

TV plays with others: the framing of injustice in a television experiment *A TV brinca com o Outro: enquadramentos de injustiça no experimento televisivo*

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Abstract: This article investigates two episodes of the segment *Vai fazer o quê?*, a social television experiment shown on the Sunday show *Fantástico* (TV Globo). We performed a frame analysis to understand the different meanings on the injustice represented and staged in the show's "2013 Christmas Special" and "2016 Christmas Special." Finally, we sought to reflect on the proposal of the social television experiment in question and what it reveals about how our television and society addresses alterity. **Keywords:** moral; injustice; frame analysis.

Resumo: Este artigo apresenta uma investigação de dois episódios do quadro "Vai fazer o quê?", um experimento social televisivo apresentado no dominical *Fantástico* (TV Globo). Realizamos uma análise de enquadramento para compreender os diferentes sentidos sobre as injustiças representadas e encenadas no "Especial de Natal 2013" e "Especial de Natal 2016" do programa. Buscamos, por fim, refletir sobre a proposta do experimento social televisivo em questão e o que ele revela sobre o jeito que nossa televisão e sociedade lidam com o Outro.

Palavras-chave: moral; injustiça; enquadramento.

The 2013 manifestations marked the political and cultural life of Brazilians, of right- and left-wing groups, being an event with consequences that are still difficult to point out. Behind the diversity of the agenda of political movements in 2013 or in the following years, whether those of red or green and yellow color, some questions seem common: *what bothers us in our society?* What are our injustices and to whom attribute responsibility? What values do we uphold for our public life and what ethics do we nurture in our daily lives?

The emergence of a reality show on the leading Brazilian broadcaster seems to be linked to this context of inquiry. The show *Vai fazer o quê?* (What are you going to do about it?, in English) comes on *Fantástico* (TV Globo) a month after the June 2013 manifestation. Hosted by journalist Ernesto Paglia, the segment is a type of television "social experiment," quite similar to humorous prank shows — but without the intention of laughter. Cameras are hidden in squares, streets, bars and shopping malls, but, this time, what is at stake are the moral and ethical questions that conflict situations, staged by disguised actors, cause in these places.

These are scenes of racism, homophobia, chauvinism, symbolic and physical violence against vulnerable people; situations in which the action and moral sense of ordinary people are summoned. By acting, the oblivious subjects trigger several senses on who is right or wrong, what is the best thing to do, how to help or not. Paglia, at the end, enters the scene with cameramen and reveals the fiction of that experience lived as if it were real. The anonymous are then interviewed and talk about what they experienced there.

This article investigates two episodes of the segment, the "2013 Christmas Special" and "2016 Christmas Special."² To address this material, we used framework analysis (BATESON, 1998; GOFFMAN, 1986; MENDONÇA; SIMÕES, 2012). We sought, in these two narratives, the meanings triggered by different agents for the questions "what is happening here?", that is, *what was happening in that staged scenario*. The *framework* is built on how the individuals (and the narrative) qualify and interpret the subjects in the *interactive situation*, their positions and actions, also assigning an ethical and moral weight to each gesture exchange, to each change in interaction.

 $^{^{2}}$ This is a part of the master's thesis by the author of this article, in which other episodes of the show were also analyzed (SEPULVEDA, 2017). The choise for these two distinct years for this article is justified by the confrontation, in both episodes, of a social class antagonism, that is, facing determinate inequalities within the commemorative Christmas context and its alleged "ethical spirit."

These triggered meanings are very rich and help us understand the sociocultural context in which the show is inserted — after all, television is "soaked" in the everyday social life, which is also inspired by television (FRANÇA, 2006; SILVERSTONE, 2002). In another dimension, there is also the way the narrative itself is placed before the situation that is built, valuing certain aspects and meanings in relation to others — which reveals important information on the analyzed television media.

Daily ethics

Daily ethics are the ethical-moral values and standards that guide us during the day. Before analyzing our empiricism, it is important to define the theoretical perspective that we found to address these ethical and moral formulations, that is, values and norms.

