrospect, to be a part of the fallen world.

By comparison, Hobbes engages in a thought experiment to understand man’s condition in the absence of a common power in his theoretical state of nature. “In such condition [he writes] there is...no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short” (p. 186) [sic]. And man, a being “apt to invade, and destroy one another” (p. 186), belongs to this nature. And, even though St. Augustine understood himself as part of a fallen nature and even though he describes himself as riddled with sin from early life,

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2 This passage resonates with St. Augustine’s own account in *City of God* where he describes the condition of human society in the absence of justice. He writes: “Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale? What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? A gang is a group of men under the command of a leader, bound by a compact of association, in which the plunder is divided according to an agreed convention”. (Book IV, chapter 5:4)

This similarity, though important to the greater literature on Hobbes and St. Augustine is, however, outside of the scope of the paper which compares only at the level of man in the *Leviathan* and St. Augustine in the *Confessions*. Nevertheless, despite the dark view the two share about the fate of human beings in the absence of social order, it is also important to note that St. Augustine would not contend that any order is better than no order as Hobbes would. Indeed he does not say ‘remove kingdoms and what are men’ but rather remove justice,” which denotes that for St. Augustine justice is more than mere conventional authority, whereas in Hobbes’s *Leviathan* justice become the product of conventional authority.

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his nature is less ‘fallen’ than the one Hobbes attributes to men in the state of nature for at least he stopped short of wanting to 'destroy' another human being. Nevertheless, despite the differences in degree, both accounts share an understanding of man’s nature as sufficiently ‘bad' to require extensive struggle on man’s part to ameliorate it. For St. Augustine, the remedy will turn out to be divine grace. For Hobbes, it will be the state of civil society. Leo Strauss went so far as to state that Hobbes “replaced the state of grace by the state of civil society” (Strauss, p. 184). This argument resonates with Beiner’s, who argued - that in Hobbes’s political philosophy, “the Christian religion ceases to assert any otherworldly claims whatsoever, and limits itself to this-worldly claims on behalf of Christ’s eventual reclamation of temporal power” or what Beiner calls, the Judaicizing Christianity (p. 55). In sum, man in the medieval conceptualization is a being that must overcome his condition and this is also a view that Hobbes adopted for his own understanding of man.

The fear of death as man's greatest fear

St. Augustine and the Hobbesian man are also most afraid of death. Indeed, though St. Augustine confesses to many fears and passions, in retrospect, he reasons that fear of death was his greatest. In his youth, he confesses to have been afraid of beatings (Book I, 9), or of being emotionally too affected by the tragic fate of Dido (Book I, 13). In his boyhood, he was prompted to new passions, amongst which the vanity to win at games even by cheating (Book I, 19), and to create for himself “an

3 The role of grace in relation to the human will is a subject that cannot be properly addressed here. This all the more so since St. Augustine changed his views dramatically from the time of when he wrote the Confessions to the end of his life. At the heart of his transformation is his debate with the Plagians. This debate went on for decades and in the aftermath St. Augustine’s understanding of free will from the Confessions as 'the ability of the mind to command the mind,' transformed into an understanding of will that was free only to sin. And, as natural corollary, as man's ability to will his mind into obedience towards God decreased, the role of grace became greater in Augustine’s later writings. Here I relay on his understanding of the will as present in the Confessions but I am nevertheless aware that as St. Augustine's understanding of the will has changed dramatically, his views of human nature became progressively pessimistic.
illusion of liberty” (Book II, 6) from not being caught for doing bad things. Youth adds to his boyhood passions: “jealousy and suspicion, fear, anger and quarrels” (Book III, 1) and “the enjoyment of the pangs of sorrow” (Book III, 2) in the theater. These passions, St. Augustine insists, “remain with us while one stage of life follows upon another” (Book I, 19). And because these passions rest deep within man, the process of reaching them becomes a difficult one. St. Augustine writes: “all who read my words may realize the depth from which we are to cry to you (Book II, 3). All these fears and passions, St. Augustine confesses, turned him away from God.

However, while these fears and passions contributed in various ways and to different degrees to turning St. Augustine away from God, St. Augustine singles out fear of death as the passion that prompted him to turn towards God. “I was sick and tired of living and yet afraid to die. I suppose that the great love which I had for my friend made me hate and fear death all the more, as though it were the most terrible of enemies” (Book IV, 6) Yet, this fear was not sufficient to turn him towards God.

