Efeitos do lobbying corporativo na remuneração do diretor executivo e no desempenho empresarial

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2022.186880

Palavras-chave:

Lobbying corporativo, Remuneração do Chief Executive Officer, Desempenho empresarial, Teoria da Agência, Teoria da Regulação Econômica

Resumo

Consoante preconiza a Teoria da Regulação Econômica, o lobbying corporativo é considerado um investimento produtivo para as empresas que procuram influenciar a legislação e as políticas públicas. A atividade política corporativa pode gerar benefícios para a organização, porém, na presença de conflitos de agência, essa vantagem é muitas vezes neutralizada pelos custos de agência suportados pelos acionistas. Por vezes, a remuneração excessiva é oferecida pelo principal em troca do compromisso do agente para com a criação de riqueza dos acionistas. Neste estudo, avalia-se a associação entre o lobbying corporativo, a remuneração do Chief Executive Officer e o desempenho empresarial, em 238 empresas com ações negociadas na New York Stock Exchange, abrangendo o quadriênio 2014-2017. As análises de regressão revelam que o lobbying corporativo está positivamente associado à remuneração do Chief Executive Officer e negativamente associado ao desempenho corporativo, sugerindo a ocorrência de custos de agência resultantes daquela prática. Segundo a amostra do estudo, em tais cenários, o lobbying corporativo não melhora o desempenho nem gera benefícios para os acionistas, mas serve como ferramenta pessoal e política para a autopromoção do gestor.

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Publicado

2022-03-28

Como Citar

Maia, A. J. R., Góis, A. D., Luca, M. M. M. de, & Lima, G. A. S. F. . (2022). Efeitos do lobbying corporativo na remuneração do diretor executivo e no desempenho empresarial. Revista De Contabilidade E Organizações, 16, e186880. https://doi.org/10.11606/issn.1982-6486.rco.2022.186880

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