A more didactic definition is offered to us by Habermas (1997). Norms regulate our moral conduct in the world, while values show what, in the world, is "better" or "good," worthy of appreciation. The author also points out that norms are universal formulations, generalized, that fall on the shoulder of all of us: the *right* must be *right* for all, and thus a *norm* is constituted: in a system of norms, one cannot go against the other. Values, on the other hand, are "intersubjectively shared experiences" (HABERMAS, 1997, p. 316) that define our relations with the world, but "compete" with each other; the field of values is a field of hierarchies in tension.

This conception, in turn, does not show the total complexity of our relationship as moral individuals. To do so, a question may be asked: why do we follow some norms so hard that we assume a certain character as a rule? Livet (2009) answers this question by observing the supererrogatory behaviors of individuals. These are moments when, aware of a norm or rule, we act beyond our duty: when, as the author illustrates, we are in a park where it is forbidden to litter and, in addition to our own individual responsibility, we also collect "the trash left by visitors before us, [being these other visitors] less concerned with respecting the norms of the park" (LIVET, 2009, p. 48, our translation).

This emotional reaction to norms reveals that, if I see a norm as a *rule*, if I recognize it in its importance or necessity, I am also recognizing a *value* in it— whether, in the example given, the value of cleanliness, order, or nature. According to Livet (2009), if we transgress a norm and feel *guilty* for the transgression, we realize that, for us, there is an important value that has been transgressed. This is because our

adherence to values forces us to a subjection, a self-obligation; when we go against what we believe, we go against *ourselves* as ethical-moral subjects.

After all, "in the dimension of values, we take up a position towards ourselves as well" (JOAS, 2000, p. 16). Our moral feelings — anger, guilt, shame — come when we notice a contravention of ourselves or others to what we believe, consider ideal or necessary, important or good; to what we value. We cling to our values because they are part of our understanding of *who we are in the world*; these feelings, therefore, "contain a reference to ourselves" (JOAS, 2000, p. 132).

One last aspect of our relation with values and the way we associate with them lies in the territory of *action*. According to Joas (2000), in our daily lives, we do not have total critical awareness of what we really have as our values. Often, when we justify our values, we are giving the answers we believe our interlocutors would like to hear. Other times, the justification of certain values — such as the value of *family*, *safety*, *civility*, *sacradness* — seem unthinkable (JOAS, 2000) due to the *firmness* they have; the importance of these values seem to be already "given" a priori, it is embodied in us, in our practices and in our institutions, so that justifying them does not seem appropriate or necessary.

Joas (2000) states that it is, therefore, in the field of action that our *adherence* to values will show itself. A value becomes *indeed a value* to the individual when there is no choice left but to be subjected to it; we show what we appreciate when we act according to that good. Everyday situations in which we realize that we act differently from what we supposedly believe to be "best" are not rare; we find out that we care more about certain aspects of life than about others; we devalue what is taken as socially "right" — a norm linked to some social institution — to act with what we think is "good" — another value. In fact, our actions "may be called into question with reference to declared values, just as values may be revised with reference to lived praxis" (JOAS, 2012, p. 130).

If "right" and "good" are tensions triggered by norms and values, what can we consider "just"? Aristotle considers justice as a *complete* virtue that organizes humans for an ideal of justice, both for *oneself* and for *others*. Justice is, by definition, a distributive question: "is that in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute either between himself and another or between two others [...] so as to give what is equal in accordance with proportion" (ARISTÓTELES, 2003, p. 129). Justice is a value that wants to ensure, in this way, that what is *good* is achieved by a society, community or group.

As Michal Sandel (2009) argues, there is no way to remove the conception of what we consider as *just* from the conception of what we consider, in our identities, as an *honest* life, that is, a life linked to our ideals, to our values. Justice, according to the neo-Aristotelian theorist, has a technological dimension, that is, linked to purpose: the criterion to consider something just or injust has to do with the purpose we give to the things and goods of the world. This does not imply a vision of the world without conflict: defining Telos, that is, the purpose of things, goods and institutions of the world is a task that is not obvious, but rather disputable (SANDEL, 2009). Discussions on what is just or not are, therefore, related to conceptions of a "good life" or some *desired future*, which, in turn, are linked to values and goods we perceive as fundamental.