It is not uncommon to argue, as Hannah Arendt did, that St. Augustine's fear of death lead him directly to God and to conversion and that “it was almost a matter of course that the apostle Paul finally convinced Augustine” (p. 14). However, if fear of death was both a necessary and a sufficient condition to conversion then St. Augustine would have converted much sooner. In fact, in the Confessions, St. Augustine's fear of death did not lead him directly to God - it lead him first to contemplate the problem of clinging to transitory things as if they were permanent. As he writes: “What madness, to love a man as something more than human!” (Book IV, 7). Afterwards he came to believe in a beyond that was permanent, then in the possibility of God as substance in Beauty and Proportion, which he subsequently dismissed. Thus, it is years after he became aware that he fears his own death most, that he arrived at the real moment of conversion. And, there is nothing in the Confessions that would indicate that fear of death necessarily led him to conversion. As a matter of fact, one could argue, following the Christian tradition, that the path from his realization that fear of death is his greatest passion, to the moment of conversion was from St. Augustine's perspective at the time contingent on many other factors and made clear and coherent only in the aftermath once he traced back the history of his life.
The experience of fear of death after all is not singular to St. Augustine. Gilgamesh too feared it; and yet the same fear did not drive him to contemplate life through God, but rather life as God. In other words, men, Christian or not, who fear death can deal with this fear a number of ways - at the limit, even suicide can be a solution to this fear, since it eliminates it once and for all. For, St. Augustine, however, his struggle towards conversion was promoted by his realization that fear of death was his greatest passion.

Analogously, according to Hobbes, man’s many passions generally incline him towards the state of nature and to war. Indeed man would be perpetually lost among his passions were it not for one passion to assert itself more than all the others and to drive him to search for a way to overcome it. Thus, while the passions that incline man to peace are “Feare of Death,” desire for comfort and the hope of attaining it (p. 188), the passion that inclines man most and on which the Leviathan is build is the fear of death (p. 252). Man must engage with the entire spectrum of his passions and understand that he is most afraid of his own death, especially brutish death. Once he acknowledges that fear of death is his greatest passion, he must proceed to overcome it.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that when man deliberates as to which passion is his greatest, he does so alone rather than through dialogue with others. This also marks a departure from the Ancient model of deliberation. Socrates, for example, did not deliberate so much with his passions as he did with the opinions of the many. In other words, Hobbes’s understanding of deliberation is not the only one possible, but it is one that is consistent with the relatively solitary process described by St. Augustine in Confessions. In sum, Hobbes shares with St. Augustine an understanding that man can also deliberate with his passions and arrive at the understanding that fear of death is his greatest passion.
Man’s will must be tempered from pride

It is hard to overemphasize the degree to which man must resist and fight his pride in both the works of St. Augustine and Hobbes. St. Augustine’s first attempt to understand God was in *Beauty and Proportion*, where he conceptualized God as substance. In retrospect, he confesses that this understanding was the product of his pride because it presumed God’s nature to be the same as man’s. He writes: “I was struggling to reach you, but you thrust me back so that I knew the taste of death. For you thwart the proud” (Book IV, 15). St. Augustine understood that his approach to God as substance was due to the Manecheans’ influence on his thought, which he abandoned in favor of the Ancient pursuit of truth.

However, St. Augustine also finds the Ancient philosophers’ approach to truth unsatisfactory. Philosophers, as he elaborates in *The City of God*, “have wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on earth and to achieve bliss by their own efforts. The Truth ridiculed such people through the words of the prophet:...’The Lord knows that the thoughts of wise men are foolish’ (City of God, p. 852). He also confesses his personal experience with this ‘amazing folly’ and the manner in which the Ancient philosophical pursuit for truth brought him to the edge of despair. He writes:

I was nineteen, the age at which I had first begun to search in earnest for truth and wisdom...I realized that I was now thirty years old and was still floundering in the same quagmire, because I was greedy to enjoy what the world had to offer, though it only eluded me and wasted my strength. And all the time I had been telling myself one tale after another. ‘Tomorrow I shall discover the truth. I shall see it quite plainly, and it will be mine to keep...’ (Book VI, 11)

St. Augustine escapes from this predicament by acknowledging that pride hindered his struggle for understanding.

