A economia dos custos de transação e a reforma na indústria de energia elétrica do Brasil
Palavras-chave:
custo de transação, contratos, governança, eletricidadeResumo
Esfe trabalho é uma confribuição para o estudo da reforma que está em curso na
indústria de energia eletrica do Brasil. A economia dos custos de transação e o referencial teórico utilizado para explicar as mudanças na estrutura de governança
vigente e para avaliar as possíveis efeifos da nova governança no desempenho da
indústria. Conclui-se que apesar dos mecanismos de incentivo à competição, como a
desverticalização, as restrições, as participações cruzadas (crossonwerships) e os limites
de auto-suprimento (self-dealing), a especificidade dos ativos envolvidos, a volatilidade
dos cusfos marginals de curto prazo, a necessidade de coordenação central e as
exigências de incentivos à expansão da capacidade instalada induzirão a indústria a
uma governançaa híbrida, abrangendo a competição e cooperação, mais esta do que aquela.
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Copyright (c) 1999 Edvaldo Alves de Santana, Carlos Augusto C.N.V. de Oliveira
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