The Other and the media

Values and norms are the forces that guide our actions - but to whom are our actions directed? At the end of the moral territory, in which we often suffer without knowing the proper way of acting, is the figure of the *different*, of the *foreigner*, of the Other. The idea of Other in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (1980) is the individual strange to a Self or Selves, strange to a I or Us-so that I and the Other "are neither all alike nor all implacably different" (SILVERSTONE, 2002, p. 11). The Other may be any individual in whom I see some asymmetry, difference or strangeness that requires me to builld a relation of alterity with them. The Other is, as pointed out by Roger Silverstone (2002), a concern - even if they have never asked or told me to be concerned. The presence of the other already puts us in a moral ground: what can I do for their sake? How to be responsible for this individual? A command is born in us, never said by anyone, that makes us moral beings before that Other; morality is what fills the ground between me and the Other. As Bauman explains, in his reading of the Levisian ethics, the Self takes "responsibility as if it was not I who took it, as if responsibility was not to take or reject, as if it was there 'already' and 'always', as if it was mine without ever being taken by me" (BAUMAN, 1996, p. 106-107).

The way we treat these Others — these "foreign" figures—ofter comes from what we know of them, their representations circulating in society and the way media represents them. In fact, "the media is currently one of the major responsibles for reflexive contact of subjects with 'others' and 'society' (MARQUES; MARTINO, 2016, p. 39, our translation). In a society whose daily life is crossed by media (FRANÇA, 2006; SILVERSTONE, 2002) — mainly by television — we are "increasingly dependent on it [the media] to define our conduct in relation to the Other, especially the *distant other*, which only makes us visible through the media (SERELLE, 2016, p. 84, our translation).

A more complete and ethical representation, therefore, is born from an appropriate distance from the Other, who "would preserve the other through difference as well as through shared identity" (SILVERSTONE, 2002, p. 14). A representation of the Other that is not violent for these individuals that are marginalized or outside the status quo must "contemplate the desire and need to be with the other, to welcome them, to respect them, to accept the challenge that the other poses through their uniqueness, their difference" (MARQUES; MARTINO, 2016, p. 42, our translation). The Other is also a moral ground challenge for the media and television: the way it is represented, shown and commented on the media space says a lot about the difficulties, prejudices and phobias existing in our society — and about the ideological apparatus behind these violent representations.

Frameworks of injustice in Vai fazer o quê?

The two episodes of *Vai fazer o quê*? analyzed here were shown in *Fastástico* editions in celebration of Christmas — one in 2013, and the other in 2016. Both try to thematize, similarly, questions on solidarity and the "Christmas spirit," which would be — or should be — present in people's conduct during that time of the year. They also address people's income inequality — and the consequent lifestyle that poor individuals lead in large Brazilian cities.

"2013 Christmas Special"

Exhibited on December 22, the television experiment takes place inside a shopping mall in Rio de Janeiro. The host Ernesto Paglia, while descending the escalators in the first part of the episode, introduces us to the problem depicted: "Christmas is very nice. It awakens in us the best feelings. It awakens solidarity, the desire to give gifts to our family, friends and even those we don't know, when we know the person is really in need." The journalist continues: "But would anyone be able to take advantage of such noble feelings? [...] If you see someone who claims to be in need trying to take toys donated to an entity [...], what would you do?"

The experiment takes place at a donation stand for the Lar Tia Lorena - a fictional entity helping children - in the corridor of a mall. In it, we have two

actors performing the following roles: the Employee of the donation point, wearing a uniform, who receives the donations from people and who will deal with the Father. This actor shows himself as a man with simple clothes, holding a plastic bag with his belongings. Although embarrassed, he is determined to ask for a donated toy to his daughter, negotiating with ordinary subjects and the Employee, claiming that he does not have money to buy a Christmas gift.

Triggered frameworks

First of all, we must ask ourselves: what does this scenario put at stake—and what does it seem to expect from its accidental participants, the ordinary subjects? This situation puts at stake a dialectic of *trust* and *distrust, negligence* and *responsibility* — a dialectic that is directed to the Other represented in that scene: the poor father, for those who believe in his supplication. "I think that, here, you're supposed to donate to those in need. I'm in need. Let me take this to my daughter for Christmas," the Father asks when the scene begins. "I've got four children at home, I'm unemployed and just wanted to give this doll to Rosa."