Consequently, he turns to the Scriptures admitting that “we are too weak to discover truth by reason alone” (Book VI, 5). Indeed, as he comes closer to the moment of his conversion, the Biblical references to pride become more abundant in the *Confessions*. He writes: “All this had grown into a wound, for the proud lie wounded at your feet....you thwart the proud and keep your grace for the humble” (Book VII, 7). Moreover, he writes: “Learn from me; I am gentle and humble of heart”
These references to pride culminate in references to Christ’s model of humility: “I was not humble enough to conceive of the humble Jesus Christ as my God, nor had I learned what lesson his human weakness was meant to teach” (Book VIII, 18). And finally, before he converts, he asks Alypius: “What is the matter with us? What is the meaning of this story?...Is it because they have led the way that we are ashamed to follow? (Book VIII, 8). Thus, while throughout Confessions St. Augustine must overcome many passions before his actual conversion, he struggles most with pride.

Returning to Hobbes, even after man realizes that his greatest passion is fear of death and acknowledges that he must overcome it, he still finds himself unable to do so unless he also realizes that pride will hinder him in his pursuits. Hobbes maintains that “vain-glory” is most common amongst young men because they assume strengths that they do not possess (p. 125, 369), and a defect that is often times corrected with age and experience. However, pride does not only hinder the young man from escaping fear of death; it does so also for the man who believes he is wise.

When Hobbes describes the faculties of mind that make men equal, he excludes men’s different abilities to articulate through speech, as well as their different abilities to comprehend science as a source of inequality and calls the learning that emerges from the arts and sciences “a vain conceipt of one’s wisdom” (p. 183). And just as the arts and sciences do not provide man with reasons to assert his inequality, neither does philosophy. Hobbes writes: “I know that Aristotle...maketh men by Nature, some worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his Philosophy, and others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies and were not philosophers as he was, and as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit” (p. 211). Hobbes makes a similar argument in regards to Plato, whom he admires for his use of geometry. He argues against his attempt to derive moral philosophy from nature stating, since “moral Philosophy is but a description of their [philosophers’] own Passions” (p. 686). Hobbes contends that even if “nature have made men unequall; yet because men that
think themselves equal, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equal terms, such equality must be admitted” (p. 211). Therefore, even if some men are unequal, they are allowed in the covenant if they agree to regard themselves as equal. Hence, men must agree to disregard their inequalities. And, Hobbes concludes that “every man acknowledge other for his Equal by Nature. That breach of this Percept is Pride” (p. 211). In sum, after man deliberates with his passions and realizes his fear of death to be his greatest fear of all, he must engage in a further deliberation with pride. In the event that he is inclined towards glory, then he must temper his pride with experience. And if he happens to be inclined towards philosophy, he must temper it by reasoning that morality cannot be derived from philosophy.

Thus, St. Augustine believes Ancient philosophy was not able to go far enough in its account of morality and yet it wrongly maintained that it did, while Hobbes maintains that Ancient philosophers were vain to believe that they could lay any claims to morality. In the end, both Hobbes and St. Augustine fault philosophy for giving man a false sense of pride and both maintain that pride hinders man from becoming a Christian or from agreeing to covenant in the *Leviathan*.

**Man willing himself to obedience**

Though Hobbes and St. Augustine both emphasize the role played by human will in the process of conversion, or agreement to the Leviathan, they do nevertheless have different understandings of cosmology that informs the manner in which they understand the concept of will. Hobbes’s views emerge most strongly in a debate on the topic with Bramhall, who argued, in accordance with the Church’s tradition, that free will exists outside the physical world and is subject to contingency. St. Augustine embodies this understanding of the will at the moment of his conversion when he reflects on the possibility of an existence outside the physical world and when he interprets this moment as a spiritual transcendence from the natural order or necessity towards a higher order of existence. The element of contingency is also evident in the Confessions as St. Augustine recalls, in the aftermath, the events that were important to his life and which, together with God’s grace, led him to conversion.
Hobbes, by contrast, understands the entire Universe as 'matter in motion' and does not believe that free will can transcend this order. Consequently, Hobbes argues that one is capable of asserting his will in as far as he is not constrained by other factors. Hobbes also eliminated the notion of contingency, arguing in favor of both logical and physical necessary causes or casual determinism.

Yet, what Hobbes does not change from the older tradition is the connection between will and action and the understanding that one could act willfully to obey, which permeates all of philosophy. Thus, regardless of how 'free' the will really is, and regardless also of how 'powerful' its impulse, the understanding that the will determines if someone will act and if they will act willfully, endured. Hobbes also continues the older philosophical tradition that maintained that acting willfully to obey either reason, as the Greek and Roman philosophers maintained, or God as the Christian theologians did, was conducive to the good life. To summarize, Hobbes still believed that willing oneself into obedience rather than say willing one's freedom is conducive to the good life. However, it is also true that the two philosophers think of will's origin and its role in connecting one to the universe is radically different ways.

