Diferenciais de utilização do cuidado de saúde no sistema suplementar brasileiro
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0101-41612009000100001Keywords:
moral hazard, health system, demand for health servicesAbstract
This paper investigates the existence of differentials of healthcare utilization between private and non private insured individuals using a counter-factual analysis. We estimate healthcare utilization for 1998 and 2003. Two variables of healthcare utilization have been selected: medical visits and the number of inpatient days. The main findings suggest a positive differential of utilization for private insured individuals. The magnitude of these differentials varies across types of medical care. Considering medical visits we found that each individual in the private sector uses 25% more services than if they only have access to healthcare services through public sector and for inpatient days this percentage is lower, around 10%.We use three different procedures to deal with the endogeneity of private insurance decision. Our findings are very robust and in accordance with international empirical evidence.Downloads
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Copyright (c) 2009 Monica Viegas Andrade, Ana Carolina Maia
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