The real question asked by the show in this episode, even before "what are you going to do?", is "can we trust those who ask us for help?" There seems to be a guiding framework, operating at the bottom of the experiment, which is: in the world in which we live today, we act with distrust and fear of being deceived by those who ask us for help. This meaning is reinforced by excerpts of news from corrupt charities exhibited between the scenes, as well as by the participation of teacher A. M., who distrusted the intention of the actor. "The world is so unbelieving that we end up not believing in people," she tells Paglia, in an interview after the scene.

The housewife M. M. sees some truth or belief in the Father's situation, but does not seem to see much reason in the request for a donation from the stand. "Let's go to a store and we can buy a ball or a doll. She [the Employee] said we can't touch these [toys]," she says. This participation, in particular, illustrates well the two provocations that are caused by the scene and that may be translated into two questionings: 1) is it fair for this poor man to take donations left in a mall?; and 2) in addition to his request, should I do something — and what should I do — for this man?

The first question seems to have an easy answer for people, despite its difficult justification: *no, it is not fair for him to do so*. "Unfortunately, there are rules we have to follow in our lives. And I understand that you want to bring a doll to your daughter. But this is not the appropriate place to do this," says psychologist L. B. to

the Father, with care and kindness. Others are more aggressive: "You're supposed to *bring* something here, and not *take*. Please, give it back. This is a children's institution asking for help. [...]. You're not going to put your hand in any fucking thing there," says policeman L. M. when entering the middle of the conversation between Father and Employee.

Aristotelian optics (SANDEL, 2009) may help us understand the frequent position of the subjects contrary to the idea of the Father taking donations left at the mall stand. It is a question of purpose, that is, the *telos* of donations: if they were left there to benefit the children of a particular institution, it is unfair that they fall into other hands — in this case, the Father's.

The second provocation generated by the scene call participants to ask: *should I do something for this man* — *and if so, what should I do?* People's reactions to this questioning evidence what Joas (2000) points out as a creative dimension of action: it is only in the field of the moment and in the course of action that we may know, in fact, what we will do with what we have at hand. If the presence of the Other commands us to do something, to be moral, we will fill this command with the feelings on what is "good" for this Other — which comes from a socially built repertoire (BAUMAN, 1996). Most have the idea to buy a gift for the Father in one of the stores in the mall. Psychologist L. B. acts otherwise: "Don't you think this [the request for the toy] represents something else?" She holds the Father's hand and takes him to a corner of the mall to talk — without filling the need for this man's request, she believes the best for this Other is to give him attention.

Being responsible for the Other — that is, to do what is considered good for the Other — is always an uncertain terrain. The risks are pointed out by Bauman (1996): on one hand, there is the danger of never doing enough, after all, morality is measured by the behavior of the saints; "we can always do better," as Livet (2009, p. 49, our translation) states. On the other hand, there is the risk of *doing too much* — our care with the other may quickly become a violent, oppressive act. If our relation with the Other requires an appropriate distance, it is difficult, in turn, to measure it.

There is another conflict that lies latent in the narrative of the episode, which reveals a very important aspect of the Father's representation, this poor and needy Other. The expression of emotions such as *fear*, *suspicion*, *anger* before this man show this conflict: the presence of that begging and poor figure inside a mall — a space that represents a center of consumption in a capitalist society — is uncomfortable. We notice this in the speech of an interviewee who did not intervene in the scene, but sought a police officer "solve" the situation she observed; or in the distrust of the

teacher who is afraid to help; or in the explicit anger of the police officer who sees the man as, in fact, an intruder. Even if these individuals had not acted because they felt uncomfortable by the presence of that subject, what we observe in the segment *Vai fazer o quê*? seems, even if accidentally, to point us to a constructive social conflict of relations in our country.

In our country, malls, although supposedly with open access, do not seem to be made for *all* — and, rather, for certain audiences with a certain purchasing power. This "veiled" segregation may be explained by what the psychoanalyst Chirstian Dunker (2015, p. 52, our translation) calls *condominium logic* in Brazilian society, a logic that tries to "exclude what is outside its walls; therefore, deep down, there is nothing to think about the tension between this walled place and its exterior." They are walls of defense, concrete or symbolic, that groups of society build to eliminate the troublesome presence of the other. The detritus and the strange — the one who does not have the same lifestyle and economic power as me — must remain outside. For the neighborhood of the familiar, the strange has only three destinies, as Bauman states "either as an element to be fought and expelled, or as an admittedly temporary guest to be confined to special quarters and rendered harmless by strict observance of the isolating ritual, or as a neighbor-to-be [...], that is made to behave like neighbors do" (1996, p. 212). We can see in the figure of the Father an admitted Other, but feared, suspicious, strange.

