A sentimental model for epistemic arrogance

Autores

  • Ximena González-Grandón Instituto de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Complejidad

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.11606/S1678-31662016000100007

Palavras-chave:

Feeling of knowledge. Metacognition. Phenomenology. Dunning-Kruger effect. Epistemic arrogance. SIR model

Resumo

Successful interaction with environment would seem to require human agents to possess insight about deficiencies and limitations in their intellectual and social skills. However, there is a significant fraction of agents that tend to be unaware of their incompetence. Here, I will call epistemic arrogance to the condition or disturbance where some people are unaware of their incompetence, and have been empirically quantified in Dunning-Kruger effect. I will analyze that the etiology of this alteration has been proposed to come from a lack of regulation between analytic metacognition and true knowledge, that I will call “epistemic uncertainity”. I will defend a different idea, that epistemic arrogance comes from a lack of calibration between a phenomenic metacognition between a metacognitive feeling and true knowledge, that I will call “phenomenal uncertainity”. This implies that the lack in arrogants it is not metaignorance, rather the regulation between a feeling of knowledge and the feeling of uncertainity. I will argue about it and I will propose a simulation of an afected population using a SIR model, where the Dunning-Kruger effect is interpreted in a different way and its show how the recovering of this alteration it is not only depend on learning true knowledge, rather on an adequated epistemic feelings regulation

Biografia do Autor

Ximena González-Grandón, Instituto de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Complejidad

Instituto de Filosofía y Ciencias de la Complejidad, Santiago, Chile. Facultad de Medicina-UNAM, Ciudad de México

Publicado

2016-06-06

Como Citar

González-Grandón, X. (2016). A sentimental model for epistemic arrogance. Scientiae Studia, 14(1), 123-150. https://doi.org/10.11606/S1678-31662016000100007

Edição

Seção

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