Can we get rid of mental representation models in cognitive science?

Autores

  • Melina Gastelum Vargas Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/S1678-31662016000100006

Palavras-chave:

Mental representation. Action oriented representations. Affordances. Intentionality. Enactivism. Situated cognition

Resumo

In this article I pretend to give an account of the models that have been used to understand the term mental representation from different approaches that have shown in philosophy of mind, focussing and defending a stand in which we can get rid of the “classical” characteristics of representation and we can take some of them from an enactivista and situated perspective. For that I will briefly present a description of the classical postures to then concentrate in detail in the way to defend a kind of representation from an enactivista and situated account. With this I will characterize the kind of representation that is necessary for perceptual phenomena, and specially I will give examples or temporality perception along the work

Biografia do Autor

Melina Gastelum Vargas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Publicado

2016-06-06

Como Citar

Vargas, M. G. (2016). Can we get rid of mental representation models in cognitive science?. Scientiae Studia, 14(1), 95-122. https://doi.org/10.11606/S1678-31662016000100006

Edição

Seção

Artigos