"2016 Christmas Special"

The "2016 Christmas Special" was the only episode of *Vai fazer o quê?* exhibited that year, with about eight minutes. It also tries to "assess" the virtues of the "Christmas spirit" of Brazilians. The experiment, performed at the Nossa Senhora da Paz Square, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, is introduced by Paglia: "It's Christmas, and people only think about celebrating, exchanging hugs, gifts, and that feeling of solidarity is in the air. It's time to help people, those who need the most, those in need," the host says. "But most of the time, the feeling is just that. Just intention."

What is then showed is a television experiment based on a very remarcable story in Brazilian Christian culture: the Birth of Jesus Christ. Paglia explains: a couple is in a square, "the lady nine months pregnant, almost having the baby. The husband is called Joseph, she is called Mary, and the baby... well, we know this story very well, it's quite old. It's 2016 years-old."

There are two actors in this scenario: Mary, a nine-month pregnant wife and her husband, Joseph, ask passers-by for shelter. With very simple clothes, and all their belongings in hand, they tell the ordinary subjects that they had just arrived in Rio and they were waiting for a cousin who would have them —but who never came. Thus, they would need a shelter for *one night*, to avoid the risk of going into labor on the street. "Let's see now how the big city welcomes Mary, Joseph, and the boy who is to come," Paglia comments as the scene begins.

Triggered frameworks

The moral question that the scene poses to its participants is: "if Mary and Joseph lived in the world in which we live today and sought help in the city of Rio de Janeiro, would they receive any help?" Would people listen to them—and what would those who would do? There also seems to be a fundamental background question about the Brazilian's own moral identity: *is the Brazilian of the great metropolises able to hear a call for help*? That is, are they hospitable, do they care?

However, as we observed in Paglia's speech, the show itself already seems to consider that big cities are inhospitable spaces, where our feelings of solidarity do not become action — "it's just intention." The lack of attention given to the couple is one of the first observations made by Paglia's narration, who monitors the scene inside a van, observing the hidden cameras.

However, those who *listen* seem to share an affective place with that couple's story. Mary says she came to "try a better life" in Rio de Janeiro to doorman A. J., who soon offers: "I have a studio, but it's unfinished [...] It's in the community [favela], is that ok?" In an interview with Paglia, the participant tells he came from Paraíba and that, when he arrived in Rio, he was also not well received — which, according to the interviewee, would have made a great difference in his life and, therefore, "we have to help others." In another moment, the couple gets the attention of maid R., who tells that, just like him, she came from outside — from Minas Gerais. Soon, she offers help to the couple: "I can take you to my work, let her [Mary] rest a little in my bed." When the actor asks the participant if anyone from the house would find their presence bad, she replies no, "I'll talk to my boss. We're in the world to help others. I'm not doing anything wrong." When the host reveals the scene and the interview in front of the cameras, R. explains, crying: "My daughter complains because I insist on helping people on the street without knowing them. [...] With the little we have we've got to help people."

There are, in these two participations, a solidarity that seems to be born from the following understanding: *I know what you are going through and this, more than anything, motivates me to help you*. These Others, for the few participants of the episode, are not necessarily *strangers*. Mary and Joseph do not seem to be treated as *people like you* by the two ordinary subjects, but, on the contrary, they seem to be seen as *people like us*. There is a relation of community, of identification and association — the moral action seems to be linked to an "obligation of solidarity," as Sandel (2009) conceptualizes, in which we feel an immaculate responsibility to those with whom we share an identity or origin. There also seems to be an understanding of the value of *trying a better life in the big city*, which makes alterity a much more possible place between participants and actors: they share the sense that the *big city is a place of opportunities*; that is, at least, *the desire to live "here" is understandable*.

Mary and Joseph arrived in the city hoping for better financial conditions for the family they were about to form — and this is not seen with amazement by anyone. This is because *struggling* families, as named by Jessé Souza (2012), are very present in our imagination and social coexistence. The family becomes more than an affective structure, it becomes a means of social and economic survival; it begins to concentrate "the functions that, in a time before capitalism, were restricted to corporations: the production and control of productive work" (SOUZA, 2012, p. 147, our translation). The value of the *productive life* of large cities seems to be so recognized by all participants — and in our society — that it does not even seem to need to be justified.