Yet, as this study aims to focus only at the level of 'man,' it will concentrate more on how man comes to act in Hobbes's Leviathan and how this compares to St. Augustine’s, rather than the larger cosmology that informs the two thinkers.

Both St. Augustine and Hobbes agree than man posses a will and that he can will himself and should will himself into obedience to a greater power. St. Augustine was always aware of his ability to will. He wrote: “I knew I had a will, as surely as I knew that there was life in me,” but he was not always ready to accept that he might have acted wrongly (Book VII, 3). In retrospect, he attributes his reluctance to admit wrongdoings to pride and it is only after he confronts his pride that his mind can command his mind (Book VIII, 9), and will himself towards God: “all that you asked of me was to deny my own will and accept yours” (Book IX, 1). In other words, aided by God’s grace, he was able to will an act outside the immediate order, or the condition trapped in nature’s necessity, and to approach God.
Returning to Hobbes, deliberation ends, in “the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof” and this is called WILL (p. 127). While will is an attribute of the Sovereign, who is the soul of the Leviathan and/or the laws of the Leviathan (p. 81), it becomes so only after it aggregates all men’s wills to escape their fear of death and after men overcome their pride. Consequently, “the only way to erect such a Common Power,...is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will...to submit their Wills, every one to his Will” (p. 227). Thus, even though in the Leviathan the will becomes the Sovereign’s, prior to covenant man is understood to possess a will. For without it, he would not be able to transfer his right “in a voluntary act of his own” (p. 191). Furthermore, Hobbes’s understanding of obligation is rooted in an understanding that men share not only fear of death, but also that under the law of nature they “ought to endeavour Peace” (p. 190). It is not enough for man to endeavor it, since he must also be of one mind that the only way to achieve it is by agreeing to the contract. In the event that he is not of one mind to lay down his right, he will perpetuate the conditions of war. Man’s agreeing to covenant marks, as far as any each man is concerned, a final act of his deliberation with his passions, his will. In other words, in the Leviathan man does not only fear death, and does not only endeavor peace, he also wills himself into obedience to a greater authority. Thus, by an act of will away from fear of death, and tempered from pride, man agrees to covenant, “comes out of it [Nature]” (p. 188) and gains security for as long as the Leviathan endures. In the end, both St. Augustine and Hobbes share an understanding that man has a will that is innate and which allows him to will himself into obedience to a greater power be that earthly or eternal.

By means of recapitulation, any man who joins the Leviathan undergoes a process similar to St. Augustine’s process of conversion. More specifically, Hobbes expects every man to understand himself and the world as sufficiently hostile to desire to improve his condition. He also expects his ‘hypothetical’ man to deliberate with his passions until he understands that fear of death is his greatest passion. Finally, he also expects man not to be proud and to will himself to obedience (p. 228, 252). Thus,
despite Hobbes’s modern political outlook, his understanding of man remains closer to the medieval view that typified the Europe of his day.

**Conclusion**

Hobbes’s medieval understanding of man should not generate amazement. He did, after all, belong to a tradition characterized by a clear understanding of duty and obligation. The Civil War that threatened this tradition probably reinforced for Hobbes the importance of preserving at least part of this tradition by adapting it to new historical circumstances and political demands as van Mill for example argued. Nevertheless, despite the many similarities described above, between St. Augustine and the 'theoretical man' that agrees to the Leviathan, once the Leviathan is enacted, these similarities begin to fade in the background. And, as these medieval elements fade in the background, what branches out from the completed *Leviathan* are the elements that form the fabric of modern liberalism amongst which most recognizable are: state of nature, social contract, rights, and liberties.

Yet, the similarities with St. Augustine's path to conversion show that Hobbes is not entirely removed from a medieval understanding of man either. They show that Hobbes adopted an understanding of man as a being in need of redemption that fears death most acutely, whose will can be tempered from pride, and who can will himself into obedience. And, this understanding of man forms the foundation for the indestructible Leviathan and, by ramification, for liberalism in general.

Yet, because the *Leviathan* is built on a pre-modern understanding of man, and because it comes to overpower its medieval heritage only upon completion, it means that further scholarship on Hobbes that focuses at the level of the individual is likely to reveal more medieval elements in Hobbes's thought. Analogously, scholarship that focuses at the level of the completed *Leviathan* is more likely to reveal more modern elements in the *Leviathan*. In the end, as the *Leviathan* remains poised for modernity,
the men comprising the Leviathan testify for the medieval tradition present at the time of its naissance.

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