Informal contracting between and within firms

  • Ricard Gil Johns Hopkins Carey Business School
  • Giorgio Zanarone Colegio Universitario Estudios Financieros
Keywords: Informal contracts, Enforcement, Empirical evidence, Testability

Abstract

While informal contracts are widely used in modern economies, limited systematic empirical evidence is available to researchers and policy makers. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing a selected sample of empirical works through the lens of a theoretical framework that clarifies the role of informal contracts. We also highlight unexplored research opportunities offered by more recent theoretical models that investigate how informal contracts are built over time, how they are subject to path dependency, and how relational rents are created, and are awaiting empirical analysis.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
Published
2017-12-01
How to Cite
Gil, R., & Zanarone, G. (2017). Informal contracting between and within firms. Revista De Administração, 52(4), 492-496. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rausp.2017.08.009
Section
Technology Management