A question that seems to reside at the bottom of this episode, in turn, lies in the very injustice represented there: the poverty that makes Mary and Joseph unequal in that urban center. A question is asked to the viewer, even if the very narrative of the *Vai fazer o quê*? is not aware of this: *how do we deal with the poor Other* — *and with the fact that people so physically close live such disparate lives*? The "turning a blind eye" of many passers-by to the condition of homelessness reveals that we treat inequality in a rather neutralized way. As pointed out by Souza, what "takes us away from 'morally superior' societies is that we exploit, accept and make a natural and everyday fact that we are living with people without any real chance of dignified life and it is not their fault" (2015, p. 245, our translation). Even the way the scene interveners address these Others reveal some naturality with the marginalized conditions in which they are — as if, deep down, lies the understanding that "things are this way, the world is like this."

However, it is difficult not to see something cathartic in the sacrifice made by those who were touched by Mary and Joseph. The maid R. offers the house of her own boss, doorman A. J. offers his studio under construction — and this responsibility seems to be less a gained, hardly supported weight, and more a moral act that is born from the construction of a real alterity with the Other — in the molds of Levinas's ethics (1980), that Other already is or is very close to be a Face that commands me. If the status quo of urbanity is spiritual individualism, as described by Simmel (2005), we have here a moral force that breaks it, a sacrifice that goes against the logic of the great urban centers; a virtue that is exalted by the show as what should constitute a "Christmas spirit."

Final remarks

Both episodes seem to build their scenarios based on the conflict between the following values: individualism — which says "I only take responsibility for what I volunteer to," or "I reject the moral command to which the presence of this Other summons me" — and solidarity — which says "I am responsible and see myself committed without having to ask myself if I am responsible or if I should commit myself."

While the Vai fazer o quê? celebrates virtuous actions, guided by the value of solidarity, it also seems to point to a moral side of our society that is what we commonly fear: that we, Brazilians, are essentially immoral individuals. There is, in the common sense, the prejudiced idea that "within Brazil, corruption is generally seen as an intrinsic characteristic of the country, as if it were endemic, an unavoidable destiny. This notion is reaffirmed by common practices — getting away with whatever you can, entering politics to misappropriate public funds — which [...] [are] a part of the Brazilian character" (SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2015, p. 504). The show, in these two episodes, seems to constantly trigger this set of meanings that configure an imaginary of the Brazilian morality — in which, often, we recognize ourselves as immoral by nature (AVRITZER et al., 2012). The program seems, therefore, to try somehow to shed light to another possibility of self-image for the public, by highlighting and celebrating the sacrifice that the ordinary subjects make for strangers in need.

While moral acting towards the Other is celebrated by this media narrative, the show often proves to be unable to thematize the very injustices that cause the marginalization and pain of this Other. It discusses the possibilities of action before that Other we see as wronged, but does not talk about, at any time, what makes this Other wronged.

If the media should be a place in which we can reflect on the singularity of the existence of marginalized individuals (MAIA; CAL, 2014; MARQUES; MARTINO, 2016), it needs to consider a criticism of the existing ideologies in the common sense that make natural certain differences, inequalities, oppressions that keep the Other in their place of strangeness before us. These ideologies, as described by Hall (2003) when resuming Althusser's thinking, are crystalized in the subjects' everyday discourses and operate without being noticed by them. They offer representations that regulate and maintain certain social relations of power and a social order — such as meritocracy, which erases the systemic dimension of class inequality and places disparity on self-merit issues (SOUZA, 2015).

Perhaps the most revealing of *Vai fazer o quê?* is that it, in addition to the attempt to be a television laboratory that examines the Brazilian morality, it is much more an evidence of how our television drinks from the discourses of common sense — and the very insertion of TV in everyday life and everyday life on TV. Our society has great difficulties in understanding the complexity of the roots of their daily injustices and cannot get close to the most painful dimension of the relationship between an Us and the Others. *Vai fazer o quê?* may be an opportunity to question much more than what we can and could do for the Other; considering a general picture, it leads us to the following question: what is our media doing for Us — and what does it teach, also, can it teach us about our difficult relation with the Other?

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